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NASA NTRS2011

Energy Storage Project

NASA's Exploration Technology Development Program funded the Energy Storage Project to develop battery and fuel cell technology to meet the expected energy storage needs of the Constellation Program for human exploration. Technology needs were determined by architecture studies and risk assessments conducted by the Constellation Program, focused on a mission for a long-duration lunar outpost. Critical energy storage needs were identified as batteries for EVA suits, surface mobility systems, and a lander ascent stage; fuel cells for the lander and mobility systems; and a regenerative fuel cell for surface power. To address these needs, the Energy Storage Project developed advanced lithium-ion battery technology, targeting cell-level safety and very high specific energy and energy density. Key accomplishments include the development of silicon composite anodes, lithiated-mixed-metal-oxide cathodes, low-flammability electrolytes, and cell-incorporated safety devices that promise to substantially improve battery performance while providing a high level of safety. The project also developed "non-flow-through" proton-exchange-membrane fuel cell stacks. The primary advantage of this technology set is the reduction of ancillary parts in the balance-of-plant--fewer pumps, separators and related components should result in fewer failure modes and hence a higher probability of achieving very reliable operation, and reduced parasitic power losses enable smaller reactant tanks and therefore systems with lower mass and volume. Key accomplishments include the fabrication and testing of several robust, small-scale nonflow-through fuel cell stacks that have demonstrated proof-of-concept. This report summarizes the project s goals, objectives, technical accomplishments, and risk assessments. A bibliography spanning the life of the project is also included.

Mercer, Carolyn R.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Sensitivity Analysis of the Bone Fracture Risk Model

Introduction: The probability of bone fracture during and after spaceflight is quantified to aid in mission planning, to determine required astronaut fitness standards and training requirements and to inform countermeasure research and design. Probability is quantified with a probabilistic modeling approach where distributions of model parameter values, instead of single deterministic values, capture the parameter variability within the astronaut population and fracture predictions are probability distributions with a mean value and an associated uncertainty. Because of this uncertainty, the model in its current state cannot discern an effect of countermeasures on fracture probability, for example between use and non-use of bisphosphonates or between spaceflight exercise performed with the Advanced Resistive Exercise Device (ARED) or on devices prior to installation of ARED on the International Space Station. This is thought to be due to the inability to measure key contributors to bone strength, for example, geometry and volumetric distributions of bone mass, with areal bone mineral density (BMD) measurement techniques. To further the applicability of model, we performed a parameter sensitivity study aimed at identifying those parameter uncertainties that most effect the model forecasts in order to determine what areas of the model needed enhancements for reducing uncertainty. Methods: The bone fracture risk model (BFxRM), originally published in (Nelson et al) is a probabilistic model that can assess the risk of astronaut bone fracture. This is accomplished by utilizing biomechanical models to assess the applied loads; utilizing models of spaceflight BMD loss in at-risk skeletal locations; quantifying bone strength through a relationship between areal BMD and bone failure load; and relating fracture risk index (FRI), the ratio of applied load to bone strength, to fracture probability. There are many factors associated with these calculations including environmental factors, factors associated with the fall event, mass and anthropometric values of the astronaut, BMD characteristics, characteristics of the relationship between BMD and bone strength and bone fracture characteristics. The uncertainty in these factors is captured through the use of parameter distributions and the fracture predictions are probability distributions with a mean value and an associated uncertainty. To determine parameter sensitivity, a correlation coefficient is found between the sample set of each model parameter and the calculated fracture probabilities. Each parameters contribution to the variance is found by squaring the correlation coefficients, dividing by the sum of the squared correlation coefficients, and multiplying by 100. Results: Sensitivity analyses of BFxRM simulations of preflight, 0 days post-flight and 365 days post-flight falls onto the hip revealed a subset of the twelve factors within the model which cause the most variation in the fracture predictions. These factors include the spring constant used in the hip biomechanical model, the midpoint FRI parameter within the equation used to convert FRI to fracture probability and preflight BMD values. Future work: Plans are underway to update the BFxRM by incorporating bone strength information from finite element models (FEM) into the bone strength portion of the BFxRM. Also, FEM bone strength information along with fracture outcome data will be incorporated into the FRI to fracture probability.

