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At least 325 records · Page 18

Free Enterprise: Contributions of the Approach and Landing Test (ALT) Program to the Development of the Space Shuttle Orbiter

The space shuttle orbiter was the first spacecraft designed with the aerodynamic characteristics and in-atmosphere handling qualities of a conventional airplane. In order to evaluate the orbiter's flight control systems and subsonic handling characteristics, a series of flight tests were undertaken at NASA Dryden Flight Research Center in 1977. A modified Boeing 747 Shuttle Carrier Aircraft carried the Enterprise, a prototype orbiter, during eight captive tests to determine how well the two vehicles flew together and to test some of the orbiter s systems. The free-flight phase of the ALT program allowed shuttle pilots to explore the orbiter's low-speed flight and landing characteristics. The Enterprise provided realistic, in-flight simulations of how subsequent space shuttles would be flown at the end of an orbital mission. The fifth free flight, with the Enterprise landing on a concrete runway for the first time, revealed a problem with the space shuttle flight control system that made it susceptible to pilot-induced oscillation, a potentially dangerous control problem. Further research using various aircraft, particularly NASA Dryden's F-8 Digital-Fly-By-Wire testbed, led to correction of the problem before the first Orbital Test Flight.

Merlin, Peter W.↗

Shuttle plate braiding machine

A method and apparatus for moving yarn in a selected pattern to form a braided article. The apparatus includes a segmented grid of stationary support elements and a plurality of shuttles configured to carry yarn. The shuttles are supported for movement on the grid assembly and each shuttle includes a retractable plunger for engaging a reciprocating shuttle plate that moves below the grid assembly. Such engagement at selected times causes the shuttles to move about the grid assembly in a selected pattern to form a braided article of a particular geometry.

Huey, Jr., Cecil O.↗

Operational Use of GPS Navigation for Space Shuttle Entry

The STS-118 flight of the Space Shuttle Endeavour was the first shuttle mission flown with three Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers in place of the three legacy Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) units. This marked the conclusion of a 15 year effort involving procurement, missionization, integration, and flight testing of a GPS receiver and a parallel effort to formulate and implement shuttle computer software changes to support GPS. The use of GPS data from a single receiver in parallel with TACAN during entry was successfully demonstrated by the orbiters Discovery and Atlantis during four shuttle missions in 2006 and 2007. This provided the confidence needed before flying the first all GPS, no TACAN flight with Endeavour. A significant number of lessons were learned concerning the integration of a software intensive navigation unit into a legacy avionics system. These lessons have been taken into consideration during vehicle design by other flight programs, including the vehicle that will replace the Space Shuttle, Orion.

Goodman, John L.↗

Application of an Elongated Kelvin Model to Space Shuttle Foams

Spray-on foam insulation is applied to the exterior of the Space Shuttle s External Tank to limit propellant boil-off and to prevent ice formation. The Space Shuttle foams are rigid closed-cell polyurethane foams. The two foams used most extensively on the Space Shuttle External Tank are BX-265 and NCFI24-124. Since the catastrophic loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia, numerous studies have been conducted to mitigate the likelihood and the severity of foam shedding during the Shuttle s ascent to space. Due to the foaming and rising process, the foam microstructures are elongated in the rise direction. As a result, these two foams exhibit a non-isotropic mechanical behavior. In this paper, a detailed microstructural characterization of the two foams is presented. The key features of the foam cells are summarized and the average cell dimensions in the two foams are compared. Experimental studies to measure the room temperature mechanical response of the two foams in the two principal material directions (parallel to the rise and perpendicular to the rise) are also reported. The measured elastic modulus, proportional limit stress, ultimate tensile stress and the Poisson s ratios for the two foams are compared. The generalized elongated Kelvin foam model previously developed by the authors is reviewed and the equations which result from this model are presented. The resulting equations show that the ratio of the elastic modulus in the rise direction to that in the perpendicular-to-rise direction as well as the ratio of the strengths in the two material directions is only a function of the microstructural dimensions. Using the measured microstructural dimensions and the measured stiffness ratio, the foam tensile strength ratio and Poisson s ratios are predicted for both foams. The predicted tensile strength ratio is in close agreement with the measured strength ratios for both BX-265 and NCFI24-124. The comparison between the predicted Poisson s ratios and the measured values is not as favorable.

