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Online Monitoring of Plant Assets in the Nuclear Industry

Today’s online monitoring technologies provide opportunities to perform predictive and proactive health management of assets within many different industries, in particular the defense and aerospace industries. The nuclear industry can leverage these technologies to enhance safety, productivity, and reliability of the aging fleet of existing nuclear power plants. The U.S. Department of Energy’s Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program is collaborating with the Electric Power Research Institute’s (EPRI’s) Long-Term Operations program to implement online monitoring in existing nuclear power plants. Proactive online monitoring in the nuclear industry is being explored using EPRI’s Fleet-Wide Prognostic and Health Management (FW-PHM) Suite software, a set of web-based diagnostic and prognostic tools and databases that serves as an integrated health monitoring architecture. This paper focuses on development of asset fault signatures used to assess the health status of generator step-up transformers and emergency diesel generators in nuclear power plants. Asset fault signatures describe the distinctive features based on technical examinations that can be used to detect a specific fault type. Fault signatures are developed based on the results of detailed technical research and on the knowledge and experience of technical experts. The Diagnostic Advisor of the FW-PHM Suite software matches developed fault signatures with operational data to provide early identification of critical faults and troubleshooting advice that could be used to distinguish between faults with similar symptoms. This research is important as it will support the automation of predictive online monitoring techniques in nuclear power plants to diagnose incipient faults, perform proactive maintenance, and estimate the remaining useful life of assets.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗

10 CFR 830 Major Modification Determination for Emergency Firewater Injection System Replacement

The continued safe and reliable operation of the ATR is critical to the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) mission. While ATR is safely fulfilling current mission requirements, a variety of aging and obsolescence issues challenge ATR engineering and maintenance personnel’s capability to sustain ATR over the long term. First documented in a series of independent assessments, beginning with an OA Environmental Safety and Health Assessment conducted in 2003, the issues were validated in a detailed Material Condition Assessment (MCA) conducted as a part of the ATR Life Extension Program in 2007.Accordingly, near term replacement of aging and obsolescent original ATR equipment has become important to ensure ATR capability in support of NE’s long term national missions. To that end, a mission needs statement has been prepared for a non-major system acquisition which is comprised of three interdependent sub-projects. The first project will replace the existent diesel-electrical bus (E-3), switchgear, and the fifty year old antiquated marine diesels with commercial power that is backed with safety-related emergency diesel generators (EDGs), switchgear, and uninterruptible power supply. The second project will replace the four, obsolete, original primary coolant pumps and motors. The third project, the subject of this major modification determination, will replace the current emergency firewater injection system (EFIS). The replacement water injection system will function as the primary emergency water injection system with the EFIS being retained as a defense-in-depth backup. Completion of this and the two other age-related projects (replacement of the ATR diesel bus (E-3) and switchgear and replacement of the existent aged primary coolant pumps and motors) will resolve major age-related operational issues plus make a significant contribution in sustaining the ATR safety and reliability profile. The major modification criteria evaluation of the project pre-conceptual design identified several issues that lead to the conclusion that the project is a major modification.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

