Results for “Mitigation Architecture” — Page 18

NASA NTRS2010

Testing for the J-2X Upper Stage Engine

NASA selected the J-2X Upper Stage Engine in 2006 to power the upper stages of the Ares I crew launch vehicle and the Ares V cargo launch vehicle. Based on the proven Saturn J-2 engine, this new engine will provide 294,000 pounds of thrust and a specific impulse of 448 seconds, making it the most efficient gas generator cycle engine in history. The engine's guiding philosophy emerged from the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) in 2005. Goals established then called for vehicles and components based, where feasible, on proven hardware from the Space Shuttle, commercial, and other programs, to perform the mission and provide an order of magnitude greater safety. Since that time, the team has made unprecedented progress. Ahead of the other elements of the Constellation Program architecture, the team has progressed through System Requirements Review (SRR), System Design Review (SDR), Preliminary Design Review (PDR), and Critical Design Review (CDR). As of February 2010, more than 100,000 development engine parts have been ordered and more than 18,000 delivered. Approximately 1,300 of more than 1,600 engine drawings were released for manufacturing. A major factor in the J-2X development approach to this point is testing operations of heritage J-2 engine hardware and new J-2X components to understand heritage performance, validate computer modeling of development components, mitigate risk early in development, and inform design trades. This testing has been performed both by NASA and its J-2X prime contractor, Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne (PWR). This body of work increases the likelihood of success as the team prepares for testing the J-2X powerpack and first development engine in calendar 2011. This paper will provide highlights of J-2X testing operations, engine test facilities, development hardware, and plans.

Buzzell, James C.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Using AI/ML to Address Satellite Cloud Remote Sensing Challenges

Various AI/ML tools, employed within the Clouds and the Earth's Radiant Energy System (CERES) Satellite Cloud and Radiation Property retrieval System (SatCORPS) project, are being used to mitigate satellite radiance artifacts and thereby yield more accurate cloud and radiation data products. Neural network and K-nearest neighbor approaches have been developed that enable us to better address common passive satellite remote sensing challenges, such as corrupted imagery, day/night cloud property discontinuities, solar terminator artifacts, inadequate knowledge of the land surface emission temperature (i.e., skin temperature), and poor assumptions about vertical cloud structure, that have otherwise proven difficult to solve using more conventional methods. Fixing these problems promotes a more consistent Earth radiation budget record. These efforts demonstrate effective use of AI/ML architecture to exploit complex, multivariate predictor relationships and produce usable output at satellite spatial and temporal resolutions that would otherwise be ignored or have large biases.

Benjamin Scarino↗

NASA NTRS2014

Conceptual Launch Vehicle and Spacecraft Design for Risk Assessment

One of the most challenging aspects of developing human space launch and exploration systems is minimizing and mitigating the many potential risk factors to ensure the safest possible design while also meeting the required cost, weight, and performance criteria. In order to accomplish this, effective risk analyses and trade studies are needed to identify key risk drivers, dependencies, and sensitivities as the design evolves. The Engineering Risk Assessment (ERA) team at NASA Ames Research Center (ARC) develops advanced risk analysis approaches, models, and tools to provide such meaningful risk and reliability data throughout vehicle development. The goal of the project presented in this memorandum is to design a generic launch 7 vehicle and spacecraft architecture that can be used to develop and demonstrate these new risk analysis techniques without relying on other proprietary or sensitive vehicle designs. To accomplish this, initial spacecraft and launch vehicle (LV) designs were established using historical sizing relationships for a mission delivering four crewmembers and equipment to the International Space Station (ISS). Mass-estimating relationships (MERs) were used to size the crew capsule and launch vehicle, and a combination of optimization techniques and iterative design processes were employed to determine a possible two-stage-to-orbit (TSTO) launch trajectory into a 350-kilometer orbit. Primary subsystems were also designed for the crewed capsule architecture, based on a 24-hour on-orbit mission with a 7-day contingency. Safety analysis was also performed to identify major risks to crew survivability and assess the system's overall reliability. These procedures and analyses validate that the architecture's basic design and performance are reasonable to be used for risk trade studies. While the vehicle designs presented are not intended to represent a viable architecture, they will provide a valuable initial platform for developing and demonstrating innovative risk assessment capabilities.

