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At least 325 records · Page 18

Analysis of tank 7 surface supernatant sample (FTF-7-15-26) in support of corrosion control program

This report provides the results of analyses on Savannah River Site Tank 7 surface supernatant liquid sample in support of the Corrosion Control Program (CCP). The measured nitrate, nitrite and free-hydroxide concentrations for the Tank 7 surface sample averaged, 3.74E-01 ± 1.88E-03, 4.17E-01 ± 9.01E-03 and 0.602 ± 0.005 M, respectively. The Tank 7 surface cesium-137, sodium and silicon concentrations were, respectively, 3.99E+08, ± 3.25E+06 dpm/mL, 2.78 M and <3.10 mg/L. The measured aluminum concentration in the Tank 7 surface sample averaged 0.11 M.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Spent Crystalline Silicotitanate Storage Study—Post AP-105DF Processing

A Tank-Side Cesium Removal (TSCR) system is under development by Washington River Protection Solutions to support initial production of immobilized low-activity waste (LAW) by feeding Hanford tank supernate from tank farms to the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) LAW Facility. Tank waste supernate is filtered to remove suspended solids and then Cs is removed by processing it through crystalline silicotitanate (CST) ion exchange media manufactured by Honeywell UOP, LLC. The Cs-loaded CST columns will be stored indefinitely, with a goal of eventual CST removal and treatment. Thus, the spent CST needs to be recoverable after undetermined storage time. Previous testing with AP-105 simulant showed that rinsing the CST bed with 3 bed volumes (1.4 apparatus volumes [AVs]) of 0.1 M NaOH resulted in a dried bed that maintained flow characteristics indicative of ease of recovery. This study explored the intermediate conditions (between feed dried in place and the 1.4 AVs of 0.1 M NaOH rinse) to evaluate CST bed properties.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Large Volume Airborne Contamination Monitoring To Support Nuclear Processes' Deactivation and Decommissioning

Current D and D operations at Hanford have demonstrated a flaw in the current state of the art capability of defining airborne contamination boundaries - Airborne particulate emissions of Pu-239 from CM2H operations on the Hanford Pu Finishing Plant were detected well beyond areas controlled for airborne Pu, putting numerous workers at risk for radiological assimilations - Current air samplers and CAM systems were surveying insufficient volumes of air to accurately predict where respiratory protection was required - Hanford is located in a high radon environment, making air monitoring for alpha emitting actinides challenging in high alpha radon induced backgrounds. - Inexpensive HEPA based home and industrial air purifiers filter significantly higher volumes of air than commercially available continuous-air monitoring (CAM) systems. - Inexpensive models capable of filtered air volumes exceeding 1000 times that of a CAM. - Detector system can be built to detect x-rays generated from actinide decay. - Branching ratios of x-rays are 4 orders of magnitude more intense from Plutonium decay than its gamma emissions. - Detector system can be a low resolution systems, as x-ray region of interest is not terribly congested. - Detection systems evaluated will be designed based on slabs of NaI or pixelated NaI or CsI panels. - Simple graphical user interface software will be developed to operate the detection system. - Concept is to deploy some of these air-purifying systems in nonradiological areas around SRNL to confirm radon can be rejected with confidence. - Generate some filters contaminated with plutonium via electroplated Pu or lab generated simulated particles. - then deploy units in known airborne radiological environments to establish systems ability to accurately measure actinide based hot particles Lab analyses will follow up the system analyses to ensure hot particles were correctly identified. Analysis by Scintillation: - Application of scintillation media to the surface of the filters is being explored. - Evaluating slabs of ZnS(Ag), application of powdered ZnS(Cu) and spray on Perkin Elmer Enhance. - Scintillation events would then be digitized with a digital camera and quantified. - Comparing against sensitivity of a PMT or SiPD readout. - Currently evaluating a Thorlabs 8 Megapixel Monochrome Scientific CCD Camera, hermetically sealed cooled package with a wide angle lens. - Wide angle lens allows complete view of HEPA filter from 7 inches away. - Images taken of glow in the dark paint, as well as plutonium-induced fluorescence. - Plutonium was flamed mounted on a 1 inch diameter stainless steel planchet, covered with a layer of mylar and a section of scintillating ZnS obtained from Eljon. - Currently working on reducing signal-to-noise levels to boost sensitivity. - Dark box to hold contaminated or electroplated source covered filters under fabrication. Analysis by x-ray Spectroscopy: - Branching ratios for x-ray emissions from Plutonium isotopes are orders of magnitude more intense than gamma-ray emissions. - The nuclear databases are incomplete on the branching ratios of some of the isotopes. - Evaluating some custom built SrI2 x-ray spectrometers vs a conventional windowed NaI detector. - SrI2 detectors are carbon-composite-windowed 51 mm x 51 mm. - MCNP calculations to establish self absorbance of filter media on 17 keV x-ray. Radon Rejection: - Activated charcoal pre-filter acts as a Radon trap. - Adding a time lapse feature to camera to aid in radon rejection. SRS Plutonium Fuel Form D and D Operations: Currently deploying air sampler to D and D operation of Pu-238 facility at SRS to generate some field samples to analyze.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Enhancement of NRC station blackout requirements for nuclear power plants

