Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Containment of Biohazards”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

23 records · Page 2
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2007

Persistent Seroconversion after Accidental Eye Exposure to Calcifying Nanoparticles

Biosafety of nanomaterials has attracted much attention recently. We report here a case where accidental human eye exposure to biogenic nanosized calcium phosphate in the form of calcifying nanoparticles (CNP) raised a strong IgG immune response against proteins carried by CNP. The antibody titer has persisted over ten years at the high level. The IgG was detected by ELISA using CNPs propagated in media containing bovine and human serum as antigen. The exposure incident occurred to a woman scientist (WS) at a research laboratory in Finland at 1993. CNP, also termed "nanobacteria", is a unique self-replicating agent that has not been fully characterized and no data on biohazards were available at that time. Before the accident, her serum samples were negative for both CNP antigen and anti-CNP antibody using specific ELISA tests (Nanobac Oy, Kuopio, Finland). The accident occurred while WS was harvesting CNP cultures. Due to a high pressure in pipetting, CNP pellet splashed into her right eye. Both eyes were immediately washed with water and saline. The following days there was irritation and redness in the right eye. These symptoms disappeared within two weeks without any treatment. Three months after the accident, blood and urine samples of WS were tested for CNP cultures (2), CNP-specific ELISA tests, and blood cell counts. Blood cell counts were normal, CNP antigen and culture tests were negative. A high IgG anti-CNP antibody titer was detected (see Figure). The antibodies of this person have been used thereafter as positive control and standard in ELISA manufacturing (Nano-Sero IgG ELISA, Nanobac Oy, Kuopio, Finland).

Ciftcioglu, Neva↗
NASA NTRS2001

Mars Sample Handling Protocol Workshop Series: Workshop 2

Numerous NASA reports and studies have identified Planetary Protection (PP) as an important part of any Mars sample return mission. The mission architecture, hardware, on-board experiments, and related activities must be designed in ways that prevent both forward- and back-contamination and also ensure maximal return of scientific information. A key element of any PP effort for sample return missions is the development of guidelines for containment and analysis of returned sample(s). As part of that effort, NASA and the Space Studies Board (SSB) of the National Research Council (NRC) have each assembled experts from a wide range of scientific fields to identify and discuss issues pertinent to sample return. In 1997, the SSB released its report on recommendations for handling and testing of returned Mars samples. In particular, the NRC recommended that: a) samples returned from Mars by spacecraft should be contained and treated as potentially hazardous until proven otherwise, and b) rigorous physical, chemical, and biological analyses [should] confirm that there is no indication of the presence of any exogenous biological entity. Also in 1997, a Mars Sample Quarantine Protocol workshop was convened at NASA Ames Research Center to deal with three specific aspects of the initial handling of a returned Mars sample: 1) biocontainment, to prevent 'uncontrolled release' of sample material into the terrestrial environment; 2) life detection, to examine the sample for evidence of organisms; and 3) biohazard testing, to determine if the sample poses any threat to terrestrial life forms and the Earth's biosphere. In 1999, a study by NASA's Mars Sample Handling and Requirements Panel (MSHARP) addressed three other specific areas in anticipation of returning samples from Mars: 1) sample collection and transport back to Earth; 2) certification of the samples as non-hazardous; and 3) sample receiving, curation, and distribution. To further refine the requirements for sample hazard testing and the criteria for subsequent release of sample materials from quarantine, the NASA Planetary Protection Officer convened an additional series of workshops beginning in March 2000. The overall objective of these workshops was to develop comprehensive protocols to assess whether the returned materials contain any biological hazards, and to safeguard the purity of the samples from possible terrestrial contamination. This document is the report of the second Workshop in the Series. The information herein will ultimately be integrated into a final document reporting the proceedings of the entire Workshop Series along with additional information and recommendations.

Rummel, John D.↗
NASA NTRS2003

NASA Tech Briefs, July 2003

Topics covered include: Real-Time, High-Frequency QRS Electrocardiograph; Software for Improved Extraction of Data From Tape Storage; Radio System for Locating Emergency Workers; Software for Displaying High-Frequency Test Data; Capacitor-Chain Successive-Approximation ADC; Simpler Alternative to an Optimum FQPSK-B Viterbi Receiver; Multilayer Patch Antenna Surrounded by a Metallic Wall; Software To Secure Distributed Propulsion Simulations; Explicit Pore Pressure Material Model in Carbon-Cloth Phenolic; Meshed-Pumpkin Super-Pressure Balloon Design; Corrosion Inhibitors as Penetrant Dyes for Radiography; Transparent Metal-Salt-Filled Polymeric Radiation Shields; Lightweight Energy Absorbers for Blast Containers; Brush-Wheel Samplers for Planetary Exploration; Dry Process for Making Polyimide/ Carbon-and-Boron-Fiber Tape; Relatively Inexpensive Rapid Prototyping of Small Parts; Magnetic Field Would Reduce Electron Backstreaming in Ion Thrusters; Alternative Electrochemical Systems for Ozonation of Water; Interferometer for Measuring Displacement to Within 20 pm; UV-Enhanced IR Raman System for Identifying Biohazards; Prognostics Methodology for Complex Systems; Algorithms for Haptic Rendering of 3D Objects; Modeling and Control of Aerothermoelastic Effects; Processing Digital Imagery to Enhance Perceptions of Realism; Analysis of Designs of Space Laboratories; Shields for Enhanced Protection Against High-Speed Debris; Study of Dislocation-Ordered In(x)Ga(1-x)As/GaAs Quantum Dots; and Tilt-Sensitivity Analysis for Space Telescopes.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2011

