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NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Establishing Trust in NASA’s Artemis Program Computer-Human Interface (CHI) Implementation

The NASA Artemis program will return humans to the moon. This time, with the help of commercial and international partners, the program’s objective is a permanent moon base. The moon base infrastructure, including an orbiting moon station and moon surface assets, will be developed for astronauts to stay for the long haul to learn to live and work on another planet in preparation for an eventual Humans-to-Mars mission. As the roundtrip communication delays increase in deep space exploration, more onboard systems autonomy and functionality will be needed to maintain and control the vehicle or habitat. These mission constraints will change the current Earth-based spacecraft ground control support approach that will demand more safe, efficient, and effective Computer-Human Interface (CHI) control. For Artemis, CHI is defined as the elements that the crew interfaces with-audio, video, lighting, and crew controls. Understanding how CHI will need to evolve to support deep space missions will be critical for the Artemis program-especially crew controls which is the focus of this paper. How does NASA ensure crew controls are reliable to control complex systems and prevent a catastrophic event due to human error-especially when the astronauts could be physiologically and/or psychologically impaired? NASA’s approach to mitigating catastrophic hazards in human spaceflight system development such as crew controls is through a holistic system engineering and Human System Integration methodology that embraces NASA’s Human-Rating Requirements-ensuring human performance characteristics to control/safely recover the crew from hazardous situations within the human interface design are considered. This paper discusses, at a high level, CHI for the Artemis program. Next, a discussion of what it means to human-rate a space system crew controls and how trust in the human-computer interface begins with the NASA human rating requirements. Finally, a discussion on how systems engineering, and the human system integration process ensures that crew control implementation incorporates the NASA human-rating requirements.

Human-Rating↗
NASA NTRS2004

Development and Characterization of a Low-Pressure Calibration System for Hypersonic Wind Tunnels

Minimization of uncertainty is essential for accurate ESP measurements at very low free-stream static pressures found in hypersonic wind tunnels. Statistical characterization of environmental error sources requires a well defined and controlled calibration method. A calibration system has been constructed and environmental control software developed to control experimentation to eliminate human induced error sources. The initial stability study of the calibration system shows a high degree of measurement accuracy and precision in temperature and pressure control. Control manometer drift and reference pressure instabilities induce uncertainty into the repeatability of voltage responses measured from the PSI System 8400 between calibrations. Methods of improving repeatability are possible through software programming and further experimentation.

Green, Del L.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Statistical Characterization of Environmental Error Sources Affecting Electronically Scanned Pressure Transducers

Minimization of uncertainty is essential to extend the usable range of the 15-psid Electronically Scanned Pressure (ESP) transducer measurements to the low free-stream static pressures found in hypersonic wind tunnels. Statistical characterization of environmental error sources inducing much of this uncertainty requires a well defined and controlled calibration method. Employing such a controlled calibration system, several studies were conducted that provide quantitative information detailing the required controls needed to minimize environmental and human induced error sources. Results of temperature, environmental pressure, over-pressurization, and set point randomization studies for the 15-psid transducers are presented along with a comparison of two regression methods using data acquired with both 0.36-psid and 15-psid transducers. Together these results provide insight into procedural and environmental controls required for long term high-accuracy pressure measurements near 0.01 psia in the hypersonic testing environment using 15-psid ESP transducers.

Green, Del L.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Statistical Characterization of Environmental Error Sources Affecting Electronically Scanned Pressure Transducers

Minimization of uncertainty is essential to extend the usable range of the 15-psid Electronically Scanned Pressure [ESP) transducer measurements to the low free-stream static pressures found in hypersonic wind tunnels. Statistical characterization of environmental error sources inducing much of this uncertainty requires a well defined and controlled calibration method. Employing such a controlled calibration system, several studies were conducted that provide quantitative information detailing the required controls needed to minimize environmental and human induced error sources. Results of temperature, environmental pressure, over-pressurization, and set point randomization studies for the 15-psid transducers are presented along with a comparison of two regression methods using data acquired with both 0.36-psid and 15-psid transducers. Together these results provide insight into procedural and environmental controls required for long term high-accuracy pressure measurements near 0.01 psia in the hypersonic testing environment using 15-psid ESP transducers.

