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At least 343 records · Page 19

Understanding the Manager of the Project Front-End

Historical data and new findings from interviews with managers of major National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) projects confirm literature reports about the criticality of the front-end phase of project development, where systems engineering plays such a key role. Recent research into the management of ten contemporary NASA projects, combined with personal experience of the author in NASA, provide some insight into the relevance and importance of the project manager in this initial part of the project life cycle. The research findings provide evidence of similar approaches taken by the NASA project manager.

Mulenburg, Gerald M.↗

Mars Observer Press Conference JPL

The Mars Observer mission spacecraft was primarily designed for exploring Mars and the Martian environment. The Mars Observer was launched on September 25, 1992. The spacecraft was lost in the vicinity of Mars on August 21, 1993 when the spacecraft began its maneuvering sequence for Martian orbital insertion. This videotape shows a press briefing, held after the spacecraft had not responded to attempts to communicate with it, to explain to the press the problems and the steps that were being taken to re-establish communication with the spacecraft. The communications had been shutdown prior to the orbital insertion burn to protect the instruments. At the time of the press conference, the communications system was still not operational, and attempts were being made to re-establish communication. Bob McMillan of the Public Affairs Office at JPL gives the initial announcement of the continuing communication problem with the spacecraft. Mr. McMillan introduces William Piotrowski, acting director of solar system exploration, who reiterates that there is indeed no communication with the Observer spacecraft. He is followed by Glenn Cunningham, the Project Manager of the Mars Observer who speaks about the attempts to re-establish contact. Mr. Cunningham is followed by Satenios Dallas, the Mission Manager for the Mars Observer Project, who speaks about the sequence of events leading up to the communication failure, and shows an animated video presenting the orbital insertion maneuvers. The briefing was then opened up for questions from the assembled press, both at JPL and at the other NASA Centers. The questions are about the possible reasons for the communication failure, and the attempts to restore communications with the spacecraft. Dr. Arden L. Albee, chief scientist for the Mars Observer Mission, joins the other panel members to answer questions. At the end of the press briefing the animation of the Mars orbital insertion is shown again.

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Starfire 1 Consort III Launch

The Consort 3 is a commercial suborbital rocket that carried 12 microgravity experiments. It was launched on a Starfire rocket on May 16, 1990, from the Naval Ordnance Missile Test Station facilities at the U.S. Army's White Sands Missile Range (WSMR), NM. The videotape opens with approximately 2 minutes of a man speaking into a microphone but there is no sound. This is followed by a brief summary of the payload, and the expected trajectory, a view of the launch vehicle, the countdown and the launch. The videotape then shows a film clip from the University of Alabama, with Dr. Francis Wessling, project manager for the Consort 3 project, speaking about the mission goals in the materials sciences experimentation. The video shows footage of the payload being assembled. The next section is a discussion by Dr. Roy Hammustedt, of Pennsylvania State University, who reviews the Penn State Bio Module,and the goal of learning about the effects of gravity on physiology. This is followed by George Maybee, from McDonald Douglas, who spoke about the payload integration process while the video shows some of the construction. The last section of the videotape shows a press conference at the launch site. Ana Villamil answers questions from the press about the flight.

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NASA Human System Risk Assessment Process

NASA utilizes an evidence based system to perform risk assessments for the human system for spaceflight missions. The center of this process is the multi-disciplinary Human System Risk Board (HSRB). The HSRB is chartered from the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) at NASA Headquarters. The HSRB reviews all human system risks via an established comprehensive risk and configuration management plan based on a project management approach. The HSRB facilitates the integration of human research (terrestrial and spaceflight), medical operations, occupational surveillance, systems engineering and many other disciplines in a comprehensive review of human system risks. The HSRB considers all factors that influence human risk. These factors include pre-mission considerations such as screening criteria, training, age, sex, and physiological condition. In mission factors such as available countermeasures, mission duration and location and post mission factors such as time to return to baseline (reconditioning), post mission health screening, and available treatments. All of the factors influence the total risk assessment for each human risk. The HSRB performed a comprehensive review of all potential inflight medical conditions and events and over the course of several reviews consolidated the number of human system risks to 30, where the greatest emphasis is placed for investing program dollars for risk mitigation. The HSRB considers all available evidence from human research and, medical operations and occupational surveillance in assessing the risks for appropriate mitigation and future work. All applicable DRMs (low earth orbit for 6 and 12 months, deep space for 30 days and 1 year, a lunar mission for 1 year, and a planetary mission for 3 years) are considered as human system risks are modified by the hazards associated with space flight such as microgravity, exposure to radiation, distance from the earth, isolation and a closed environment. Each risk has a summary two-page assessment representing the state of knowledge/evidence of that risk, available risk mitigations, traceability to the Space Flight Human System Standards (SFHSS) and program requirements, and future work required. These data then can drive coordinated budgets across the Human Research Program, the International Space Station, Crew Health and Safety and Advanced Exploration System budgets to provide the most economical and timely mitigations. The risk assessments were completed for the 6 DRMs and serve as the baseline for which subsequent research and technology development and crew health care portfolios can be assessed. The HSRB reviews each risk at least annually or when new evidence/information is available that adds to the body of evidence. The current status of each risk can be reported to program management for operations, budget reviews and general oversight of the human system risk management program.

