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Results for “Arms control treaty verification”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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30 records · Page 2
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Prototype for Unclassified Algorithm

Continuing previous efforts to investigate and develop the Unclassified Radioisotope Algorithm, the goal of the FY19-FY20 effort was to develop a prototype detector system which uses the algorithm to confirm warhead attributes related to the presence of either weapons grade plutonium (WGPu) or highly enriched uranium (HEU). The final deliverable is a prototype attribute measurement system built with common, commercially available gamma radiation detector components, capable of confirming the presence of specific, complex radioactive sources of interest, without the collection and storage of gamma energy spectra. This is accomplished by processing each gamma pulse as it is received, applying weight values based on the energy and incrementing or decrementing scalar counters which can be compared with expected values to determine if the measured source is consistent with WGPu or HEU. This report documents the design of the prototype system as well as the development of the algorithm and performance testing results. While the previously conceptualized, simple algorithm resulted in a prohibitive amount of false positives, the goal for a simple attribute measurement system capable of verifying Ba-133 and Ra-226 (weapons grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium surrogate testing sources) at over 95% accuracy with sub 5% false positive rate was demonstrated.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

Laser Based Ultrasound for Verification of Circuit Card Assemblies

This IR is a follow-up conference Paper to the IR approved abstract; PNNL-SA-194096. --- Verification that equipment is authentic and not changed; even at the circuit card assembly (CCA) level will likely be an important component of future arms control treaties. This effort was an initial evaluation of the potential for laser-based ultrasound (LBU) as an inspection tool for Unique Identification (UID) of Circuit Card Assembly (CCA) boards and CCA components. The LBU system used a laser pulse for ultrasound generation and an Optical Microphone for ultrasound detection to image subsurface structures without physical contact and in a dry state. This paper described the selected CCA surrogate, CCA components that were examined, the LBU system, LBU images of the CCA components, and the initial development of UID algorithms. Receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curves indicated good performance for two algorithms as a potential means for UID of CCA boards and CCA components.

Laser Ultrasound, Equipment Verification, Arms Con↗
DOE OSTI2020

Technical Cooperation on Verification and its Role in Trust Building

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it will demonstrate how technical cooperation on verification contributed to the softening of tensions and the improvement of trust between the United States and the Soviet Union. Because the scope of this endeavor is too broad to be adequately considered in the length of this work, the primary focus will be on the private and public partnerships on seismic and hydroacoustic test ban treaty verification that were forged between Soviet and American scientists from 1986-1988. In order to orient the analysis within the political-scientific landscape of the time, the discussion begins with a brief description of the arms control landscape in the early 1980s, including both the stances of the Reagan and Gorbachev administrations vis a vis nuclear test ban verification. The section concludes with an analysis of the two primary US-USSR collaborative projects in this key sphere – the test ban verification project conducted by the National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and Soviet Academy of Sciences (SAS) and the Joint Verification Experiment (JVE) between the US and Soviet National Laboratories.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

PROACTIVE FA4: Progress Update 2024

The Priority Research Objectives for Arms Control Technology Innovation, Verification, and Evaluation (PROACTIVE) venture’s overall goal is to address the technical challenges that will “enable the negotiation and implementation of future nuclear arms limitation/reduction treaties with verification at the level of individual warheads by advancing the state of the art in verification and monitoring capabilities.” One of the four focus areas of the venture, Focus Area 4 (FA4), is a system-of-systems effort to establish methodologies for the integration of monitoring and verification (M&V) technologies into verification systems that support treaty objectives.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Radiation Detection Technologies

When governing bodies seek to reduce the spread and development of nuclear material and weapons, arms control and safeguards technologies play an important role in preventing proliferation within a state that has already developed a nuclear weapon. Arms control treaties work to control the development, production, stockpiling, proliferation, distribution, or the usage of a certain weapon type or delivery system. Treaty guidelines are met using combinations of monitoring, detection, and verification technologies. 1 To verify compliance, a country must determine if the activities of another country are within the limits and obligations established by the treaty. A verifiable treaty contains an interlocking web of constraints and provisions designed to deter cheating, to make cheating more complicated and more expensive, or to make its detection timelier. In the past, the U.S. has deemed treaties to be effectively verifiable if there is confidence that significant violations can be detected in time to respond and offset any threat that the violation may create for the U.S.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2025

PROACTIVE Focus Area 4: Structured Decision Metrics Analysis (Final Report)

A structured decision metrics analysis was developed as one of the tasks under PROACTIVE’s Focus Area 4 (FA4) and used structured decision metrics for processes, items, and facilities (PIF) to determine the efficacy of an M&V system in meeting treaty goals and technical objectives. The method starts with the functional decomposition of a “treaty” with the M&V system overlaid on it. A Functional Decomposition Rubric (FDR) for each PIF is used to determine a score ranging from 0 (weak) to 4 (strong) for assurance, security, and burden. The individual scores are combined to provide an overall Verification System Score (VSS) which assesses the overall verification system’s suitability given goals; scores for each step of the process are also given. The outcome of the evaluation is to identify needs or modifications to the enterprise model, verification system, or proposed testbed capabilities. VeriScore was used to evaluate FA4’s Spiral 0 exercise; those results are included in this report. The VeriScore and FDR framework can also be used in a non-treaty environment, as any goal/objective/method structure will work, thus expanding its applicability beyond traditional arms control structures.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Verifying Deep Reductions in the Nuclear Arsenals: Development and Demonstration of a Motion-detection Subsystem for a “Buddy Tag” Using Non-export Controlled Accelerometers