Launch Vehicle↗

NASA NTRS2022

PAAV Concept Document

The Pathfinding for Airspace with Autonomous Vehicles (PAAV) Concept Document, version 1.0, lays out the key challenges and potential solutions for the use of uncrewed aircraft (UA) technology for future regional air cargo operations. The challenges and solutions described in this document were informed by communications with the UA industry community (e.g., RTCA, the Federal Aviation Administration, and regional air cargo business operators), as well as the PAAV team’s research activities during the last two years including four tabletop exercises, a human-in-the-loop simulation study, a numerical simulation study, a functional allocation study, and flight data analysis (Appendix A). This document first describes the expected operational context of PAAV (Section 2), such as the flight mission, baseline UAS components, nominal operations, m:N operations (i.e., "m" remote pilots per "N" aircraft), and off-nominal operations. This context sets the scope for the PAAV concept development work. PAAV concept development assumes that UA operations will be increasingly autonomous. Thus, near- and far-term assumptions are defined (Section 3). PAAV identified seven key challenges for UA operations (Section 4): - Flight route planning - Separation and flow management - Traffic pattern integration - Contingency management - Taxi, takeoff, and landing - m:N operations - Communications operations The following 13 potential solutions to these challenges are then described (Section 5): - Scalable communications architecture - Data link - Designated UAS corridors - Crew planning for m:N operations - Flight route optimization - Traffic load-level control - Trajectory solutions with data link - Automated hazard avoidance for m:N operations - Traffic pattern integration (TPI) tool - Standard lost command and control (C2) link (LC2L) procedures - Automated hazard avoidance under LC2L - Auto-taxi, auto-takeoff, and auto-land - Ground control station (GCS) user interface for m:N operations The document attempts to link each of these solutions to one or more of the challenge areas. Novel solutions involving numerous automation technologies are needed to mitigate traffic and airspace management challenges, especially for realizing m:N operations and ensuring safety under LC2L conditions. The purpose of this document is to help understand alternatives and tradeoffs among potential solutions and provide a foundation for a cohesive PAAV concept that will be described and refined in subsequent concept versions.

Unmanned aircraft, uncrewed aircraft, regional air↗

NASA NTRS2018

Commercial Off-The-Shelf GPU Qualification for Space Applications

With increased sensor data rates, and limited downlink capability, NASA missions have increased demands for onboard processing for applications ranging from synthetic aperture radar (SAR) data reduction to hyperspectral image processing and recognition, and even artificial intelligence (AI). Graphics Processor Units (GPUs) offer an attractive processing architecture for many of the applications due to their massive parallelism. As no radiation hardened GPU devices currently exist, any near term GPU-based onboard processors must use commercially available devices. To address this need NASA GSFC is collaborating with Cubic Aerospace Incorporated to, (a) characterize the capability of GPUs to meet the demands of a candidate onboard processing application, thereby demonstrating their ability to improve mission performance, reduce spacecraft SWaP, and potentially enable new missions, and (b) evaluate the radiation tolerance of capable COTS GPU devices to determine their suitability for spaceflight applications and understand any mitigations that are needed. A candidate onboard processing image has been prototyped and evaluated on a commercial GPU board and has demonstrated significantly increased processing throughput. Radiation tests for commercial GPU devices are planned for early fiscal year 2019.