mathematical models↗
NASA NTRS1975

Migratory gold resistive shorts - Chemical aspects of a failure mechanism

Integrated-circuit devices using the Ti/W/Au metal system are subject to failure mechanisms based on electrolytic corrosion. The migratory gold resistive short (MGRS) failure mode is one example of this mechanism and results in the formation of filamentary or dendritic deposits of gold between adjacent stripes on the IC chip. This reaction requires the presence of a sufficient amount of water, a bias voltage between adjacent stripes, and the activation of the cathodic (-) stripe. Gold ions are transported from anode to cathode through a film of moisture adsorbed on the surface of the chip; halide ions are probably involved in the transfer. Their presence is verified experimentally by X-ray photoelectron spectroscopy. Some of the chemical and electrostatic factors involved in the MGRS mechanism are discussed in this paper, including the questions of a threshold level of moisture and contamination.

Grunthaner, F. J.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Energy Storage Technology Development for Space Exploration

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration is developing battery and fuel cell technology to meet the expected energy storage needs of human exploration systems. Improving battery performance and safety for human missions enhances a number of exploration systems, including un-tethered extravehicular activity suits and transportation systems including landers and rovers. Similarly, improved fuel cell and electrolyzer systems can reduce mass and increase the reliability of electrical power, oxygen, and water generation for crewed vehicles, depots and outposts. To achieve this, NASA is developing non-flow-through proton-exchange-membrane fuel cell stacks, and electrolyzers coupled with low permeability membranes for high pressure operation. The primary advantage of this technology set is the reduction of ancillary parts in the balance-of-plant fewer pumps, separators and related components should result in fewer failure modes and hence a higher probability of achieving very reliable operation, and reduced parasitic power losses enable smaller reactant tanks and therefore systems with lower mass and volume. Key accomplishments over the past year include the fabrication and testing of several robust, small-scale non-flow-through fuel cell stacks that have demonstrated proof-of-concept. NASA is also developing advanced lithium-ion battery cells, targeting cell-level safety and very high specific energy and energy density. Key accomplishments include the development of silicon composite anodes, lithiatedmixed- metal-oxide cathodes, low-flammability electrolytes, and cell-incorporated safety devices that promise to substantially improve battery performance while providing a high level of safety.

Mercer, Carolyn R.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Electrified Aircraft Propulsion Systems: Potential Failure Modes and Failure Mitigation Strategies

Electrified aircraft propulsion (EAP) systems hold great potential for the reduction of aircraft fuel burn, emissions, and noise. Currently, NASA and other organizations are actively working to identify and mature technologies necessary to bring EAP designs to reality. A requirement for the development of any civil aircraft and its systems is to ensure that potential hazards in the design are identified and appropriately mitigated to ensure that the system is safe. During aircraft development, a system safety assessment that consists of a functional hazard assessment is conducted to identify all potential failure conditions of each function, and classify those failures according to the severity of their effects on the aircraft or its occupants. The more severe a function's failure condition classification, the greater the development assurance level required for the function to ensure that the probability of the hazard is acceptably low. Today, aircraft engines and their control systems receive type certificate approval as a stand-alone system to signify their airworthiness. However, the complex coupling and distributed nature of EAP designs are expected to place added challenges on the certification of these systems. This presentation will provide an initial high-level review of the potential failure modes and hazards posed by a generic EAP system along with potential mitigation strategies for those failures. The EAP system is assumed to be a hybrid design consisting of gas turbine engines, mechanical drives, electric machines, power electronics and distribution systems, energy storage devices, and motor driven propulsors. The functionality provided by each of these EAP subsystems will be discussed along with the potential failure modes they may encounter. This will include a discussion of coupled failure effects, where a fault in one EAP subsystem effects the operation of other subsystems in the architecture. Next, potential failure mitigation strategies are discussed including both software-based and hardware-based mitigation strategies. The presentation will conclude with an example evaluation of the potential failure modes and mitigation strategies for a concept EAP system proposed by NASA.

