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Impact of the Columbia Supercomputer on NASA Space and Exploration Mission

NASA's 10,240-processor Columbia supercomputer gained worldwide recognition in 2004 for increasing the space agency's computing capability ten-fold, and enabling U.S. scientists and engineers to perform significant, breakthrough simulations. Columbia has amply demonstrated its capability to accelerate NASA's key missions, including space operations, exploration systems, science, and aeronautics. Columbia is part of an integrated high-end computing (HEC) environment comprised of massive storage and archive systems, high-speed networking, high-fidelity modeling and simulation tools, application performance optimization, and advanced data analysis and visualization. In this paper, we illustrate the impact Columbia is having on NASA's numerous space and exploration applications, such as the development of the Crew Exploration and Launch Vehicles (CEV/CLV), effects of long-duration human presence in space, and damage assessment and repair recommendations for remaining shuttle flights. We conclude by discussing HEC challenges that must be overcome to solve space-related science problems in the future.

Biswas, Rupak↗

STS-1: Columbia Complete Mission

A video presentation of the STS-1 Columbia Mission is shown. The video begins with footage of the STS-1 Columbia arriving at Kennedy Space Center on March 24, 1979. The various milestones that were shown include: 1) STS-1 Columbia Shuttle Rocket Booster (SRB) stacking; 2) External Tank (ET) lift and mating; 3) Move to VAB and Mating; 4) Rollout to pad 39A; 5) Flight Readiness Firing (FRF) on February 19, 1981; 6) Launch day; and 7) Return to Kennedy Space Center. John W. Young, Commander and Robert L. Crippen, Pilot are shown having a traditional breakfast before the suit up and drive out to the launch pad. Footage of the lift-off along with Shuttle Rocket Booster (SRB) separation is shown. After lift-off, there is a shot of the crew in the mid-deck and also a view of thunderstorms over the Amazon Basin. The video ends with a view of Columbia returning to Kennedy Space Center on April 25, 1981.

Source record↗

The Columbia Accident Investigation and The NASA Glenn Ballistic Impact Laboratory Contributions Supporting NASA's Return to Flight

On February 1, 2003, the Space Shuttle Columbia broke apart during reentry, resulting in loss of the vehicle and its seven crewmembers. For the next several months, an extensive investigation of the accident ensued involving a nationwide team of experts from NASA, industry, and academia, spanning dozens of technical disciplines. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), a group of experts assembled to conduct an investigation independent of NASA, concluded in August, 2003 that the most likely cause of the loss of Columbia and its crew was a breach in the left wing leading edge Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) thermal protection system initiated by the impact of thermal insulating foam that had separated from the orbiters external fuel tank 81 seconds into the mission's launch. During reentry, this breach allowed superheated air to penetrate behind the leading edge and erode the aluminum structure of left wing, which ultimately led to the breakup of the orbiter. The findings of the CAIB were supported by ballistic impact tests, which simulated the physics of External Tank Foam impact on the RCC wing leading edge material. These tests ranged from fundamental material characterization tests to full-scale Orbiter Wing Leading Edge tests. Following the accident investigation, NASA spent the next 18 months focused on returning the shuttle safely to flight. In order to fully evaluate all potential impact threats from the many debris sources on the Space Shuttle during ascent, NASA instituted a significant impact testing program. The results from these tests led to the validation of high-fidelity computer models, capable of predicting actual or potential Shuttle impact events, were used in the certification of STS-114, NASA s Return to Flight Mission, as safe to fly. This presentation will provide a look into the inner workings of the Space Shuttle and a behind the scenes perspective on the impact analysis and testing done for the Columbia Accident Investigation and NASA's Return to Flight programs. In addition, highlights from recent Shuttle missions are presented.