Onboard processing↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance Integration - the Future of Safe Deep Space Human Exploration

As a foundational element of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Artemis Campaign, the Gateway is an incrementally built cislunar spacecraft that will serve as a platform for deep space human exploration, science, and technology demonstration. The Gateway will be a unifying catalyst for international partners around the world to establish sustained deep space scientific investigations, lunar surface access, and missions to Mars. As human exploration moves farther away from Earth, spacecraft designs must prioritize and optimize mass and volume allocations, while minimizing human and spacecraft risk. To accomplish this objective, the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance functions develop, implement, and ensure compliance with requirements, in concert with the accurate characterization and transparent communication of residual hazard risks, for integrated safety, reliability and maintainability and quality assurance. Safety and Mission Assurance was a key contributor during Gateway program pre-formulation and formulation activities where safety and reliability analysis was embedded in the Gateway Systems Engineering and Integration team. During these early program stages, a preliminary Gateway Integrated Hazard Analysis and Preliminary Gateway Probabilistic Risk Assessment assisted in Gateway architectural and operational definition as part of a risk-informed design process. As the deep space architecture has matured, the integrated Safety and Mission Assurance analyses have matured, new safety review processes have been developed, and requirements have been refined to ensure compliance with integrated safety and mission assurance objectives. The Gateway Program is currently concluding the preliminary design review informed milestone, where the primary objectives included: - Ensured completeness and consistency of the preliminary design, including the meeting of all requirements within appropriate margins and acceptable risk posture. - Identification of any major issues moving forward to the Critical Design phase. At this milestone, Safety and Mission Assurance provided numerous products, including Gateway Top Risks and Risk Mitigation Plans, updated integrated hazard analyses, updated probabilistic risk assessment, Crew Survival Analysis Report, and updated Safety and Mission Assurance Requirements and Plans. These products provide a many-faceted perspective on the inherent risk and available mitigations involved in flying the current proposed vehicle design and anticipated stack configurations. In addition, Safety and Mission Assurance identified top technical, process and workforce concerns to be addressed as the program progresses toward the critical design phase. This paper will detail the evolution of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance integration functions, provide its current status and lessons learned for future human spaceflight programs. Throughout this paper the key tenets of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance will be discussed: - Application of a risk-informed approach to identify and mitigate areas of highest risk. - Leverage of valuable processes and lessons learned from earlier spaceflight programs. - Development of Safety and Mission Assurance products to inform design risk trades. - Utilization of common Safety and Mission Assurance practices to identify safety risks for multiple perspectives: top-down, bottom-up, and across lines of integration. - Approval of safety hazards at the appropriate level of authority, keeping most deliberation closest to design expertise and elevating risks of greatest concern for program-level consideration. - Championing of Safety and Mission Assurance processes and forums to foster a pervasive safety culture that is transparent, inclusive, and collaborative between all partners. These tenets have allowed the Gateway Safety and Mission Assurance function to play a key role in optimized vehicle design evolution, and early identification and mitigation of Gateway program and Artemis mission risk.

Helen Vaccaro↗

NASA NTRS2024

Evaluating Liftoff Debris for NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Prior to the Artemis I Launch

