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At least 343 records · Page 19

Realizing the Materials-Designed-To-Environments Promise of Additive Manufacturing Through a Fundamentally Different Approach to Optimization of Nonlinear Solid Mechanics Structures

Additive Manufacturing (AM) is expected to play a large role in the labs-wide goals of accelerating innovation and leading in modern engineering. More specifically, AM is seen as a key enabling technology for increasing the agility of nuclear deterrence and other national security applications involving complex coupled environments. However, the impact of AM on these initiatives has not been as wide-ranging as hoped because – despite its unique qualities – the focus has mostly been on detailed qualification to force AM components into pre-existing performance envelopes. This paradigm fundamentally precludes the novel possibilities afforded by the geometric and material flexibility of AM. In particular, the engineering of small-scale features to undergo buckling and contact can cause large geometric and symmetry changes which provide responsiveness to different environments. Despite almost a decade of observing such behavior, there exists no way to systematically design for AM to exploit it. Our goal for this project was to connect material design to multi-environment component performance by reconceptualizing how to design for AM to exploit the buckling and contact of small-scale features.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Low Temperature Tantalum Electrodeposition: Enabling Next Generation Coatings

This project aimed to identify the ligand and solvation conditions necessary for the electrodeposition of refractory metals from low-temperature organic electrolytes. Tantalum (Ta) was chosen as a specific exemplar for programmatic purposes. It was hoped that a deeper understanding of these relationships could facilitate the innovative application of refractory metal coatings on thermally sensitive and geometrically intricate components used in extreme environments related to energy generation and storage, nuclear deterrence, aerospace, defense, and beyond.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Test and Evaluation of Radiofrequency Tamper Indicating Devices for Remote Monitoring of Advanced/Small Modular Reactors

Advanced and small modular reactors (A/SMRs), due to their versatile nature, are likely to be used in remote locations to provide electrical power or other services in regions that are difficult to access or have limited transportation infrastructure. This will result in limited on-site staff, therefore driving A/SMR vendors to consider remote monitoring as a solution to support nuclear security. Maintaining Continuity of Knowledge (CoK) of nuclear material quantities and locations is vital to nuclear security, and remote monitoring of active tamper indicating devices (TIDs) has been well established as a component of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards since the early 2000s. Active TIDs, such as radiofrequency TIDs (RFTIDs), immediately alarm upon unauthorized access attempts, promoting timely detection. In contrast, passive TIDs require a surveillance regime and offer delayed detection. Active TIDs deter insiders and enable prompt detection of malicious acts. They can be used on nuclear material containers and controlled entry points like vaults and toolboxes. Therefore, the implementation of RFTIDs into security programs bolsters overall nuclear material control, and provides a visible deterrent, with primary efficacy in mitigating the insider threat and potentially allowing for Security by Design considerations. They are a strong candidate technology for maintaining nuclear security of A/SMRs but need to be evaluated for feasibility and implementation into the wider physical protection system.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Stockpile Stewardship and Nuclear Testing: A Technical Assessment

Since 1992, the United States has retained confidence in its nuclear weapon stockpile without performing any tests that produce nuclear yield. Instead, it has invested in a stockpile stewardship program (SSP) based on the same approach that was validated through fifty years of experience during the nuclear testing era. As the test moratorium continues and new information becomes available, it is both necessary and appropriate to periodically revisit the question of whether or not nuclear testing should resume. In a recent article by Dr. Mark Schneider, he asserts that the United States should return to nuclear testing to address the issues that negatively affect our country’s nuclear deterrent. A serious, technically informed evaluation of the most significant of the issues Dr. Schneider has raised is provided in this paper. The conclusion of this evaluation is that the strategy of a well-funded SSP coupled with rigorous assessments to identify if there is a specific need for a nuclear test is sound and cost-effective approach. Any decision otherwise needs to take into careful consideration all the classified SSP successes and data pertaining to the particular issues in question.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Watching for light: An enterprise roadmap for trustworthy laser threat warning (LTW) to protect national assets