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) in response to Commission direction to conduct a systematic and methodical review of NRC processes and regulations to determine whether the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system and to make recommendations to the Commission for its policy direction, in light of the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant. The NTTF's review resulted in a set of recommendations that took a balanced approach to defense-in-depth as applied to low-likelihood, high-consequence events such as prolonged station blackout (SBO) resulting from severe natural phenomena. Part 50, Section 63, of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), 'Loss of All Alternating Current Power,' currently requires that each nuclear power plant must be able to cool the reactor core and maintain containment integrity for a specified duration of an SBO. The SBO duration and mitigation strategy for each nuclear power plant is site specific and is based on the robustness of the local transmission system and the transmission system operator's capability to restore offsite power to the nuclear power plant. With regard to SBO, the NTTF recommended that the NRC strengthen SBO mitigation capability at all operating and new reactors for design-basis and beyond-design-basis external events. The NTTF also recommended strengthening emergency preparedness for prolonged SBO and multi-unit events. These recommendations, taken together, are intended to clarify and strengthen US nuclear reactor safety regarding protection against and mitigation of the consequences of natural disasters and emergency preparedness during SBO. The focus of this paper is on the existing SBO requirements and NRC initiatives to strengthen SBO capability at all operating and new reactors to address prolonged SBO stemming from design-basis and beyond-design-basis external events. The NRC initiatives are intended to enhance core and spent fuel pool cooling, reactor coolant system integrity, and containment integrity. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Development of a Methodology to Assess the Impact of Non-Conventional Waste Streams Following a Radiological Incident - 18271

The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Waste Estimation Support Tool (WEST) is a Geographic Information System (GIS)-based decision support tool for estimating waste generated from remediation and cleanup activities following a radiological incident. WEST uses the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) Hazus-MH software's infrastructure information combined with image classification capabilities to estimate the quantity of waste and debris that may result from a radiological incident. WEST can be used to create customized decontamination strategies that allow end-users to evaluate different means of decontamination and how those strategies may impact the resulting waste stream in each geographical locality. This capability can potentially reduce the response/recovery time frame and cost. One of the key observations from past applications of WEST is that planning scenarios are site-specific, especially when dealing with chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) waste management issues. Furthermore, site-specific issues are not limited to resource limitations or response bottlenecks but should also account for differences in an area's geography and urban footprint, a phenomenon observed during the Fukushima response. For instance, a recent WEST case study found that the amount of waste generated per unit of affected area, for a given decontamination approach, is largely a function of the building surface area in the affected area (relative to the ground surfaces). However, differences in the geometry and density of contaminated objects in the landscape may impact the amount and characteristics of the waste stream. Although buildings typically constitute a large portion of the surface area in urban environments, other objects such as vehicles and trees can be just as prominent. For example, seasonal changes in the amount of foliage present can alter the non-structural surface area calculated for an area like New York City by 20-30%. Very little is known about the impact that these non-conventional waste streams have on overall remediation strategies, or to what extent differences in characteristics of urban versus rural environments, traffic activities, or seasonal variations may have on these factors. This paper will present the proposed methodology to incorporate into WEST the impacts that niche, nonconventional waste streams might have from rural and urban environments following a nuclear power plant incident or detonation of a radiological dispersal device or improvised nuclear device. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Criteria for Determining the Safety of Wireless Technologies at Nuclear Power Plants