Sullivan, Roy M.↗

Recent Shuttle Post Flight MMOD Inspection Highlights

Post flight inspections on the Space Shuttle Atlantis conducted after the STS-11.5 mission revealed a 0.11 inch (2.8 mm) hole in the outer face sheet of the starboard payload bay door radiator panel #4. The payload bay door radiators in this region are 0.5 inch (12.7 mm) thick aluminum honeycomb with 0.011 in (0.279 mm) thick aluminum face sheets topped with 0.005 in (0.127 mm) silver-Teflon tape. Inner face sheet damage included a 0.267 in (6.78 mm) long through crack with measureable deformation in the area of 0.2 in (5.1 mm). There was also a 0.031 in (0.787 nun) diameter hole in the rear face sheet. A large approximately l in (25 mm) diameter region of honeycomb was also destroyed. Since the radiators are located on the inside of the shuttle payload bay doors which are closed during ascent and reentry, the damage could only have occurred during the on-orbit portion of the mission. During the August 2007 STS-118 mission to the International Space Station, a micro-meteoroid or orbital debris (MMOD) particle impacted and completely penetrated one of shuttle Endeavour's radiator panels and the underlying thermal control system (TCS) blanket, leaving deposits on (but no damage to) the payload bay door. While it is not unusual for shuttle orbiters to be impacted by small MMOD particles, the damage from this impact is larger than any previously seen on the shuttle radiator panels. One of the largest impacts ever observed on a crew module window occurred during the November 2008 STS-126 mission to the International Space Station. Damage to the window was documented by the crew on orbit. Post flight inspection revealed a 0.4 in (10.8 mm) crater in the window pane, with a depth of 0.03 in (0.76 mm). The window pane was replaced due to the damage caused by this impact. Analysis performed on residue contained in dental mold impressions taken of the site indicated that a meteoroid particle produced this large damage site. The post flight inspection after the subsequent mission, STS-119 in March of 2009, produced a large MMOD impact feature in a wing leading edge reinforced carbon-carbon panel. The crater measured 0.18 in (4.5 nun) in diameter and was nearly 0.037 in (0.93 nun) deep. The thickness of the silicon carbide coating that protects the carbon substrate is nominally 0.02 in (0.5 nun) to 0.04 in (1 mm), making this a significant impact into the RCC. The damage occurred on the upper surface of the panel, which experiences lower heat loads on re-entry. This poster will document the data collected from the impact sites and will include results of the Scanning Electron Microscope/Energy Dispersive X-ray (SEM/EDX) analysis. Evidence will be presented that suggests a source of the impacts.

Hyed, James L.↗

Overview of Carbon Dioxide Control Issues During International Space Station/Space Shuttle Joint Docked Operations

Manned space vehicles have a common requirement to remove the Carbon Dioxide (CO2) created by the metabolic processes of the crew. The Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) each have systems in place to allow control and removal of CO2 from the habitable cabin environment. During periods where the Space Shuttle is docked to ISS, known as joint docked operations, the Space Shuttle and ISS share a common atmosphere environment. During this period there is an elevated production of CO2 caused by the combined metabolic activity of the Space Shuttle and ISS crew. This elevated CO2 production, combined with the large effective atmosphere created by the collective volumes of the docked vehicles, creates a unique set of requirements for CO2 removal. This paper will describe the individual CO2 control plans implemented by the Space Shuttle and ISS engineering teams, as well as the integrated plans used when both vehicles are docked. In addition, the paper will discuss some of the issues and anomalies experienced by both engineering teams.

