Results for “DAA Alerting Performance” — Page 2

NASA NTRS2018

Comparative Analysis of ACAS-Xu and DAIDALUS Detect-and-Avoid Systems

The Detect and Avoid (DAA) capability of a recent version (Run 3) of the Airborne Collision Avoidance System-Xu (ACAS-Xu) is measured against that of the Detect and AvoID Alerting Logic for Unmanned Systems (DAIDALUS), a reference algorithm for the Phase 1 Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for DAA. This comparative analysis of the two systems' alerting and horizontal guidance outcomes is conducted through the lens of the Detect and Avoid mission using flight data of scripted encounters from a recent flight test. Results indicate comparable timelines and outcomes between ACAS-Xu's Remain Well Clear alert and guidance and DAIDALUS's corrective alert and guidance, although ACAS-Xu's guidance appears to be more conservative. ACAS-Xu's Collision Avoidance alert and guidance occurs later than DAIDALUS's warning alert and guidance, and overlaps with DAIDALUS's timeline of maneuver to remain Well Clear. Interesting discrepancies between ACAS-Xu's directive guidance and DAIDALUS's "Regain Well Clear" guidance occur in some scenarios.

Davies, Jason T.↗

NASA NTRS2016

UAS in the NAS Flight Test Series 4 Overview

Flight Test Series 4 (FT4) provides the researchers with an opportunity to expand on the data collected during the first flight tests. Following Flight Test Series 3, additional scripted encounters with different aircraft performance and sensors will be conducted. FT4 is presently planned for Spring of 2016 to ensure collection of data to support the validation of the final RTCA Phase 1 DAA (Detect and Avoid) Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS). There are three research objectives associated with this goal: Evaluate the performance of the DAA system against cooperative and non-cooperative aircraft encounters Evaluate UAS (Unmanned Aircraft Systems) pilot performance in response to DAA maneuver guidance and alerting with live intruder encounters Evaluate TCAS/DAA (Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System/Detect and Avoid) interoperability. This flight test series will focus on only the Scripted Encounters configuration, supporting the collection of data to validate the interoperability of DAA and collision avoidance algorithms.

flight test↗

NASA NTRS2021

Evaluation of Sensor Uncertainty Mitigation Methods for Detect-and-Avoid Systems

The impact of sensor noise on the performance of Detect-And-Avoid (DAA) systems can be reduced by implementing various mitigation schemes. This paper evaluates two such methods. One of them is the Sensor Uncertainty Mitigation (SUM) method, implemented in the Detect and Avoid Alerting Logic for Unmanned Systems (DAIDALUS) algorithm, a reference implementation in the DAA minimum operational performance standards. The second method is the Virtual Intruder State Aggregation (VISA), which averages multiple subsequent intruder states extrapolated to the current (most recent) time into a single ``aggregated`` intruder state. The VISA method can be used either individually as a sensor noise mitigation method in its own right, or in combination with DAIDALUS SUM. The performance of these methods is evaluated using three safety and operational suitability metrics and compared with a baseline configuration using static safety buffers. A large number of encounters representative of low-speed unmanned aircraft against non-cooperative manned aircraft, not equipped with a broadcasting transponder or ADS-B out system, are simulated and evaluated. An air-to-air radar model produces representative sensor noise for the DAA system. Results show that increasing the DAIDALUS SUM parameters for horizontal and vertical uncertainty improves the safety metric at the cost of increasing the number of actionable alerts leading to increased workload. A range of SUM parameters is recommended as suitable values for the type of operations considered for this work. VISA was found to be almost as effective as other noise mitigation methods even when it was used alone. Combining VISA with DAIDALUS SUM achieved the best performance among all investigated methods used with DAIDALUS. General trends and optimal SUM configurations were found to be nearly the same for two large and very different encounter data sets.