This report provides an initial discussion of the potential impact to safety-related/important-to-safety (SR/ITS) systems by the possible expanded use of wireless technologies. One aspect of this discussion is focused on a review of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.180 Rev. 2 to determine whether any revisions are necessary to reflect the current state of practice in evaluating and protecting instrumentation and control (I&C) systems and components from electromagnetic interference (EMI) or radiofrequency interference (RFI) on safety and nonsafety I&C. Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) is the ability of a device or system to function satisfactorily in its electromagnetic (EM) environment, which is achieved by limiting the unintentional generation, propagation, and reception of EM energy that may cause unwanted effects such as EMI. The goal of EMC is to ensure the correct operation of different types of equipment in a common EM environment.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Annual Site Environmental Report for 2009

The purpose of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Annual Site Environmental Report for 2009 (ASER) is to provide information required by U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 231.1A, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting. Specifically, the ASER presents summary environmental data to: (1) characterize site environmental management performance; (2) summarize environmental occurrences and responses reported during the calendar year; (3) Confirm compliance with environmental standards and requirements; and (4) highlight the WIPP Environmental Management System (EMS) and significant environmental programs and accomplishments, including progress toward the DOE Environmental Sustainability Goals. The DOE Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) and the management and operating contractor (MOC), Washington TRU Solutions LLC (WTS), maintain and preserve the environmental resources at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). DOE Order 231.1A; DOE Order 450.1A, Environmental Protection Program; and DOE Order 5400.5, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment, require that the affected environment at and near DOE facilities be monitored to ensure the safety and health of the public and workers, and preservation of the environment. This report was prepared in accordance with DOE Order 231.1A, which requires that DOE facilities submit an ASER to the DOE Headquarters Chief Health, Safety, and Security Officer. The WIPP Hazardous Waste Facility Permit (HWFP) Number NM4890139088-TSDF (treatment, storage, and disposal facility) further requires that the ASER be provided to the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED).

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Summary Overview of Content Guidance For Early Site Permit Applications

The Early Site Permit (ESP) process offered under Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 52, Subpart A, was promulgated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in 1989 to address industry concerns with the former licensing process under 10 CFR Part 50. Previously, the licensing process required large expenditures of time and money by applicants well before key site specific environmental, safety, and emergency planning issues could be resolved. As envisioned, the ESP process is meant to resolve these issues well in advance of when a decision is made to build a nuclear power facility and before substantial capital is invested in the construction of a new nuclear facility. The ESP application is required to provide design information pertaining to structures, systems, and components along with site-specific parameters (such as meteorology, demographics, and hydrology) and address site safety, environmental protection, and emergency planning. Although an ESP applicant does not need to specify a particular nuclear plant design, as in construction permit applications, it does need to provide sufficient surrogate design information (developed to bound the nuclear plant design(s) that are being considered by the applicant) so that the NRC can make a determination on the acceptability of the site and the environmental impacts, and determine whether designs bounded by the surrogate design information provided by the applicant can be qualified for the proposed site.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Life support and self-sufficiency in space communities

