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The following areas of NASA's responsibilities are examined: (1) the Space Transportation System (STS) operations and evolving program elements; (2) establishment of the Space Station program organization and issuance of requests for proposals to the aerospace industry; and (3) NASA's aircraft operations, including research and development flight programs for two advanced X-type aircraft.
Abstracts covering the following areas are presented: (1) oxygen technology; (2) fire safety; (3) accidents/incidents; (4) toxic spills; (5) aircraft safety; (6) structural failures; (7) nuclear systems; (8) fluid flow; and (9) zero gravity combustion.
Directory aids safety specialists in locating information sources and individual experts in engineering-related fields. Lists 170 organizations and approximately 300 individuals who can provide safety-related technical information in form of documentation, data, and consulting expertise. Information on hazard and failure cause identification, accident analysis, and materials characteristics are covered.
Contractor and NASA technical management for the development and manufacture of the Skylab modules is reviewed with emphasis on the following management controls: configuration and interface management; vendor control; and quality control of workmanship. A review of the modified two-stage Saturn V launch vehicle which focused on modifications to accommodate the Skylab payload; resolution of prior flight anomalies; and changes in personnel and management systems is presented along with an evaluation of the possible age-life and storage problems for the Saturn 1-B launch vehicle. The NASA program management's visibility and control of contractor operations, systems engineering and integration, the review process for the evaluation of design and flight hardware, and the planning process for mission operations are investigated. It is concluded that the technical management system for development and fabrication of the modules, spacecraft, and launch vehicles, the process of design and hardware acceptance reviews, and the risk assessment activities are satisfactory. It is indicated that checkout activity, integrated testing, and preparations for and execution of mission operation require management attention.
Results of the design and manufacturing reviews on the maturity of the Skylab modules are presented along with results of investigations on the scope of the cluster risk assessment efforts. The technical management system and its capability to assess and resolve problems are studied.
Each system was chosen on the basis of its importance with respect to crew safety and mission success. An overview of the systems management is presented. The space shuttle main engine, orbiter thermal protection system, avionics, external tanks and solid rocket boosters were examined. The ground test and ground support equipment programs were studied. Program management was found to have an adequate understanding of the significant ground and flight risks involved.
The panel reviewed the following areas of major significance for the Approach and Landing Test program: mission planning and crew training, flight-readiness of the Carrier Aircraft and the Orbiter, including its flight control and avionics system, facilities, and communications and ground support equipment. The management system for risk assessment was investigated. The Orbital Flight Test Program was also reviewed. Observations and recommendations are presented.
The panel focused its attention on those areas that are considered most significant for flight success and safety. Elements required for the Approach and Landing Test Program, the Orbital Flight Test Program, and those management systems and their implementation which directly affect safety, reliability, and quality control, were investigated. Ground facilities and the training programs for the ground and flight crews were studied. Of special interest was the orbiter thermal protection subsystems.
Safety management areas of concern include the space shuttle main engine, shuttle avionics, orbiter thermal protection system, the external tank program, and the solid rocket booster program. The ground test program and ground support equipment system were reviewed. Systems integration and technical 'conscience' were of major priorities for the investigating teams.
The NASA and contractor management systems, including policies, practices, and procedures for the development of critical systems, subsystems and integration of the program elements, were investigated. The technical development status of critical systems, subsystems, and interfaces is presented. Space shuttle elements were qualified as to potential risks and hazards. The elements included the orbiter, external tanks, main engine, solid rocket boosters, and the ground support facilities.
The management areas and the individual elements of the shuttle system were investigated. The basic management or design approach including the most obvious limits or hazards that are significant to crew safety was reviewed. Shuttle program elements that were studied included the orbiter, the space shuttle main engine, the external tank project, solid rocket boosters, and the launch and landing elements.
Elements of the shuttle program that directly affect the mission success and crew safety were investigated. These elements included the shuttle orbiter, the main engine, the solid rocket boosters, avionic system, ground support equipment and the approach and landing operations. The thermal protection systems were studied in detail. Crew training and ground simulation test procedures were reviewed.