Future nuclear arms-control agreements may place numerical limits on items that are difficult to monitor with national technical means, even when complemented with onsite inspections. Such items could include small objects and mobile assets, such as non-deployed nuclear warheads and mobile missile launchers. Typically, this verification task can be addressed with unique identifiers, but standard tagging techniques may be unacceptable in this case due to host concerns about safety and intrusiveness. First proposed in the late 1980s and partially developed by Sandia National Laboratories in the early 1990s, the “Proximity Tag” or “Buddy Tag” concept seeks to overcome these concerns by separating the tag from the treaty accountable item itself. A buddy tag has two key elements: a tamper-indicating enclosure and a motion-detection system designed to detect illicit movements in a stand-down period. As part of this project, we have built a buddy-tag prototype for demonstration and evaluation purposes. This paper reviews the design choices and functionalities of the tag’s motion-detection subsystem.We pursue a modular approach for the tag’s hardware, built around an Arduino-class microcontroller and a non-export-controlled low-noise accelerometer, and use open-source algorithms for the motion-detection software. Finally, we discuss the results of an extensive experimental campaign involving both indoor and outdoor measurements assessing the performance of the tag under real-world environmental conditions.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Active Neutron Interrogation as a Method for Verification of the Absence of Special Nuclear Material in Arms Control Dismantlement

The next step in arms control reductions will deal with both strategic and non-strategic weapons, presenting new and hard challenges for verification. One verification approach that might be used in support of these reductions is the concept of deferred verification, which forgoes inspections at sensitive nuclear sites and relies on an inspection regime having access to the open segment of a State's nuclear sector, in "monitored transfer zones." A component of this approach is the anticipated need for an instrument suite capable of detecting well-shielded highly-enriched uranium or plutonium where it isn't supposed to be. This specific need was recently identified by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research in an enabling operating concept they call "contain and dispose." At the foundation of this approach is the idea that items declared as "not nuclear" are, by definition, not treaty limited and are thus "fair-game" for inspection and questioning. Active Neutron Interrogation (ANI), using beta-delayed neutron emissions as the signature for special nuclear material (SNM) detection, is a promising method to address this challenge. The method is quick, has high sensitivity and high specificity for detecting shielded SNM, is robust against changing background radiation environments, is robust against the presence of unknown shielding, and avoids the use of gamma-ray spectrometry which may introduce complications due to the potential release of sensitive information. This paper will present recent research activities exploring technical aspects of using ANI as a FAIRGAME verification method and discuss future prospects and research needs

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗
DOE OSTI2024

A Discrete Event Simulation Approach to Nuclear Arms Enterprise Modeling and Analysis

We overview a discrete event simulation of an arms control enterprise developed to familiarize individuals with the challenges of verification and monitoring at the enterprise level. We will review the design of the simulation applied to a notional country’s nuclear arms enterprise. This simulation models how these nuclear weapons move over their lifetime from deployment, storage, maintenance, and dismantlement. With this output information, we then characterize the “ground truth” of the enterprise. Next, based on these data, we built a sophisticated analysis engine designed to provide treaty monitoring and verification information to support partner country inspectors and their evaluation. This tool was designed to be used as a game, enabling teams to compete on developing the best inspection plan to determine if the host country is complying with the conceptual treaty developed for this effort.

Pulliam, Rachel M.↗
DOE OSTI2024

Developing an intrinsically secure information barrier for arms control verification through machine learning

Near-term solutions are needed to allow for flexible engagement in future nuclear arms control discussions. This project developed a method for implementing an information barrier (IB) on commercial systems, shortening the research and development lifecycle for warhead verification technologies while offering improved and inherently flexible capabilities. The crux of the verification challenge remains the difficulty in developing an authenticatable IB which prevents sensitive host country information from inadvertent transmission to an inspector. Many concepts for IB’s rely on dedicated “trusted” processor modules developed with dedicated custom radiation detection systems and associated algorithms. Without a priori knowledge of the treaty item, the parameter space for measurements can be nearly infinite and robustness against spoofing without the ability to view sensitive data is key. This project has produced an unclassified framework capable of ingesting data from common gamma detectors and identifying the presence of weapons grade nuclear material at over 90% accuracy.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

EVALUATING NUCLEAR SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE SPLINTERNET

The internet, which for years has been viewed as a global online commons with standardized protocols but few regulations is, according to some experts, starting to mirror the contentious political and commercial contours of the physical world. Contributing to this is the rise in data breaches, cyber-enabled attacks on critical infrastructure, government surveillance operations, theft of intellectual property, manipulation of electoral processes, and perceived erosion of privacy, all of which are resulting in a growing skepticism that an open internet will naturally serve the best interests of users, communities, countries, and the global economy. In addition, the rapidly emerging and increasingly lucrative power of data has global superpowers scrambling to protect their informational sovereignty as an urgent matter of national security. Underscoring this urgency is the fact that, despite its global reach and cosmopolitan contributor base, internet infrastructure and governance of the World Wide Web remain largely under U.S. corporate auspices, which reinforces the perception of U.S. control. Whether fragmentation is politically, economically, or socially motivated, there appears to be a growing appetite for an internet that is partitioned and controlled at the national level. From “the Great Firewall of China” to the “Halal” internet of Iran, the trend towards a “Splinternet” has courts and governments embarking on what some call a "legal arms race" to impose a maze of national or regional rules, often conflicting, in the digital realm. The paper explores the emerging Splinternet phenomenon, analyses the implications of this trend on nuclear security, and identifies questions that present opportunities for future research.

Internet, Data Security, Cyber Security, Nuclear S↗