10 CFR 830 Major Modification Determination for Replacement of ATR Primary Coolant Pumps and Motors

The continued safe and reliable operation of the ATR is critical to the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) mission. While ATR is safely fulfilling current mission requirements, a variety of aging and obsolescence issues challenge ATR engineering and maintenance personnel’s capability to sustain ATR over the long term. First documented in a series of independent assessments, beginning with an OA Environmental Safety and Health Assessment conducted in 2003, the issues were validated in a detailed Material Condition Assessment (MCA) conducted as a part of the ATR Life Extension Program in 2007.Accordingly, near term replacement of aging and obsolescent original ATR equipment has become important to ensure ATR capability in support of NE’s long term national missions. To that end, a mission needs statement has been prepared for a non-major system acquisition which is comprised of three interdependent subprojects. The first project will replace the existent diesel-electrical bus (E-3), switchgear, and the 50-year-old obsolescent marine diesels with commercial power that is backed with safety related emergency diesel generators, switchgear, and uninterruptible power supply (UPS). The second project, the subject of this major modification determination, will replace the four, obsolete, original primary coolant pumps (PCPs) and motors. Completion of this and the two other age-related projects (replacement of the ATR diesel bus [E-3] and switchgear and replacement of the existent emergency firewater injection system) will resolve major age-related operational issues plus make a significant contribution in sustaining the ATR safety and reliability profile. The major modification criteria evaluation of the project pre-conceptual design identified several issues that lead to the conclusion that the project is a major modification: 1. Evaluation Criteria #3 (Change of existing process). The proposed strategy for equipping the replacement PCPs with VFDs and having the PCPs also function as ECPs will require significant safety basis changes requiring DOE approval. 2. Evaluation Criteria #4 (Use of new technology). The use of VFD and VFD “pump catcher” technology for the PCPs is not currently in use and has not been previously formally reviewed/approved by DOE for ATR. It is noted that VFD technology has several decades of commercial use and experience. However, the ATR probabilistic risk assessment will have to be updated, reflecting the changes for supplying ECP flows including VFD reliability, to confirm that the proposed activity maintains or reduces the CDF for the ATR. 3. Evaluation Criteria #5 (Create the need for new or revised safety SSCs). It is expected that the proposed activity will result in a revised list of safety-related SSCs. Specifically, as currently proposed, the existing ECPs will be deleted from the list. The PCPs and their associated components, picking up the ECP function, will be classified as safety-related active Seismic Category I.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Thermoacoustic Thermometry for Nuclear Reactor Monitoring

On Friday, March 11, 2011, at 2:46pm (Japan Standard Trme), the Tohoku region on the east coast of northern Japan experi­enced what would become known as the largest earthquake in the country's history at magnitude 9.0 on the Richter scale. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant suffered exten­sive and irreversible damage. Six operating units were at the site, each with a boiling water reactor. When the earthquake struck, three of the six reactors were operating and the others were in a periodic inspection outage phase. In one reactor, all of the fuel had been relocated to a spent fuel pool in the reactor building. The seismic acceleration caused by the earthquake brought the three operating units to an automatic shutdown. Since there was damage to the power transmission lines, the emergency diesel generators (EDG) were automat­ically started to ensure continued cooling of the reactors and spent fuel pools. The situation was under control until the tsunami hit about forty-five minutes later with a maximum wave height of approximately 15 meters, which was three times taller than the sea wall of 5m. The influx of water submerged the EDGs, the electrical switchgear, and dc batteries, resulting in the total loss of power to five of the six reactors. The flooding also resulted in the loss of instrumentation that would have other­ wise been used to monitor and control the emergency. The ugly aftermath included high radiation exposure to operators at the nuclear power plants and early contamina­tion of food supplies and water within several restricted areas in Japan, where high radiation levels have rendered them un­safe for human habitation. While the rest of the story will remain a tragic history, it is this part of the series of unfortunate events that has inspired our research. It has indubitably highlighted the need for a novel sensor and instrumentation system that can withstand similar or worse conditions to avoid future catastrophe and assume damage prevention as quickly as possible. This is the question which we are attempting to answer: Is it possible to implement a self-powered sensor that could transmit data independently of electronic networks while taking advantage of the harsh operating environment of the nuclear reactor?

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Distributed Energy Resource (DER) Reliability for Backup Electric Power Systems

Hospitals, emergency services, military bases, ports, airports, industries, commercial facilities, and others rely on backup power systems to provide electricity for their critical loads during grid outages. The purpose of this report it to provide accurate reliability information on commonly deployed distributed energy resources (DERs) to improve quantitative estimates for the reliability of these backup power systems during a grid outage. A backup power system consists of DERs, an electric distribution system with its associated switches and other devices, and mechanisms to control and manage the flow of electricity. Too often, facilities and campuses fail to properly quantify the reliability of their backup power systems. DERs are assumed to be 100% reliable, with the only concern being the availability of fuel. Such assumptions can lead to gross errors in the backup system's reliability estimates, particularly for long-duration outages. This report provides a set of estimates for reliability of emergency diesel generators (EDGs), natural gas prime generators and combined heat and power (CHP) prime movers, solar photovoltaics (PV), wind turbines, and Li-ion battery energy storage systems (BESS). The estimates are derived from empirical data when available and supplemented by modeling results when needed. These reliability estimates are for the DERs ability to provide power during a grid outage, ranging from an hour to 2 weeks.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Investigation of instrumentation containing an embedded digital device - 257