The SLS Artemis I launch vehicle is the first of several planned Artemis launch vehicles, with a number of design differences from earlier NASA missions that incur liftoff debris risk to the mission. As a test vehicle, the Artemis I hardware also endured environments and tests not planned for future missions, which led to several additional factors contributing to an evolving liftoff debris risk to the SLS vehicle. This paper will summarize these risk factors and address the processes used to evaluate and communicate the risks to support a successful Artemis I launch. It will discuss how the evolving risks that were quantified and evaluated by a Cross-Program team of debris Subject Matter Experts to mitigate liftoff debris hazards and communicate updated risk to the SLS vehicle. This process was performed through the inaugural use of an SLS debris day-of-launch (DOL) standard operating procedure that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions. This paper addresses the risk of liftoff debris, debris released by the vehicle or from the launch pad during liftoff through vehicle tower clear. Expected liftoff debris is well understood from previous NASA programs’ experience and from tests of materials, processes and functions that are known to release liftoff debris. These expected sources were assessed and cleared well ahead of launch day. However, given the ever-changing schedules and environments, processes were in place to evaluate any additional potential liftoff debris risks identified during launch countdown. Although many of the Artemis vehicle hardware components are similar to those on the NASA Shuttle Program, there are important differences in the architecture of the Artemis I vehicle which require new assessments of liftoff debris risk for the Artemis missions. The more favorable Artemis crew module location and surfaces are far less vulnerable to debris impacts; however, the longer vehicle can result in higher liftoff debris impact energies to those components on the aft end of the vehicle. Additionally, the positional change of the RS-25 liquid engines to nearer the Booster nozzle exit plane along with the change in Booster throat plug design is a disadvantage to the overall liftoff debris risk which resulted in additional test and analysis efforts for evaluating the integrated vehicle debris risk. In spite of the comprehensive tests and analyses of Artemis I expected liftoff debris, a number of additional tests/processes were completed prior to the Artemis I mission that were required to support a complete understanding of a new launch vehicle, but increased the risk of releasing liftoff debris. The hardware endured several additional cryogenic loading cycles, including the Green Run tests at Stennis Space Center, Wet Dress Rehearsals at Kennedy Space Center, and multiple launch attempts. Each of these cycles induced stresses in the thermal protection system (TPS) materials, increasing the risk of damage to and release of the TPS. Additionally, induced and weather environmental factors that could increase the likelihood of debris release were significant. Vibrations and stresses in the TPS were induced by a required roll-back to the Vehicle Assembly Building before Hurricane Ian to protect the vehicle from damage by high winds. Wind damage and potential internal stresses to several outer mold line materials on the integrated SLS vehicle and mobile launcher were caused by weathering Hurricane Nicole at Pad 39B the week before launch. A thorough imagery scan of the vehicle was performed after each event and the damage observed was repaired, removed, or assessed and the risk to the mission evaluated. Mitigation of debris risk can occur by tests and analyses to show debris impacted components as damage tolerant, by new/improved processes for prevention of debris availability, or redesign. Risk mitigation processes for Artemis I-specific liftoff debris events and the development and use of the SLS debris day of launch (DOL) procedures that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions will be described.

Space Launch System↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evaluating Liftoff Debris for NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Prior to the Artemis I Launch

The SLS Artemis I launch vehicle is the first of several planned Artemis launch vehicles, with a number of design differences from earlier NASA missions that incur liftoff debris risk to the mission. As a test vehicle, the Artemis I hardware also endured environments and tests not planned for future missions, which led to several additional factors contributing to an evolving liftoff debris risk to the SLS vehicle. This paper will summarize these risk factors and address the processes used to evaluate and communicate the risks to support a successful Artemis I launch. It will discuss how the evolving risks that were quantified and evaluated by a Cross-Program team of debris Subject Matter Experts to mitigate liftoff debris hazards and communicate updated risk to the SLS vehicle. This process was performed through the inaugural use of an SLS debris day-of-launch (DOL) standard operating procedure that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions. This paper addresses the risk of liftoff debris, debris released by the vehicle or from the launch pad during liftoff through vehicle tower clear. Expected liftoff debris is well understood from previous NASA programs’ experience and from tests of materials, processes and functions that are known to release liftoff debris. These expected sources were assessed and cleared well ahead of launch day. However, given the ever-changing schedules and environments, processes were in place to evaluate any additional potential liftoff debris risks identified during launch countdown. Although many of the Artemis vehicle hardware components are similar to those on the NASA Shuttle Program, there are important differences in the architecture of the Artemis I vehicle which require new assessments of liftoff debris risk for the Artemis missions. The more favorable Artemis crew module location and surfaces are far less vulnerable to debris impacts; however, the longer vehicle can result in higher liftoff debris impact energies to those components on the aft end of the vehicle. Additionally, the positional change of the RS-25 liquid engines to nearer the Booster nozzle exit plane along with the change in Booster throat plug design is a disadvantage to the overall liftoff debris risk which resulted in additional test and analysis efforts for evaluating the integrated vehicle debris risk. In spite of the comprehensive tests and analyses of Artemis I expected liftoff debris, a number of additional tests/processes were completed prior to the Artemis I mission that were required to support a complete understanding of a new launch vehicle, but increased the risk of releasing liftoff debris. The hardware endured several additional cryogenic loading cycles, including the Green Run tests at Stennis Space Center, Wet Dress Rehearsals at Kennedy Space Center, and multiple launch attempts. Each of these cycles induced stresses in the thermal protection system (TPS) materials, increasing the risk of damage to and release of the TPS. Additionally, induced and weather environmental factors that could increase the likelihood of debris release were significant. Vibrations and stresses in the TPS were induced by a required roll-back to the Vehicle Assembly Building before Hurricane Ian to protect the vehicle from damage by high winds. Wind damage and potential internal stresses to several outer mold line materials on the integrated SLS vehicle and mobile launcher were caused by weathering Hurricane Nicole at Pad 39B the week before launch. A thorough imagery scan of the vehicle was performed after each event and the damage observed was repaired, removed, or assessed and the risk to the mission evaluated. Mitigation of debris risk can occur by tests and analyses to show debris impacted components as damage tolerant, by new/improved processes for prevention of debris availability, or redesign. Risk mitigation processes for Artemis I-specific liftoff debris events and the development and use of the SLS debris day of launch (DOL) procedures that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions will be described.