The development of a controlled ecological life support system (CELSS) is necessary to enable the extended presence of humans in space, as on the Moon or on another planetary body. Over a long period, the provision of oxygen, water, and food, and protection from such inimical agents as radiation and temperature extremes, while maintaining the psychological health of the subjects, becomes prohibitively expensive if all supplies must be brought from Earth. Thus, some kind of a regenerative life support system within an enclosure or habitat must be established, thereby cutting the umbilicus to Mother Earth, but not irreversibly. This protective enclosure will enable the survival and growth of an assemblage of terrestrial species of microorganisms, plants, and animals. It is envisioned that the nonterrestrial ecosystem will evolve through the sequential introduction of terrestrial and local materials, together with the appropriate living forms.

Johansson, Karl R.↗

Implementation of remove monitoring in facilities under safeguards with unattended systems

Remote monitoring is being applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at nuclear facilities around the world. At the Monju Reactor in Japan we have designed, developed and implemented a remote monitoring approach that can serve as a model for applying remote monitoring to facilities that are already under full-scope safeguards using unattended instrumentation. Remote monitoring implementations have historically relied upon the use of specialized data collection hardware and system design features that integrate remote monitoring into the safeguards data collection system. The integration of remote monitoring and unattended data collection increases the complexity of safeguards data collection systems. This increase in complexity necessarily produces a corresponding reduction of system reliability compared to less-complex unattended monitoring systems. At the Monju facility we have implemented a remote monitoring system that is decoupled from the activity of safeguards data collection. In the completed system the function of remote data transfer is separated from the function of safeguards data collection. As such, a failure of the remote monitoring function cannot produce an associated loss of safeguards data, as is possible with integrated remote-monitoring implementations. Currently, all safeguards data from this facility is available to the IAEA on a 24/7 basis. This facility employs five radiation-based unattended systems, video surveillance and numerous optical seal systems. The implementation of remote monitoring at this facility, while increasing the complexity of the safeguards system, is designed to avoid any corresponding reduction in reliability of the safeguards data collection systems by having decoupled these functions. This design and implementation can serve as a model for implementation of remote monitoring at nuclear facilities that currently employ unattended safeguards systems.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Development of NUREG-0700, rev 3 - 229

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) evaluates the human factors engineering (HFE) of nuclear power plant design and operations to protect public health and safety. The HFE safety reviews encompass both the design process and its products. Detailed guidance for these reviews is provided in two key documents: the HFE Program Review Model (NUREG-0711) and the Human-System Interface Design Review Guidelines (NUREG-0700). The NRC is committed to the periodic update and improvement of the guidance to ensure that they remain state-of-the-art design evaluation tools. In this paper, we will describe the updates made to NUREG-0700 that resulted in Revision 3 of the guidance. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Network Penetration Testing and Research

This paper will focus the on research and testing done on penetrating a network for security purposes. This research will provide the IT security office new methods of attacks across and against a company's network as well as introduce them to new platforms and software that can be used to better assist with protecting against such attacks. Throughout this paper testing and research has been done on two different Linux based operating systems, for attacking and compromising a Windows based host computer. Backtrack 5 and BlackBuntu (Linux based penetration testing operating systems) are two different "attacker'' computers that will attempt to plant viruses and or NASA USRP - Internship Final Report exploits on a host Windows 7 operating system, as well as try to retrieve information from the host. On each Linux OS (Backtrack 5 and BlackBuntu) there is penetration testing software which provides the necessary tools to create exploits that can compromise a windows system as well as other operating systems. This paper will focus on two main methods of deploying exploits 1 onto a host computer in order to retrieve information from a compromised system. One method of deployment for an exploit that was tested is known as a "social engineering" exploit. This type of method requires interaction from unsuspecting user. With this user interaction, a deployed exploit may allow a malicious user to gain access to the unsuspecting user's computer as well as the network that such computer is connected to. Due to more advance security setting and antivirus protection and detection, this method is easily identified and defended against. The second method of exploit deployment is the method mainly focused upon within this paper. This method required extensive research on the best way to compromise a security enabled protected network. Once a network has been compromised, then any and all devices connected to such network has the potential to be compromised as well. With a compromised network, computers and devices can be penetrated through deployed exploits. This paper will illustrate the research done to test ability to penetrate a network without user interaction, in order to retrieve personal information from a targeted host.