The U.S. nuclear power industry primarily relies on mature, well-proven analog technology as the basis for most instrumentation and control (I and C) equipment employed in its nuclear power plants (NPPs). However, the market for this legacy instrumentation is very small and availability of such equipment for spare parts or replacement is increasingly limited. Frequently, modern I and C equipment contains embedded digital devices (EDDs), such as microprocessors and programmable logic devices. While the enhanced functional capabilities provided by the digital components offer improved performance, reliability, and maintainability, the corresponding complexity of sophisticated digital implementations also exacerbate concerns about an increased potential for undetected systematic faults, which can lead to common-cause failure (CCF). As part of a research project sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy, an investigation has been conducted of commercially available instrumentation marketed for nuclear or industrial application. The objective was to identify the usage of EDDs and to determine the types of functional roles allocated to the devices. Examples of the equipment surveyed include smart sensors, sequencers for emergency diesel generators, pumps, valve actuators, motor control centers, breakers, priority logic modules, and uninterruptible power sources. Where sufficient detail was found, an evaluation was performed to ascertain the nature and role of the digital technology implemented in the instrumentation. The information gained through this investigation serves as technical input for defining a classification approach for EDDs based on the functional impact of the device. For example, the role of an EDD can involve any of the following functions: performance monitoring and diagnostics, information extraction and communication, instrument condition monitoring and protection, or execution of core instrument functions. Classifying digital devices according to their role in the operation of the instrumentation in which they are embedded can enable determination of the potential functional impact of failure of that device and contribute to determination of the potential safety significance of a CCF event disabling all instances of that device. This paper will report on the findings of the investigation of instrumentation with EDDs and indicate considerations for the emerging classification approach. The higher-level goal of this effort is to determine whether a graded approach to qualification testing may be possible based on classification. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Markov Model of Accident Progression at Fukushima Daiichi

On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake followed by a tsunami caused loss of offsite power and disabled the emergency diesel generators, leading to a prolonged station blackout at the Fukushima Daiichi site. After successful reactor trip for all operating reactors, the inability to remove decay heat over an extended period led to boil-off of the water inventory and fuel uncovery in Units 1-3. A significant amount of metal-water reaction occurred, as evidenced by the quantities of hydrogen generated that led to hydrogen explosions in the auxiliary buildings of the Units 1 & 3, and in the de-fuelled Unit 4. Although it was assumed that extensive fuel damage, including fuel melting, slumping, and relocation was likely to have occurred in the core of the affected reactors, the status of the fuel, vessel, and drywell was uncertain. To understand the possible evolution of the accident conditions at Fukushima Daiichi, a Markov model of the likely state of one of the reactors was constructed and executed under different assumptions regarding system performance and reliability. The Markov approach was selected for several reasons: It is a probabilistic model that provides flexibility in scenario construction and incorporates time dependence of different model states. It also readily allows for sensitivity and uncertainty analyses of different failure and repair rates of cooling systems. While the analysis was motivated by a need to gain insight on the course of events for the damaged units at Fukushima Daiichi, the work reported here provides a more general analytical basis for studying and evaluating severe accident evolution over extended periods of time. This work was performed at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy to explore 'what-if' scenarios in the immediate aftermath of the accidents.

08 HYDROGEN↗

Analysis of Loss-of-Offsite-Power Events 1998–2013

Loss of offsite power (LOOP) can have a major negative impact on a power plant’s ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions. Risk analyses suggest that loss of all alternating current power contributes over 70% of the overall risk at some U.S. nuclear plants. LOOP event and subsequent restoration of offsite power are important inputs to plant probabilistic risk assessments. This report presents a statistical and engineering analysis of LOOP frequencies and durations at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. The data used in this study are based on the operating experience during calendar years 1997 through 2013. Frequencies and durations were determined for four event categories: plant-centered, switchyard-centered, grid-related, and weather-related. The emergency diesel generator failure modes considered are failure to start, failure to load and run, and failure to run more than 1 hour. The component reliability estimates and the reliability data are trended for the most recent 10-year period while yearly estimates for reliability are provided for the entire active period. No statistically significant trends in LOOP frequencies over the 1997–2013 period are identified. There is a possibility that a significant trend in grid-related LOOP frequency exists that is not easily detected by a simple analysis. Statistically significant increases in recovery times after grid- and switchyard-related LOOPs are identified.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Analysis of Loss-of-Offsite-Power Events 1997-2015