Space Launch System↗

NASA NTRS2007

ISHM Anomaly Lexicon for Rocket Test

Integrated Systems Health Management (ISHM) is a comprehensive capability. An ISHM system must detect anomalies, identify causes of such anomalies, predict future anomalies, help identify consequences of anomalies for example, suggested mitigation steps. The system should also provide users with appropriate navigation tools to facilitate the flow of information into and out of the ISHM system. Central to the ability of the ISHM to detect anomalies is a clearly defined catalog of anomalies. Further, this lexicon of anomalies must be organized in ways that make it accessible to a suite of tools used to manage the data, information and knowledge (DIaK) associated with a system. In particular, it is critical to ensure that there is optimal mapping between target anomalies and the algorithms associated with their detection. During the early development of our ISHM architecture and approach, it became clear that a lexicon of anomalies would be important to the development of critical anomaly detection algorithms. In our work in the rocket engine test environment at John C. Stennis Space Center, we have access to a repository of discrepancy reports (DRs) that are generated in response to squawks identified during post-test data analysis. The DR is the tool used to document anomalies and the methods used to resolve the issue. These DRs have been generated for many different tests and for all test stands. The result is that they represent a comprehensive summary of the anomalies associated with rocket engine testing. Fig. 1 illustrates some of the data that can be extracted from a DR. Such information includes affected transducer channels, narrative description of the observed anomaly, and the steps used to correct the problem. The primary goal of the anomaly lexicon development efforts we have undertaken is to create a lexicon that could be used in support of an associated health assessment database system (HADS) co-development effort. There are a number of significant byproducts of the anomaly lexicon compilation effort. For example, (1) Allows determination of the frequency distribution of anomalies to help identify those with the potential for high return on investment if included in automated detection as part of an ISHM system, (2) Availability of a regular lexicon could provide the base anomaly name choices to help maintain consistency in the DR collection process, and (3) Although developed for the rocket engine test environment, most of the anomalies are not specific to rocket testing, and thus can be reused in other applications.

Schmalzel, John L.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Joint Radioisotope Electric Propulsion Studies - Neptune System Explorer

The Neptune System Explorer (NSE) mission concept study assessed opportunities to conduct Cassini-like science at Neptune with a radioisotope electric propulsion (REP) based spacecraft. REP is based on powering an electric propulsion (EP) engine with a radioisotope power source (RPS). The NSE study was commissioned under the Joint Radioisotope Electric Propulsion Studies (JREPS) project, which sought to determine the technical feasibility of flagship class REP applications. Within JREPS, special emphasis was given toward identifying tall technology tent poles, as well as recommending any new RPS technology developments that would be required for complicated REP missions. Based on the goals of JREPS, multiple RPS (e.g. thermoelectric and Stirling based RPS) and EP (e.g. Hall and ion engines) technology combinations were traded during the NSE study to determine the most favorable REP design architecture. Among the findings from the study was the need for >400We RPS systems, which was driven by EP operating powers and the requirement for a long-lived mission in the deep solar system. Additionally multiple development and implementation risks were identified for the NSE concept, as well as REP missions in general. Among the strengths of the NSE mission would be the benefits associated with RPS and EP use, such as long-term power (approx. 2-3kW) at Neptune and flexible trajectory options for achieving orbit or tours of the Neptune system. Although there are still multiple issues to mitigate, the NSE concept demonstrated distinct advantages associated with using REP for deep space flagship-class missions.

