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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 325 records · Page 18
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1990

The final days of Solar Max - Lessons learned from engineering evaluation tests

End-of-life engineering evaluation tests were performed on Solar Max between October and November 1989. The tests included four-wheel control law operation; reaction wheel rundowns; modular power subsystem standard power regulator unit voltage-temperature level tests; battery rundown/2nd plateau determination; high gain antenna retraction and jettison; and solar array jettison. This paper presents these tests, their results, and the lessons learned from them.

Donnelly, Michael L.↗
NASA NTRS1991

Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Motor Program - Lessons learned

An evaluation is given of the most important lessons learned concerning the Space Shuttle's Solid Rocket Motors with respect to flight safety, reuse requirements, system reliability, structural integrity, and hardware damage due to reentry, water impact, and retrieval. Within the major categories of flight safety, performance, and reuse/cost, priorities are identified for implementation of envisioned improvements; schedule and cost considerations are noted to have been substantially downgraded in favor of flight safety. The consequences of the primacy of flight safety are discussed in the areas of primary systems design, redundant systems, manufacturing and assembly processing, and launch constraints.

Mccool, A. A.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Hubble Space Telescope: SRM/QA observations and lessons learned

The Hubble Space Telescope (HST) Optical Systems Board of Investigation was established on July 2, 1990 to review, analyze, and evaluate the facts and circumstances regarding the manufacture, development, and testing of the HST Optical Telescope Assembly (OTA). Specifically, the board was tasked to ascertain what caused the spherical aberration and how it escaped notice until on-orbit operation. The error that caused the on-orbit spherical aberration in the primary mirror was traced to the assembly process of the Reflective Null Corrector, one of the three Null Correctors developed as special test equipment (STE) to measure and test the primary mirror. Therefore, the safety, reliability, maintainability, and quality assurance (SRM&QA) investigation covers the events and the overall product assurance environment during the manufacturing phase of the primary mirror and Null Correctors (from 1978 through 1981). The SRM&QA issues that were identified during the HST investigation are summarized. The crucial product assurance requirements (including nonconformance processing) for the HST are examined. The history of Quality Assurance (QA) practices at Perkin-Elmer (P-E) for the period under investigation are reviewed. The importance of the information management function is discussed relative to data retention/control issues. Metrology and other critical technical issues also are discussed. The SRM&QA lessons learned from the investigation are presented along with specific recommendations. Appendix A provides the MSFC SRM&QA report. Appendix B provides supplemental reference materials. Appendix C presents the findings of the independent optical consultants, Optical Research Associates (ORA). Appendix D provides further details of the fault-tree analysis portion of the investigation process.

Rodney, George A.↗
NASA NTRS1991

Lessons learned in the development of the Hubble Space Telescope software

The lessons learned in the development of the Hubble Space Telescope software are described. Those aspects of the development that were successful are discussed. Areas which in retrospective analysis could have been more efficient are identified. It is concluded that few hardware oriented project managers understand or are comfortable with software technology. Most managers overestimate the size and magnitude of the complex tasks assigned.

Harrington, Michael↗
NASA NTRS1992

Milstar's flexible-substrate solar array: Lessons learned

The Flexible Substrate Solar Array (FSSA) is an evolutionary development of the lightweight, flexible substrate design pioneered during the seventies. Many of the features of the design are related to the Solar Array Flight Experiment (SAFE), flown on STS-41D in 1984. FSSA development has created a substantial technology base for future flexible substrate solar arrays such as the array for the Space Station Freedom. Lessons learned during the development of the FSSA can and should be applied to the Freedom array and other future flexible substrate designs.

Gibb, John↗
NASA NTRS1990

MILSTAR's flexible substrate solar array: Lessons learned, addendum

MILSTAR's Flexible Substrate Solar Array (FSSA) is an evolutionary development of the lightweight, flexible substrate design pioneered at Lockheed during the seventies. Many of the features of the design are related to the Solar Array Flight Experiment (SAFE), flown on STS-41D in 1984. FSSA development has created a substantial technology base for future flexible substrate solar arrays such as the array for the Space Station Freedom. Lessons learned during the development of the FSSA can and should be applied to the Freedom array and other future flexible substrate designs.