Melis, Matthew E.↗

Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report

NASA commissioned the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) to conduct a thorough review of both the technical and the organizational causes of the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and her crew on February 1, 2003. The accident investigation that followed determined that a large piece of insulating foam from Columbia s external tank (ET) had come off during ascent and struck the leading edge of the left wing, causing critical damage. The damage was undetected during the mission. The CAIB's findings and recommendations were published in 2003 and are available on the web at http://caib.nasa.gov/. NASA responded to the CAIB findings and recommendations with the Space Shuttle Return to Flight Implementation Plan. Significant enhancements were made to NASA's organizational structure, technical rigor, and understanding of the flight environment. The ET was redesigned to reduce foam shedding and eliminate critical debris. In 2005, NASA succeeded in returning the space shuttle to flight. In 2010, the space shuttle will complete its mission of assembling the International Space Station and will be retired to make way for the next generation of human space flight vehicles: the Constellation Program. The Space Shuttle Program recognized the importance of capturing the lessons learned from the loss of Columbia and her crew to benefit future human exploration, particularly future vehicle design. The program commissioned the Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team (SCSIIT). The SCSIIT was asked to perform a comprehensive analysis of the accident, focusing on factors and events affecting crew survival, and to develop recommendations for improving crew survival for all future human space flight vehicles. To do this, the SCSIIT investigated all elements of crew survival, including the design features, equipment, training, and procedures intended to protect the crew. This report documents the SCSIIT findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

Source record↗

The Reconstruction and Failure Analysis of the Space Shuttle Columbia

Several days following the Columbia accident a team formed and began planning for the reconstruction of Columbia. A hangar at the Kennedy Space Center was selected for this effort due to it's size, available technical workforce and materials science laboratories and access to the vehicle ground processing infrastructure. The Reconstruction team established processes for receiving, handling, decontamination, tracking, identifying, cleaning and assessment of the debris. Initially, a 2-dimensional reconstruction of the Orbiter outer mold line was developed. As the investigation progressed fixtures which allowed a 3-dimensional reconstruction of the forward portions of the left wing's leading edge was developed. To support the reconstructions and forensic analyses a Materials and Processes (M&P) 'team was formed. This M&P team established processes for recording factual observations, debris cleaning, and engineering analysis. Fracture surfaces and thermal effects of selected airframe debris were assessed, and process flows for both nondestructive and destructive sampling and evaluation of debris were developed. The Team also assessed left hand airframe components that were believed to be associated with a structural breach of Columbia. A major portion of this analysis was evaluation of metallic deposits were prevalent on left wing leading edge components. Extensive evaluation of the visual, metallurgical and chemical nature of the deposits provided conclusions that were consistent with the visual assessments and interpretations of the NASA lead teams and the findings of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. Analytical data collected by the M&P Team showed that a significant thermal event occurred at the left wing leading edge in the proximity of LH RCC Panels 8-9, and a correlation was formed between the deposits and overheating in these areas to the wing leading edge components. The analysis of deposits also showed exposure to temperatures in excess of 1649 C (3200 F), which would severely degrade support structure, tiles, and RCC panel materials. The integrated failure analysis of wing leading edge debris and deposits strongly supported the hypothesis that a breach occurred at LH RCC Panel 8.

Russell, Richard↗

Materials Analysis: A Key to Unlocking the Mystery of the Columbia Tragedy

Materials analyses of key forensic evidence helped unlock the mystery of the loss of space shuttle Columbia that disintegrated February 1, 2003 while returning from a 16-day research mission. Following an intensive four-month recovery effort by federal, state, and local emergency management and law officials, Columbia debris was collected, catalogued, and reassembled at the Kennedy Space Center. Engineers and scientists from the Materials and Processes (M&P) team formed by NASA supported Columbia reconstruction efforts, provided factual data through analysis, and conducted experiments to validate the root cause of the accident. Fracture surfaces and thermal effects of selected airframe debris were assessed, and process flows for both nondestructive and destructive sampling and evaluation of debris were developed. The team also assessed left hand (LH) airframe components that were believed to be associated with a structural breach of Columbia. Analytical data collected by the M&P team showed that a significant thermal event occurred at the left wing leading edge in the proximity of LH reinforced carbon carbon (RCC) panels 8 and 9. The analysis also showed exposure to temperatures in excess of 1,649 C, which would severely degrade the support structure, tiles, and RCC panel materials. The integrated failure analysis of wing leading edge debris and deposits strongly supported the hypothesis that a breach occurred at LH RCC panel 8.