Loss of offsite power (LOOP) can have a major negative impact on a power plant’s ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions. LOOP event frequencies and times required for subsequent restoration of offsite power are important inputs to plant probabilistic risk assessments. This report presents a statistical and engineering analysis of LOOP frequencies and durations at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. The data used in this study are based on the operating experience during calendar years 1997 through 2015. LOOP events during critical operation that do not result in a reactor trip, are not included. Frequencies and durations were determined for four event categories: plant-centered, switchyard-centered, grid-related, and weather-related. Emergency diesel generator reliability is also considered (failure to start, failure to load and run, and failure to run more than 1 hour). There is an adverse trend in LOOP durations. The previously reported adverse trend in LOOP frequency was not statistically significant for 2006-2015. Grid-related LOOPs happen predominantly in the summer. Switchyard-centered LOOPs happen predominantly in winter and spring. Plant-centered and weather-related LOOPs do not show statistically significant seasonality. The engineering analysis of LOOP data shows that human errors have been much less frequent since 1997 than in the 1986 -1996 time period.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Analysis of Loss-of-Offsite-Power Events: 1987-2016

Loss of offsite power (LOOP) can have a major negative impact on a power plant’s ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions. LOOP event frequencies and times required for subsequent restoration of offsite power are important inputs to plant probabilistic risk assessments. This report presents a statistical and engineering analysis of LOOP frequencies and durations at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. The data used in this study are based on the operating experience during calendar years 1987 through 2016. LOOP events during critical operation that do not result in a reactor trip are not included. Frequencies and durations were determined for four event categories: plant-centered, switchyard-centered, grid-related, and weather-related. Emergency diesel generator reliability is also considered (failure to start, failure to load and run, and failure to run more than 1 hour). An adverse trend in overall LOOP frequency is identified. An adverse trend in LOOP durations is identified. Plant-centered and weather-related LOOP events do not show statistically significant seasonality. The engineering analysis of LOOP data shows that human errors have been much less frequent since 1997 than in the 1986–1996 time period.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Light Water Sustainability Program: Optimizing Information Automation Using a New Method Based on System-Theoretic Process Analysis

This report describes the interim progress for research supporting the design and optimization of information automation systems for nuclear power plants. Much of the domestic nuclear fleet is currently focused on modernizing technologies and processes, including transitioning toward digitalization in the control room and elsewhere throughout the plant, along with a greater use of automation, artificial intelligence, robotics, and other emerging technologies. While there are significant opportunities to apply these technologies toward greater plant safety, efficiency, and overall cost-effectiveness, optimizing their design and avoiding potential safety and performance risks depends on ensuring that human-performance-related organizational and technical design issues are identified and addressed. This report describes modeling tools and techniques, based on sociotechnical system theory, to support these design goals and their application in the current research effort. The report is intended for senior nuclear energy stakeholders, including regulators, corporate management, and senior plant management. We have developed and employed a method to design an optimized information automation ecosystem (IAE) based on the systems-theoretic constructs underlying sociotechnical systems theory in general and the Systems-Theoretic Accident Modeling and Processes (STAMP) approach in particular. We argue that an IAE can be modeled as an interactive information control system whose behavior can be understood in terms of dynamic control and feedback relationships amongst the system’s technical and organizational components. Up to this point, we have employed a Causal Analysis based on STAMP (CAST) technique to examine a performance- and safety-related incident at an industry partner’s plant that involved the unintentional activation of an emergency diesel generator. This analysis provided insight into the behavior of the plant’s current information control structure within the context of a specific, significant event. Our ongoing analysis is focused on identifying near-term process improvements and longer-term design requirements for an optimized IAE system. The latter analyses will employ a second STAMP-derived technique, System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA). STPA is a useful modeling tool for generating and analyzing actual or potential information control structures. Finally, we have begun modeling plantwide organizational relationships and processes. Organizational system modeling will supplement our CAST and STPA findings and provide a basis for mapping out a plantwide information control architecture. CAST analysis findings indicate an important underlying contributor to the incident under investigation, and a significant risk to information automation system performance, was perceived schedule pressure, which exposed weaknesses in interdepartmental coordination between and within responsible plant organizations and challenged the resilience of established plant processes, until a human caused the initiating event. These findings are discussed in terms of their risk to overall system performance and their implications for information automation system resilience and brittleness. We present two preliminary information automation models. The proactive issue resolution model is a test case of an information automation concept with significant near-term potential for application and subsequent reduction in significant plant events. The IAE model is a more general representation of a broader, plantwide information automation system. From our results, we have generated a set of preliminary system-level requirements and safety constraints. These requirements will be further developed over the remainder of our project in collaboration with nuclear industry subject matter experts and specialists in the technical systems under consideration. Additionally, we will continue to pursue the system analyses initiated in the first part of our effort, with a particular emphasis on STPA as the main tool to identify weak or weakening control structures that affect the resilience of organizations and programs. Our intent is to broaden the scope of the analysis from an individual use case to a related set of use cases (e.g., maintenance tasks, compliance tasks) with similar human-system performance challenges. This will enable more generalized findings to refine the Proactive Issue Resolution and IAE models, as well as their system-level requirements and safety constraints. We will use organizational system modeling analyses to supplement STPA findings and model development. We conclude the report with a set of summary recommendations and an initial draft list of system-level requirements and safety constraints for optimized information automation systems.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Optimizing Information Automation Using a New Method Based on System-Theoretic Process Analysis: Tool Development and Method Evaluation

