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NASA NTRS2011

Towards Measurement of Confidence in Safety Cases

Arguments in safety cases are predominantly qualitative. This is partly attributed to the lack of sufficient design and operational data necessary to measure the achievement of high-dependability targets, particularly for safety-critical functions implemented in software. The subjective nature of many forms of evidence, such as expert judgment and process maturity, also contributes to the overwhelming dependence on qualitative arguments. However, where data for quantitative measurements is systematically collected, quantitative arguments provide far more benefits over qualitative arguments, in assessing confidence in the safety case. In this paper, we propose a basis for developing and evaluating integrated qualitative and quantitative safety arguments based on the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) and Bayesian Networks (BN). The approach we propose identifies structures within GSN-based arguments where uncertainties can be quantified. BN are then used to provide a means to reason about confidence in a probabilistic way. We illustrate our approach using a fragment of a safety case for an unmanned aerial system and conclude with some preliminary observations

Denney, Ewen↗
NASA NTRS2011

Determining the Optimal Number of Clusters with the Clustergram

Cluster analysis aids research in many different fields, from business to biology to aerospace. It consists of using statistical techniques to group objects in large sets of data into meaningful classes. However, this process of ordering data points presents much uncertainty because it involves several steps, many of which are subject to researcher judgment as well as inconsistencies depending on the specific data type and research goals. These steps include the method used to cluster the data, the variables on which the cluster analysis will be operating, the number of resulting clusters, and parts of the interpretation process. In most cases, the number of clusters must be guessed or estimated before employing the clustering method. Many remedies have been proposed, but none is unassailable and certainly not for all data types. Thus, the aim of current research for better techniques of determining the number of clusters is generally confined to demonstrating that the new technique excels other methods in performance for several disparate data types. Our research makes use of a new cluster-number-determination technique based on the clustergram: a graph that shows how the number of objects in the cluster and the cluster mean (the ordinate) change with the number of clusters (the abscissa). We use the features of the clustergram to make the best determination of the cluster-number.

Fluegemann, Joseph K.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Advancing Aeronautics: A Decision Framework for Selecting Research Agendas

Publicly funded research has long played a role in the development of aeronautics, ranging from foundational research on airfoils to development of the air-traffic control system. Yet more than a century after the research and development of successful controlled, sustained, heavier-than-air flight vehicles, there are questions over the future of aeronautics research. The field of aeronautics is relatively mature, technological developments within it have become more evolutionary, and funding decisions are sometimes motivated by the continued pursuit of these evolutionary research tracks rather than by larger factors. These developments raise questions over whether public funding of aeronautics research continues to be appropriate or necessary and at what levels. Tightened federal budgets and increasing calls to address other public demands make these questions sharper still. To help it address the questions of appropriate directions for publicly funded aeronautics research, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA's) Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) asked the RAND Corporation to assess the elements required to develop a strategic view of aeronautics research opportunities; identify candidate aeronautic grand challenges, paradigms, and concepts; outline a framework for evaluating them; and exercise the framework as an example of how to use it. Accordingly, this research seeks to address these questions: What aeronautics research should be supported by the U.S. government? What compelling and desirable benefits drive government-supported research? How should the government--especially NASA--make decisions about which research to support? Advancing aeronautics involves broad policy and decisionmaking challenges. Decisions involve tradeoffs among competing perspectives, uncertainties, and informed judgment.

AERONAUTICS↗
NASA NTRS2012

Aeromedical Disposition and Waiver Consideration for ISS Crewmembers

Aeromedical certification of astronauts and cosmonauts traveling to the International Space Station is a multi?-tiered process that involv es standards agreed to by the partner agencies, and participation by the individual agency aeromedical boards and a multilateral space medi cine board. Medical standards are updated continually by a multilater al working group. The boards operate by consensus and strive to achie ve effective decision making through experience, medical judgment, medical evidence and risk modeling. The aim of the certification process is to minimize the risk to the ISS program of loss of mission object ives due to human health issues.