Matty, Christopher M.↗

The Evolution of the Rendezvous Profile During the Space Shuttle Program

The rendezvous and proximity operations approach design techniques for space shuttle missions has changed significantly during the life of the program in response to new requirements that were not part of the original mission design. The flexibility of the shuttle onboard systems design and the mission planning process has allowed the program to meet these requirements. The design of the space shuttle and the shift from docking to grappling with a robotic ann prevented use of legacy Apollo rendezvous techniques. Over the life of the shuttle program the rendezvous profile has evolved due to several factors, including lowering propellant consumption and increasing flexibility in mission planning. Many of the spacecraft that the shuttle rendezvoused with had unique requirements that drove the creation of mission-unique proximity operations. The dockings to the Russian Mir space station and International Space Station (ISS) required further evolution of rendezvous and proximity operations techniques and additional sensors to enhance crew situational awareness. After the Columbia accident, a Rendezvous Pitch Maneuver (RPM) was added to allow tile photography from ISS. Lessons learned from these rendezvous design changes are applicable to future vehicle designs and operations concepts.

Summa, William R.↗

Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) Reliability and Analysis Evolution

The Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) is a large thrust class, reusable, staged combustion cycle rocket engine employing liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen propellants. A cluster of three SSMEs is used on every space shuttle mission to propel the space shuttle orbiter vehicle into low earth orbit. Development of the SSME began in the early 70 s and the first flight of the space shuttle occurred in 1981. Today, the SSME has accrued over one million seconds of ground test and flight operational time, launching 129 space shuttle missions. Given that the SSME is used to launch a manned vehicle, its reliability must be commensurate for the task. At the same time, the SSME is a high performance, high power density engine which traditionally does not lend itself towards high reliability. Furthermore, throughout its history, the SSME operational envelope has been explored and expanded leading to several major test failures. Hence, assessing the reliability of the SSME throughout its history has been a challenging undertaking. This paper provides a review and discussion of SSME reliability assessment techniques and results over its history. Basic reliability drivers such as engine design, test program, major failures, redesigns and upgrades will also be discussed.

Stephens, Walter E.↗

History of Space Shuttle Main Engine Turbopump Bearing Testing at the Marshall Space Flight Center

The Space Shuttle is propelled into orbit by two solid rocket motors and three liquid fed main engines. After the solid motors fall away, the shuttle engines continue to run for a total time of 8 minutes. These engines are fed propellants by low and high pressure turbopumps. A critical part of the turbopump is the main shaft that supports the drive turbine and the pump inducer and impeller. Rolling element bearings hold the shaft in place during rotation. If the bearings were to fail, the shaft would move, allowing components to rub in a liquid oxygen or hydrogen environment, which could have catastrophic results. These bearings are required to spin at very high speeds, support radial and axial loads, and have high wear resistance without the benefit of a conventional means of lubrication. The Rocketdyne built Shuttle turbopumps demonstrated their capability to perform during launches; however, the seven hour life requirement was not being met. One of the limiting factors was the bearings. In the late 1970's, an engineering team was formed at the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), to develop a test rig and plan for testing the Shuttle s main engine high pressure oxygen turbopump (HPOTP) bearings. The goals of the program were to better understand the operation of bearings in a cryogenic environment and to further develop and refine existing computer models used to predict the operational limits of these bearings. In 1982, testing began in a rig named the Bearing and Seal Material Tester or BSMT as it was commonly called. The first testing investigated the thermal margin and thermal runaway limits of the HPOTP bearings. The test rig was later used to explore potential bearing improvements in the area of increased race curvatures, new cage materials for better lubrication, new wear resistant rolling element materials, and other ideas to improve wear life. The most notable improvements during this tester s time was the incorporation of silicon nitride balls and bronze filled polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) cage inserts into the bearings and the anchoring of the SHABERTH bearing model and SINDA thermal computer model for cryogenic bearing analysis. In the mid 1990's, Pratt and Whitney (P&W) won the contract to deliver new high pressure turbopumps for the Shuttle s engines. P&W used two new bearing materials for the rings, Cronidur 30 and AISI 9310 steel and testing was needed on these new materials. A test rig had been designed and delivered to MSFC for testing hydrostatic bearings but with the need by Pratt to validate their bearings, the rig was reconfigured for testing of two ball bearings or a ball bearing and a roller bearing. The P&W bearings are larger than the Rocketdyne bearings and could not be installed in the BSMT. This new test rig was called the LH2 test rig and began operation in 1995. The LH2 test rig accumulated 75,000 seconds of run time in hydrogen. This test rig was valuable in two areas: validating the use of silicon nitride balls and rollers in Alternate Turbopump Development (ATD) bearings, which Pratt eventually used, and in proving the robustness of the balls and rollers after river marks appeared on the surface of the rolling elements. Individual test reports have been presented at conferences and symposiums throughout the years. This paper is a comprehensive report of all the bearing testing done at Marshall. It represents thousands of hours of dedication and labor in all engineering and technical fields that made this program a success.