Murphy, Brandon F.↗

Misuse Detection for a Generalized SFR Test Reactor

Sodium-cooled Fast Reactors (SFRs) present unique challenges for international safeguards. SFRs possess neutron physics characteristics that if configured appropriately could produce more fissile material than consumed. An adversary state may choose to build an SFR, justified by a lack of domestic natural uranium and limited access or interest to procuring uranium from international markets. Once constructed, the state may choose to misuse the SFR for the purpose of diverting fissile plutonium from declared operation. This work shows that a demonstration SFR does not need to be configured as a plutonium breeder to create one Significant Quantity (SQ) of plutonium in a short amount of time (e.g., one to few years). However, such an extreme case of misuse would change the core reactivity in such a way as to be easily indicated by deviations of control rod position compared to declared operation. In this work a contrived SFR demonstration reactor was modeled for the purpose of exploring proliferation scenarios and how such misuse could be detected using the SFR's Reactor Data Acquisition System (RDAS). Typically, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) does not have access to the control rod position, power, thermal, pressure sensing and indicating systems of nuclear power plants. However, this work shows that such data streams can be compared against a parallel detailed simulation model (a Digital Twin) to detect possible misuse.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Feasibility of critical infrastructure protection using network functions for programmable and decoupled ICS policy enforcement over WAN

Industrial control systems (ICS) represent a major component of our critical infrastructure. With the increasing need for more control and monitoring of such systems, ICS have seen an increase in connectivity to wide area networks (WAN) exposing aging equipment to rapidly evolving cybersecurity threats. Furthermore, the ICS data requires a reliability measure from the networks for critical functions for infrastructure monitoring and control. Especially when remote plant sites are involved such as pipelines, energy distribution networks, and transportation, WAN transport impairments most often provide a best effort delivery with no strict reliability guarantees. Network functions can provide a vendor agnostic, programmable critical infrastructure protection with a single maintenance, policy determination, and reliability assurance surface. A network function (NF) can be utilized for policy enforcement over the communication between remote entities and the main control office. This paper presents the research on transparent integration with existing ICS without disrupting communications, resulting in minimal downtime while decoupling the fast paced evolution of defensive security measures from the upgrade cycle of expensive long term hardware. We report our measurements on the resource requirements and overhead in the network for successful NF insertion under a wide variety of network impairments (network packet delay, reordering, and loss). Our paired NF implementation provides a policy enforcement platform extensible to cover myriad cybersecurity-related communication goals, including packet signing for verification, encryption for data privacy, packet filtering and data diode operation (i.e. protecting against eavesdropping, packet injection, and denial-of-service). Furthermore, bundling communication specifications into packet flows allows for tunability in applying policies as coarse- or fine-grained as the needs of the operator. We report on network function resource requirements in the form of required queue depth and network utilization overhead to inform the decision making against hardware cost constraints.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Predicting plant attractiveness to coccinellids with plant trait profiling, citizen science, and common garden surveys