Detect-and-Avoid Systems↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Applying Sensor Uncertainty Mitigation Schemes to Detect-and-Avoid Systems

Impact of sensor noise on the performance of Detect-And-Avoid (DAA) systems can be reduced by implementing various mitigation schemes. This paper evaluates the Sensor Uncertainty Mitigation (SUM) method, implemented in the Detect and Avoid Alerting Logic for Unmanned Systems (DAIDALUS) algorithm, a reference implementation in the DAA minimum operational performance standards. DAIDALUS SUM performance is evaluated using a few safety and operational suitability metrics and compared with more traditional approaches using static safety buffers. A large number of encounters representative of low-speed unmanned aircraft against non-cooperative manned aircraft are simulated and evaluated. An air-to-air radar model produces representative sensor noise for the DAA system. Results show that increasing the tunable parameters for horizontal and vertical uncertainty in DAIDALUS SUM improves the safety metric at the cost of increasing the number of system alerts leading to increased workload. A range of SUM parameters is recommended as suitable values for the type of operations considered for this work. General trends and optimal SUM configurations were found to be nearly the same for two large and very different encounter data sets.

detect and avoid↗

NASA NTRS2017

Unmanned Aircraft Systems Minimum Operations Performance Standards End-to-End Verification and Validation (E2-V2) Simulation

As Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) make their way to mainstream aviation operations within the National Airspace System (NAS), research efforts are underway to develop a safe and effective environment for their integration into the NAS. Detect and Avoid (DAA) systems are required to account for the lack of "eyes in the sky" due to having no human on-board the aircraft. The current NAS relies on pilot's vigilance and judgement to remain Well Clear (CFR 14 91.113) of other aircraft. RTCA SC-228 has defined DAA Well Clear (DAAWC) to provide a quantified Well Clear volume to allow systems to be designed and measured against. Extended research efforts have been conducted to understand and quantify system requirements needed to support a UAS pilot's ability to remain well clear of other aircraft. The efforts have included developing and testing sensor, algorithm, alerting, and display requirements. More recently, sensor uncertainty and uncertainty mitigation strategies have been evaluated. This paper discusses results and lessons learned from an End-to-End Verification and Validation (E2-V2) simulation study of a DAA system representative of RTCA SC-228's proposed Phase I DAA Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS). NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) was called upon to develop a system that evaluates a specific set of encounters, in a variety of geometries, with end-to-end DAA functionality including the use of sensor and tracker models, a sensor uncertainty mitigation model, DAA algorithmic guidance in both vertical and horizontal maneuvering, and a pilot model which maneuvers the ownship aircraft to remain well clear from intruder aircraft, having received collective input from the previous modules of the system. LaRC developed a functioning batch simulation and added a sensor/tracker model from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) William J. Hughes Technical Center, an in-house developed sensor uncertainty mitigation strategy, and implemented a pilot model similar to one from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Lincoln Laboratory (MIT/LL). The resulting simulation provides the following key parameters, among others, to evaluate the effectiveness of the MOPS DAA system: severity of loss of well clear (SLoWC), alert scoring, and number of increasing alerts (alert jitter). The technique, results, and lessons learned from a detailed examination of DAA system performance over specific test vectors and encounter cases during the simulation experiment will be presented in this paper.