Green, Del L.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Review of Significant Incidents and Close Calls in Human Spaceflight from a Human Factors Perspective

This project aims to identify poor human factors design decisions that led to error-prone systems, or did not facilitate the flight crew making the right choices; and to verify that NASA is effectively preventing similar incidents from occurring again. This analysis was performed by reviewing significant incidents and close calls in human spaceflight identified by the NASA Johnson Space Center Safety and Mission Assurance Flight Safety Office. The review of incidents shows whether the identified human errors were due to the operational phase (flight crew and ground control) or if they initiated at the design phase (includes manufacturing and test). This classification was performed with the aid of the NASA Human Systems Integration domains. This in-depth analysis resulted in a tool that helps with the human factors classification of significant incidents and close calls in human spaceflight, which can be used to identify human errors at the operational level, and how they were or should be minimized. Current governing documents on human systems integration for both government and commercial crew were reviewed to see if current requirements, processes, training, and standard operating procedures protect the crew and ground control against these issues occurring in the future. Based on the findings, recommendations to target those areas are provided.

Silva-Martinez, Jackelynne↗
NASA NTRS1998

Errors in Aviation Decision Making: Bad Decisions or Bad Luck?

Despite efforts to design systems and procedures to support 'correct' and safe operations in aviation, errors in human judgment still occur and contribute to accidents. In this paper we examine how an NDM (naturalistic decision making) approach might help us to understand the role of decision processes in negative outcomes. Our strategy was to examine a collection of identified decision errors through the lens of an aviation decision process model and to search for common patterns. The second, and more difficult, task was to determine what might account for those patterns. The corpus we analyzed consisted of tactical decision errors identified by the NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board) from a set of accidents in which crew behavior contributed to the accident. A common pattern emerged: about three quarters of the errors represented plan-continuation errors, that is, a decision to continue with the original plan despite cues that suggested changing the course of action. Features in the context that might contribute to these errors were identified: (a) ambiguous dynamic conditions and (b) organizational and socially-induced goal conflicts. We hypothesize that 'errors' are mediated by underestimation of risk and failure to analyze the potential consequences of continuing with the initial plan. Stressors may further contribute to these effects. Suggestions for improving performance in these error-inducing contexts are discussed.

Orasanu, Judith↗
NASA NTRS2018

Evaluation of Multiple Flow Constrained Area Capacity Setting Methods for Collaborative Trajectory Options Program

The purpose of this study was to compare flow constrained area (FCA) capacity setting methods for Collaborative Trajectory Options Program (CTOP) as they pertain to the Integrated Demand Management (IDM) concept. IDM uses flow balancing to manage air traffic across multiple FCAs with a common downstream constraint, as well as constraints at the respective FCA locations. FCA capacity rates can be set manually, but generating capacities for multiple, interdependent FCAs could potentially over-burden a user. A new enhancement to CTOP called the FCA Balance Algorithm (FBA) was developed at NASA Ames Research Center to improve the process of allocating capacity across multiple flow constrained segments in the airspace. The FBA evaluates the predicted demand and capacity across multiple FCAs and dynamically generates capacity settings for the FCAs that best meet capacity limits for all identified constraints. In a human-in-the-loop simulation study, both manual and automated capacity setting methods were evaluated in terms of their overall feasibility using measures of system performance, human performance, and qualitative feedback. Subject matter experts were asked to use three different methods to allocate capacity to three FCAs, either (1) by manually setting capacity for every 60-minute time window, (2) by manually setting capacity for every 15-minute time window, or (3) by using the FBA capability to automatically generate capacity settings. Results showed no significant differences in terms of overall system performance, indicated by similar ground delay and airport throughput numbers between methods. However, differences in individual strategies afforded by the manual methods allowed some participants to achieve system-wide delay that was much lower than the average. The FBA was the fastest method of capacity setting, and it received the lowest subjective rating scores on physical task load, mental task load, task difficulty and task complexity out of the three methods. Finally, participants explained through qualitative feedback that there were many benefits to using the FBA, such as ease of use, accuracy, and low risk of human input error. Participants did not experience the same limitations with the FBA that they did with the manual methods, such as reduced accuracy in the 60-minute manual condition, or high complexity in the 15-minute/manual condition. These results suggest that the FBA automation enhancement to CTOP maintains system performance while improving human performance. Therefore, the FBA could be introduced as a way to mitigate operator workload while planning a CTOP.

