Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “low radioactivity”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 325 records · Page 18

Product Consistency Test Results for the LAW Phase 5 Glasses

This report provides the results of the Vapor Hydration Test solutions and the Product Consistency Test leachates from the Low-Activity Waste Phase 5 glasses, a series of simulated nuclear waste glasses fabricated at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. The series included quenched and canister-centerline cooled versions of the glasses. These data will be used in the development of enhanced property/composition models for waste glass vitrification at Hanford. Several of the blanks had detectable amounts of sodium and/or silicon. The measured concentrations (mg/L) of boron, sodium, and silicon for the low-activity test reference material glass included with the Product Consistency Tests were much lower than the expected low-activity test reference material test results. A review of the Product Consistency Test data indicated that there was generally little difference between the normalized values based on targeted or measured glass composition. Heat treatment had various impacts on the normalized concentration values. Most of the glasses had NC B , NC Na , and NC Si values that were greater than the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant low-activity waste constraint of 4 g/L. The release rates for boron, sodium, and silicon were highly correlated for the study glasses.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Effect of sucrose on technetium and rhenium retention during vitrification of low-activity wastes

Sucrose (C 12 H 22 O 11 ) has been used in low-activity waste (LAW) melter feeds containing large fractions of nitrates, nitrites, or both because it facilitates foam suppression and denitration. This study focused on the effect of sucrose in LAW feeds on technetium (Tc) and rhenium (Re) retention. The amount of sucrose added in feeds was varied to differentiate the carbon-to-nitrogen mole ratio (C/N ratio). The results show that larger sucrose addition (higher C/N ratio) enhances Tc and Re retention. Reducing conditions induced by sucrose decomposition and early chemical reactions between sucrose and NaNO 3 /NaNO 2 are expected to increase Tc and Re retention. However, high sucrose addition decreased sulfur (S) retention slightly because sodium sulfate decomposes in reducing conditions at lower temperature. This early sulfate decomposition can affect Tc and Re retention partly because these species can be soluble in sulfate phases. This correlation indicates that the decrease of sulfate phases in the glass by early decomposition can reduce the solubility of Tc and Re in the sulfate phases, which may increase Tc and Re retention in the glass. In addition, continuous gas evolution and vigorous foaming at the foaming temperature range of 700–900°C may influence Tc and Re retention process interrupting retention or facilitating volatilization.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Characterization of the Sulfur-Saturated Melt Versions of the LAW ALG Glasses

This report provides the results from the chemical analyses of a series of sulfur-saturated melt version of the Low Activity Waste Algorithm study glasses, a series of simulated nuclear waste glasses designed and fabricated at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. These data will be used in the development, validation, and implementation of enhanced property/composition models for waste glass vitrification at Hanford.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Annual Summary Report for the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility—FY2021

This Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 annual summary report (ASR) documents the continued adequacy of the performance assessment (PA), the composite analysis (CA) and associated operating disposal-authorization statement (ODAS) technical basis documents for the Remote Handled (RH) Low-Level Waste (LLW) Disposal Facility at Idaho National Laboratory. Annual review of the adequacy of the PA and CA for the RHLLW Disposal Facility ensures that conclusions of the analyses remain valid in accordance with requirements of Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1, “Radioactive Waste Management.” In FY 2021, no significant operational changes or other activities occurred that would cause deviation from the assumptions in the PA and CA pertaining to disposal geometry, verification of waste characteristics, tracking disposal inventories against total limits, facility closure design, or institutional controls. Sixteen total waste-canister shipments were received at the RHLLW Disposal Facility, and 16 total waste canisters were emplaced.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Annual Summary Report for the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility—FY 2022

This Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 annual summary report (ASR) documents the continued adequacy of the performance assessment (PA), the composite analysis (CA) and associated operating disposal-authorization statement (ODAS) technical-basis documents for the Remote-Handled (RH) Low-Level Waste (LLW) Disposal Facility at Idaho National Laboratory. Annual review of the adequacy of the PA and CA for the RHLLW Disposal Facility ensures that conclusions of the analyses remain valid in accordance with requirements of Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1, “Radioactive Waste Management.” In FY 2022, no significant operational changes or other activities occurred that would cause deviation from the assumptions in the PA and CA pertaining to disposal geometry, verification of waste characteristics, tracking disposal inventories against total limits, facility-closure design, or institutional controls. Fifteen waste canister shipments were received at the RHLLW Disposal Facility, and 15 waste canisters were emplaced in disposal vaults.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Annual Summary Report for the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility—FY 2023

This Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 annual summary report (ASR) documents the continued adequacy of the performance assessment (PA), the composite analysis (CA) and associated operating disposal-authorization statement (ODAS) technical-basis documents for the Remote-Handled (RH) Low-Level Waste (LLW) Disposal Facility at Idaho National Laboratory. Annual review of the adequacy of the PA and CA for the RHLLW Disposal Facility ensures that conclusions of the analyses remain valid in accordance with requirements of Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1, “Radioactive Waste Management.” In FY 2023, no significant operational changes or other activities occurred that would cause deviation from the assumptions in the PA and CA pertaining to disposal geometry, verification of waste characteristics, tracking disposal inventories against total limits, facility-closure design, or institutional controls. Eleven waste canister shipments were received at the RHLLW Disposal Facility, and ten waste canisters were emplaced in disposal vaults.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Graphite waste classification and disposal cost estimation for high temperature gas and salt reactors

As high-temperature reactor designs progress to demonstration, managing the radioactive wastes from these systems presents unique challenges. This work explores the irradiated graphite source term produced by three reactor designs: The Modular High Temperature Gas reactor (MHTGR), a pebble-bed High Temperature Gas Reactor (pb-HTGR), and a Fluoride-cooled High-temperature Reactor (FHR). We predicted a C-14 concentration of 4.3 Ci/m 3 for the MHTGR, 1.2 Ci/m 3 for the pebble bed HTGR, and 2.5 Ci/m 3 for the gFHR after 20 years of operation. The final C-14 concentration highly depended on the graphite nitrogen impurity, a major precursor for C-14. The C-14 concentration in all reactor types exceeded the 0.8 Ci/m3 threshold, resulting in a Class C waste classification. The costs associated with accepting the graphite after 20 years in a low-level waste disposal facility were projected to be 255 dollars per kWe for the MHTGR, 248 dollars per kWe for the pb-HTGR, and 56.8 dollars per kWe for the FHR.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Vitrification of Hanford Tank 241-AP-101 Waste and Simulant

Hanford tank 241-AP-101 (referred to herein as AP-101) is the second Hanford radioactive tank waste planned to be processed and vitrified. A simulant version of AP 101 waste was formulated from the best-basis inventory (BBI) for the Hanford Tank 241-AP-101 liquid with an assumed target dilution of the waste from the BBI sodium molarity of 8.61 M to the desired 5.5 M Na. After the addition of glass-forming chemicals (GFCs), the simulant melter feed was processed in a non-radioactive, continuous laboratory-scale melter (CLSM) system. The AP-101 simulant melter feed was charged into the CLSM for 6.11 h of processing, which produced 6.55 kg of glass, for an average glass production rate of 2275 kg m 2 d -1 . Since there were no processing issues with the AP-101 simulant melter feed, AP-101 melter feed made with actual waste was then processed in a CLSM system built into a contamination area in a radioactive environment. The melting behavior characteristics appeared similar for both the simulant and waste melter feeds. The AP-101 waste melter feed was charged into the CLSM for 12.14 h of processing, which produced 8.75 kg of glass, for an average glass production rate of 1530 kg m 2 d -1 . During the AP-101 waste melter feed charging, the pump used to move the feed reached a maximum and it is believed that if the pump had a greater capacity, a greater average glass production rate could have been achieved. A constituent of interest present in low quantities in the AP-101 waste is 99 Tc or its non-radioactive surrogate, Re, added to the AP-101 simulant. Analysis for the quantities of 99 Tc and Re in the AP-101 glass product resulted in an average single-pass retention from the melter feed during relative chemical steady state of 55 ± 2 % for 99 Tc and 45 ± 2 % for Re. Compared to the processing of other melter feeds, the retention of 99 Tc in the AP-101 glass was greater than in both AP-107 and AP-105 glass, while the retention of Re in the AP-101 was less than in the AP-107 glass, but greater than in the AP-105 glass. A spike of I was added into the AP-101 melter feed that could be detected above the analysis detection limits. However, the iodine was only detectable above the ~6 ppm limit in one glass pour: the pour immediately following the burn off of the cold cap, where the I level reached ~30 ppm. This event was significant because the glass was poured immediately after burn off and thus it is presumed that the iodine had yet to volatilize from the glass melt while idling. It is recommended to perform future tests with I spikes at greater levels so that it can be detected in additional glass pours to determine if the expected 50 % retention of I used in the Kim et al. glass models can be confirmed. Offgas liquid samples were analyzed for acetonitrile, which was present at greater concentrations in CLSM liquids than in other scaled melter systems. This result was expected based on unique conditions with the CLSM system including a small plenum space leading to low residence time for offgas and the rapidity of offgas cooling upon exiting the CLSM vessel due to the location and environment. About 90 % of the total acetonitrile captured during both the AP-101 simulant and waste CLSM runs was found in the offgas condensate and demister liquids, thus it is recommended that only those liquids be sent for analysis if future testing to study the presence of acetonitrile in offgas products is desired.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The abundance of the radioactive isotope Al-26 in galactic cosmic rays