Ghatas, Rania W.↗

NASA NTRS2016

SC-228 Inclusion of DAA Warning Alert for TCAS Interoperability

This white paper summarizes NASA research results that have informed Special Committee 228 (SC-228) discussions and decisions regarding the inclusion of a warning-level alert within the detect and avoid (DAA) alerting structure for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). For UAS, the removal of the pilot from onboard the aircraft has eliminated the ability of the ground-based pilot in command (PIC) to use out-the-window visual information to make judgments about a potential threat of a loss of well clear with another aircraft. As a result, the DAA traffic display will be the primary source of information that the PIC can use to execute the three primary well clear functions: 1) detect a potential loss of well clear, 2) determine a resolution maneuver, and 3) upload that maneuver to the aircraft via the ground control station (GCS). In addition, pilots are required to coordinate with air traffic control (ATC) prior to maneuvering off of their approved flight plan. In determining an appropriate resolution maneuver to avoid a loss of well clear, the PIC must decide both when and how to maneuver, and both the timeliness and the accuracy (i.e., correctness) of the maneuver are critical to reducing the likelihood and/or severity of a loss of well clear. Alerting information is one of three critical components of the DAA display, along with traffic information elements (e.g., relative heading, speed and altitude) and maneuver guidance. Alerting information and maneuver guidance, in particular, have been found to have a significant impact, both statistically and practically, on pilots' ability to avoid and minimize the severity of losses of well clear While all three display components are key to pilots performing the traffic avoidance task of remaining well clear, in general, alerting information provides crucial information about when a resolution maneuver is required while maneuver guidance assists the pilot in determining how best to maneuver. A fundamental task of the DAA alerting system is to provide critical timing information to the pilot about the potential for a loss of well clear with another aircraft. This is done by employing both temporal and spatial thresholds that indicate to the pilot the likelihood and imminence of a loss of well clear. The design of the DAA alerting thresholds is a balancing act between eliciting the desired pilot response in real loss of well clear threat events and reducing excessive, unnecessary, and/or uncoordinated UAS maneuvering within the air traffic environment; larger thresholds, both spatially and temporally, may increase the likelihood of a pilot avoiding a loss of well clear, but it can also increase the frequency of maneuvering - especially in cases where a maneuver is not actually needed to maintain well clear. A series of human in the loop (HITL) simulations have been conducted as part of NASA's Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Integration in the National Airspace System (NAS) project. The purpose of these HITLs has been to provide empirical results in order to inform development of the minimum human-machine interface requirements for the DAA system. This white paper will present those results which provide evidence of a human performance benefit (in terms of response times and ability to remain well clear of other aircraft) of the DAA warning alert both with and without a collision avoidance system on board the aircraft.

TCAS interoperability↗

NASA NTRS2016

ACES M and S: Unmitigated Factorial Encounter Study on DAA/TCAS Interoperability

Realization of the expected proliferation of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) operations in the National Airspace System (NAS) depends on the development and validation of standards for UAS Detect and Avoid (DAA) Systems. The RTCA Special Committee 228 is charged with leading the development of draft Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for UAS DAA Systems. NASA, as a participating member of RTCA SC-228 is committed to supporting the development and validation of draft requirements for DAA alerting and guidance systems. This presentation contains the results of two combinatorial encounter analysis studies using NASA's SAA Control fast-time simulation capability for this purpose. In these studies, encounters between two aircraft were simulated one at a time for the full factorial combination of encounter geometries (e.g., encounter angle, CPA offset) and aircraft performance (e.g., ownership and intruder ground speeds and vertical rates). The first study analyzes the relationships (e.g., timeline) between the different alerting-safety regions in the SC-228 MOPS (in order of increasing severity): 1) DAA warning alert, 2) well clear recovery (WCR) guidance, 3) DAA-Collision Avoidance (CA), and 4) TCAS RA. This study will focus primarily on encounter situations in which TCAS RA occurs prior to any of the other alerting-safety boundaries. In particular, this study will investigate whether using vertical distance or vertical distance at closest point of approach (i.e., vertical miss distance or VMD) is more appropriate for the definition of the DAA-CA region. In addition, cases where transitions between different regions skip an intermediate region will be analyzed. The second study in this presentation explores a proposal to use an altitude rate error threshold to determine if vertical maneuvers are acceptable for DAA WCR guidance against non-cooperative intruders. This study incorporates the radar from the Honeywell sensor model and examines a series of pairwise encounters between a non-cooperative intruder and a UAS ownship, with different combinations of intruder states and ownship performance levels. The study uses SAA Control as a simulation platform and pilot model, and Omnibands to provide DWC recovery guidance. Two simulation sets, one that allows vertical DWC recovery guidance and one that does not, are compared to determine if encounters with altitude rate errors above 250 feet-per-minute are more likely to have more severe losses of well clear, as determined by the Loss of Well-Clear Severity metric.