Simon, Donald L.↗
NASA NTRS1984

Fastener load tests and retention systems tests for cryogenic wind-tunnel models

A-286 stainless steel screws were tested to determine the tensile load capability and failure mode of various screw sizes and types at both cryogenic and room temperature. Additionally, five fastener retention systems were tested by using A-286 screws with specimens made from the primary metallic alloys that are currently used for cryogenic models. The locking system effectiveness was examined by simple no-load cycling to cryogenic temperatures (-275 F) as well as by dynamic and static loading at cryogenic temperatures. In general, most systems were found to be effective retention devices. There are some differences between the various devices with respect to ease of application, cleanup, and reuse. Results of tests at -275 F imply that the cold temperatures act to improve screw retention. The improved retention is probably the result of differential thermal contraction and/or increased friction (thread-binding effects). The data provided are useful in selecting screw sizes, types, and locking devices for model systems to be tested in cryogenic wind tunnels.

Wallace, J. W.↗
NASA NTRS2013

What Reliability Engineers Should Know about Space Radiation Effects

Space radiation in space systems present unique failure modes and considerations for reliability engineers. Radiation effects is not a one size fits all field. Threat conditions that must be addressed for a given mission depend on the mission orbital profile, the technologies of parts used in critical functions and on application considerations, such as supply voltages, temperature, duty cycle, and redundancy. In general, the threats that must be addressed are of two types-the cumulative degradation mechanisms of total ionizing dose (TID) and displacement damage (DD). and the prompt responses of components to ionizing particles (protons and heavy ions) falling under the heading of single-event effects. Generally degradation mechanisms behave like wear-out mechanisms on any active components in a system: Total Ionizing Dose (TID) and Displacement Damage: (1) TID affects all active devices over time. Devices can fail either because of parametric shifts that prevent the device from fulfilling its application or due to device failures where the device stops functioning altogether. Since this failure mode varies from part to part and lot to lot, lot qualification testing with sufficient statistics is vital. Displacement damage failures are caused by the displacement of semiconductor atoms from their lattice positions. As with TID, failures can be either parametric or catastrophic, although parametric degradation is more common for displacement damage. Lot testing is critical not just to assure proper device fi.mctionality throughout the mission. It can also suggest remediation strategies when a device fails. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. (2) On the NEAR mission a functional failure was traced to a PIN diode failure caused by TID induced high leakage currents. NEAR was able to recover from the failure by reversing the current of a nearby Thermal Electric Cooler (turning the TEC into a heater). The elevated temperature caused the PIN diode to anneal and the device to recover. It was by lot qualification testing that NEAR knew the diode would recover when annealed. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. Single Event Effects (SEE): (1) In contrast to TID and displacement damage, Single Event Effects (SEE) resemble random failures. SEE modes can range from changes in device logic (single-event upset, or SEU). temporary disturbances (single-event transient) to catastrophic effects such as the destructive SEE modes, single-event latchup (SEL). single-event gate rupture (SEGR) and single-event burnout (SEB) (2) The consequences of nondestructive SEE modes such as SEU and SET depend critically on their application--and may range from trivial nuisance errors to catastrophic loss of mission. It is critical not just to ensure that potentially susceptible devices are well characterized for their susceptibility, but also to work with design engineers to understand the implications of each error mode. -For destructive SEE, the predominant risk mitigation strategy is to avoid susceptible parts, or if that is not possible. to avoid conditions under which the part may be susceptible. Destructive SEE mechanisms are often not well understood, and testing is slow and expensive, making rate prediction very challenging. (3) Because the consequences of radiation failure and degradation modes depend so critically on the application as well as the component technology, it is essential that radiation, component. design and system engineers work togetherpreferably starting early in the program to ensure critical applications are addressed in time to optimize the probability of mission success.