Comprehensive space force protection must include effective and trustworthy laser threat warning (LTW). Effective LTW will detect and characterize threats to space assets and thus enhance space deterrence. LTW must be trustworthy: able to categorize threats and non-threats by being both sensitive to true events and resistant to false alarms. Outside of the laboratory, the statistics and even the roles of lasers become unclear. In the chain of events leading to an attack, the laser may be the last link to be understood. Human situational awareness and informal reasoning must blend statistics with circumstantial evidence to visualize these chains before they are clear. This paper sets out an industrial model for an enterprise that will routinely produce trustworthy LTW. By incorporating psychology and economics, this enterprise can overcome the difficulties and perils of cooperation in networked defense and intelligence. This roadmap suggests how the enterprise can incentivize distracted actors with different goals to share what they know and coordinate what they do.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Risks to the DOW Mission From Global Advanced Energy Adoption

Advanced energy technologies have the potential to enhance energy security and resilience; however, they can introduce new vulnerabilities even as they mitigate existing ones. This dichotomy highlights that both action and inaction carry strategic risks in a contested and logistically complex operating environment. Regardless of U.S. civilian or military adoption of such technologies, key allies and adversaries are on adoption paths that will impact the U.S. military at the tactical, operational, and strategic level. The global adoption of advanced energy technologies presents the potential for both positive and negative consequences for U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) missions in the next 10-20 years. Three categories of risk drivers are presented in this analysis: infrastructure-related, adoption-related, and response-related. Each risk type can generate consequences for DOD, including power disruptions, suboptimal DOD mission performance and operational effectiveness, higher costs and shortages for both legacy and advanced energy technologies, and loss of U.S. influence and strategic deterrent value. Specific impacts could include tactical impacts, operational impacts, and strategic impacts. Mitigation strategies could include energy resource and technology planning, cybersecurity, supply chain resilience, workforce development, exercises and simulations, investments in commercialized technology, operational testing and pilot programs, research into emerging technologies, partnerships and working groups, common standards, budget planning, and repurposing infrastructure.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

INFORMATION: Inspection Report on "Removal of Categories I and II Special Nuclear Material from Sandia National Laboratories-New Mexico"

The Department of Energy's (DOE's) Sandia National Laboratories-New Mexico (Sandia) develops science-based technologies in support of national security in areas such as nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, military technologies, and homeland security. Sandia's primary mission is ensuring that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is safe, secure, and reliable and can fully support the Nation's deterrence policy. Part of this mission includes systems engineering of nuclear weapons; research, design, and development of non-nuclear components; manufacturing of non-nuclear weapons components; the provision of safety, security, and reliability assessments of stockpile weapons; and the conduct of high-explosives research and development and environmental testing. Sandia Corporation, a subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, operates Sandia for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). On May 7, 2004, the Secretary announced that the Department would evaluate missions at DOE sites to consolidate Special Nuclear Material (SNM) in the most secure environments possible. The Administrator of the NNSA said that this effort was a key part of an overall plan to transform the nuclear weapons complex into a smaller, safer, more secure, and more efficient national security enterprise. In February 2008, Sandia was the first site to report it had reduced its on-site inventory of nuclear material below 'Categories I and II' levels, which require the highest level of security to protect material such as plutonium and highly enriched uranium. The Office of Inspector General initiated an inspection to determine if Sandia made appropriate adjustments to its security posture in response to the removal of the Categories I and II SNM. We found that Sandia adjusted its security posture in response to the removal of Categories I and II SNM. For example, security posts were closed; unneeded protective force weapons and equipment were excessed from the site; and, Sandia's Site Safeguards and Security Plan was modified. We also found that some highly enriched uranium in a complex material configuration was not removed from Sandia. This material was designated as Category III material using a methodology for assessing the attractiveness of complex materials that was not specifically addressed in any current DOE directive. Although DOE and NNSA officials believed that this designation was appropriate, the methodology used to support this designation had not, as of the time of our review, been incorporated into the DOE directives system. Historically, the Department has considered the categorization of SNM to be an important national security and public policy issue. Consequently, we believe that expedited action should be taken to formalize this methodology in the DOE directives system and that it be disseminated throughout the Department of Energy complex.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Science and Technology Review July/August 2010