Taddeo, Terrance↗
NASA NTRS2012

Mars Science Laboratory Rover Integrated Pump Assembly Bellows Jamming Failure

The Mars Science Laboratory rover and spacecraft utilize two mechanically pumped fluid loops for heat transfer to and from the internal electronics assemblies and the Radioisotope Thermo-Electric Generator (RTG). The heat transfer fluid is Freon R-11 (CFC-11) which has a large coefficient of thermal expansion. The Freon within the heat transfer system must have a volume for safe expansion of the fluid as the system temperature rises. The device used for this function is a gas-over-liquid accumulator. The accumulator uses a metal bellows to separate the fluid and gas sections. During expansion and contraction of the fluid in the system, the bellows extends and retracts to provide the needed volume change. During final testing of a spare unit, the bellows would not extend the full distance required to provide the needed expansion volume. Increasing the fluid pressure did not loosen the jammed bellows either. No amount of stroking the bellows back and forth would get it to pass the jamming point. This type of failure, if it occurred during flight, would result in significant overpressure of the heat transfer system leading to a burst failure at some point in the system piping. A loss of the Freon fluid would soon result in a loss of the mission. The determination of the source of the jamming of the bellows was quite elusive, leading to an extensive series of tests and analyses. The testing and analyses did indicate the root cause of the failure, qualitatively. The results did not provide a set of dimensional limits for the existing hardware design that would guarantee proper operation of the accumulator. In the end, a new design was developed that relied on good engineering judgment combined with the test results to select a reliable enough solution that still met other physical constraints of the hardware, the schedule, and the rover system.

bellows↗
NASA NTRS2013

Application of Statistically Derived CPAS Parachute Parameters

The Capsule Parachute Assembly System (CPAS) Analysis Team is responsible for determining parachute inflation parameters and dispersions that are ultimately used in verifying system requirements. A model memo is internally released semi-annually documenting parachute inflation and other key parameters reconstructed from flight test data. Dispersion probability distributions published in previous versions of the model memo were uniform because insufficient data were available for determination of statistical based distributions. Uniform distributions do not accurately represent the expected distributions since extreme parameter values are just as likely to occur as the nominal value. CPAS has taken incremental steps to move away from uniform distributions. Model Memo version 9 (MMv9) made the first use of non-uniform dispersions, but only for the reefing cutter timing, for which a large number of sample was available. In order to maximize the utility of the available flight test data, clusters of parachutes were reconstructed individually starting with Model Memo version 10. This allowed for statistical assessment for steady-state drag area (CDS) and parachute inflation parameters such as the canopy fill distance (n), profile shape exponent (expopen), over-inflation factor (C(sub k)), and ramp-down time (t(sub k)) distributions. Built-in MATLAB distributions were applied to the histograms, and parameters such as scale (sigma) and location (mu) were output. Engineering judgment was used to determine the "best fit" distribution based on the test data. Results include normal, log normal, and uniform (where available data remains insufficient) fits of nominal and failure (loss of parachute and skipped stage) cases for all CPAS parachutes. This paper discusses the uniform methodology that was previously used, the process and result of the statistical assessment, how the dispersions were incorporated into Monte Carlo analyses, and the application of the distributions in trajectory benchmark testing assessments with parachute inflation parameters, drag area, and reefing cutter timing used by CPAS.

Romero, Leah M.↗
NASA NTRS2013

A Step-Wise Approach to Elicit Triangular Distributions

Adapt/combine known methods to demonstrate an expert judgment elicitation process that: 1.Models expert's inputs as a triangular distribution, 2.Incorporates techniques to account for expert bias and 3.Is structured in a way to help justify expert's inputs. This paper will show one way of "extracting" expert opinion for estimating purposes. Nevertheless, as with most subjective methods, there are many ways to do this.