radioisotope power source (RPS)↗

NASA NTRS2023

How Dark the Sky: The JWST Backgrounds

We describe the sources of stray light and thermal background that affect JWST observations; report actual backgrounds as measured from commissioning and early science observations; compare those background levels to pre-launch predictions; estimate the impact of the backgrounds on science performance; and explore how the backgrounds probe the achieved configuration of the deployed observatory. We find the observatory is limited by the irreducible astrophysical backgrounds, rather than scattered stray light and thermal self-emission, for all wavelengths λ<12.5 micron, thus meeting the level 1 requirement. This result was not assured given the open architecture and thermal challenges of JWST, and is the result of meticulous attention to stray light and thermal issues in the design, construction, integration, and test phases. From background considerations alone, JWST will require less integration time in the near-infrared compared to a system that just met the stray light requirements; as such, JWST will be even more powerful than expected for deep imaging at 1--5 micron. In the mid-infrared, the measured thermal backgrounds closely match pre-launch predictions. The background near 10 micron is slightly higher than predicted before launch, but the impact on observations is mitigated by the excellent throughput of MIRI, such that instrument sensitivity will be as good as expected pre-launch. These measured background levels are fully compatible with JWST's science goals and the Cycle 1 science program currently underway.

Astronomical instrumentation↗

NASA NTRS1999

SRAM Based Re-programmable FPGA for Space Applications

An SRAM (static random access memory)-based reprogrammable FPGA (field programmable gate array) is investigated for space applications. A new commercial prototype, named the RS family, was used as an example for the investigation. The device is fabricated in a 0.25 micrometers CMOS technology. Its architecture is reviewed to provide a better understanding of the impact of single event upset (SEU) on the device during operation. The SEU effect of different memories available on the device is evaluated. Heavy ion test data and SPICE simulations are used integrally to extract the threshold LET (linear energy transfer). Together with the saturation cross-section measurement from the layout, a rate prediction is done on each memory type. The SEU in the configuration SRAM is identified as the dominant failure mode and is discussed in detail. The single event transient error in combinational logic is also investigated and simulated by SPICE. SEU mitigation by hardening the memories and employing EDAC (error detection and correction) at the device level are presented. For the configuration SRAM (CSRAM) cell, the trade-off between resistor de-coupling and redundancy hardening techniques are investigated with interesting results. Preliminary heavy ion test data show no sign of SEL (single event latch-up). With regard to ionizing radiation effects, the increase in static leakage current (static I(sub CC)) measured indicates a device tolerance of approximately 50krad(Si).

Wang, J. J.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Flammability of Materials on the Moon

Some materials have recently been found to exhibit increased flammability in Lunar gravity. The reduced buoyancy driven flow on the Moon may present a goldilocks region of decreased convective cooling, while still supplying adequate oxidizer to the flame zone. Combined with the desired elevated oxygen habitat of exploration architectures and the difficulty of rescue, the combination could present increased risk to crew. Flammability of Materials on the Moon will be delivered to the Lunar surface on an HLS lander, and will burn four samples; SIBAL fabric will be exposed to normal air while the PMMA rods will be exposed to the normoxic Space Exploration Atmospheres (SEA) with elevated oxygen in a small atmospheric chamber. Each fuel will have two tests each, one burning upward and one burning downward. The results of flame size, spread rate, atmosphere changes, and extinction oxygen concentration will then be analyzed and used to help quantify the risk and mitigation for future exploration missions.