SaaControl↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Advanced Air Mobility Operations & Automation Part II Technical Lecture

The Airborne Collision Avoidance System X (ACAS X) is a next-generation collision avoidance tool developed to support different aircraft types and operations. The rotorcraft variant – referred to as ACAS XR – is designed to accommodate existing helicopter platforms as well as in-development, electric vertical takeoff and landing concepts, which are critical to the emerging concept of operations referred to as Advanced Air Mobility. The fundamental role of ACAS XR is to provide Detect and Avoid (DAA) and/or Collision Avoidance (CA) protection against airborne traffic. DAA alerting and guidance in the context of ACAS XR is caution-level and “suggestive,” and is to be used by the pilot if, and when, they decide to maneuver against an identified threat to DAA “well clear.” The CA alerting, by contrast, is warning-level and “directive,” with the pilot required to comply with the associated guidance to prevent a predicted Near Midair Collision (NMAC). The CA alerts generated by ACAS XR are referred to as Resolution Advisories (RAs) consistent with previous CA systems. Unlike earlier CA systems, ACAS XR issues RAs in the horizontal and vertical dimensions as well as multi-axis RAs (referred to as “Blended” RAs). According to the Minimal Operational Performance Standards of DAA systems for Unmanned Aircraft Systems, maneuvers to comply with RAs may be automated, whereas maneuvers based on DAA alerting assume a manual response. The current presentation discusses two human-in-the-loop simulations that presented rotorcraft pilots with ACAS XR alerts and guidance in eVTOL simulators with varying levels of automation. It also presents overviews of these studies as well as how they assisted live flight tests, which will occur throughout 2023.

air taxis↗

NASA NTRS2020

UAS Integration in the NAS Project: Overview of Flight Test Series 6

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration in the National Airspace System (UAS-NAS) Project has conducted a series of flight test campaigns intended to support the reduction of barriers that prevent unmanned aircraft from flying without the required waivers from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The 2019 Flight Test Series 6 (FT6) campaign furthered this path and supported three test configurations: 1) Radar Characterization, 2) Scripted Encounters and 3) Full Mission. Radar Characterization assessed the performance of Honeywell’s low size, weight, and power (low SWaP) radar system; Scripted Encounters investigated the timing of Detect and Avoid (DAA) alerting thresholds using a Department of Defense (DoD) Group 3 unmanned aircraft system (UAS) equipped with low SWaP sensors and three different live intruder aircraft flown at varying encounter geometries; and Full Mission validated human-in-the-loop simulations by collecting pilot performance data from a ground control station while controlling a live unmanned aircraft on a mission in both virtual and live air traffic controlled airspace. The subject pilot observed a research display that presented DAA advisories to maintain separation from live and virtual aircraft. The test was conducted over a twenty-week period within the R-2508 special use airspace located near Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB), CA. Over 240 encounters were flown during the test series and FT6 proved to be invaluable for the purposes of planning, managing, and executing this type of integrated flight test in both live and virtual environments. Data collected from FT6 was provided to the RTCA Special Committee 228 (SC-228) to help inform the Phase 2 Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS). FT6 was the final test series for the UAS-NAS project that began in 2012. This paper provides an overview of FT6 and its success can be directly attributed to the diligent work of the men and women who supported this effort.

UAS in the NAS↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Assessing Helicopter Pilots’ Detect and Avoid and Collision Avoidance Performance With ACAS Xr