Greenberg, Marc W.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Work Practice Simulation of Complex Human-Automation Systems in Safety Critical Situations: The Brahms Generalized berlingen Model

The transition from the current air traffic system to the next generation air traffic system will require the introduction of new automated systems, including transferring some functions from air traffic controllers to on­-board automation. This report describes a new design verification and validation (V&V) methodology for assessing aviation safety. The approach involves a detailed computer simulation of work practices that includes people interacting with flight-critical systems. The research is part of an effort to develop new modeling and verification methodologies that can assess the safety of flight-critical systems, system configurations, and operational concepts. The 2002 Ueberlingen mid-air collision was chosen for analysis and modeling because one of the main causes of the accident was one crew's response to a conflict between the instructions of the air traffic controller and the instructions of TCAS, an automated Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System on-board warning system. It thus furnishes an example of the problem of authority versus autonomy. It provides a starting point for exploring authority/autonomy conflict in the larger system of organization, tools, and practices in which the participants' moment-by-moment actions take place. We have developed a general air traffic system model (not a specific simulation of Überlingen events), called the Brahms Generalized Ueberlingen Model (Brahms-GUeM). Brahms is a multi-agent simulation system that models people, tools, facilities/vehicles, and geography to simulate the current air transportation system as a collection of distributed, interactive subsystems (e.g., airports, air-traffic control towers and personnel, aircraft, automated flight systems and air-traffic tools, instruments, crew). Brahms-GUeM can be configured in different ways, called scenarios, such that anomalous events that contributed to the Überlingen accident can be modeled as functioning according to requirements or in an anomalous condition, as occurred during the accident. Brahms-GUeM thus implicitly defines a class of scenarios, which include as an instance what occurred at Überlingen. Brahms-GUeM is a modeling framework enabling "what if" analysis of alternative work system configurations and thus facilitating design of alternative operations concepts. It enables subsequent adaption (reusing simulation components) for modeling and simulating NextGen scenarios. This project demonstrates that BRAHMS provides the capacity to model the complexity of air transportation systems, going beyond idealized and simple flights to include for example the interaction of pilots and ATCOs. The research shows clearly that verification and validation must include the entire work system, on the one hand to check that mechanisms exist to handle failures of communication and alerting subsystems and/or failures of people to notice, comprehend, or communicate problematic (unsafe) situations; but also to understand how people must use their own judgment in relating fallible systems like TCAS to other sources of information and thus to evaluate how the unreliability of automation affects system safety. The simulation shows in particular that distributed agents (people and automated systems) acting without knowledge of each others' actions can create a complex, dynamic system whose interactive behavior is unexpected and is changing too quickly to comprehend and control.

complex systems↗
NASA NTRS2014

Force Limiting Vibration Tests Evaluated from both Ground Acoustic Tests and FEM Simulations of a Flight Like Vehicle System Assembly

Marshall Space Flight Center has conducted a series of ground acoustic tests with the dual goals of informing analytical judgment, and validating analytical methods when estimating vibroacoustic responses of launch vehicle subsystems. The process of repeatedly correlating finite element-simulated responses with test-measured responses has assisted in the development of best practices for modeling and post-processing. In recent work, force transducers were integrated to measure interface forces at the base of avionics box equipment. Other force data was indirectly measured using strain gauges. The combination of these direct and indirect force measurements has been used to support and illustrate the advantages of implementing the Force Limiting approach for equipment qualification tests. The comparison of force response from integrated system level tests to measurements at the same locations during component level vibration tests provides an excellent illustration. A second comparison of the measured response cases from the system level acoustic tests to finite element simulations has also produced some principles for assessing the suitability of Finite Element Models (FEMs) for making vibroacoustics estimates. The results indicate that when FEM models are employed to guide force limiting choices, they should include sufficient detail to represent the apparent mass of the system in the frequency range of interest.