This issue has the following articles: (1) Deterrence with a Minimum Nuclear Stockpile - Commentary by Bruce T. Goodwin; (2) Enhancing Confidence in the Nation's Nuclear Stockpile - Livermore experts are participating in a national effort aimed at predicting how nuclear weapon materials and systems will likely change over time; (3) Narrowing Uncertainties - For climate modeling and many other fields, understanding uncertainty, or margin of error, is critical; (4) Insight into a Deadly Disease - Laboratory experiments reveal the pathogenesis of tularemia in host cells, bringing scientists closer to developing a vaccine for this debilitating disease. (5) Return to Rongelap - On the Rongelap Atoll, Livermore scientists are working to minimize radiological exposure for natives now living on or wishing to return to the islands.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Quality and Performance of LED Flashlights in Kenya: Common End User Preferences and Complaints

Flashlights that use LED technology have quickly emerged as the dominant source of portable lighting in Kenya. While flashlights do not normally provide a substitute for kerosene and other highly inefficient fuels, they are an important early manifestation of LED lighting in the developing world that can serve as a platform - or deterrent - to the diffusion of the technology into the broader off-grid lighting market. The lead acid batteries embedded in flashlights also represent an important source of hazardous waste, and flashlight durability is thus an important determinant of the rate of waste disposal. Low-cost LED flashlights with prices from $1 to $4 are now widely available in shops and markets throughout Kenya. The increased penetration of LED technology in the flashlight market is significant, as over half of all Kenyan households report owning a flashlight (Kamfor, 2002). While this shift from conventional incandescent technology to modern LEDs may appear to be a promising development, end users that our research team interviewed expressed a number of complaints about the quality and performance of these new flashlights. This raises concerns about the interests of low-income flashlight users, and it may also indicate the onset of a broader market spoiling effect for off-grid lighting products based on LED technology (Mills and Jacobson, 2008; Lighting Africa, 2007). The quality of low-cost LED flashlights can contribute to market spoiling because these products appear to represent the first contact that most Kenyans have with LED technology. In this report, our team uses interviews with 46 end users of flashlights to collect information about their experiences, perceptions, and preferences. We focus especially on highlighting common complaints from respondents about the flashlights that they have used, as well as on noting the features that they indicated were important when evaluating the quality of a flashlight. In previous laboratory tests, researchers from our team found a wide range of quality and performance among battery powered LED lights (Granderson, et al. 2008).

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

A User-Centered Design Exploration of Factors That Influence the Rideshare Experience

The rise of real-time information communication through smartphones and wireless networks enabled the growth of ridesharing services. While personal rideshare services (individuals riding alone or with acquaintances) initially dominated the market, the popularity of pooled ridesharing (individuals sharing rides with people they do not know) has grown globally. However, pooled ridesharing remains less common in the U.S., where personal vehicle usage is still the norm. Vehicle design and rideshare services may need to be tailored to user preferences to increase pooled rideshare adoption. Based on a large, national U.S. survey (N = 5385), the results of exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses suggested that four key factors influence riders’ willingness to consider pooled ridesharing: comfort/ease of use, convenience, vehicle technology/accessibility, and passenger safety. A binomial logistic regression was conducted to determine how the four factors influence one’s willingness to consider pooled ridesharing. The two factors that positively influence riders’ willingness to consider pooled ridesharing are vehicle technology/accessibility (B = 1.10) and convenience (B = 0.94), while lack of passenger safety (B = –0.63) and comfort/ease of use (B = –0.17) are pooled ridesharing deterrents. Understanding user-centered design and service factors are critical to increase the use of pooled ridesharing services in the future.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Women as a Force Multiplier for Bringing Nuclear Forensic Capabilities to the International Stage