The latest variant of the Federal Aviation Administration’s Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS X) is being designed for both crewed and uncrewed rotorcraft. Referred to as ACAS Xr, the system joins a suite of other ACAS X variants poised to replace the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS II). ACAS Xr is tuned to support current-day helicopter platforms as well as electric Vertical Takeoff and Landing (eVTOL) vehicles that are still under development. Given this flexibility, ACAS Xr may be used by helicopter crews currently in operation or by remotely-operated eVTOL aircraft in the emerging Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) market. To cover the range of potential uses, two distinct configurations are being proposed for ACAS Xr: Collision Avoidance System (CAS) and Detect and Avoid (DAA). Under the CAS configuration, ACAS Xr provides minimal caution-level alerting but issues directive warning-level alerting and guidance. The DAA configuration, by contrast, provides caution-level alerting and guidance, in addition to the warning-level alerting and guidance. The current study was performed as part of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s AAM project. Six helicopter pilots were recruited to fly a variety of scripted traffic scenarios in a full-motion, crewed eVTOL simulator. Participants flew 60 encounters over two days, reacting to pre-recorded intruder aircraft that were scripted to fly into the participant’s aircraft from different approach angles, relative altitudes, and during different phases of flight. The pilots flew half of the encounters with the CAS configuration and half with the DAA configuration. Within each block of 30 encounters, pilots experienced 10 conflicts while in cruise, 10 in hover, and 10 while on approach to a heliport. Results showed that pilot response times were consistently under 5 seconds for RAs and under 10 seconds for DAA alerts, when present, during all three phases of flight. Unsurprisingly, the DAA configuration was associated with lower rates of en-route and high-severity losses of DAA well clear compared to the CAS configuration in all phases of flight except for the terminal area. Rates of losses of DAA well clear were found to be substantially higher in the Hover scenario, compared to Cruise. Pilots failed to fully comply with RAs at a rate of 0.10-0.18 in all conditions except for the DAA configuration in the Hover scenario, which was associated with a higher non-compliance rate of 0.4 due to Descend RAs issued at low altitudes. The implications of these results with regards to the ongoing development of ACAS Xr is discussed.

air taxis↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Assessing Helicopter Pilots’ Detect and Avoid and Collision Avoidance Performance with ACAS Xr

The latest variant of the Federal Aviation Administration’s Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS X) is being designed for both crewed and uncrewed rotorcraft. Referred to as ACAS Xr, the system joins a suite of other ACAS X variants poised to replace the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS II). ACAS Xr is tuned to support current-day helicopter platforms as well as electric Vertical Takeoff and Landing (eVTOL) vehicles that are still under development. Given this flexibility, ACAS Xr may be used by helicopter crews currently in operation or by remotely-operated eVTOL aircraft in the emerging Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) market. To cover the range of potential uses, two distinct configurations are being proposed for ACAS Xr: Collision Avoidance System (CAS) and Detect and Avoid (DAA). Under the CAS configuration, ACAS Xr provides minimal caution-level alerting but issues directive warning-level alerting and guidance. The DAA configuration, by contrast, provides caution-level alerting and guidance, in addition to the warning-level alerting and guidance. The current study was performed as part of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s AAM project. Six helicopter pilots were recruited to fly a variety of scripted traffic scenarios in a full-motion, crewed eVTOL simulator. Participants flew 60 encounters over two days, reacting to pre-recorded intruder aircraft that were scripted to fly into the participant’s aircraft from different approach angles, relative altitudes, and during different phases of flight. The pilots flew half of the encounters with the CAS configuration and half with the DAA configuration. Within each block of 30 encounters, pilots experienced 10 conflicts while in cruise, 10 in hover, and 10 while on approach to a heliport. Results showed that pilot response times were consistently under 5 seconds for RAs and under 10 seconds for DAA alerts, when present, during all three phases of flight. Unsurprisingly, the DAA configuration was associated with lower rates of en-route and high-severity losses of DAA well clear compared to the CAS configuration in all phases of flight except for the terminal area. Rates of losses of DAA well clear were found to be substantially higher in the Hover scenario, compared to Cruise. Pilots failed to fully comply with RAs at a rate of 0.10-0.18 in all conditions except for the DAA configuration in the Hover scenario, which was associated with a higher non-compliance rate of 0.4 due to Descend RAs issued at low altitudes. The implications of these results with regards to the ongoing development of ACAS Xr is discussed.

air taxis↗

NASA NTRS2019

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Integration in the National Airspace System (NAS) Project: ACAS Xu HITL Overview