Smith, Andrew↗
NASA NTRS2014

Neither Pollyanna nor Chicken Little: Thoughts on the Ethics of Automation

This paper has raised issues concerning the ethics of automation in aviation systems, and outlined ways of thinking about the issues that may help in ethical decision making. It is very easy to be carried along by technology and the Pollyanna view, but just because we can do something, doesn't mean we should - which is perhaps a little milder than the Chicken Little view. Both views have merits, and we would view ethical decisions as ones that more appropriately balance or reconcile these conflicting viewpoints. We have set out some of the background to the problems of automation in aviation systems, but are aware that there is much more that could be said (considering military UAS, for example). We hope, however, that the brief introduction provides a foundation for the ethical questions that we have set out. The underlying aim in proposing ESCs is to make understanding ethical issues easier so that ethically-informed decisions can be made. Whilst we have not linked the discussion directly back to specific ethical decisions, we believe that making explicit those issues on which such judgments are based is a contribution to ethically informed decision making. We also believe that the four principles set out by the RAEng are reflected in this approach. We acknowledge that what we have set out, especially the ideas of ESC, goes some way beyond current practice and principles and there are significant technical issues to resolve before such an approach could be implemented. It is hoped, however, that the ideas will help improve the production and presentation of safety cases in a range of industries not just aviation - a Pollyanna view, of course!

Holloway, C. Michael↗
NASA NTRS2015

New York City Panel on Climate Change 2015 Report: Climate Observations and Projections - Chapter 1

During 2013 and 2014, numerous international (IPCC, 2013) and national (Melillo et al., 2014; Gordon, 2014) reports have concluded that human activities are changing the climate, leading to increased vulnerability and risk. Since the industrial revolution, fossil fuel burning, industrial activity, and land use changes have led to a 40% increase in heat-trapping carbon dioxide (CO2), and an approximately 150% increase in methane (CH4), another powerful greenhouse gas (GHG), has been observed. Global temperatures have increased by close to 1 C since 1880 as the upper oceans have warmed and polar ice has retreated. These and other climate changes are projected to accelerate as greenhouse gas concentrations continue to rise. In the coming decades, climate change is extremely likely to bring warmer temperatures in the New York metropolitan region (see Box. 1.1 and Fig.1.1 for key definitions and terms). Heat waves are very likely to increase; total annual precipitation will likely increase and brief, intense rainstorms are very likely to increase. Because of incomplete knowledge about exactly how much climate change will occur, choosing among policies for reducing future damages requires prudent risk management (Yohe and Leichenko, 2010; Kunreuther et al., 2013). Given differing risk tolerances among stakeholders, a risk management approach allows for a range of possible climate change outcomes to be examined with associated uncertainties surrounding their likelihoods. The New York City Panel on Climate Change 2 (NPCC2) projections can be used to inform planning across multiple governmental scales (e.g., city, county, state) in the New York metropolitan region. Such coordinated efforts can serve as test cases for successful local, state, and federal coordination for integrated climate adaptation initiatives. This chapter describes the global climate system, and presents observed temperature and precipitation trends and projections for the region. Chapter 2 (NPCC, 2015) focuses on sea level rise and possible changes in coastal storms. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 (NPCC, 2015) describe efforts to better understand the region's vulnerability to coastal flooding during coastal storms. The treatment of likelihood related to the NPCC projections is similar to that developed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth and Fifth Assessment Reports (IPCC, 2007; 2013), with six likelihood categories (Box 1.1 and Fig. 1.1). The assignment of climate hazards to these categories is based on observed data, global climate model simulations, published literature, and expert judgment.

climate change↗
NASA NTRS2011

A Team Mental Model Perspective of Pre-Quantitative Risk

This study was conducted to better understand how teams conceptualize risk before it can be quantified, and the processes by which a team forms a shared mental model of this pre-quantitative risk. Using an extreme case, this study analyzes seven months of team meeting transcripts, covering the entire lifetime of the team. Through an analysis of team discussions, a rich and varied structural model of risk emerges that goes significantly beyond classical representations of risk as the product of a negative consequence and a probability. In addition to those two fundamental components, the team conceptualization includes the ability to influence outcomes and probabilities, networks of goals, interaction effects, and qualitative judgments about the acceptability of risk, all affected by associated uncertainties. In moving from individual to team mental models, team members employ a number of strategies to gain group recognition of risks and to resolve or accept differences.