NextGen↗
NASA NTRS2018

Evaluation of Multiple Flow Constrained Area Capacity Setting Methods for Collaborative Trajectory Options Program

The purpose of this study was to compare flow constrained area (FCA) capacity setting methods for Collaborative Trajectory Options Program (CTOP) as they pertain to the Integrated Demand Management (IDM) concept. IDM uses flow balancing to manage air traffic across multiple FCAs with a common downstream constraint, as well as constraints at the respective FCA locations. FCA capacity rates can be set manually, but generating capacities for multiple, interdependent FCAs could potentially over-burden a user. A new enhancement to CTOP called the FCA Balance Algorithm (FBA) was developed at NASA Ames Research Center to improve the process of allocating capacity across multiple flow constrained segments in the airspace. The FBA evaluates the predicted demand and capacity across multiple FCAs and dynamically generates capacity settings for the FCAs that best meet capacity limits for all identified constraints. In a human-in-the-loop simulation study, both manual and automated capacity setting methods were evaluated in terms of their overall feasibility using measures of system performance, human performance, and qualitative feedback. Subject matter experts were asked to use three different methods to allocate capacity to three FCAs, either (1) by manually setting capacity for every 60-minute time window, (2) by manually setting capacity for every 15-minute time window, or (3) by using the FBA capability to automatically generate capacity settings. Results showed no significant differences in terms of overall system performance, indicated by similar ground delay and airport throughput numbers between methods. However, differences in individual strategies afforded by the manual methods allowed some participants to achieve system-wide delay that was much lower than the average. The FBA was the fastest method of capacity setting, and it received the lowest subjective rating scores on physical task load, mental task load, task difficulty and task complexity out of the three methods. Finally, participants explained through qualitative feedback that there were many benefits to using the FBA, such as ease of use, accuracy, and low risk of human input error. Participants did not experience the same limitations with the FBA that they did with the manual methods, such as reduced accuracy in the 60-minute manual condition, or high complexity in the 15-minute/manual condition. These results suggest that the FBA automation enhancement to CTOP maintains system performance while improving human performance. Therefore, the FBA could be introduced as a way to mitigate operator workload while planning a CTOP.

NextGen↗
NASA NTRS1992

Correction techniques for depth errors with stereo three-dimensional graphic displays

Three-dimensional (3-D), 'real-world' pictorial displays that incorporate 'true' depth cues via stereopsis techniques have proved effective for displaying complex information in a natural way to enhance situational awareness and to improve pilot/vehicle performance. In such displays, the display designer must map the depths in the real world to the depths available with the stereo display system. However, empirical data have shown that the human subject does not perceive the information at exactly the depth at which it is mathematically placed. Head movements can also seriously distort the depth information that is embedded in stereo 3-D displays because the transformations used in mapping the visual scene to the depth-viewing volume (DVV) depend intrinsically on the viewer location. The goal of this research was to provide two correction techniques; the first technique corrects the original visual scene to the DVV mapping based on human perception errors, and the second (which is based on head-positioning sensor input data) corrects for errors induced by head movements. Empirical data are presented to validate both correction techniques. A combination of the two correction techniques effectively eliminates the distortions of depth information embedded in stereo 3-D displays.

Parrish, Russell V.↗
NASA NTRS1994

A psychologist's view of validating aviation systems

All systems, no matter what they are designed to do, have shortcomings that may make them less productive than was hoped during the initial development. Such shortcomings can arise at any stage of development: from conception to the end of the implementation life cycle. While systems failure and errors of a lesser magnitude can occur as a function of mechanical or software breakdown, the majority of such problems, in aviation are usually laid on the shoulders of the human operator and, to a lesser extent, on human factors. The operator bears the responsibility and blame even though, from a human factors perspective, error may have been designed into the system. Human factors is not a new concept in aviation. The name may be new, but the issues related to operators in the loop date back to the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century and certainly to the aviation build-up for World War I. During this first global confrontation, military services from all sides discovered rather quickly that poor selection and training led to drastically increased personnel losses. While hardware design became an issue later, the early efforts were primarily focused on increased care in pilot selection and on their training. This actually involved early labor-intensive simulation, using such devices as sticks and chairs mounted on rope networks which could be manually moved in response to control input. The use of selection criteria and improved training led to more viable person-machine systems. More pilots survived training and their first ten missions in the air, a rule of thumb arrived at by experience which predicted ultimate survival better than any other. This rule was to hold through World War II. At that time, personnel selection and training became very sophisticated based on previous standards. Also, many psychologists were drafted into Army Air Corps programs which were geared towards refining the human factor. However, despite the talent involved in these programs and the tremendous build-up of aviation during the war, there were still aircraft designs that were man killers (no sexism implied since all combat pilots were men). One classic design error that was identified fifty years ago was the multipointer altimeter, which could easily be misread especially by a pilot under considerable task load. It has led to flying fully operational aircraft into the terrain. The authors of the research which formally identified this problem put 'Human Errors' in quotes to express their dissatisfaction with the traditional approach to accident investigation. It traditionally places the burden of guilt on the operator. Some of these altimeters still exist in older aircraft to this day.