Mayeaux, Brian M.↗

Space Shuttle Columbia Reconstruction Effort: An Analysis of the Thermal Protection System.

Upon the breakup of the Space Shuffle Columbia, which occurred during peak heating, at an altitude of 200,000 feet, and traveling at Mach 19, the daunting responsibility was placed upon National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to determine the root cause of the accident. One of the foremost tasks was to begin locating Columbia's debris, which was scattered acr ss a 2,000 square miles area of Texas and into western Louisiana. Each potential shuttle debris piece found was categorized and the longitude and latitude noted. This provided crucial data to the vehicle's breakup trajectory path and aided in locating key shuffle components. Since the airframe and tiles would be the primary focus during the reconstruction effort at the Kennedy Space center in Florida, packing and shipping was crucial to the preservation of the shape and condition of each recovered object. Over 83,000 pieces of Columbia, in a five-month timeframe, were located. The recovered tiles still bonded to structure indicated failures modes due to heating and aerodynamic loads. Also, different types of tile bond failure modes were observed, with adhesion failures at the Koropon layer or material failure at the tile's densification layer. Numerous tiles had the identification markings burned off, slumping of the Reaction-Cured Glass (RCG) coating, and of the Ll-900 silica base material. The conditions in which the tiles were found resulted in developing methods to aid in the identification of the tile. Correctly identifying each tile was critical to understanding the heating patterns of the tiles in relationship to the vehicle, since it was known that the lower left wing received the initial external tank foam impact. With the aid of multiple disciplines, the clues found in the TPS debris, lead to the root cause of the breakup of Columbia.

Micklos, Ann M.↗

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report. Volume Two

Volume II of the Report contains appendices that were cited in Volume I. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board produced many of these appendices as working papers during the investigation into the February 1, 2003 destruction of the Space Shuttle Columbia. Other appendices were produced by other organizations (mainly NASA) in support of the Board investigation. In the case of documents that have been published by others, they are included here in the interest of establishing a complete record, but often at less than full page size. Contents include: CAIB Technical Documents Cited in the Report: Reader's Guide to Volume II; Appendix D. a Supplement to the Report; Appendix D.b Corrections to Volume I of the Report; Appendix D.1 STS-107 Training Investigation; Appendix D.2 Payload Operations Checklist 3; Appendix D.3 Fault Tree Closure Summary; Appendix D.4 Fault Tree Elements - Not Closed; Appendix D.5 Space Weather Conditions; Appendix D.6 Payload and Payload Integration; Appendix D.7 Working Scenario; Appendix D.8 Debris Transport Analysis; Appendix D.9 Data Review and Timeline Reconstruction Report; Appendix D.10 Debris Recovery; Appendix D.11 STS-107 Columbia Reconstruction Report; Appendix D.12 Impact Modeling; Appendix D.13 STS-107 In-Flight Options Assessment; Appendix D.14 Orbiter Major Modification (OMM) Review; Appendix D.15 Maintenance, Material, and Management Inputs; Appendix D.16 Public Safety Analysis; Appendix D.17 MER Manager's Tiger Team Checklist; Appendix D.18 Past Reports Review; Appendix D.19 Qualification and Interpretation of Sensor Data from STS-107; Appendix D.20 Bolt Catcher Debris Analysis.

CAIB (COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD)↗

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report. Volume Three

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board's (CAIB) independent investigation into the February 1, 2003 destruction of the Space Shuttle Columbia produced a six volume report. This is Volume III of the report. Volume III contains other technical documents produced by NASA and other organizations, which were provided to the CAIB in support of its inquiry into the tragedy. Technical documents included in the report are: Appendix E.1 CoFR Endorsements; Appendix E.2 STS-107 Image Analysis Team Final Report; Appendix E.3 An Assessment of Potential Material Candidates for the 'Flight Day 2', Radar Object Observed during the NASA Mission STS-107; Appendix E.4 Columbia Early Sighting Assessment Team Final Report.