This presentation provides an overview of a recently completed human-in-the-loop simulation, conducted as part of the Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Integration in the National Airspace System (NAS) Project. This study examined how to present resolution advisories (RAs) issued by Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) Xu, which can be in the vertical dimension, the horizontal dimension, or both (i.e., "blended"). The study varied the location of the ACAS Xu traffic information - it was either presented within an 'integrated' display or a 'standalone' display, where the traffic information was separated from the vehicle control interfaces and navigational information. The presentation covers the test set-up, scenario design, and facilities utilized in this experiment. The primary dependent variables are listed, but no detailed results are included in this outbrief since data analysis is still underway. Goal: assess ACAS Xu Run 5 in a HITL setting to measure pilot & system performance – RWC alerting and guidance – RA alerting and guidance • Horizontal-only, vertical-only, and blended RAs • Strengthening RAs, reversals and added/removed RAs during blended maneuvers – Incorporate realistic sensor noise into the simulation environment – Compare pilot and DAA system performance back to NASA’s Phase 1 DAA MOPS V&V HITL • We leveraged the findings of an engineering analysis conducted in March to help inform how to implement the Xu logic – Part 1 focused on how to display horizontal-only, vertical-only and blended RAs – Part 2 focused on how to display automated RA responses Xu Engineering Analysis Results Part 1 objectives: – Characterize pilot responses to (canned) ACAS Xu RAs in a variety of display configurations • With vs. Without text accompaniment • Simple vs. ‘Advanced’ aural alerting • Results – Pilots struggled to meet 5 seconds initial response requirement • Particularly against horizontal and blended RAs – Pilots failed to respond more quickly to secondary RAs • Expected response time to subsequent RAs = 2.5 seconds No clear effect of the different alerting conditions on response times – Response times primarily driven by RA type • Pilots demonstrated high level of compliance with RAs and self-reported Xu alerting and guidance as being acceptable – 1/5 reported text as being necessary – 4/5 wanted the aural alert to retain the original RA sequence (i.e., issue a follow-on RA second rather than first) – 4/5 wanted to retain the “Maintain Heading/Vertical Speed” aural alert in the event that the pilot reached their target response at the time of secondary RA Based on these results, we decided on the following for the HITL experimental design: – Incorporated an ‘auto-fill’ feature in Vigilant Spirit that removes the need for pilots to manually enter a heading or altitude for RAs • Pilots only have to click ‘Send’ to upload the RA target heading/altitude – Did not include an RA ‘text box’ • The auto-fill feature largely replaces the purpose of the text box – Using a combination of the ‘Basic’ and ‘Advanced’ aural alerting • In case of blended maneuvers will issue “Maintain Heading/Vertical Rate” if pilot has reached 1st RA target at the time the 2nd RA is issued • Integration and testing with Xu Run 5 also resulted in us adding display logic to modify how horizontal RAs are presented – Target heading was shown to update at approx. 1 Hz making it difficult for pilots to implement – Display logic limited horizontal RA strengthening to once every 5 seconds • Did not impact timing of reversals, new RAs (i.e., blended), or CoC Engineering Analysis Results