Risks attendant to NASA's operations are identified for the following: mission operations; orbiter readiness for orbital flight tests; space shuttle main engine; avionics; thermal projection system; hazard assessment; human error. Past and future projects are assessed.
The process of preparation for the first two shuttle flights was observed and information from both flights was gathered in order to confirm the concept and performance of the major elements of the space transportation system. To achieve truly operational operating safety, regularity, and minimum practical cost, the organization of efforts between the R&D community and any transportation service organization should be clearly separated with the latter organization assuming responsibilities for marketing its services; planning and acquiring prime hardware and spares; maintainance; certification of procedures; training; and creation of requirements for future development. A technical audit of the application of redundancy concepts to shuttle systems is suggested. The state of the art of space transportation hardware suggests that a number of concept changes may improve reliability, costs, and operational safety. For the remaining R&D flights, it is suggested that a redline audit be made of limits that should not be exceeded for ready to launch.
Data acquired on the actual flight experience with the various subsystems are assessed. These subsystems include: flight control and performance, structural integrity, orbiter landing gear, lithium batteries, EVA and prebreathing, and main engines. Improvements for routine operations are recommended. Policy issues for operations and flight safety for aircraft operations are discussed.
An assessment of NASA's safety performance for 1983 affirms that NASA Headquarters and Center management teams continue to hold the safety of manned flight to be their prime concern, and that essential effort and resources are allocated for maintaining safety in all of the development and operational programs. Those conclusions most worthy of NASA management concentration are given along with recommendations for action concerning; product quality and utility; space shuttle main engine; landing gear; logistics and management; orbiter structural loads, landing speed, and pitch control; the shuttle processing contractor; and the safety of flight operations. It appears that much needs to be done before the Space Transportation System can achieve the reliability necessary for safe, high rate, low cost operations.
The results of the Panel's activities are presented in a set of findings and recommendations. Highlighted here are both improvements in NASA's safety and reliability activities and specific areas where additional gains might be realized. One area of particular concern involves the curtailment or elimination of Space Shuttle safety and reliability enhancements. Several findings and recommendations address this area of concern, reflecting the opinion that safety and reliability enhancements are essential to the continued successful operation of the Space Shuttle. It is recommended that a comprehensive and continuing program of safety and reliability improvements in all areas of Space Shuttle hardware/software be considered an inherent component of ongoing Space Shuttle operations.
The THOR anthropomorphic test device (ATD) has been developed and continuously improved by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to provide automotive manufacturers an advanced tool that can be used to assess the injury risk of vehicle occupants in crash tests. Recently, a series of modifications were completed to improve the biofidelity of THOR ATD [1]. The updated THOR Modification Kit (THOR-K) ATD was employed at Wright-Patterson Air Base in 22 impact tests in three configurations: vertical, lateral, and spinal [2]. Although a computational finite element (FE) model of the THOR had been previously developed [3], updates to the model were needed to incorporate the recent changes in the modification kit. The main goal of this study was to develop and validate a FE model of the THOR-K ATD. The CAD drawings of the THOR-K ATD were reviewed and FE models were developed for the updated parts. For example, the head-skin geometry was found to change significantly, so its model was re-meshed (Fig. 1a). A protocol was developed to calibrate each component identified as key to the kinematic and kinetic response of the THOR-K head/neck ATD FE model (Fig. 1b). The available ATD tests were divided in two groups: a) calibration tests where the unknown material parameters of deformable parts (e.g., head skin, pelvis foam) were optimized to match the data and b) validation tests where the model response was only compared with test data by calculating their score using CORrelation and Analysis (CORA) rating system. Finally, the whole ATD model was validated under horizontal-, vertical-, and lateral-loading conditions against data recorded in the Wright Patterson tests [2]. Overall, the final THOR-K ATD model developed in this study is shown to respond similarly to the ATD in all validation tests. This good performance indicates that the optimization performed during calibration by using the CORA score as objective function is not test specific. Therefore confidence is provided in the ATD model for uses in predicting response in test conditions not performed in this study such those observed in the spacecraft landing. Comparison studies with ATD and human models may also be performed to contribute to future changes in THOR ATD design in an effort to improve its biofidelity, which has been traditionally based on post-mortem human subject testing and designer experience.