DiBari, Rebecca↗
NASA NTRS2010

Risk Assessment Using the Three Dimensions of Probability (Likelihood), Severity, and Level of Control

Traditional hazard analysis techniques utilize a two-dimensional representation of the results determined by relative likelihood and severity of the residual risk. These matrices present a quick-look at the Likelihood (Y-axis) and Severity (X-axis) of the probable outcome of a hazardous event. A three-dimensional method, described herein, utilizes the traditional X and Y axes, while adding a new, third dimension, shown as the Z-axis, and referred to as the Level of Control. The elements of the Z-axis are modifications of the Hazard Elimination and Control steps (also known as the Hazard Reduction Precedence Sequence). These steps are: 1. Eliminate risk through design. 2. Substitute less risky materials for more hazardous materials. 3. Install safety devices. 4. Install caution and warning devices. 5. Develop administrative controls (to include special procedures and training.) 6. Provide protective clothing and equipment. When added to the twodimensional models, the level of control adds a visual representation of the risk associated with the hazardous condition, creating a tall-pole for the least-well-controlled failure while establishing the relative likelihood and severity of all causes and effects for an identified hazard. Computer modeling of the analytical results, using spreadsheets and threedimensional charting gives a visual confirmation of the relationship between causes and their controls

Watson, Clifford↗
NASA NTRS2010

Risk Presentation Using the Three Dimensions of Likelihood, Severity, and Level of Control

Traditional hazard analysis techniques utilize a two-dimensional representation of the results determined by relative likelihood and severity of the residual risk. These matrices present a quick-look at the Likelihood (Y-axis) and Severity (X-axis) of the probable outcome of a hazardous event. A three-dimensional method, described herein, utilizes the traditional X and Y axes, while adding a new, third dimension, shown as the Z-axis, and referred to as the Level of Control. The elements of the Z-axis are modifications of the Hazard Elimination and Control steps (also known as the Hazard Reduction Precedence Sequence). These steps are: 1. Eliminate risk through design. 2. Substitute less risky materials for more hazardous materials. 3. Install safety devices. 4. Install caution and warning devices. 5. Develop administrative controls (to include special procedures and training.) 6. Provide protective clothing and equipment. When added to the two-dimensional models, the level of control adds a visual representation of the risk associated with the hazardous condition, creating a tall-pole for the leastwell-controlled failure while establishing the relative likelihood and severity of all causes and effects for an identified hazard. Computer modeling of the analytical results, using spreadsheets and three-dimensional charting gives a visual confirmation of the relationship between causes and their controls.

Watson, Clifford↗
NASA NTRS2011

Risk Assessment Using the Three Dimensions of Probability (Likelihood), Severity, and Level of Control

Traditional hazard analysis techniques utilize a two-dimensional representation of the results determined by relative likelihood and severity of the residual risk. These matrices present a quick-look at the Likelihood (Y-axis) and Severity (X-axis) of the probable outcome of a hazardous event. A three-dimensional method, described herein, utilizes the traditional X and Y axes, while adding a new, third dimension, shown as the Z-axis, and referred to as the Level of Control. The elements of the Z-axis are modifications of the Hazard Elimination and Control steps (also known as the Hazard Reduction Precedence Sequence). These steps are: 1. Eliminate risk through design. 2. Substitute less risky materials for more hazardous materials. 3. Install safety devices. 4. Install caution and warning devices. 5. Develop administrative controls (to include special procedures and training.) 6. Provide protective clothing and equipment. When added to the two-dimensional models, the level of control adds a visual representation of the risk associated with the hazardous condition, creating a tall-pole for the least-well-controlled failure while establishing the relative likelihood and severity of all causes and effects for an identified hazard. Computer modeling of the analytical results, using spreadsheets and three-dimensional charting gives a visual confirmation of the relationship between causes and their controls.

Watson, Clifford C.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Membrane-Based Gas Traps for Ammonia, Freon-21, and Water Systems to Simplify Ground Processing