human systems integration↗

NASA NTRS2017

Validation of Minimum Display Requirements for a UAS Detect and Avoid System

The full integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) into the National Airspace System (NAS), a prerequisite for enabling a broad range of public and commercial UAS operations, presents several technical challenges to UAS developers, operators and regulators. A primary barrier is the inability for UAS pilots (situated at a ground control station, or GCS) to comply with Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations sections 91.111 and 91.113, which require pilots to “see and avoid” other aircraft in order to maintain well clear. UAS pilots’ removal from the flight deck of the aircraft necessitates the development of a UAS-specific system for detecting nearby traffic and displaying traffic information to the pilot to support their ability to maintain an objectively defined “DAA well clear” threshold from other aircraft. This new UAS-specific function of remaining DAA well clear is called traffic avoidance. The resulting Detect and Avoid (DAA) system, however, will be subject to a collection of requirements that manufacturers will be obligated to meet in order to certify their equipment. RTCA Special Committee 228 (SC-228), a consortium of representatives from government, industry and academia, is responsible for developing and documenting the Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for UAS DAA systems. The present study is the final in a series of human-in-the-loop (HITL) experiments designed to explore and test the various display and alerting requirements being incorporated into the DAA MOPS. Whereas the prior DAA HITLs examined a wide variety of DAA display features and concepts, the current experiment aims to validate the latest minimum display requirements for Phase 1 of the DAA MOPS. Rather than test different display concepts, this study tests two configurations of a MOPS-compatible DAA display: a version that is integrated into the primary navigation and control display of the GCS and a version that is physically separated from the primary display. This manipulation tests the draft minimum requirement that allows the DAA traffic display to be a separate, or standalone, configuration. This type of configuration is a more achievable near-term technology solution since it does not stipulate additional certification or integration requirements on UAS manufacturers. However, a standalone display configuration has the potential to result in pilot performance issues resulting from the cognitive costs of switching between the primary DAA display and the primary navigation and control display. This configuration is also particularly susceptible to errors if the displays are in different orientations (e.g., north-up versus track-up). Both the integrated and standalone display configurations were presented to 16 active UAS pilots in a medium-fidelity simulation, which included confederate air traffic controllers and pseudo pilots operating simulated manned traffic. Pilots were tasked with navigating two different mission routes while maintaining DAA well clear with scripted conflicts. Pilot response times (i.e., measured response) and ability to remain DAA well clear are reported. Primary results indicate that both display configurations resulted in favorable response times and well clear rates. While there were clear trends of pilots objectively performing better in the integrated display condition, with several measured response metrics reaching statistical significance, the differences between the two displays were typically moderate. While the primary variable of DAA display location did not have an especially large impact on pilot performance on its own, when examined alongside the type of DAA threat the pilot was facing (a caution-level versus a warning-level alert), the response time benefits associated with the integrated display were amplified. The implications of these American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 2 results on the Phase 1 DAA MOPS and the connection of this data to previous studies is also discussed.

detect and avoid↗

NASA NTRS2018

An Interoperability Concept for Detect and Avoid and Collision Avoidance Systems: Results from a Human-In-The-Loop Simulation

The integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) into the National Airspace System (NAS) poses a variety of technical challenges to UAS developers and aviation regulators. In response to growing demand for access to civil airspace in the United States, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has produced a roadmap identifying key areas requiring further research and development. One such technical challenge is the development of a "detect and avoid" system (DAA) capable of providing a means of compliance with the "see and avoid" requirement in manned aviation. The purpose of the DAA system is to support the pilot, situated at a ground control station (GCS), in maintaining "DAA well clear" of nearby aircraft through the use of GCS displays and alerts. In addition to its primary function of aiding the pilot in maintaining DAA well clear, the DAA system must also safely interoperate with existing NAS systems and operations, such as the airspace management procedures of air traffic controllers (ATC) and Collision Avoidance (CA) systems currently in use by manned aircraft, namely the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS II). It is anticipated that many UAS architectures will integrate both a DAA system and a TCAS II. It is therefore necessary to explicitly study the integration of DAA and TCAS II alerting structures and maneuver guidance formats to ensure that pilots understand the appropriate type and urgency of their response to the various alerts. This paper presents a concept of interoperability for the two systems. The concept was developed with the goal of avoiding any negative impact on the performance level of TCAS II while retaining a DAA system that still effectively enables pilots to maintain DAA well clear. The interoperability concept described in the paper focuses primarily on facilitating the transition from a late-stage DAA encounter (where a loss of DAA well clear is imminent) to a TCAS II Corrective Resolution Advisory (RA), which requires pilot compliance within five seconds of its issuance. The interoperability concept was presented to 10 participants (6 active UAS pilots and 4 active commercial pilots) in a medium-fidelity, human-in-the-loop simulation designed to stress different aspects of the DAA and TCAS II systems. Pilots' ability to maintain separation, their rate of compliance and response times using the interoperability concept are reported. Results indicated that pilots exhibited comprehension of, and appropriate prioritization within, the DAA-TCAS II combined alert structure. Pilots demonstrated a high rate of compliance with TCAS II RAs and were also seen to respond to corrective RAs within the five second requirement established for manned aircraft. The DAA system presented under test was also shown to be effective in supporting pilots' ability to maintain DAA well clear in the overwhelming majority of cases in which pilots had sufficient time to respond.