This report is an update to a prior report that describes progress and findings for a program of research supporting the design and optimization of information automation systems for nuclear power plants. Much of the domestic nuclear fleet is currently focused on modernizing technologies and processes, including transitioning toward digitalization in the control room and throughout the plant, along with a greater interest in the use of automation, artificial intelligence, robotics, and other emerging technologies. While there are significant opportunities to apply these technologies toward greater plant safety, efficiency, and overall cost-effectiveness, optimizing their design and avoiding potential safety and performance risks depends on ensuring that human performance-related organizational and technical design issues are identified and addressed early in the design process. This report describes modeling tools and techniques, based on sociotechnical systems theory, to support these design goals and their application in the current research effort. The report is primarily intended for senior nuclear energy stakeholders, including regulators, corporate management, and senior plant management. We have developed and employed a method to design an optimized information automation ecosystem (IAE) based on the systems-theoretic constructs underlying sociotechnical systems theory in general and the Systems-Theoretic Accident Modeling and Processes (STAMP) approach in particular. We argue that an IAE can be modeled as an interactive information control system whose behavior can be understood in terms of dynamic control, feedback, and communication relationships amongst the system’s technical and organizational components. We have employed two STAMP-based tools in this effort. The first is Causal Analysis based on STAMP (CAST), an accident and incident analysis technique that was used to examine a performance- and safety-related incident at an industry partner’s plant involving the unintentional activation of an emergency diesel generator. This analysis provided insight into the behavior of the plant’s current information control structure within the context of a specific, significant event. The second tool is Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) which is a proactive risk analysis tool used to examine existing and potential, planned sociotechnical systems. STPA was used to identify risk factors in the current design of a generic nuclear power plant (NPP) preventive maintenance system. Our analyses focused on identifying near-term system improvements and longer-term design requirements for an optimized IAE system. CAST analysis findings indicate an important underlying contributor to the incident under investigation, and a significant risk to information automation system performance, was perceived time and schedule pressure, which exposed weaknesses in interdepartmental coordination between and within responsible plant organizations and challenged the resilience of established plant processes, until a human caused the eventual event. These findings are discussed in terms of their risk to overall system performance and their implications for information automation system resilience and brittleness. STPA findings exposed several areas of concern in the design of current preventive maintenance systems. We also present two preliminary information automation models. The proactive issue resolution (PIR) model is a test case of an information automation concept with significant near-term potential for application and subsequent reduction in significant plant events. The IAE model is a more general representation of a broader, plantwide information automation system and represents an end-state vision for our work. From our results, we have generated an initial set of preliminary system-level requirements and safety constraints for these models. We have also focused on early development of easy to learn, easy to use “transportable” tools for sociotechnical systems analysis. We intend these to be used by NPP personnel as a means of gaining reliable and relatively quick insight into (1) sociotechnical systems factors impacting incidents and accidents, (2) potential sociotechnical risk factors in existing or planned system designs, and (3) potential weaknesses in a system’s safety and/or information control structure. We conclude the report with a set of summary recommendations, a discussion of planned and potential follow-on research and development, and a draft list of system-level requirements and safety constraints for optimized information automation systems.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 29, No. 3, July-September 1988]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 259 Fifteenth Water Reactor Safety Information Meeting by E. G. Silver; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 284 Reliability Technology to Improve and/or Maintain Emergency Diesel Generator Performance by S. Karimian and J. H. Taylor, 293 A Noise Diagnostics System for Operator Advice by G. Hessel, P. Liewers, P. Schumann, W. Schmitt, and F.-P. Weiss; PLANT SAFETY FEATURES: 307 A Passive Containment System for Advanced Light-Water Reactors by O. B. Falls, Jr., and F. W. Kleimola; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 318 Data Base Construction for a Computerized Radiological Risk Investigation System by L. M. Hively, J. E. Nyquist, J. L. Bledsoe, and A. L. Sjoreen, 326 Erratum to "Radiation Hormesis and Nuclear Safety," Vol. 29, No. 1; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 327 Operational Safety Experience and Passive Safety Testing at the Fast Flux Text Facility by Q. L. Baird, J. L. Rathbun, D. D. Stepnewski, R. L. Stover, and A. E. Waltar, 344 Backfilling of Independent Residual Heat Removal Systems in West Germany and Switzerland by G. Eckert and Y. Salomon, 353 Reactor Shutdown Experience Compiled by J. W. Cletcher, 356 Selected Safety-Related Events Compiled by G. A. Murphy, 363 Operating U.S. Power Reactors Compiled by E. G. Silver; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 384 General Administrative Activities Compiled by E. G. Silver, 390 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides by D. S. Queener, 395 Status of Power-Reactor Projects Undergoing Licensing Review Compiled by E. G. Silver, 400 Proposed Rule Changes as of Mar. 31,1988; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 283 International ENS/ANS Conference on Thermal Reactor Safety "NUCSAFE 88", 317 Northwestern University Short Course on Radiation Safety, 407 Second International Seminar on Small- and Medium-Sized Nuclear Reactors, 407 International Workshop on New Developments in Occupational Dose Control and ALARA Implementation at Nuclear Power Plants and Similar Facilities, 408 Fourth International Topical Meeting on Nuclear Reactor Thermal Hydraulics (NURETH-4), 404 The Authors.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