Gibson, Howard↗

Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPV): Developing Flight Rationale for the Space Shuttle Program

Introducing composite vessels into the Space Shuttle Program represented a significant technical achievement. Each Orbiter vehicle contains 24 (nominally) Kevlar tanks for storage of pressurized helium (for propulsion) and nitrogen (for life support). The use of composite cylinders saved 752 pounds per Orbiter vehicle compared with all-metal tanks. The weight savings is significant considering each Shuttle flight can deliver 54,000 pounds of payload to the International Space Station. In the wake of the Columbia accident and the ensuing Return to Flight activities, the Space Shuttle Program, in 2005, re-examined COPV hardware certification. Incorporating COPV data that had been generated over the last 30 years and recognizing differences between initial Shuttle Program requirements and current operation, a new failure mode was identified, as composite stress rupture was deemed credible. The Orbiter Project undertook a comprehensive investigation to quantify and mitigate this risk. First, the engineering team considered and later deemed as unfeasible the option to replace existing all flight tanks. Second, operational improvements to flight procedures were instituted to reduce the flight risk and the danger to personnel. Third, an Orbiter reliability model was developed to quantify flight risk. Laser profilometry inspection of several flight COPVs identified deep (up to 20 mil) depressions on the tank interior. A comprehensive analysis was performed and it confirmed that these observed depressions were far less than the criterion which was established as necessary to lead to liner buckling. Existing fleet vessels were exonerated from this failure mechanism. Because full validation of the Orbiter Reliability Model was not possible given limited hardware resources, an Accelerated Stress Rupture Test of a flown flight vessel was performed to provide increased confidence. A Bayesian statistical approach was developed to evaluate possible test results with respect to the model credibility and thus flight rationale for continued operation of the Space Shuttle with existing flight hardware. A non-destructive evaluation (NDE) technique utilizing Raman Spectroscopy was developed to directly measure the overwrap residual stress state. Preliminary results provide optimistic results that patterns of fluctuation in fiber elastic strains over the outside vessel surface could be directly correlated with increased fiber stress ratios and thus reduced reliability.

Kezirian, Michael T.↗

Correlation of Space Shuttle Landing Performance with Post-Flight Cardiovascular Dysfunction

Introduction: Microgravity induces cardiovascular adaptations resulting in orthostatic intolerance on re-exposure to normal gravity. Orthostasis could interfere with performance of complex tasks during the re-entry phase of Shuttle landings. This study correlated measures of Shuttle landing performance with post-flight indicators of orthostatic intolerance. Methods: Relevant Shuttle landing performance parameters routinely recorded at touchdown by NASA included downrange and crossrange distances, airspeed, and vertical speed. Measures of cardiovascular changes were calculated from operational stand tests performed in the immediate post-flight period on mission commanders from STS-41 to STS-66. Stand test data analyzed included maximum standing heart rate, mean increase in maximum heart rate, minimum standing systolic blood pressure, and mean decrease in standing systolic blood pressure. Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated with the null hypothesis that there was no statistically significant linear correlation between stand test results and Shuttle landing performance. A correlation coefficient? 0.5 with a p<0.05 was considered significant. Results: There were no significant linear correlations between landing performance and measures of post-flight cardiovascular dysfunction. Discussion: There was no evidence that post-flight cardiovascular stand test data correlated with Shuttle landing performance. This implies that variations in landing performance were not due to space flight-induced orthostatic intolerance.