STS-107↗

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report. Volume Four

This is Volume Four of a set of six reports produced by NASA and other organizations which were provided to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) in support of its inquiry into the February 1, 2003 destruction of the Space Shuttle Columbia. The Technical Documents included in this volume are: Appendix F.1 Water Absorption by Foam; Appendix F.2 Follow the TPS; Appendix F.3 MADS Sensor Data; Appendix F.4 ET Cryoinsulation; Appendix F.5 Space Shuttle STS-107 Columbia Accident Investigation, and External Tank Working Group Final Report - Volume 1.

CRYOINSULATION↗

Columbia Accident Investigation Board. Volume One

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board's independent investigation into the February 1, 2003, loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and its seven-member crew lasted nearly seven months. A staff of more than 120, along with some 400 NASA engineers, supported the Board's 13 members. Investigators examined more than 30,000 documents, conducted more than 200 formal interviews, heard testimony from dozens of expert witnesses, and reviewed more than 3,000 inputs from the general public. In addition, more than 25,000 searchers combed vast stretches of the Western United States to retrieve the spacecraft's debris. In the process, Columbia's tragedy was compounded when two debris searchers with the U.S. Forest Service perished in a helicopter accident. This report concludes with recommendations, some of which are specifically identified and prefaced as 'before return to flight.' These recommendations are largely related to the physical cause of the accident, and include preventing the loss of foam, improved imaging of the Space Shuttle stack from liftoff through separation of the External Tank, and on-orbit inspection and repair of the Thermal Protection System. The remaining recommendations, for the most part, stem from the Board's findings on organizational cause factors. While they are not 'before return to flight' recommendations, they can be viewed as 'continuing to fly' recommendations, as they capture the Board's thinking on what changes are necessary to operate the Shuttle and future spacecraft safely in the mid- to long-term. These recommendations reflect both the Board's strong support for return to flight at the earliest date consistent with the overriding objective of safety, and the Board's conviction that operation of the Space Shuttle, and all human space-flight, is a developmental activity with high inherent risks.

SPACE SHUTTLE COLUMBIA↗

Renewed Commitment to Excellence: An Assessment of the NASA Agency-Wide Applicability of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report

The Space Shuttle fleet has been grounded since the Columbia accident. As a result, 'Return to Flight' has become not just a phrase but a program and the global of virtually everyone associated with NASA. Even those who are not affiliated with the Shuttle Program are looking forward to the safe and successful completion of the next Shuttle mission. In this recovery process, NASA will be guided by the Report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). The CAIB was an investigating body, convened by NASA Administrator O'Keefe the day of the Columbia accident, according to procedures established after the loss of Space Challenger.

SPACE SHUTTLE COLUMBIA↗

Warming of the lower Columbia River , 1853 to 2018

Abstract Water temperature is a critical ecological indicator; however, few studies have statistically modeled century‐scale trends in riverine or estuarine water temperature, or their cause. Here, we recover, digitize, and analyze archival temperature measurements from the 1850s onward to investigate how and why water temperatures in the lower Columbia River are changing. To infill data gaps and explore changes, we develop regression models of daily historical Columbia River water temperature using time‐lagged river flow and air temperature as the independent variables. Models were developed for three time periods (mid‐19th, mid‐20th, and early 21st century), using archival and modern measurements (1854–1876; 1938–present). Daily and monthly averaged root‐mean‐square errors overall are 0.89°C and 0.77°C, respectively for the 1938–2018 period. Results suggest that annual averaged water temperature increased by 2.2°C ± 0.2°C since the 1850s, a rate of 1.3°C ± 0.1°C/century. Increased water temperatures are seasonally dependent. An increase of approximately 2.0°C ± 0.2°C/century occurs in the July–Dec time‐frame, while springtime trends are statistically insignificant. Rising temperatures change the probability of exceeding ecologically important thresholds; since the 1850s, the number of days with water temperatures over 20°C increased from ~5 to 60 per year, while the number below 2°C decreased from ~10 to 0 days/per year. Overall, the modern system is warmer, but exhibits less temperature variability. The reservoir system reduces sensitivity to short‐term atmospheric forcing. Statistical experiments within our modeling framework suggest that increased water temperature is driven by warming air temperatures (~29%), altered river flow (~14%), and water resources management (~57%).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Caspian Tern Management to Increase Survival of Juvenile Salmonids in the Columbia River Basin: Progress and Adaptive Management Considerations