In 2009, the US Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA’s) Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program initiated a new nuclear forensics outreach effort under its Confidence Building Measures Program. Little did they know that the timing could not have been better. This article focuses on the early years (2009–2015) of the NNSA’s international nuclear forensics outreach, specifically the efforts and experiences of the women who helped establish this program, building it from a fledgling, bilateral effort into an enduring technical capacity provider engaging with dozens of countries and multilateral organizations. At the onset of the program, nuclear forensics was an emerging priority within the US Government and receiving increased focus from international organizations through high-level diplomatic efforts such as the Nuclear Security Summit and Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Additionally, working-level initiatives were gaining traction through the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group. Over the next 6 years, a small team comprising a uniquely large number of women NNSA federal, contract, and national laboratory staff served as key leaders engaging with the international community to strengthen global technical nuclear forensics capacity and best practices. The program continues today under the Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence Program as Investigation Support. The experiences shared here detail a unique time period when the new technical discipline of nuclear forensics was beginning to mature and gain international traction. The authors have made every effort to remember history correctly and be as inclusive as possible. A wealth of training, guidance, and exercise documentation was developed in the 2009–2015 time frame, much of which still serves as the foundation for today’s even more extensive program and community of dedicated technical and diplomatic practitioners.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

MORS Phalax Ad for Systems Analysis

At Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, applying cutting-edge science and technology to challenging security questions is an everyday thing. Systems Analysis is one way we solve problems—by bringing analytic rigor to missions like strategic deterrence and critical infrastructure defense. Working with the brightest minds in science, technology, and engineering, systems analysts at LLNL bring state-of-the-art analytic tools to bear on problems of national importance. From ensuring the safety, security, and effectiveness of our nation’s nuclear stockpile to shaping the future of inertial fusion energy—if you have a penchant for problem-solving using modeling and analysis tools—we have a place for you.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Livermore Lab's giant laser system will bring star power to Earth

In the 50 years since the laser was first demonstrated in Malibu, California, on May 16, 1960, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has been a world leader in laser technology and the home for many of the world's most advanced laser systems. That tradition continues today at LLNL's National Ignition Facility (NIF), the world's most energetic laser system. NIF's completion in March 2009 not only marked the dawn of a new era of scientific research - it could also prove to be the next big step in the quest for a sustainable, carbon-free energy source for the world. NIF consists of 192 laser beams that will focus up to 1.8 million joules of energy on a bb-sized target filled with isotopes of hydrogen - forcing the hydrogen nuclei to collide and fuse in a controlled thermonuclear reaction similar to what happens in the sun and the stars. More energy will be produced by this 'ignition' reaction than the amount of laser energy required to start it. This is the long-sought goal of 'energy gain' that has eluded fusion researchers for more than half a century. Success will be a scientific breakthrough - the first demonstration of fusion ignition in a laboratory setting, duplicating on Earth the processes that power the stars. This impending success could not be achieved without the valuable partnerships forged with other national and international laboratories, private industry and universities. One of the most crucial has been between LLNL and the community in which it resides. Over 155 businesses in the local Tri-Valley area have contributed to the NIF, from industrial technology and engineering firms to tool manufacturing, electrical, storage and supply companies. More than $2.3B has been spent locally between contracts with nearby merchants and employee salaries. The Tri-Valley community has enabled the Laboratory to complete a complex and far-reaching project that will have national and global impact in the future. The first experiments were conducted on NIF last summer and fall, successfully delivering a world-record level of ultraviolet laser energy - more than 1.2 million joules - to a target. The experiments also demonstrated the target drive and target capsule conditions required to achieve fusion ignition. When ignition experiments begin later this year, NIF's lasers will create temperatures and pressures in the hydrogen target that exist only in the cores of stars and giant planets and inside thermonuclear weapons. As a key component of the National Nuclear Security Administration's Stockpile Stewardship Program, NIF will offer the means for sustaining a safe, secure and reliable U.S. nuclear deterrent without nuclear testing. NIF is uniquely capable of providing the experimental data needed to develop and validate computer models that will enable scientists to assess the continuing viability of the nation's nuclear stockpile. Along with this vital national security mission, success at NIF also offers the possibility of groundbreaking scientific discoveries in a wide variety of disciplines ranging from hydrodynamics to astrophysics. As a unique facility in the world that can create the conditions that exist in supernovas and in the cores of giant planets, NIF will help unlock the secrets of the cosmos and inspire the next generation of scientists. It is NIF's third mission, energy security that has been generating the most excitement in the news media and the international scientific community. The reasons are obvious: global energy demand, driven by population growth and the aspirations of the developing world, already is straining the planet's existing energy resources. Global need for electricity is expected to double from its current level of about two trillion watts (TW) to four TW by 2030 and could reach eight to ten TW by the end of the century. As many as 10,000 new billion-watt power plants will have to be built to keep up with this demand. Meeting this pressing need will require a sustainable carbon-free energy technology that can supply base load electricity to the world. Successful ignition experiments at NIF can be a springboard for a revolutionary, long-term solution to our energy security - laser inertial fusion energy, or LIFE. An advanced energy concept now under development at LLNL, LIFE will build on the physics and technology developed for NIF to help meet future worldwide energy needs in a safe, sustainable manner without carbon dioxide emissions. LIFE power plants would be inherently safe, use the limitless supply of hydrogen fuel found in the world's oceans, and be capable of supplying base load electricity to the world. By harnessing the universe's quintessential power source, fusion energy, the United States can continue its leadership in game-changing technologies that drive economic competitiveness. Successful demonstration of ignition and energy gain at NIF will be a transforming event that will solidify fusion's potential as an important energy source.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Niche of harmful alga Aureococcus anophagefferens revealed through ecogenomics