Rorie, R. Conrad↗

NASA NTRS2016

Piloted "Well Clear" Performance Evaluation of Detect-and-Avoid Systems with Suggestive Guidance

This study evaluated the performance of four prototype unmanned aircraft detect-and-avoid (DAA) display configurations, each with different informational elements driven by alerting and guidance algorithms. Sixteen unmanned aircraft pilots flew each combination of the display configurations, with half being given zero DAA surveillance sensor uncertainty and the other half experiencing errors that were comparable, and in some cases slightly better than, errors that were measured in DAA system flight tests. The displays that showed intruder alert information in altitude and heading bands had significantly fewer losses of well clear compared with alternative displays that lacked that information. This difference was significant from a statistical and practical perspective: those losses that did occur lasted for shorter periods and did not penetrate as far into the geometric "separation cylinder" as those in the non-banded displays. A modest level of DAA surveillance sensor uncertainty did not affect the proportion of losses of well clear or their severity. It is recommended that DAA traffic displays implement a band-type display in order to improve the safety of UAS operations in the National Airspace System. Finally, this report provides pilot response time distributions for responding to DAA alerts.

unmanned aircraft system↗

NASA NTRS2018

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Integration in the National Airspace System (NAS) Project: Terminal Operations HITL 1B Primary Results

This presentation provides an overview of the primary results from the Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Integration in the National Airspace System (NAS) Project's second Terminal Operations human-in-the-loop simulation. This talk covers the background of this follow-on experiment, which includes an overview of the first Terminal Operations HITL performed by the project. The primary results include a look at the number and durations of detect and avoid (DAA) alerts issued by the two DAA systems under test. It also includes response time metrics and metrics on the ability of the pilot-in-command (PIC) to maintain sufficient separation. Additional interoperability metrics are included to illustrate how pilots interact with the tower controller. Implications and conclusions are covered at the end.

unmanned aircraft systems↗

NASA NTRS2018

An Interoperability Concept for Detect and Avoid and Collision Avoidance Systems: Results from a Human-In-The-Loop Simulation

The integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) into the National Airspace System (NAS) poses a variety of technical challenges to UAS developers and aviation regulators. In response to growing demand for access to civil airspace in the United States, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has produced a roadmap identifying key areas requiring further research and development. One such technical challenge is the development of a "detect and avoid" system (DAA) capable of providing a means of compliance with the "see and avoid" requirement in manned aviation. The purpose of the DAA system is to support the pilot, situated at a ground control station (GCS), in maintaining "DAA well clear" of nearby aircraft through the use of GCS displays and alerts. In addition to its primary function of aiding the pilot in maintaining well clear, the DAA system must also safely interoperate with existing NAS systems and operations, such as the airspace management procedures of air traffic controllers (ATC) and Collision Avoidance (CA) systems currently in use by manned aircraft, namely the Traffic alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) II. It is anticipated that many UAS architectures will integrate both a DAA system and a TCAS II. It is therefore necessary to explicitly study the integration of DAA and TCAS II alerting structures and maneuver guidance formats to ensure that pilots understand the appropriate type and urgency of their response to the various alerts. This paper presents a concept of interoperability for the two systems. The concept was developed with the goal of avoiding any negative impact on the performance level of TCAS II while retaining a DAA system that still effectively enables pilots to maintain DAA well clear.

unmanned aircraft systems↗

NASA NTRS2019

Alternative Surveillance Fast Time Simulation with Sensor Uncertainties and Mitigation

This presentation describes a simulation plan for the fast time simulation 3 for the modeling and simulation team in the UAS (Unmanned Aircraft Systems) in the NAS (National Airspace System)project. Objectives: Investigate the effect of limited surveillance volume and realistic radar noise on DAA (Detect and Avoid) performance; Evaluate the ability of the sensor uncertainty mitigation (SUM) feature of the DAIDALUS [Dectect and Avoid...] algorithm to improve DAA alerting and guidance [Includes content on SWaP-C (size, weight, power, and cost) of unmanned aircraft; and Near-mid-air-collision (NMAC).]

UAS↗