Abstract Predation by Caspian terns Hydroprogne caspia is a factor limiting the recovery of some Endangered Species Act-listed populations of salmonids from the Columbia River basin, especially steelhead Oncorhynchus mykiss. This prompted the development and implementation of two separate management plans, one in the Columbia River estuary and the other in the Columbia Plateau region, to reduce the impact of Caspian tern predation on smolt survival. Caspian terns nesting at managed breeding colonies within the basin were relocated to alternative nesting islands created for terns outside the basin. Both plans were successful in significantly reducing smolt losses to Caspian terns nesting at managed sites; however, new developments have led to regression in smolt survival gains associated with tern management. Adaptive management to prevent terns at managed colonies from relocating to nest elsewhere in the basin and to improve nesting opportunities for Caspian terns outside the basin are needed to maximize the survival benefits to Endangered Species Act-listed salmonids from management. Adaptive management is also necessary to ensure the long-term viability of the Pacific Flyway population of Caspian terns, whose breeding population has declined by more than 50% since the two management plans were implemented.

Collis, Ken↗

Stock-specific spatial overlap among seabird predators and Columbia River juvenile Chinook Salmon suggests a mechanism for predation during early marine residence

Abstract Objective Because predation is thought to be the primary source of natural mortality for juvenile salmon first entering the ocean, we sought to identify regions where, on average, stock-specific spatial overlap between the distribution of threatened and endangered juvenile Chinook Salmon Oncorhynchus tshawytscha and abundant fish-eating seabirds (common murres Uria aalge and sooty shearwaters Ardenna grisea) suggests the greatest potential for ocean predation risk to juvenile Chinook Salmon. Methods The relative abundance and spatial distribution of seabird predators and juvenile Chinook Salmon were quantified as part of long-term ecosystem surveys during May 2003–2012 and June 2003–2022. Genetic stock identification methods were used to assign individual fish to their respective stock groups. Stock-specific species distribution models then generated maps and indices of average annual spatial overlap between predators and prey within the survey area. Result There is unequivocal evidence for spatial overlap between common murres, sooty shearwaters, and five genetic groups of interior and lower Columbia River juvenile Chinook Salmon. We found strongly positive (≥0.70) spatial correlations between predator and prey densities in both May and June, although spatial overlap was, in general, greater during May. The region of highest spatial overlap occurred on the inner continental shelf between the Columbia River mouth (46.2°N) and Grays Harbor (47.0°N), a region at the beginning of the juvenile salmon migratory pathway that is strongly affected by freshwater outflow from the river. Conclusion Our findings support the idea that ocean avian predation during early marine residence has the potential to affect marine survival of juvenile Chinook Salmon and should be further investigated to better inform and implement ecological models and possible recovery actions for Chinook Salmon populations of the Columbia River basin.