Cooper, Lynne P.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Cognitive Bias in the Verification and Validation of Space Flight Systems

Cognitive bias is generally recognized as playing a significant role in virtually all domains of human decision making. Insight into this role is informally built into many of the system engineering practices employed in the aerospace industry. The review process, for example, typically has features that help to counteract the effect of bias. This paper presents a discussion of how commonly recognized biases may affect the verification and validation process. Verifying and validating a system is arguably more challenging than development, both technically and cognitively. Whereas there may be a relatively limited number of options available for the design of a particular aspect of a system, there is a virtually unlimited number of potential verification scenarios that may be explored. The probability of any particular scenario occurring in operations is typically very difficult to estimate, which increases reliance on judgment that may be affected by bias. Implementing a verification activity often presents technical challenges that, if they can be overcome at all, often result in a departure from actual flight conditions (e.g., 1-g testing, simulation, time compression, artificial fault injection) that may raise additional questions about the meaningfulness of the results, and create opportunities for the introduction of additional biases. In addition to mitigating the biases it can introduce directly, the verification and validation process must also overcome the cumulative effect of biases introduced during all previous stages of development. A variety of cognitive biases will be described, with research results for illustration. A handful of case studies will be presented that show how cognitive bias may have affected the verification and validation process on recent JPL flight projects, identify areas of strength and weakness, and identify potential changes or additions to commonly used techniques that could provide a more robust verification and validation of future systems.

Larson, Steve↗
NASA NTRS2016

The Psychology of Cost Estimating

Cost estimation for large (and even not so large) government programs is a challenge. The number and magnitude of cost overruns associated with large Department of Defense (DoD) and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) programs highlight the difficulties in developing and promulgating accurate cost estimates. These overruns can be the result of inadequate technology readiness or requirements definition, the whims of politicians or government bureaucrats, or even as failures of the cost estimating profession itself. However, there may be another reason for cost overruns that is right in front of us, but only recently have we begun to grasp it: the fact that cost estimators and their customers are human. The last 70+ years of research into human psychology and behavioral economics have yielded amazing findings into how we humans process and use information to make judgments and decisions. What these scientists have uncovered is surprising: humans are often irrational and illogical beings, making decisions based on factors such as emotion and perception, rather than facts and data. These built-in biases to our thinking directly affect how we develop our cost estimates and how those cost estimates are used. We cost estimators can use this knowledge of biases to improve our cost estimates and also to improve how we communicate and work with our customers. By understanding how our customers think, and more importantly, why they think the way they do, we can have more productive relationships and greater influence. By using psychology to our advantage, we can more effectively help the decision maker and our organizations make fact-based decisions.

Price, Andy↗
NASA NTRS2016

Utilizing the ISS Mission as a Testbed to Develop Cognitive Communications Systems