Stein, Earl S.↗
NASA NTRS2001

Asthenia--does it exist in space?

OBJECTIVE: First popularized as neurasthenia in the late 1800s by American George Beard, asthenia has been viewed by Russian psychologists and flight surgeons as a major problem that affects cosmonauts participating in long-duration space missions. However, there is some controversy about whether this syndrome exists in space; this controversy is attributable in part to the fact that it is not recognized in the current American psychiatric diagnostic system. METHODS: To address this issue empirically, we retrospectively examined the data from our 4 1/2-year, NASA-funded study of crew member and mission control interactions during the Shuttle/Mir space program. Three of the authors identified eight items of stage 1 asthenia from one of our measures, the Profile of Mood States (POMS). Scores on these items from 13 Russian and American crew members were compared with scores derived from the opinions of six Russian space experts. RESULTS: Crew members' scores in space were significantly lower than the experts' scores on seven of the eight items, and they generally were in the "not at all" to "a little" range of the item scales. There were no differences in mean scores before and after launch or across the four quarters of the missions. There were no differences in response between Russian and American crew members. CONCLUSIONS: We could not demonstrate the presence of asthenia in space as operationally defined using the POMS. However, the POMS addresses only emotional and not physiological aspects of the syndrome, and the subject responses in our study generally were skewed toward the positive end of the scales. Further research on this syndrome needs to be done and should include physiological measures and measures that are specific to asthenia.

Non-NASA Center↗
NASA NTRS1992

An advanced teleoperator control system - Design and evaluation

The design goal of an advanced teleoperator control system is twofold: 1) to allow the operator's manual control to be robust to system nonlinearities such as time delays and operator's control errors, and 2) to support the high performance of teleoperation while reducing the operator's control burden by providing the master and slave arms with desirable dynamic properties and by allowing the slave arm to automatically perform such control tasks as compliance and force control in the form of task sharing. The authors present a novel teleoperator control system achieving the above design goal by taking the following into consideration: the human dynamics involved in generating control command based on visual and forced feedback is modeled and incorporated into the controller design and evaluation; the dynamic characteristics of slave and master arms are actively modified in such a way as to implement the desirable dynamic characteristics; and the force feedback is redefined in terms of the combination of opposition and force discrepancies in order to establish the required man/machine dynamic coordination under shared control. The proposed control system with human dynamics in the control loop is simulated and compared with a number of conventional methods in the presence of human control errors and time delays.

Lee, Sukhan↗
NASA NTRS2017

Mind the Gap: Exploring the Underground of the NASA Space Cancer Risk Model

The REID quantifies the lifetime risk of death from radiation-induced cancer in an exposed astronaut. The NASA Space Cancer Risk (NSCR) 2012 mode incorporates elements from physics, biology, epidemiology, and statistics to generate the REID distribution. The current model quantifies the space radiation environment, radiation quality, and dose-rate effects to estimate a NASA-weighted dose. This weighted dose is mapped to the excess risk of radiation-induced cancer mortality from acute exposures to gamma rays and then transferred to an astronaut population. Finally, the REID is determined by integrating this risk over the individual's lifetime. The calculated upper 95% confidence limit of the REID is used to restrict an astronaut's permissible mission duration (PMD) for a proposed mission. As a statistical quantity characterized by broad, subjective uncertainties, REID estimates for space missions result in wide distributions. Currently, the upper 95% confidence level is over 350% larger than the mean REID value, which can severely limit an astronaut's PMD. The model incorporates inputs from multiple scientific disciplines in the risk estimation process. Physics and particle transport models calculate how radiation moves through space, penetrates spacecraft, and makes its way to the human beings onboard. Epidemiological studies of exposures from atomic bombings, medical treatments, and power plants are used to quantify health risks from acute and chronic low linear energy transfer (LET) ionizing radiation. Biological studies in cellular and animal models using radiation at various LETs and energies inform quality metrics for ions present in space radiation. Statistical methodologies unite these elements, controlling for mathematical and scientific uncertainty and variability. Despite current progress, these research platforms contain knowledge gaps contributing to the large uncertainties still present in the model. The NASA Space Radiation Program Element (SRPE) defines the knowledge gaps that impact our understanding of the cancer risks. These gaps are outlined in NASA's Human Research Roadmap [4], which identifies the research questions and actions recommended for reducing the uncertainty in the current NSCR model and for formulation of future models. The greatest contributors to uncertainty in the current model include radiation quality, dose rate effects, and the transfer of exposure-based risk from other populations to an astronaut population. Future formulations of the risk model may benefit from including other potential sources of uncertainty such as space dosimetry, errors in human epidemiology data, and the impact of microgravity and other spaceflight stressors. Here, we discuss the current capabilities of the NSCR-2012 model and several immediate research needs, highlighting areas expected to have an operational impact on the current model schema. The following subway-style route map outlines the NSCR-2012 model (Green Line), emphasizing the research gaps in the Human Research Roadmap for risk of radiation-induced carcinogenesis (Stops on Dashed Lines). The map diagrams how these research gaps feed specific portions of the model.