flammability↗

NASA NTRS2010

Portable Health Algorithms Test System

A document discusses the Portable Health Algorithms Test (PHALT) System, which has been designed as a means for evolving the maturity and credibility of algorithms developed to assess the health of aerospace systems. Comprising an integrated hardware-software environment, the PHALT system allows systems health management algorithms to be developed in a graphical programming environment, to be tested and refined using system simulation or test data playback, and to be evaluated in a real-time hardware-in-the-loop mode with a live test article. The integrated hardware and software development environment provides a seamless transition from algorithm development to real-time implementation. The portability of the hardware makes it quick and easy to transport between test facilities. This hard ware/software architecture is flexible enough to support a variety of diagnostic applications and test hardware, and the GUI-based rapid prototyping capability is sufficient to support development execution, and testing of custom diagnostic algorithms. The PHALT operating system supports execution of diagnostic algorithms under real-time constraints. PHALT can perform real-time capture and playback of test rig data with the ability to augment/ modify the data stream (e.g. inject simulated faults). It performs algorithm testing using a variety of data input sources, including real-time data acquisition, test data playback, and system simulations, and also provides system feedback to evaluate closed-loop diagnostic response and mitigation control.

Melcher, Kevin J.↗

NASA NTRS2024

NASA’s Top Human System Research and Technology Needs for Mars

NASA is working with industry and international partners to return humans to the Moon and to eventually enable humans to explore Mars. Within NASA, several organizations work together to identify, prioritize, fund, execute, and operationalize the research and technology development (R&TD) that will be necessary to enable crew health and performance (CHP) during these future missions. These organizations include flight programs, the Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA), the Human Research Program, the Space Technology Mission Directorate, System Capability Leadership Teams, and other organizations, many of which existed for several years prior to the creation of the Moon-to-Mars (M2M) Program Office in 2023. A variety of constructs, vocabularies, and processes exist for managing risks and supporting strategic planning across these organizations. For example, M2M objectives, program risks, human system risks, human research gaps, capability gaps, and envisioned futures are all constructs currently used within NASA to identify and prioritize R&TD needs. These strategic planning constructs are evolving to allow M2M objectives and R&TD investments to be aligned and traced at a detailed level. A recognized need exists among stakeholder organizations to identify and communicate the highest CHP R&TD priorities in a unified and digestible way that addresses the perspectives of NASA’s CHP community. To achieve this, the HMTA arranged a series of discussions with representatives of NASA’s CHP community, during which the 8 highest priority CHP capabilities that will enable human missions to Mars, referred to as the “top human system capability needs for Mars”, were identified. The list includes Earth-independent human operations; Mars-duration food system; Mars-duration effects on human physiology; risk mitigations for vehicle atmospheres; computational injury and anthropometric models; exploration exercise countermeasures; individual variability in responses to spaceflight; and sensorimotor countermeasures. Existing tools and processes for strategic planning and risk management were evaluated, as well as the technical practicalities, cost, and schedule feasibility associated with potential R&TD investments in different capability need areas. This capability needs report is not owned by any one NASA organization and does not replace existing strategic or program planning processes; rather it aims to complement and inform them with a unified set of community generated priorities. These top capability needs will be re-evaluated periodically based on R&TD progress and the evolving M2M architecture.

technology gaps↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA’s Top Human System Research and Technology Needs for Mars