MEPAG Recommendations for a 2018 Mars Sample Return Caching Lander - Sample Types, Number, and Sizes

The return to Earth of geological and atmospheric samples from the surface of Mars is among the highest priority objectives of planetary science. The MEPAG Mars Sample Return (MSR) End-to-End International Science Analysis Group (MEPAG E2E-iSAG) was chartered to propose scientific objectives and priorities for returned sample science, and to map out the implications of these priorities, including for the proposed joint ESA-NASA 2018 mission that would be tasked with the crucial job of collecting and caching the samples. The E2E-iSAG identified four overarching scientific aims that relate to understanding: (A) the potential for life and its pre-biotic context, (B) the geologic processes that have affected the martian surface, (C) planetary evolution of Mars and its atmosphere, (D) potential for future human exploration. The types of samples deemed most likely to achieve the science objectives are, in priority order: (1A). Subaqueous or hydrothermal sediments (1B). Hydrothermally altered rocks or low temperature fluid-altered rocks (equal priority) (2). Unaltered igneous rocks (3). Regolith, including airfall dust (4). Present-day atmosphere and samples of sedimentary-igneous rocks containing ancient trapped atmosphere Collection of geologically well-characterized sample suites would add considerable value to interpretations of all collected rocks. To achieve this, the total number of rock samples should be about 30-40. In order to evaluate the size of individual samples required to meet the science objectives, the E2E-iSAG reviewed the analytical methods that would likely be applied to the returned samples by preliminary examination teams, for planetary protection (i.e., life detection, biohazard assessment) and, after distribution, by individual investigators. It was concluded that sample size should be sufficient to perform all high-priority analyses in triplicate. In keeping with long-established curatorial practice of extraterrestrial material, at least 40% by mass of each sample should be preserved to support future scientific investigations. Samples of 15-16 grams are considered optimal. The total mass of returned rocks, soils, blanks and standards should be approximately 500 grams. Atmospheric gas samples should be the equivalent of 50 cubic cm at 20 times Mars ambient atmospheric pressure.

Allen, Carlton C.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Assessing the Biohazard Potential of Putative Martian Organisms for Exploration Class Human Space Missions

Exploration Class missions to Mars will require precautions against potential contamination by any native microorganisms that may be incidentally pathogenic to humans. While the results of NASA's Viking biology experiments of 1976 have been generally interpreted as inconclusive for surface organisms, the possibility of native surface life has never been ruled out and more recent studies suggest that the case for biological interpretation of the Viking Labeled Release data may now be stronger than it was when the experiments were originally conducted. It is possible that, prior to the first human landing on Mars, robotic craft and sample return missions will provide enough data to know with certainty whether or not future human landing sites harbor extant life forms. However, if native life is confirmed, it will be problematic to determine whether any of its species may present a medical risk to astronauts. Therefore, it will become necessary to assess empirically the risk that the planet contains pathogens based on terrestrial examples of pathogenicity and to take a reasonably cautious approach to bio-hazard protection. A survey of terrestrial pathogens was conducted with special emphasis on those pathogens whose evolution has not depended on the presence of animal hosts. The history of the development and implementation of Apollo anticontamination protocol and recent recommendations of the NRC Space Studies Board regarding Mars were reviewed. Organisms can emerge in nature in the absence of indigenous animal hosts and both infectious and non-infectious human pathogens are theoretically possible on Mars. The prospect of Martian surface life, together with the existence of a diversity of routes by which pathogenicity has emerged on Earth, suggests that the possibility of human pathogens on Mars, while low, is not zero. Since the discovery and study of Martian life can have long-term benefits for humanity, the risk that Martian life might include pathogens should not be an obstacle to human exploration. As a precaution, however, it is recommended that EVA suits be decontaminated when astronauts enter surface habitats when returning from field activity and that biosafety protocol approximating laboratory BSL 2 be developed for astronauts working in laboratories on the Martian surface. Quarantine of astronauts and Martian materials arriving on Earth should also be part of a human Mars mission and this and the surface biosafety program should be integral to human expeditions from the earliest stages of the mission planning.

Warmflash, David↗