Gibb, John↗
NASA NTRS1992

LDEF electronic systems: Successes, failures and lessons

Following LDEF retrieval, a series of tests were performed of various NASA and experimenter electronics, including the NASA provided data and initiate systems. The post-flight test program objectives and observations are discussed, as well as the 'lessons learned' from these examinations. Results are also included of an evaluation of electronic hardware flown on Boeing's LDEF experiment. Overall the electronic systems performed remarkably well, even though most were developed under budget restraints and used some non-space qualified components. Several anomalies were observed, however, including some which resulted in loss of data. Suggestions for avoiding similar problems on future programs are presented.

Miller, E. A.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Project management lessons learned on SDIO's Delta Star and Single Stage Rocket Technology programs

The topics are presented in viewgraph form and include the following: a Delta Star (Delta 183) Program Overview, lessons learned, and rapid prototyping and the Single Stage Rocket Technology (SSRT) Program. The basic objective of the Strategic Defense Initiative Programs are to quickly reduce key uncertainties to a manageable range of parameters and solutions, and to yield results applicable to focusing subsequent research dollars on high payoff areas.

Klevatt, Paul L.↗
NASA NTRS1991

Lessons learned from and the future for NASA's Small Explorer Program

NASA started the Small Explorer Program to provide space scientists with an opportunity to conduct space science research in the Explorer Program using scientific payloads launched on small-class expendable launch vehicles. A series of small payload, scientific missions was envisioned that could be launched at the rate of one to two missions per year. Three missions were selected in April 1989: Solar Anomalous and Magnetospheric Particle Explorer, Fast Auroral Snapshot Explorer, and Sub-millimeter Wave Astronomy. These missions are planned for launch in June 1992, September 1994 and June 1995, respectively. At a program level, this paper presents the history, objectives, status, and lessons learned which may be applicable to similar programs, and discusses future program plans.

Newton, George P.↗
NASA NTRS1991

Phase III integrated water recovery testing at MSFC - Partially closed hygiene loop and open potable loop results and lessons learned

A series of tests has been conducted at the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) to evaluate the performance of a predevelopment water recovery system. Potable, hygiene, and urine reclamation subsystems were integrated with end-use equipment items and successfully operated in open and partially closed-loop modes, with man-in-the-loop, for a total of 28 days. Several significant subsystem physical anomalies were encountered during testing. Reclaimed potable and hygiene water generally met the current Space Station Freedom (SSF) water quality specifications for inorganic and microbiological constituents, but exceeded the maximum allowable concentrations for Total Organic Carbon (TOC). This paper summarizes the test objectives, system design, test activities/protocols, significant results/anomalies, and major lessons learned.

Bagdigian, R. M.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Jet-powered V/STOL aircraft - Lessons learned

Over the years a variety of jet-powered V/STOL aircraft were studied in test facilities and flight. The tests disclosed several fundamental limitations: (1) lack of design features conducive to good STOL performance, (2) inadequate performance margins and poor handling qualities, (3) performance and handling qualities degradation due to propulsion system induced flow and ground effect, and (4) inadequate integration of flight control and propulsion systems. The purpose of this paper is to review the lessons learned from tests of jet V/STOL aircraft in key technology areas including: (1) aerodynamic/performance tradeoffs, (2) unique propulsion requirements and induced flow effects, (3) handling qualities, and (4) operating procedures. The sensitivity of current ASTOVL designs to meet requirements in these critical technology area is examined.

Anderson, Seth B.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Lessons learned from evaluating launch-site processing problems of Space Shuttle payloads

The authors discuss a trend analysis program that is being conducted on the problem reports written during the processing of Space Shuttle payloads at Kennedy Space Center. The program is aimed at developing lessons learned that can both improve the effectiveness of the current payload processing cycles as well as help to guide the processing strategies for Space Station Freedom. The payload processing reports from STS 26R and STS 41 are used. A two-tier evaluation activity is described, and some typical results from the tier one analyses are presented.