Francisco, D.↗

Underestimation of Project Costs

Large projects almost always exceed their budgets. Estimating cost is difficult and estimated costs are usually too low. Three different reasons are suggested: bad luck, overoptimism, and deliberate underestimation. Project management can usually point to project difficulty and complexity, technical uncertainty, stakeholder conflicts, scope changes, unforeseen events, and other not really unpredictable bad luck. Project planning is usually over-optimistic, so the likelihood and impact of bad luck is systematically underestimated. Project plans reflect optimism and hope for success in a supposedly unique new effort rather than rational expectations based on historical data. Past project problems are claimed to be irrelevant because "This time it's different." Some bad luck is inevitable and reasonable optimism is understandable, but deliberate deception must be condemned. In a competitive environment, project planners and advocates often deliberately underestimate costs to help gain project approval and funding. Project benefits, cost savings, and probability of success are exaggerated and key risks ignored. Project advocates have incentives to distort information and conceal difficulties from project approvers. One naively suggested cure is more openness, honesty, and group adherence to shared overall goals. A more realistic alternative is threatening overrun projects with cancellation. Neither approach seems to solve the problem. A better method to avoid the delusions of over-optimism and the deceptions of biased advocacy is to base the project cost estimate on the actual costs of a large group of similar projects. Over optimism and deception can continue beyond the planning phase and into project execution. Hard milestones based on verified tests and demonstrations can provide a reality check.

Cost estimation↗

A New Approach to Mission Classification and Risk Management for NASA Space Flight Missions

The NASA risk classification system is meant to uide space mission development from formulation through completion of implementation. It is also meant to be the basis on which program and project managers develop and implement appropriate mission assurance and risk management strategies for the mission. In order to be useful, the risk classification system needs to provide consistent and reproducible classification results so that missions may be designed with the appropriate components, subsystems, and testing philosophy, all of which impacts mission schedule and cost. In a cost-constrained environment, a clear, robust, and reproducible approach to mission implementation becomes more critical than ever before. Once a project's risk classification level is established, the managers can define the appropriate management controls, systems engineering processes, mission assurance requirements, safety, and testing for that mission. The current NASA mission classification system will be reviewed before a new system is proposed.NASA manages space flight missions according to a four-tiered classification which assumes increasing levels of risk. We argue that risk does not change between classes. What changes are the means available to reduce risk. In performance-driven missions, the project will spend money in order to maintain performance without reducing margins. In cost-constrained missions, performance will be reduced in order to stay within budget or to maintain schedule: measurement requirements may be traded, design life may be reduced, or both. We then propose a new approach to the classification of NASA space flight missions, based on an assessment of how flexible the requirements, how exquisite the measurements, how long the lifetime, and how rigid the budget.Our proposed approach makes possible a clearer differentiation between classification levels and more effective guidance to program and project managers.

Bordi, Francesco↗

Hubble Space Telescope Spacecraft Overview Briefing

This Kennedy Space Center video release presents the third part of a press conference held at Goddard Space Flight Center on Jan. 13, 1994. The session is moderated by Randee Exler (News Chief, GSFC) and includes presentations by Ken Ledbetter (HST Program Manager, NASA Headquarters), Frank Cepollina (HST Project Manager for Flight Systems and Servicing, GSFC) and Joe Rothenberg (Director, HST Flight Projects, GSFC) that discuss pre-flight testing and training, on-orbit servicing, highlights, and the status of the Hubble Space Telescope (HST). A question and answer period follows the presentations, after which three short highlight videos are presented that include actual footage of on-orbit servicing, galactic images taken by the HST, and pre-flight preparation and construction.

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EOS Directory

This Earth Observing System (EOS) directory is divided into two main sections: white and yellow pages. The white pages list alphabetically the names and addresses -- including e-mail, phone, and fax when available -- of all individuals involved with EOS, from graduate students to panel members to program management and more. The yellow pages list the names, affiliation, and phone number of participants divided by project management, program management, individual project participants, interdisciplinary investigations (listed alphabetically by PI), the Science Executive Committee, various panels, platforms, working groups, fellowships, and contractors.