Gas traps are critical for the smooth operation of coolant loops because gas bubbles can cause loss of centrifugal pump prime, interference with sensor readings, inhibition of heat transfer, and blockage of passages to remote systems. Coolant loops are ubiquitous in space flight hardware, and thus there is a great need for this technology. Conventional gas traps will not function in micro-gravity due to the absence of buoyancy forces. Therefore, clever designs that make use of adhesion and momentum are required for adequate separation, preferable in a single pass. The gas traps currently used in water coolant loops on the International Space Station are composed of membrane tube sets in a shell. Each tube set is composed of a hydrophilic membrane (used for water transport and capture of bubbles) and a hydrophobic membrane (used for venting of air bubbles). For the hydrophilic membrane, there are two critical pressures, the pressure drop and the bubble pressure. The pressure drop is the decrease in system pressure across the gas trap. The bubble pressure is the pressure required for air bubbles to pass across the water filled membrane. A significant difference between these pressures is needed to ensure complete capture of air bubbles in a single pass. Bubbles trapped by the device adsorb on the hydrophobic membrane in the interior of the hydrophilic membrane tube. After adsorption, the air is vented due to a pressure drop of approximately 1 atmosphere across the membrane. For water systems, the air is vented to the ambient (cabin). Because water vapor can also transport across the hydrophobic membrane, it is critical that a minimum surface area is used to avoid excessive water loss (would like to have a closed loop for the coolant). The currently used gas traps only provide a difference in pressure drop and bubble pressure of 3-4 psid. This makes the gas traps susceptible to failure at high bubble loading and if gas venting is impaired. One mechanism for the latter is when particles adhere to the hydrophobic membrane, promoting formation of a water layer about it that can blind the membrane for gas transport (Figure 1). This mechanism is the most probable cause for observed failures with the existing design. The objective of this project was to devise a strategy for choosing new membrane materials (database development and procedure), redesign of the gas trap to mitigate blinding effects, and to develop a design that can be used in ammonia and Freon-21 coolant loops.

Ritchie, Stephen M. C.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Piezoelectrically Initiated Pyrotechnic Igniter

This innovation consists of a pyrotechnic initiator and piezoelectric initiation system. The device will be capable of being initiated mechanically; resisting initiation by EMF, RF, and EMI (electromagnetic field, radio frequency, and electromagnetic interference, respectively); and initiating in water environments and space environments. Current devices of this nature are initiated by the mechanical action of a firing pin against a primer. Primers historically are prone to failure. These failures are commonly known as misfires or hang-fires. In many cases, the primer shows the dent where the firing pin struck the primer, but the primer failed to fire. In devices such as "T" handles, which are commonly used to initiate the blowout of canopies, loss of function of the device may result in loss of crew. In devices such as flares or smoke generators, failure can result in failure to spot a downed pilot. The piezoelectrically initiated ignition system consists of a pyrotechnic device that plugs into a mechanical system (activator), which on activation, generates a high-voltage spark. The activator, when released, will strike a stack of electrically linked piezo crystals, generating a high-voltage, low-amperage current that is then conducted to the pyro-initiator. Within the initiator, an electrode releases a spark that passes through a pyrotechnic first-fire mixture, causing it to combust. The combustion of the first-fire initiates a primary pyrotechnic or explosive powder. If used in a "T" handle, the primary would ramp the speed of burn up to the speed of sound, generating a shock wave that would cause a high explosive to go "high order." In a flare or smoke generator, the secondary would produce the heat necessary to ignite the pyrotechnic mixture. The piezo activator subsystem is redundant in that a second stack of crystals would be struck at the same time with the same activation force, doubling the probability of a first strike spark generation. If the first activation fails to ignite, the device is capable of multiple attempts. Another unique aspect is in the design of the pyrotechnic device. There is an electrode that aids the generation of a directed spark and the use of a conductive matrix to support the first-fire material so that the spark will penetrate to the second electrode.

Quince, Asia↗
DOE OSTI2024

Failure investigation and mitigation after experimental research reactor fuel plate deformation in an irradiation device