Satellite observations of the isotopic composition of aluminum in low energy cosmic rays (E/M = 200 MeV/amu) have been used to determine the abundance of the unstable isotope Al-26 (T1/2 = 0.87 Myr). The observed abundance ratio, Al-26/Al-27 = 0.036 (+0.037, -0.022), is in good agreement with previous balloon observations and yields a cosmic ray confinement time consistent with values based on the abundance of Be-10.

Wiedenbeck, M. E.↗

Composition Measurements and Product Consistency Test Results for the EMHQ-LBE-04-B Glass

This report provides the results from the chemical analyses of the glass composition and the Product Consistency Test leachate analyses for the EMHQ-LBE-04-B glass. These data will be used in the development, validation, and implementation of enhanced property/composition models for waste glass vitrification at Hanford.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Comparison of Supervised and Un-Supervised Machine Learning Algorithms for Threat Detection and Scintillator Performance for Radiation Portal Monitoring

Following the events of September 11, 2001, international border crossing have been equipped with radiation portal monitors (RPMs) to identify illicit radioactive material. Polyvinyl toluene (PVT) scintillators are commonly used due to their low cost and reasonable maintainability, however they offer low spectral resolution. Despite the fact that over twenty years has transpired since this event, radioisotopes are still typically identified by hand-crafted classification algorithms, e.g., total counts or energy windowing, and exhibit relatively poor performance in detecting threats at the low false alarm rates required to support the stream of commerce. While some improvement to performance has been realized via the use of supervised machine learning, these classification algorithms typically utilize simulations in lieu of real data due to the sparsity of data for one or more classes. Accordingly, the performance of these algorithms is somewhat less than optimal when examining experiments or simulations with model mismatch. Consequently, in this work, we examine the application of a number of unsupervised machine learning, anomaly detection based algorithms, to circumvent the inverse crime when analyzing spectroscopy data for RPMs. We also compare anomaly detection results with those obtained via the use of supervised classification detection ML algorithms when model mismatch is introduced between the simulated threat items utilized for training/testing. Finally, we compared the performance of the PVT scintillators to those obtained with higher resolution detectors using both anomaly detection and supervised classification algorithms.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Performance Assessment of the Inactive Trenches in the 200 West Low-Level Burial Grounds at the Hanford Site

The purpose of this document is to provide a performance assessment (PA) of the 200 West Area Low‑Level Burial Grounds (LLBGs), under the requirements of DOE O 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management1. The objective is to ensure that the radioactive waste is managed in a manner that is protective of human health and the environment. Figure ES-1 shows the location of the LLBGs in the 200 West and 200 East Areas of the Hanford Site.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

The relative abundance of the isotopes of Li, Be and B and the age of cosmic rays

Using a balloon borne double dE/dx total energy telescope, we have determined the isotopic composition of cosmic ray Li, Be and B nuclei in the energy range 100-250 MeV/nuc. The measured mass resolution for these nuclei is about 0.3 AMU. The observed isotopic composition is in agreement with that predicted on the basis of interstellar fragmentation with the exception of a deficiency of Be-10. If the low abundance of Be-10 is attributed to the decay of this radioactive isotope, we obtain a mean cosmic ray lifetime of 3.4 (plus 3.4 or minus 1.3) m.y.