MSPI False Indication Probability Simulations

This paper examines false indication probabilities in the context of the Mitigating System Performance Index (MSPI), in order to investigate the pros and cons of different approaches to resolving two coupled issues: (1) sensitivity to the prior distribution used in calculating the Bayesian-corrected unreliability contribution to the MSPI, and (2) whether (in a particular plant configuration) to model the fuel oil transfer pump (FOTP) as a separate component, or integrally to its emergency diesel generator (EDG). False indication probabilities were calculated for the following situations: (1) all component reliability parameters at their baseline values, so that the true indication is green, meaning that an indication of white or above would be false positive; (2) one or more components degraded to the extent that the true indication would be (mid) white, and “false” would be green (negative) or yellow (negative) or red (negative). In key respects, this was the approach taken in NUREG-1753. The prior distributions examined were the constrained noninformative (CNI) prior used currently by the MSPI, a mixture of conjugate priors, the Jeffreys noninformative prior, a nonconjugate log(istic)-normal prior, and the minimally informative prior investigated in (Kelly et al., 2010). The mid-white performance state was set at ?CDF = ?10 ? 10-6/yr. For each simulated time history, a check is made of whether the calculated ?CDF is above or below 10-6/yr. If the parameters were at their baseline values, and ?CDF > 10-6/yr, this is counted as a false positive. Conversely, if one or all of the parameters are set to values corresponding to ?CDF > 10-6/yr but that time history’s ?CDF < 10-6/yr, this is counted as a false negative indication. The false indication (positive or negative) probability is then estimated as the number of false positive or negative counts divided by the number of time histories (100,000). Results are presented for a set of base case parameter values, and three sensitivity cases in which the number of FOTP demands was reduced, along with the Birnbaum importance of the FOTP.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Synergistic Smart Fuel For In-pile Nuclear Reactor Measurements