Experimental research reactor fuel testing is conducted in the Belgian Reactor 2 (BR2) of the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre (SCK CEN) in dedicated irradiation vehicles or rigs. One such vehicle allows flat full-size fuel plates to be irradiated by inserting them into slotted baskets that captures a narrow portion of the longitudinal edges of the plates. The motion of the fuel plates within the baskets is possible within the narrow slots and thus, the plate is considered to be unattached. The design intentionally omits fixing mechanisms of the fuel plates to the baskets to facilitate the inspection and repositioning of the plates between the irradiation cycles and the accommodation of thermal expansion of the plates in the lateral direction. However, loosely inserted fuel plates have weak structural boundary conditions allowing for larger out-of-plane deflections caused by hydrodynamic loads exerted by the flowing coolant, as compared to those of fixed plates. Unexpected large deformations of plates occurred in several irradiation cycles that further resulted in a loss of cladding integrity. These deformations could not be attributed to a single source. This triggered a series of thermal hydraulic, structural, and fluid-structure interaction analyses aiming at understanding the observed phenomenon. The analyses revealed that, for a certain combination of unfavorable manufacturing and assembly tolerances, fuel plate edges could escape out of the slots in the irradiation basket due to the hydrodynamic load. Subsequently, the plate could become wedged inside the basket coolant channel opening. This resulted in reduced coolant flow and accelerated temperature increase and thermal expansion of the plate while under irradiation. This unfavorable feedback loop could then lead to excessive plate surface temperatures, deformed plates and cladding failure, as was observed in the experiments. These analyses not only provided a probable cause of the fuel plate failures, but also resulted in a new and improved design of the irradiation basket to avoid these issues in the future. In conclusion, a series of recent successful irradiations confirm that the sources of failures were identified correctly, and the implemented mitigations were adequate.

BR2↗
NASA NTRS2011

Single-Event Gate Rupture in Power MOSFETs: A New Radiation Hardness Assurance Approach

Almost every space mission uses vertical power metal-semiconductor-oxide field-effect transistors (MOSFETs) in its power-supply circuitry. These devices can fail catastrophically due to single-event gate rupture (SEGR) when exposed to energetic heavy ions. To reduce SEGR failure risk, the off-state operating voltages of the devices are derated based upon radiation tests at heavy-ion accelerator facilities. Testing is very expensive. Even so, data from these tests provide only a limited guide to on-orbit performance. In this work, a device simulation-based method is developed to measure the response to strikes from heavy ions unavailable at accelerator facilities but posing potential risk on orbit. This work is the first to show that the present derating factor, which was established from non-radiation reliability concerns, is appropriate to reduce on-orbit SEGR failure risk when applied to data acquired from ions with appropriate penetration range. A second important outcome of this study is the demonstration of the capability and usefulness of this simulation technique for augmenting SEGR data from accelerator beam facilities. The mechanisms of SEGR are two-fold: the gate oxide is weakened by the passage of the ion through it, and the charge ionized along the ion track in the silicon transiently increases the oxide electric field. Most hardness assurance methodologies consider the latter mechanism only. This work demonstrates through experiment and simulation that the gate oxide response should not be neglected. In addition, the premise that the temporary weakening of the oxide due to the ion interaction with it, as opposed to due to the transient oxide field generated from within the silicon, is validated. Based upon these findings, a new approach to radiation hardness assurance for SEGR in power MOSFETs is defined to reduce SEGR risk in space flight projects. Finally, the potential impact of accumulated dose over the course of a space mission on SEGR susceptibility is explored. SEGR evaluation of gamma-irradiated power MOSFETs suggests a non-significant SEGR susceptibility enhancement due to accumulated dose from gamma rays. During SEGR testing, an unexpected enhanced dose effect from heavy-ion irradiation was detected. We demonstrate that this effect could be due to direct ionization by two or more ions at the same channel location. The probability on-orbit for such an occurrence is near-zero given the low heavy-ion fluence over a typical mission lifetime, and did not affect SEGR susceptibility. The results of this work can be used to bound the risk of SEGR in power MOSFETs considered for insertion into spacecraft and instruments.

Lauenstein, Jean-Marie↗
NASA NTRS1996

Chemical Characterization and Reactivity Testing of Fuel-Oxidizer Reaction Product (Test Report)