Chappell, L. J.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Procedural error monitoring and smart checklists

Human beings make and usually detect errors routinely. The same mental processes that allow humans to cope with novel problems can also lead to error. Bill Rouse has argued that errors are not inherently bad but their consequences may be. He proposes the development of error-tolerant systems that detect errors and take steps to prevent the consequences of the error from occurring. Research should be done on self and automatic detection of random and unanticipated errors. For self detection, displays should be developed that make the consequences of errors immediately apparent. For example, electronic map displays graphically show the consequences of horizontal flight plan entry errors. Vertical profile displays should be developed to make apparent vertical flight planning errors. Other concepts such as energy circles could also help the crew detect gross flight planning errors. For automatic detection, systems should be developed that can track pilot activity, infer pilot intent and inform the crew of potential errors before their consequences are realized. Systems that perform a reasonableness check on flight plan modifications by checking route length and magnitude of course changes are simple examples. Another example would be a system that checked the aircraft's planned altitude against a data base of world terrain elevations. Information is given in viewgraph form.

Palmer, Everett↗
DOE OSTI2024

Digital risk analysis in nuclear engineering projects: Designing for safety, performance, reliability, and security

Cyber-informed engineering and security-by-design frameworks are important in promoting the need to identify cybersecurity concerns early in the systems engineering lifecycle so risks from adversarial cyber-attacks can be eliminated or reduced through engineering design practices. In addition to adversarial risk, risk in operational technology systems also includes non-adversarial and unintentional risk from other factors such as human performance errors, environmental conditions, design flaws, and device degradation or failure. This paper introduces a new concept for characterizing digital risk, both adversarial and non-adversarial, and provides the basis for initial research into a novel digital risk analysis approach focused on incorporating attack difficulty into a multi-attribute analysis technique using robust decision-making. This digital risk characterization is also used to frame a discussion on the challenges of competing objectives and competing stakeholder requirements in an integrated energy system project that incorporates a small modular reactor and industrial facility.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
NASA NTRS2003

Organizational Culture and Safety

'..only a fool perseveres in error.' Cicero. Humans will break the most advanced technological devices and override safety and security systems if they are given the latitude. Within the workplace, the operator may be just one of several factors in causing accidents or making risky decisions. Other variables considered for their involvement in the negative and often catastrophic outcomes include the organizational context and culture. Many organizations have constructed and implemented safety programs to be assimilated into their culture to assure employee commitment and understanding of the importance of everyday safety. The purpose of this paper is to examine literature on organizational safety cultures and programs that attempt to combat vulnerability, risk taking behavior and decisions and identify the role of training in attempting to mitigate unsafe acts.

Adams, Catherine A.↗
NASA NTRS2001

2001 Research Reports NASA/ASEE Summer Faculty Fellowship Program

This document is a collection of technical reports on research conducted by the participants in the 2001 NASA/ASEE Summer Faculty Fellowship Program at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC). Research areas are broad. Some of the topics addressed include: project management, space shuttle safety risks induced by human factor errors, body wearable computers as a feasible delivery system for 'work authorization documents', gas leak detection using remote sensing technologies, a history of the Kennedy Space Center, and design concepts for collabsible cyrogenic storage vessels.

Source record↗