Webber, W. R.↗

Measurement of Human Blood and Plasma Volumes

Report reviews techniques for measuring blood-plasma volume in humans. Common technique of using radioactive iodine isotope to label plasma albumin involves unwarranted risks from low-level radiation. Report emphasizes techniques using Evans-blue-dye (T-1824) labeling of albumin, hematocrit or hemoglobin/hematocrit measurements, or blood densitometry. In Evans-blue-dye technique, plasma volume determined from decrease in dye concentration occurring after small amount of dye solution injected into circulatory system. Subjection of Evans blue dye to test for carcinogenicity gave negative results.

Greenleaf, J. E.↗

Gamma ray astronomy

Miscellaneous tasks related to mission operations and data analysis for the Burst and Transient Source Experiment on the Gamma Ray Observatory, to collection, analysis, and interpretation of data from the Marshall Space Flight Center Very Low Frequency transient monitoring program, and to compilation and analysis of induced radioactivity data were performed. The results are summarized and relevant references are included.

Paciesas, William S.↗

Addendum 2 to the Closure Report for CAU 577 Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, NNSS, Nevada

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 577, “Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells,” includes five low-level waste cells at the Nevada National Security Site Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site where buried waste received from Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., was subsequently determined to contain chromium that exceeded the toxicity characteristic leaching procedure regulatory limit, which would require the waste to carry hazardous waste code D007. CAU 577 was created to satisfy the requirements of the Settlement Agreement (SA) executed between the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) on April 25, 2019 (NDEP 2019). The SA required that the chromium-containing waste received from NFS would be addressed following the closure process laid out in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). The FFACO process ensures proper closure of the chromium-containing waste and documentation of that closure through FFACO-type documents. The following three Corrective Action Sites (CASs) were closed, and their closure was documented in the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030, dated September 2021 (U.S. Department of Energy [DOE] Environmental Management [EM] Nevada Program 2021a): • CAS 05-21-02, Waste Disposal Cell 12 • CAS 05-21-03, Waste Disposal Cell 15 • CAS 05-21-04, Waste Disposal Cell 17 Closure of the following CAS was previously documented in the Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030-ADD, dated September 2022 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022): • CAS 05-21-05, Waste Disposal Cell 20 This second addendum to the Closure Report documents the closure activities that have occurred for CAS 05-21-06, Waste Disposal Cell 21. This is the last CAS in CAU 577. The final waste shipment was placed in the waste disposal cell on November 21, 2022. Following this, closure activities began on November 28, 2022, and were conducted according to the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b). The following closure activities were performed: • Constructing an engineered evapotranspiration cover • Installing two subsidence monuments and vadose zone monitoring equipment • Seeding the cover with a mixture of native plant species • Installing four concrete monuments on the corners of the cover and placing two use restriction (UR) warning signs on each monument These activities fulfill applicable federal and state regulations for closure of CAS 05-21-06 and minimize potential future exposure pathways to buried waste. Completed closure activities are also consistent with closure of the nine historical Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) units included in Section 10.2.2 of the RCRA Permit that governs hazardous waste management activities at the Nevada National Security Site (Permit NEV HW0101) (NDEP 2023). UR documentation for this CAS is included in Appendix B of this report. The post-closure plan is presented in detail in the CADD/CAP for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b), and the requirements are summarized in Section 5.2 of this document. In accordance with paragraph 5D of the SA, a request to incorporate the requirements for post-closure monitoring of CAU 577 was included with the permit application for RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 that was submitted in January 2022 (NNSA/NFO 2022). The request included the post-closure requirements for the three CASs that had been closed at the time of submittal of the application as well as requirements that would be implemented upon future approval of closure of the remaining two CASs. All CAU 577 post-closure monitoring requirements have been captured in the April 4, 2023, Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit (NDEP 2023). As the RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 has been revised since the submittal of the original CAU 577 Closure Report (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021a) and Addendum 1 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022), the post-closure requirements in this Addendum 2 report do not align with the previous documents. Specific changes resulting from the issuance of Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit are discussed in Section 5.2 of this report. The requirements in this report are consistent with the current permit (NDEP 2023) and supersede all requirements listed in the CAU 577 Closure Report and Addendum 1. All CAU 577 post-closure requirements should be conducted in accordance with the version of the RCRA Permit that is current at the time of the activities being performed. The DOE EM Nevada Program is requesting a Notice of Completion from NDEP for closure of CAU 577. Although CAU 577 is not a legacy site, the FFACO process is being followed to ensure proper closure of the chromium-containing waste. Therefore, transfer of CAU 577 from Appendix III of the FFACO to Appendix IV, Closed Corrective Action Units, is requested, as all closure activities have been completed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