Flores, Carlos A.↗
NASA NTRS1993

The Mini-Mast CSI testbed: Lessons learned

The Mini-Mast testbed was one of the first large scale Controls-Structure-Interaction (CSI) systems used to evaluate state-of-the-art methodology in flexible structure control. Now that all the testing at Langley Research Center has been completed, a look back is warranted to evaluate the program. This paper describes some of the experiences and technology development studies by NASA, university, and industry investigators. Lessons learned are presented from three categories: the testbed development, control methods, and the operation of a guest investigator program. It is shown how structural safety margins provided a realistic environment to simulate on-orbit CSI research, even though they also reduced the research flexibility afforded to investigators. The limited dynamic coupling between the bending and torsion modes of the cantilevered test article resulted in highly successful SISO and MIMO controllers. However, until accurate models were obtained for the torque wheel actuators, sensors, filters, and the structure itself, most controllers were unstable. Controls research from this testbed should be applicable to cantilevered appendages of future large space structures.

Tanner, Sharon E.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Lessons learned from an historical look at flight testing

A brief historical review of accidents was made to examine lessons learned in flight testing with major emphasis on human factors limitations. The results of this survey show undeniably that new aircraft and new pilots are not immune to old problems. Of three related human factors limitations, pilot skill frequently showed up as the primary factor responsible for accidents due to inadequate training (or proficiency) to handle an unexpected situation. A primary contributing factor was unsatisfactory aircraft handling qualities which increased pilot work load and therefore were less forgiving to 'pilot error,' particularly when flown in a stressful situation at the extremes of the flight envelope. Historically, pilot induced oscillation (PIO) has persisted as a major control problem particularly in first-flight operation. Deliberate errors involving a conscious decision to 'take a chance' by flying an aircraft with known deficiencies occurred more frequently in early times. Finally, inadvertent errors involving forgetfulness, indecision, and confusion are occurring more frequently with the current trend toward automated computerized controlled cockpits.

Seth B. Anderson↗
NASA NTRS1992

Integration and use of Microgravity Research Facility: Lessons learned by the crystals by vapor transport experiment and Space Experiments Facility programs

The Crystals by Vapor Transport Experiment (CVTE) and Space Experiments Facility (SEF) are materials processing facilities designed and built for use on the Space Shuttle mid deck. The CVTE was built as a commercial facility owned by the Boeing Company. The SEF was built under contract to the UAH Center for Commercial Development of Space (CCDS). Both facilities include up to three furnaces capable of reaching 850 C minimum, stand-alone electronics and software, and independent cooling control. In addition, the CVTE includes a dedicated stowage locker for cameras, a laptop computer, and other ancillary equipment. Both systems are designed to fly in a Middeck Accommodations Rack (MAR), though the SEF is currently being integrated into a Spacehab rack. The CVTE hardware includes two transparent furnaces capable of achieving temperatures in the 850 to 870 C range. The transparent feature allows scientists/astronauts to directly observe and affect crystal growth both on the ground and in space. Cameras mounted to the rack provide photodocumentation of the crystal growth. The basic design of the furnace allows for modification to accommodate techniques other than vapor crystal growth. Early in the CVTE program, the decision was made to assign a principal scientist to develop the experiment plan, affect the hardware/software design, run the ground and flight research effort, and interface with the scientific community. The principal scientist is responsible to the program manager and is a critical member of the engineering development team. As a result of this decision, the hardware/experiment requirements were established in such a way as to balance the engineering and science demands on the equipment. Program schedules for hardware development, experiment definition and material selection, flight operations development and crew training, both ground support and astronauts, were all planned and carried out with the understanding that the success of the program science was as important as the hardware functionality. How the CVTE payload was designed and what it is capable of, the philosophy of including the scientists in design and operations decisions, and the lessons learned during the integration process are descussed.

Heizer, Barbara L.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Environmental effects consideration: A case study - Lessons learned

This paper discusses the importance for serious consideration of environmental effects and associated risks by management early in the development cycle of a facility. A case study on the Space Shuttle provides information with regard to some of the environmental effects issues encountered and the lesson learned. The importance of early management action to enable the acceptance of known environmental risks, or to make program adjustments to avoid their potential consequences, is emphasized.

Vaughan, William W.↗
NASA NTRS1993

The X-15 airplane - Lessons learned

The X-15 rocket research airplane flew to an altitude of 354,000 ft and reached Mach 6.70. In almost 200 flights, this airplane was used to gather aerodynamic-heating, structural loads, stability and control, and atmospheric-reentry data. This paper describes the origins, design, and operation of the X-15 airplane. In addition, lessons learned from the X-15 airplane that are applicable to designing and testing the National Aero-Space Plane are discussed.

Aeroplane↗