Zamon, Jeannette E.↗

Integrating novel stellarator single-stage optimization algorithms to design the Columbia stellarator experiment

Abstract The Columbia Stellarator eXperiment (CSX), currently being designed at Columbia University, aims to test theoretical predictions related to QA plasma behavior, and to pioneer the construction of an optimized stellarator using three-dimensional, non-insulated high-temperature superconducting (NI-HTS) coils. The magnetic configuration is generated by a combination of two circular planar poloidal field (PF) coils and two 3D-shaped interlinked (IL) coils, with the possibility to add windowpane coils to enhance shaping and experimental flexibility. The PF coils and vacuum vessel are repurposed from the former Columbia Non-Neutral Torus experiment, while the IL coils will be custom-wound in-house using NI-HTS tapes. To obtain a plasma shape that meets the physics objectives with a limited number of coils, novel single-stage optimization techniques are employed, optimizing both the plasma and coils concurrently, in particular targeting a tight aspect ratio QA plasma and minimized strain on the HTS tape. Despite the increased complexity due to the expanded degrees of freedom, these methods successfully identify optimized plasma geometries that can be realized by coils meeting engineering specifications. This paper discusses the derivation of the constraints and objectives specific to CSX, and describe how two recently developed single-stage optimization methodologies are applied to the design of CSX. A set of selected configurations for CSX is then described in detail.

Baillod, A. (ORCID:0000000303529180)↗

Utility of parentage‐based tagging for monitoring Coho salmon ( Oncorhynchus kisutch ) in the interior Columbia River basin

Abstract By the 1980s, after decades of declining numbers in the mid‐1900s, Coho salmon ( Oncorhynchus kisutch ) were considered extirpated from the interior Columbia River. In the mid‐1990s, the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation, and the Nez Perce Tribe began successful reintroduction programs of Coho salmon upstream of Bonneville Dam, but which were initially sourced from lower Columbia River hatcheries. Here we present the first Coho salmon parentage‐based tagging (PBT) baseline from seven hatchery programs located in the interior Columbia River basin, and two sites at or downstream of Bonneville Dam, composed of over 32,000 broodstock samples. Analyses of baseline collections revealed that genetic structure followed a temporal pattern based on 3‐year broodlines rather than geographic location or stocking history. Across hatchery programs, similar levels of genetic diversity was present. The PBT baseline provided multiple direct applications such as identification of origin for Coho salmon collected in a mixed stock at Priest Rapids Dam and the detection of the proportion and distribution of hatchery‐origin fish on the spawning grounds in the Methow River basin. The PBT baseline for Coho salmon is freely available for use and can be downloaded from FishGen.net .

Horn, Rebekah L.↗

Genetic variation associated with adult migration timing in lineages of Steelhead and Chinook Salmon in the Columbia River

Abstract With the discovery of a major effect region (GREB1L, ROCK1) for adult migration timing in genomes of both Chinook Salmon and Steelhead, several subsequent studies have investigated the effect size and distribution of early and late migration alleles among populations in the Columbia River. Here, we synthesize the results of these studies for the major lineages of Chinook Salmon and Steelhead that include highly distinct groups in the interior Columbia River that exhibit atypical life histories from most coastal lineage populations of these two species. Whole‐genome studies with high marker density have provided extensive insight into SNPs most associated with adult migration timing, and suites of markers for each species have been genotyped in large numbers of individuals to further validate phenotypic effects. For Steelhead, the largest phenotypic effect sizes have been observed in the coastal lineage (36% of variation for passage timing at Bonneville Dam; 43% of variation for tributary arrival timing) compared to the inland lineage (7.5% of variation for passage timing at Bonneville Dam; 8.4% of variation for tributary arrival timing) that overwinter in freshwater prior to spawning. For Chinook Salmon, large effect sizes have been observed in all three lineages for multiple adult migration phenotypes (Coastal lineage: percentage of variation of 27.9% for passage timing at Bonneville Dam, 28.7% for arrival timing for spawning; Interior ocean type: percentage of variation of 47.6% for passage timing at Bonneville Dam, 39.6% for tributary arrival timing, 77.9% for arrival timing for spawning; Interior stream type: percentage of variation of 35.3% for passage at Bonneville Dam, 9.8% for tributary arrival timing, 4.7% for arrival timing for spawning). Together, these results have extended our understanding of genetic variation associated with life history diversity in distinct populations of the Columbia River, however, much research remains necessary to determine the causal mechanism for this major effect region on migration timing in these species.

Narum, Shawn R.↗