NASA is working with industry and international partners to return humans to the Moon and to eventually enable humans to explore Mars. Within NASA, several organizations work together to identify, prioritize, fund, execute, and operationalize the research and technology development (R&TD) that will be necessary to enable crew health and performance (CHP) during these future missions. These organizations include flight programs, the Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA), the Human Research Program, the Space Technology Mission Directorate, System Capability Leadership Teams, and other organizations, many of which existed for several years prior to the creation of the Moon-to-Mars (M2M) Program Office in 2023. A variety of constructs, vocabularies, and processes exist for managing risks and supporting strategic planning across these organizations. For example, M2M objectives, program risks, human system risks, human research gaps, capability gaps, and envisioned futures are all constructs currently used within NASA to identify and prioritize R&TD needs. These strategic planning constructs are evolving to allow M2M objectives and R&TD investments to be aligned and traced at a detailed level. A recognized need exists among stakeholder organizations to identify and communicate the highest CHP R&TD priorities in a unified and digestible way that addresses the perspectives of NASA’s CHP community. To achieve this, the HMTA arranged a series of discussions with representatives of NASA’s CHP community, during which the 8 highest priority CHP capabilities that will enable human missions to Mars, referred to as the “top human system capability needs for Mars”, were identified. The list includes Earth-independent human operations; Mars-duration food system; Mars-duration effects on human physiology; risk mitigations for vehicle atmospheres; computational injury and anthropometric models; exploration exercise countermeasures; individual variability in responses to spaceflight; and sensorimotor countermeasures. Existing tools and processes for strategic planning and risk management were evaluated, as well as the technical practicalities, cost, and schedule feasibility associated with potential R&TD investments in different capability need areas. This capability needs report is not owned by any one NASA organization and does not replace existing strategic or program planning processes; rather it aims to complement and inform them with a unified set of community generated priorities. These top capability needs will be re-evaluated periodically based on R&TD progress and the evolving M2M architecture.

technology gaps↗

NASA NTRS2008

Towards Intelligent Control for Next Generation Aircraft

NASA Aeronautics Subsonic Fixed Wing Project is focused on mitigating the environmental and operation impacts expected as aviation operations triple by 2025. The approach is to extend technological capabilities and explore novel civil transport configurations that reduce noise, emissions, fuel consumption and field length. Two Next Generation (NextGen) aircraft have been identified to meet the Subsonic Fixed Wing Project goals - these are the Hybrid Wing-Body (HWB) and Cruise Efficient Short Take-Off and Landing (CESTOL) aircraft. The technologies and concepts developed for these aircraft complicate the vehicle s design and operation. In this paper, flight control challenges for NextGen aircraft are described. The objective of this paper is to examine the potential of state-of-the-art control architectures and algorithms to meet the challenges and needed performance metrics for NextGen flight control. A broad range of conventional and intelligent control approaches are considered, including dynamic inversion control, integrated flight-propulsion control, control allocation, adaptive dynamic inversion control, data-based predictive control and reinforcement learning control.

Acosta, Diana Michelle↗

NASA NTRS2002

C/sic Life Prediction for Propulsion Applications

Accurate life prediction is critical to successful use of ceramic matrix composites (CMC). The tools to accomplish this are immature and not oriented toward the behavior of carbon fiber reinforced silicon carbide (C/SiC), the primary system of interest for many reusable and single mission launch vehicle propulsion and airframe applications. This paper describes an approach and process made to satisfy the need to develop an integrated life prediction system that addresses mechanical durability and environmental degradation of C/SiC. Issues such as oxidation, steam and hydrogen effects on material behavior are discussed. Preliminary tests indicate that steam will aggressively remove SiC seal coat and matrix in line with past experience. The kinetics of water vapor reaction with carbon fibers is negligible at 600 C, but comparable to air attack at 1200 C. The mitigating effect of steam observed in fiber oxidation studies has also been observed in stress rupture tests. Detailed microscopy of oxidized specimens is being carried out to develop the oxidation model. Carbon oxidation kinetics are reaction controlled at intermediate temperatures and diffusion controlled at high temperatures (approximately 1000 C). Activation energies for T-300 and interface pyrolytic carbon were determined as key inputs to the oxidation model. Crack opening as a function of temperature and stress was calculated. Mechanical property tests to develop and verify the probabilistic life model are very encouraging except for residual strength prediction. Gage width is a key variable governing edge oxidation of seal coated specimens. Future efforts will include architectural effects, enhanced coatings, biaxial tests, and LCF. Modeling will need to account for combined effects.

Levine, Stanley R.↗