McCluskey, R.↗

Space Shuttle Navigation in the GPS Era

The Space Shuttle navigation architecture was originally designed in the 1970s. A variety of on-board and ground based navigation sensors and computers are used during the ascent, orbit coast, rendezvous, (including proximity operations and docking) and entry flight phases. With the advent of GPS navigation and tightly coupled GPS/INS Units employing strapdown sensors, opportunities to improve and streamline the Shuttle navigation process are being pursued. These improvements can potentially result in increased safety, reliability, and cost savings in maintenance through the replacement of older technologies and elimination of ground support systems (such as Tactical Air Control and Navigation (TACAN), Microwave Landing System (MLS) and ground radar). Selection and missionization of "off the shelf" GPS and GPS/INS units pose a unique challenge since the units in question were not originally designed for the Space Shuttle application. Various options for integrating GPS and GPS/INS units with the existing orbiter avionics system were considered in light of budget constraints, software quality concerns, and schedule limitations. An overview of Shuttle navigation methodology from 1981 to the present is given, along with how GPS and GPS/INS technology will change, or not change, the way Space Shuttle navigation is performed in the 21 5 century.

Goodman, John L.↗

An Engineering Look at Space Shuttle and ISS Operations

This slide presentation, in Spanish, is an overview of NASA's Space Shuttle operations and preparations for serving the International Space Station. There is information and or views of the shuttle's design, the propulsion system, the external tanks, the foam insulation, the reusable solid rocket motors, the vehicle assembly building (VAB), the mobile launcher platform being moved from the VAB to the launch pad. There is a presentation of some of the current issues with the space shuttle: cracks in the LH2 flow lines, corrosion and pitting, the thermal protection system, and inspection of the thermal protection system while in orbit. The shuttle system has served for more than 20 years, it is still a challenge to re-certify the vehicles for flight. Materials and material science remain as chief concerns for the shuttle,

Hernandez, Jose M.↗

Use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Shuttle Decision Making Process

This slide presentation reviews the use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to assist in the decision making for the shuttle design and operation. Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a comprehensive, structured, and disciplined approach to identifying and analyzing risk in complex systems and/or processes that seeks answers to three basic questions: (i.e., what can go wrong? what is the likelihood of these occurring? and what are the consequences that could result if these occur?) The purpose of the Shuttle PRA (SPRA) is to provide a useful risk management tool for the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) to identify strengths and possible weaknesses in the Shuttle design and operation. SPRA was initially developed to support upgrade decisions, but has evolved into a tool that supports Flight Readiness Reviews (FRR) and near real-time flight decisions. Examples of the use of PRA for the shuttle are reviewed.

Boyer, Roger L.↗

Evolution of Space Shuttle Range Safety (RS) Ascent Flight Envelope Design

Ascent flight envelopes are trajectories that define the normal operating region of a space vehicle s position from liftoff until the end of powered flight. They fulfill part of the RS data requirements imposed by the Air Force s 45th Space Wing (45SW) on space vehicles launching from the Eastern Range (ER) in Florida. The 45SW is chartered to protect the public by minimizing risks associated with the inherent hazards of launching a vehicle into space. NASA s Space Shuttle program has launched 130+ manned missions over a 30 year period from the ER. Ascent envelopes were delivered for each of those missions. The 45SW envelope requirements have remained largely unchanged during this time. However, the methodology and design processes used to generate the envelopes have evolved over the years to support mission changes, maintain high data quality, and reduce costs. The evolution of the Shuttle envelope design has yielded lessons learned that can be applied to future endevours. There have been numerous Shuttle ascent design enhancements over the years that have caused the envelope methodology to evolve. One of these Shuttle improvements was the introduction of onboard flight software changes implemented to improve launch probability. This change impacted the preflight nominal ascent trajectory, which is a key element in the RS envelope design. While the early Shuttle nominal trajectories were designed preflight using a representative monthly mean wind, the new software changes involved designing a nominal ascent trajectory on launch day using real-time winds. Because the actual nominal trajectory position was not known until launch day, the envelope analysis had to be customized to account for this nominal trajectory variation in addition to the other envelope components.