Harmful algal blooms (HABs) cause significant economic and ecological damage worldwide. Despite considerable efforts, a comprehensive understanding of the factors that promote these blooms has been lacking, because the biochemical pathways that facilitate their dominance relative to other phytoplankton within specific environments have not been identified. Here, biogeochemical measurements showed that the harmful alga Aureococcus anophagefferens outcompeted co-occurring phytoplankton in estuaries with elevated levels of dissolved organic matter and turbidity and low levels of dissolved inorganic nitrogen. We subsequently sequenced the genome of A. anophagefferens and compared its gene complement with those of six competing phytoplankton species identified through metaproteomics. Using an ecogenomic approach, we specifically focused on gene sets that may facilitate dominance within the environmental conditions present during blooms. A. anophagefferens possesses a larger genome (56 Mbp) and has more genes involved in light harvesting, organic carbon and nitrogen use, and encoding selenium- and metal-requiring enzymes than competing phytoplankton. Genes for the synthesis of microbial deterrents likely permit the proliferation of this species, with reduced mortality losses during blooms. Collectively, these findings suggest that anthropogenic activities resulting in elevated levels of turbidity, organic matter, and metals have opened a niche within coastal ecosystems that ideally suits the unique genetic capacity of A. anophagefferens and thus, has facilitated the proliferation of this and potentially other HABs.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Insider Threat - Material Control and Accountability Mitigation

The technical objectives of nuclear safeguards are (1) the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful uses to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown and (2) the deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection. The safeguards and security program must address both outsider threats and insider threats. Outsider threats are primarily addressed by the physical protection system. Insider threats can be any level of personnel at the site including passive or active insiders that could attempt protracted or abrupt diversion. This could occur by an individual acting alone or by collusion between an individual with material control and accountability (MC&A) responsibilities and another individual who has responsibility or control within both the physical protection and the MC&A systems. The insider threat is one that must be understood and incorporated into the safeguards posture. There have been more than 18 documented cases of theft or loss of plutonium or highly enriched uranium. The insider has access, authority, and knowledge, as well as a set of attributes, that make him/her difficult to detect. An integrated safeguards program is designed as a defense-in-depth system that seeks to prevent the unauthorized removal of nuclear material, to provide early detection of any unauthorized attempt to remove nuclear material, and to rapidly respond to any attempted removal of nuclear material. The program is also designed to support protection against sabotage, espionage, unauthorized access, compromise, and other hostile acts that may cause unacceptable adverse impacts on national security, program continuity, the health and safety of employees, the public, or the environment. Nuclear MC&A play an essential role in the capabilities of an integrated safeguards system to deter and detect theft or diversion of nuclear material. An integrated safeguards system with compensating mitigation can decrease the risk of an insider performing a malicious act without detection.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