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Risk Management Structured for Today's Environment

Today's project management environment provides NASA with myriad challenges. We have smaller budgets and, consequently, smaller programs and shorter lead times. We have less money for development, and no money to recover from contingencies or mishaps. The NASA Administrator is leading the Agency away from operations, instilling a renewed focus on scientific research and the development and application of new cutting-edge technologies. We are using performance-based and fixed-price contracts with industry, and we are forming more and more partnerships with the international community. In addition to the environment, we have many NASA-unique conditions that challenge mission success. They include a higher level of performance requirements, limited production numbers, higher development efforts and cost, the inability to operate a space element fully under realistic conditions on the ground, limited access to the product during operation, and, of course, the need for more science for fewer dollars and on a shorter schedule.

Michael A. Greenfield↗

How to plan and manage reserves effectively

Three categories comprise the major project manager (PM) responsibility. To be successful, he/she has to control quality, schedule and budget. When these come together inside an agreement with a customer/sponsor, all is well.

scope↗

STARDUST: Discovery's InterStellar Dust and Cometary Sample Return Mission

The STARDUST Discovery mission will collect samples of cometary and interstellar dust and return them to Earth. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory provides project management with Lockheed Martin Astronautics as the spacecraft industrial partner. STARDUST management is aggressively pursuing cost control through the use of Total Quality Management principles, specifically operating in a Project Engineering and Integration Team that

STARDUST↗

NASA gets under way

The organization, staffing, and project management of NASA was reviewed. Early projects included: sounding rocket research; explorer-class satellites; geodetic satellites; weather satellites; and communication satellites. The first recorded direct obligations to space science or related projects are presented.

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The Software Management Environment (SME)

The Software Management Environment (SME) is a research effort designed to utilize the past experiences and results of the Software Engineering Laboratory (SEL) and to incorporate this knowledge into a tool for managing projects. SME provides the software development manager with the ability to observe, compare, predict, analyze, and control key software development parameters such as effort, reliability, and resource utilization. The major components of the SME, the architecture of the system, and examples of the functionality of the tool are discussed.

Valett, Jon D.↗

Program Helps Standardize Documentation Of Software

Intelligent Documentation Management System, IDMS, computer program developed to assist project managers in implementing information system documentation standard known as NASA-STD-2100-91, NASA STD, COS-10300, of NASA's Software Management and Assurance Program. Standard consists of data-item descriptions or templates, each of which governs particular component of software documentation. IDMS helps program manager in tailoring documentation standard to project. Written in C language.

Howe, G.↗

Lunar-Ultraviolet Telescope Experiment (LUTE) integrated program plan

A detailed Lunar Ultraviolet Telescope Experiment (LUTE) program plan representing major decisions and tasks leading to those decisions for program execution are presented. The purpose of this task was to develop an integrated plan of project activities for the LUTE project, and to display the plan as an integrated network that shows the project activities, all critical interfaces, and schedules. The integrated network will provide the project manager with a frame work for strategic planning and risk management throughout the life of the project.

Smith, Janice F.↗

Post-Flight Assessment Review (PFAR): Advanced Colloids Experiment (ACE) ACE-T7-1,2

The objective of this PFAR is to: • Provide closure to ZIN DO-237 ACE-T7work and close NASA NPR 7123.1 requirements as listed in the SpaceDOC-II (S2) contract (the S2 CDRL DID No. PM-09 calls for a SEMP which refers backto NPR 7123.1) • Provide closure of SEMP (ZIN’s P40025) requirements for Technical Reviews • Provide plan to complete Informatics requirements. • Provide milestone closure to sponsoring organization. • Document property re-use and transfer decisions. • Transfer raw science data to the designated repository at MSFC. • Transfer required documents to Informatics • Opens an Informatics folder at MSFC to officially receive ACE-T7 information. • Capture open action items. • Create a formal presentation in configuration control. • Provide directions (in a Project Manager Report) how to contact the Project and Science teams through NASA when follow-on grants are awarded by Informatics.

microgravity↗

Manager's Role in Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Control

This presentation captures the essence of electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) engineering from a project manager's perspective. It explains the basics of EMC and the benefits to the project of early incorporation of EMC best practices. The EMC requirement products during a project life cycle are identified, along with the requirement verification methods that should be utilized. The goal of the presentation is to raise awareness and simplify the mystique surrounding electromagnetic compatibility for managers that have little or no electromagnetics background

Safety↗

Evaluating success levels of mega-projects

Today's mega-projects transcend the traditional trajectories traced within national and technological limitations. Powers unleashed by internationalization of initiatives, in for example space exploration and environmental protection, are arguably only temporarily suppressed by narrower national, economic, and professional disagreements as to how best they should be harnessed. While the world gets its act together there is time to develop the technologies of such supra-mega-project management that will synergize truly diverse resources and smoothly mesh their interfaces. Such mega-projects and their management need to be realistically evaluated, when implementing such improvements. This paper examines current approaches to evaluating mega-projects and questions the validity of extrapolations to the supra-mega-projects of the future. Alternatives to improve such evaluations are proposed and described.

Kumaraswamy, Mohan M.↗