Brewer, Joan D.↗

A History of Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) Redline Limits Management

The Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) has several "redlines", which are operational limits designated to preclude a catastrophic shutdown of the SSME. The Space Shuttle Orbiter utilizes a combination of hardware and software to enable or disable the automated redline shutdown capability. The Space Shuttle is launched with the automated SSME redline limits enabled, but there are many scenarios which may result in the manual disabling of the software by the onboard crew. The operational philosophy for manually enabling and disabling the redline limits software has evolved continuously throughout the history of the Space Shuttle Program, due to events such as SSME hardware changes and updates to Space Shuttle contingency abort software. In this paper, the evolution of SSME redline limits management will be fully reviewed, including the operational scenarios which call for manual intervention, and the events that triggered changes to the philosophy. Following this review, improvements to the management of redline limits for future spacecraft will be proposed.

Arnold, Thomas M.↗

Space Shuttle Day-of-Launch Trajectory Design Operations

A top priority of any launch vehicle is to insert as much mass into the desired orbit as possible. This requirement must be traded against vehicle capability in terms of dynamic control, thermal constraints, and structural margins. The vehicle is certified to specific structural limits which will yield certain performance characteristics of mass to orbit. Some limits cannot be certified generically and must be checked with each mission design. The most sensitive limits require an assessment on the day-of-launch. To further minimize vehicle loads while maximizing vehicle performance, a day-of-launch trajectory can be designed. This design is optimized according to that day s wind and atmospheric conditions, which increase the probability of launch. The day-of-launch trajectory design and verification process is critical to the vehicle s safety. The Day-Of-Launch I-Load Update (DOLILU) is the process by which the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Space Shuttle Program tailors the vehicle steering commands to fit that day s environmental conditions and then rigorously verifies the integrated vehicle trajectory s loads, controls, and performance. This process has been successfully used for almost twenty years and shares many of the same elements with other launch vehicles that execute a day-of-launch trajectory design or day-of-launch trajectory verification. Weather balloon data is gathered at the launch site and transmitted to the Johnson Space Center s Mission Control. The vehicle s first stage trajectory is then adjusted to the measured wind and atmosphere data. The resultant trajectory must satisfy loads and controls constraints. Additionally, these assessments statistically protect for non-observed dispersions. One such dispersion is the change in the wind from the last measured balloon to launch time. This process is started in the hours before launch and is repeated several times as the launch count proceeds. Should the trajectory design not meet all constraint criteria, Shuttle would be No-Go for launch. This Shuttle methodology is very similar to other unmanned launch vehicles. By extension, this method would likely be employed for any future NASA launch vehicle. This paper will review the Shuttle s day-of-launch trajectory optimization and verification operations as an example of a more generic application of day-of-launch design and validation. With Shuttle s retirement, it is fitting to document the current state of this critical process and capture lessons learned to benefit current and future launch vehicle endeavors.

Harrington, Brian E.↗

Flight Planning Branch Space Shuttle Lessons Learned

Planning products and procedures that allow the mission flight control teams and the astronaut crews to plan, train and fly every Space Shuttle mission have been developed by the Flight Planning Branch at the NASA Johnson Space Center. As the Space Shuttle Program ends, lessons learned have been collected from each phase of the successful execution of these Shuttle missions. Specific examples of how roles and responsibilities of console positions that develop the crew and vehicle attitude timelines will be discussed, as well as techniques and methods used to solve complex spacecraft and instrument orientation problems. Additionally, the relationships and procedural hurdles experienced through international collaboration have molded operations. These facets will be explored and related to current and future operations with the International Space Station and future vehicles. Along with these important aspects, the evolution of technology and continual improvement of data transfer tools between the shuttle and ground team has also defined specific lessons used in the improving the control teams effectiveness. Methodologies to communicate and transmit messages, images, and files from Mission Control to the Orbiter evolved over several years. These lessons have been vital in shaping the effectiveness of safe and successful mission planning that have been applied to current mission planning work in addition to being incorporated into future space flight planning. The critical lessons from all aspects of previous plan, train, and fly phases of shuttle flight missions are not only documented in this paper, but are also discussed as how they pertain to changes in process and consideration for future space flight planning.

Price, Jennifer B.↗