The product of incomplete reaction of monomethylhydrazine (MMH) and nitrogen tetroxide (NTO) propellants, or fuel-oxidizer reaction product (FORP), has been hypothesized as a contributory cause of an anomaly which occurred in the chamber pressure (PC) transducer tube on the Reaction Control Subsystem (RCS) aft thruster 467 on flight STS-51. A small hole was found in the titanium-alloy PC tube at the first bend below the pressure transducer. It was surmised that the hole may have been caused by heat and pressure resulting from ignition of FORP. The NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) was requested to define the chemical characteristics of FORP, characterize its reactivity, and simulate the events in a controlled environment which may have lead to the Pc-tube failure. Samples of FORP were obtained from the gas-phase reaction of MMH with NTO under laboratory conditions, the pulsed firings of RCS thrusters with modified PC tubes using varied oxidizer or fuel lead times, and the nominal RCS thruster firings at WSTF and Kaiser-Marquardt. Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy (FTIR), differential scanning calorimetry (DSC), accelerating rate calorimetry (ARC), ion chromatography (IC), inductively coupled plasma (ICP) spectrometry, thermogravimetric analysis (TGA) coupled to FTIR (TGA/FTIR), and mechanical impact testing were used to qualitatively and quantitatively characterize the chemical, thermal, and ignition properties of FORP. These studies showed that the composition of FORP is variable but falls within a limited range of compositions that depends on the fuel loxidizer ratio at the time of formation, composition of the post-formation atmosphere (reducing or oxidizing), and reaction or postreaction temperature. A typical composition contains methylhydrazinium nitrate (MMHN), ammonium nitrate (AN), methylammonium nitrate (MAN), and trace amounts of hydrazinium nitrate and 1,1-dimethylhydrazinium nitrate. The thermal decomposition reactions of FORP compositions used in this study were unremarkable, Neither the various compositions of FORP, the pure major components of FORP, nor mixtures of FORP with propellant-system corrosion products showed any unusual thermal activity when decomposed under laboratory conditions. Off-limit thruster operations were simulated by rapid mixing of liquid MMH and liquid NTO in a confined space. The test hardware was constructed with pressure- and temperature-measurement devices to determine if the expected fuel oxidizer reaction would result in increased energy release when FORP, FORP constituents, or propellant-system corrosion products were present. These tests demonstrated that FORP, MMHN, AN, or Inconel corrosion products can induce a mixture of MMH and NTO to produce component-damaging energies. The simulation-test program was not extensive enough to provide statistical probabilities for these events but did show that such events can occur. Damaging events required FORP or metal salts to be present at the initial mixing of MMH and NTO. Based on the results of these studies, it is suggested that removal or mitigation of a buildup of these materials may decrease the incidence of these high-energy, potentially damaging events.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2006

Monitoring Temperatures of Tires Using Luminescent Materials

A method of noncontact, optical monitoring of the surface temperature of a tire has been devised to enable the use of local temperature rise as an indication of potential or impending failures. The method involves the use of temperature-sensitive paint (or filler): Temperature-sensitive luminescent dye molecules or other luminescent particles are incorporated into a thin, flexible material coating the tire surface of interest. (Alternatively, in principle, the luminescent material could be incorporated directly into the tire rubber, though this approach has not yet been tested.) The coated surface is illuminated with shorter-wavelength light to excite longer-wavelength luminescence, which is observed by use of a charge-coupled-device camera or a photodetector (see Figure 1). If temporally constant illumination is used, then the temperature can be deduced from the known temperature dependence of the intensity response of the luminescence. If pulsed illumination is used, then the temperature can be deduced from the known temperature dependence of the time or frequency response of the luminescence. If sinusoidally varying illumination is used, then the temperature can be deduced from the known temperature dependence of the phase response of the luminescence. Unlike a prior method of monitoring the temperature at a fixed spot on a tire by use of a thermocouple, this method is not restricted to one spot and can, therefore, yield information on the spatial distribution of temperature: in particular, it enables the discovery of newly forming hot spots where damage may be starting. Also unlike in the thermocouple method, the measurements in this method are not vulnerable to breakage of wires in repeated flexing of the tire. Moreover, unlike in another method in which infrared radiation is monitored as an indication of surface temperature, the luminescence measurements in this method are not significantly affected by changes in infrared emissivity. This method has been demonstrated in application to the outside surface of a tire (see Figure 2), using both constant and pulsed light sources for illumination and cooled, slow-scan, gated CCD cameras for detection. For observing the temperature of the inside surface of a tire (this has not yet been done), it would probably be necessary to use fiber optics and/or windows for coupling excitation light into, and coupling luminescence out of, the interior volume.

Bencic, Timothy J↗