Comparison of Supervised and Un-Supervised Machine Learning Algorithms for Threat Detection and Scintillator Performance for Radiation Portal Monitoring

Abstract

Following the events of September 11, 2001, international border crossing have been equipped with radiation portal monitors (RPMs) to identify illicit radioactive material. Polyvinyl toluene (PVT) scintillators are commonly used due to their low cost and reasonable maintainability, however they offer low spectral resolution. Despite the fact that over twenty years has transpired since this event, radioisotopes are still typically identified by hand-crafted classification algorithms, e.g., total counts or energy windowing, and exhibit relatively poor performance in detecting threats at the low false alarm rates required to support the stream of commerce. While some improvement to performance has been realized via the use of supervised machine learning, these classification algorithms typically utilize simulations in lieu of real data due to the sparsity of data for one or more classes. Accordingly, the performance of these algorithms is somewhat less than optimal when examining experiments or simulations with model mismatch. Consequently, in this work, we examine the application of a number of unsupervised machine learning, anomaly detection based algorithms, to circumvent the inverse crime when analyzing spectroscopy data for RPMs. We also compare anomaly detection results with those obtained via the use of supervised classification detection ML algorithms when model mismatch is introduced between the simulated threat items utilized for training/testing. Finally, we compared the performance of the PVT scintillators to those obtained with higher resolution detectors using both anomaly detection and supervised classification algorithms.