The ISS provides an excellent opportunity for pioneering artificial intelligence software to meet the challenges of real-time communications (comm) link management. This opportunity empowers the ISS Program to forge a testbed for developing cognitive communications systems for the benefit of the ISS mission, manned Low Earth Orbit (LEO) science programs and future planetary exploration programs. In November, 1998, the Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) started the ISS Antenna Manager (IAM) project to develop a single processor supporting multiple comm satellite tracking for two different antenna systems. Further, the processor was developed to be highly adaptable as it supported the ISS mission through all assembly stages. The ISS mission mandated communications specialists with complete knowledge of when the ISS was about to lose or gain comm link service. The current specialty mandated cognizance of large sun-tracking solar arrays and thermal management panels in addition to the highly-dynamic satellite service schedules and rise/set tables. This mission requirement makes the ISS the ideal communications management analogue for future LEO space station and long-duration planetary exploration missions. Future missions, with their precision-pointed, dynamic, laser-based comm links, require complete autonomy for managing high-data rate communications systems. Development of cognitive communications management systems that permit any crew member or payload science specialist, regardless of experience level, to control communications is one of the greater benefits the ISS can offer new space exploration programs. The IAM project met a new mission requirement never previously levied against US space-born communications systems management: process and display the orientation of large solar arrays and thermal control panels based on real-time joint angle telemetry. However, IAM leaves the actual communications availability assessment to human judgment, which introduces unwanted variability because each specialist has a different core of experience with comm link performance. Because the ISS utilizes two different frequency bands, dynamic structure can be occasionally translucent at one frequency while it can completely interdict service at the other frequency. The impact of articulating structure on the comm link can depend on its orientation at the time it impinges on the link. It can become easy for a human specialist to cross-associate experience at one frequency with experience at the other frequency. Additionally, the specialist's experience is incremental, occurring one nine-hour shift at a time. Only the IAM processor experiences the complete 24x7x365 communications link performance for both communications links but, it has no "learning capability." If the IAM processor could be endowed with a cognitive ability to remember past structure-induced comm link outages, based on its knowledge of the ISS position, attitude, communications gear, array joint angles and tracking accuracy, it could convey such experience to the human operator. It could also use its learned communications link behaviors to accurately convey the availability of future communications sessions. Further, the tool could remember how accurately or inaccurately it predicted availability and correct future predictions based on past performance. The IAM tool could learn frequency-specific impacts due to spacecraft structures and pass that information along as "experience." Such development would provide a single artificial intelligence processor that could provide two different experience bases. If it also "knew" the satellite service schedule, it could distinguish structure blockage from schedule or planet blockage and then quickly switch to another satellite. Alternatively, just as a human operator could judge, a cognizant comm system based on the IAM model could "know" that the blockage is not going to last very long and continue tracking a comm satellite, waiting for it to track away from structure. Ultimately, once this capability was fully developed and tested in the Mission Control Center, it could be transferred on-orbit to support development of operations concepts that include more advanced cognitive communications systems. Future applications of this capability are easily foreseen because even more dynamic satellite constellations with more nodes and greater capability are coming. Currently, the ISS fully employs a 300 million bit-per-second (Mbps) return link for harvesting payload science. In the coming eighteen months, it will step up to 600 Mbps. Already there is talk of a 1.2 billion bit-per-second (Gbps) upgrade for the ISS and laser comm links have already been tested from the ISS. Every data rate upgrade mandates more complicated and sensitive communications equipment which implies greater expertise invested in the human operator. Future on-orbit cognizant comm systems will be needed to meet greater performance demands aboard larger, far more complicated spacecraft. In the LEO environment, the old-style one-satellite-per-spacecraft operations concept will give way to a new concept of a single customer spacecraft simultaneously using multiple comm satellites. Much more highly-dynamic manned LEO missions with decades of crew members potentially increase the demand for communications link performance. A cognizant on-board communications system will meet advanced communications demands from future LEO missions and future planetary missions. The ISS has fledgling components of future exploration programs, both LEO and planetary. Further, the Flight Operations Directorate, through the IAM project, has already begun to develop a communications management system that attempts to solve advanced problems ideally represented by dynamic structure impacting scheduled satellite service. With an earnest project to integrate artificial intelligence into the IAM processor, the ISS Program could develop a cognizant communications system that could be adapted and transferred to future on-orbit avionics designs.