U.S. national security through global technical engagement presentation to composite group A : homeland and international operations.

This talk will discuss Sandia's Global Security Program focused on reducing proliferation and terrorism threats to U.S. national security through global technical engagement. Elements include nuclear and radiological risks, biological and chemical risks, and multi-threat risk reduction. Also, recent work addressing the need to better integrate nonproliferation, arms control, counterterrorism, and nuclear deterrent objectives will be discussed.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

A Practical Solution to Used Nuclear Fuel Treatment to Enable Sustained Nuclear Energy and Recovery of Vital Materials

A systems analysis, based on previous in-depth studies, was made to develop an advanced used fuel recycling approach in which over 90% of the fuel components and cladding material are recovered and reused. This can minimize the waste requiring disposition to a geologic repository while enabling sustained nuclear energy and recovery of vital materials. The analysis assumed that: (1) continuing delays will occur in locating a site and licensing a geologic repository in the United States; (2) continued storage of used fuel at reactor sites or central storage locations is not a permanent solution; and (3) public perception is that the unresolved used fuel disposal problem is a deterrent to the continuation and expansion of the use of nuclear energy. The practical solution recommended is to move forward with a parallel approach to (1) deployment of industrialized recycling of used fuels which is a multi-decade process, and (2) focused R&D to recover the re-usable components and minimize residual waste. This approach would use concepts for proliferation resistant recycle facilities, processing oldest fuels first, and incorporating more-complete recycling of used fuel components. In addition to uranium and transuranic actinide recycle, the R&D would be focused on recovery and re-use of valuable components such as noble metals, lighter lanthanide elements, xenon gas, and zirconium from cladding. While the eventual need for a geologic repository will remain, the methods recommended can delay the need, minimize the capacity required, and significantly reduce the hazard of the wastes disposed. With no decision, the path forward for nuclear waste (used fuels) disposal remains uncertain, with many diverse technologies being considered. However, a decision to take advantage of proliferation resistant facility design, processing aged fuels, and incorporation of the concepts of nearcomplete recycling will provide the focus and path forward to a practical solution to the problem of nuclear waste disposal.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

The NPR, NPT and the prospects for disarmament

In Prague's Hradcany Square on April 5, 2009, President Barack Obama offered a bold vision of the nuclear future that encompasses both reducing nuclear dangers and pursuing the goal of a world without nuclear weapons while maintaining, as long as nuclear weapons remain, a safe secure, and effective arsenal, to deter potential adversaries and to assure U.S. allies and other security partners that they can count on America's security commitments. The agenda put forward in Prague involves the full range of issues from deterrence to nonproliferation and disarmament. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) report, reflecting the twin objectives of the Prague speech, for the first time places the United States effort to lead expanded international efforts to rebuild and strengthen the global nuclear nonproliferation regime at the top the U.S. nuclear agenda. This attention underscores the fact that the top priority of the United States is to discourage additional states from acquiring nuclear weapon capabilities and to stop terrorist groups from acquiring weapon-usable nuclear materials. It also reinforced the view that positively influencing the 2010 Review Conference (RevCon) of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was a key objective of the Obama Administration. The NPR developed both the vision and the policy, but details of implementation will need to be developed and better understood. This paper will address the Nuclear Posture Review and its implementation, as well as it's relation to, and impact on, the NPT RevCon and the long term prospects for nonproliferation and disarmament.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