Lady beetles are key predators in agricultural systems and their impact can be enhanced by plant resources. Facilitation of lady beetles is a potentially effective pest management strategy but a lack of data on which plant species attract and nurture them limits implementation. Here we investigate which plant species might optimize lady beetle impact by developing a profile of plant characteristics most likely to attract lady beetles and testing if the subset of “potentially preferred” plant families exhibiting those characteristics are significantly more attractive to lady beetles than other families. This testing encompassed a combination of observations submitted to a citizen science program, the Lost Ladybug Project, and two repeated site surveys. Traits reported to be most attractive to lady beetles included the presence of trichomes that provide protection from predation, nutritional resources such as nectar or prey, and visual or chemical cues associated with those traits. Significantly more lady beetles were observed on the three plant families which most often exhibit these traits, Apiaceae, Asteraceae, and Rosaceae, than on other families. Furthermore, strategies for incorporating plants from these families into production systems to attract lady beetles and limit pest damage are discussed.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Low-Activity Waste Pretreatment System Additional Engineering-Scale Integrated Test Report

Washington River Protections Solutions, LLC’s (WRPS) Low Activity Waste Pretreatment System (LAWPS) Project provides for the early production of immobilized low-activity waste (ILAW) by feeding LAW directly from Tank Farms to the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) LAW Facility, bypassing the WTP Pretreatment Facility. Prior to the transfer of feed to the WTP LAW Vitrification Facility, tank supernatant waste will be pretreated in the LAWPS to meet the WTP LAW waste acceptance criteria (WAC). Full-scale and engineering-scale testing of critical technology elements, as part of the technology maturation process, are components of the overall LAWPS Project. WRPS awarded the engineering-scale integrated testing scope to AECOM via WRPS Subcontract 58349. This report is deliverable MSR-008 of the subcontract.

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Off-line Tests of the DM1200 Thermal Catalytic Oxidation (TCO) Unit (Final Report)

The River Protection Project-Waste Treatment Plant (RPP-WTP) Low-Activity Waste (LAW) and High-Level Waste (HLW) feed streams are listed for a variety of hazardous organic compounds. The permitting basis for the WTP systems may necessitate the demonstration of minimum Destruction/Removal Efficiencies (DREs) of such species from any released emissions of up to 99.99%. Results from a previous study on the fate of hazardous organics in the melter itself indicated, not only that DREs for selected test compounds approached 99.99% only at extreme melter conditions, but also that organic compounds not originally present in the feed were actually produced in the melter, In order to ensure that the required DREs for hazardous organics are met, Thermal Catalytic Oxidation (TCO) units were therefore added to both the HLW and LAW off-gas treatment systems, The extent to which these species can be destroyed or removed in the TCO units is therefore an important issue in the design and permitting of the LAW and HLW off-gas treatment systems. A further consideration is that it would be desirable, if possible, to be able to achieve all of the required DRE across the TCO alone. If that is not the case, the DRE would be distributed across several unit operations, which may then become subject to additional operational constraints that may reduce process flexibility. Compliance with the DRE requirements on the basis of the TCO unit alone is also an approach that lends itself to periodic confirmation during operations, since the TCO is located at the back-end of the off-gas treatment system where radioactivity levels are lowest.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Securing Small Modular Reactors in Urban Environments

Current small modular reactor (SMR) deployment use cases consider both rural and urban deployments, depending on the operational in-country needs for clean and reliable sources of energy. Many studies have been conducted analyzing security in rural and remote deployment locations, but this study looks at the physical security implications of an SMR placed in an urban environment and its uses for electricity production, district heating, and process heating. SMRs used for electricity production, district heating, and process heating may be key sources of both energy infrastructure and commercial infrastructure within a city and a State. As a result, long-term shutdowns could have a serious impact on a State’s overall energy or commercial production. Therefore, operators may consider further security applications to protect an SMR plant from physical attacks against both radiological sabotage and sabotage acts that could result in the SMR facility being offline for a significant amount of time. In this study, the team designed and analyzed a physical protection system (PPS) for securing an urban SMR facility against acts of radiological sabotage and sabotage acts that could disrupt the facility’s long-term operation. Additionally, this work analyzed the nuanced security issues related to siting an SMR near an urban environment (versus in a rural environment). The result of these analyses includes recommendations for PPSs for urban SMR facilities used for energy production, district heating, and process heating.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