Jackson, Dan↗
NASA NTRS2016

A Carbonaceous Chondrite Based Simulant of Phobos

In support of an ESA-funded concept study considering a sample return mission, a simulant of the Martian moon Phobos was needed. There are no samples of the Phobos regolith, therefore none of the four characteristics normally used to design a simulant are explicitly known for Phobos. Because of this, specifications for a Phobos simulant were based on spectroscopy, other remote measurements, and judgment. A composition based on the Tagish Lake meteorite was assumed. The requirement that sterility be achieved, especially given the required organic content, was unusual and problematic. The final design mixed JSC-1A, antigorite, pseudo-agglutinates and gilsonite. Sterility was achieved by radiation in a commercial facility.

simulant↗
NASA NTRS2016

Confidence Intervals for Laboratory Sonic Boom Annoyance Tests

Commercial supersonic flight is currently forbidden over land because sonic booms have historically caused unacceptable annoyance levels in overflown communities. NASA is providing data and expertise to noise regulators as they consider relaxing the ban for future quiet supersonic aircraft. One deliverable NASA will provide is a predictive model for indoor annoyance to aid in setting an acceptable quiet sonic boom threshold. A laboratory study was conducted to determine how indoor vibrations caused by sonic booms affect annoyance judgments. The test method required finding the point of subjective equality (PSE) between sonic boom signals that cause vibrations and signals not causing vibrations played at various amplitudes. This presentation focuses on a few statistical techniques for estimating the interval around the PSE. The techniques examined are the Delta Method, Parametric and Nonparametric Bootstrapping, and Bayesian Posterior Estimation.

Rathsam, Jonathan↗
NASA NTRS2016

SC-228 Inclusion of DAA Warning Alert for TCAS Interoperability

This white paper summarizes NASA research results that have informed Special Committee 228 (SC-228) discussions and decisions regarding the inclusion of a warning-level alert within the detect and avoid (DAA) alerting structure for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). For UAS, the removal of the pilot from onboard the aircraft has eliminated the ability of the ground-based pilot in command (PIC) to use out-the-window visual information to make judgments about a potential threat of a loss of well clear with another aircraft. As a result, the DAA traffic display will be the primary source of information that the PIC can use to execute the three primary well clear functions: 1) detect a potential loss of well clear, 2) determine a resolution maneuver, and 3) upload that maneuver to the aircraft via the ground control station (GCS). In addition, pilots are required to coordinate with air traffic control (ATC) prior to maneuvering off of their approved flight plan. In determining an appropriate resolution maneuver to avoid a loss of well clear, the PIC must decide both when and how to maneuver, and both the timeliness and the accuracy (i.e., correctness) of the maneuver are critical to reducing the likelihood and/or severity of a loss of well clear. Alerting information is one of three critical components of the DAA display, along with traffic information elements (e.g., relative heading, speed and altitude) and maneuver guidance. Alerting information and maneuver guidance, in particular, have been found to have a significant impact, both statistically and practically, on pilots' ability to avoid and minimize the severity of losses of well clear While all three display components are key to pilots performing the traffic avoidance task of remaining well clear, in general, alerting information provides crucial information about when a resolution maneuver is required while maneuver guidance assists the pilot in determining how best to maneuver. A fundamental task of the DAA alerting system is to provide critical timing information to the pilot about the potential for a loss of well clear with another aircraft. This is done by employing both temporal and spatial thresholds that indicate to the pilot the likelihood and imminence of a loss of well clear. The design of the DAA alerting thresholds is a balancing act between eliciting the desired pilot response in real loss of well clear threat events and reducing excessive, unnecessary, and/or uncoordinated UAS maneuvering within the air traffic environment; larger thresholds, both spatially and temporally, may increase the likelihood of a pilot avoiding a loss of well clear, but it can also increase the frequency of maneuvering - especially in cases where a maneuver is not actually needed to maintain well clear. A series of human in the loop (HITL) simulations have been conducted as part of NASA's Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Integration in the National Airspace System (NAS) project. The purpose of these HITLs has been to provide empirical results in order to inform development of the minimum human-machine interface requirements for the DAA system. This white paper will present those results which provide evidence of a human performance benefit (in terms of response times and ability to remain well clear of other aircraft) of the DAA warning alert both with and without a collision avoidance system on board the aircraft.

TCAS interoperability↗