In March 2011, an earthquake of magnitude 9.0 on the Richter scale struck Japan with its epicenter on the northeast coast, near the Tohoku region. In addition to the immense physical destruction and casualties across the country, several nuclear power plants (NPP) were affected. It was the Fukushima Daiichi NPP that experienced the most severe and irreversible damage. The earthquake brought the reactors at Fukushima to an automatic shutdown and because the power transmission lines were damaged, emergency diesel generators (EDGs) were activated to ensure that there was continued cooling of the reactors and spent fuel pools. The situation was being successfully managed until the tsunami hit about forty-five minutes later with a maximum wave height of approximately 15 m. The influx of water submerged the EDGs, the electrical switchgear, and dc batteries, resulting in the total loss of power to the reactors.2 At this point, the situation became critical. There was a loss of the sensors and instrumentation within the reactor that could have provided valuable information to guide the operators to make informed decisions and avoid the unfortunate events that followed. In the light of these events, we have developed and tested a potential self-powered thermoacoustic system, which will have the ability to serve as a temperature sensor and can transmit data independently of electronic networks. Such a device is synergistic with the harsh environment of the nuclear reactor as it utilizes the heat from the nuclear fuel to provide the input power.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

On-line maintenance methodology development and its applications

With the increasing economic pressures being faced and the potential for shortening outage times under the conditions of deregulated electricity markets in the world, licensees are motivated to get an increasing amount of the on-line maintenance (OLM). The benefits of the OLM includes increased system and plant reliability, reduction of plant equipment and system material condition deficiencies that could adversely impact operations, and reduction of work scope during plant refueling outages. In Korea, allowance guidelines of risk assessment is specified in the safety regulation guidelines 16.7 and 16.8 of the Korea Inst. of Nuclear Safety (KINS), which is 'General guidelines of Risk-informed application for requesting permission of changes' and 'Requesting permission of changes of Risk-informed application for Technical Specification'. We select the emergency diesel generator (EDG) of the Ulchin unit 3 and 4 for risk assessment analysis by applying configuration changes. The EDG which has plant safety level IE belongs to on-site standby power (A, B train EDG) in electric distribution system. The EDG is important component because it should maintain standby status during plant is operating, therefore we select the EDG for target component of risk assessment analysis. The risk assessment is limited to CDF. The risk assessment is performed by using AIMS-PSA Release2. We evaluate CDF by applying the configuration changes with some assumptions. Evaluation of the full power operation and Low power/Shut down operation was performed. This study has been performed for introducing a methodology and performing risk assessment. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Addressing embedded digital devices in safety-related systems of nuclear power plants - 307

The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the development of the approach to addressing embedded digital devices (EDD) in safety-related systems of nuclear power plants in the U.S. and around the world. In April, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US NRC) issued RIS 2016-05 to heighten awareness that EDDs might exist in procured equipment used in safety-related systems without the devices having been explicitly identified in procurement documentation. Inadequate consideration of these devices in digital technology system upgrades, component replacements, and new equipment applications could lead to an adverse safety consequence. The US NRC request was for addressees to implement early efforts to identify these devices. An area where this is being addressed is in regard to the performance of Diversity and Defense-In-Depth (D3) analyses, as addressed in US NRC Branch Technical Position 7-19. Nuclear facilities have increased their use and reliance on digital technology in systems and equipment (e.g., I and C, electrical systems, and fluid systems). In addition to digital instrumentation and control (I and C) systems, examples of safety-related equipment that may use digital technology include emergency diesel generators, pumps, valve actuators, motor control centers, breakers, priority logic modules, time-delay relays, and uninterruptible power sources. In the U.S. and around the world, engineering and licensing activities in standards and guidance have been, and are being developed to address this important consideration in protecting safety-related systems. This paper addresses development of an extended approach to evaluating common-cause failure vulnerability and mitigation in regard to equipment with an EDD. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Systems Engineering (SE) Approach of Developing A Passive Safety Injection System (PSIS) to Cope with APR1400 Extended Station Black-Out (SBO) Accident Using RELAP5

On 11 March 2011 the power supply and cooling of the three Fukushima Daiichi reactors were disabled by a major earthquake followed by a relatively high tsunami waves. The earthquake damaged the electrical grid which is the normal power supply for the reactors, then the tsunami waves disabled the emergency diesel generators of the Fukushima Daiichi reactors, which left the plant with no alternating current (AC) source. This condition is called 'Station Black-Out'. The reactors were tripped immediately, but due to the nuclear physics phenomena, the reactor cores were still producing thermal power, which is generated by the decay of radioactive fission products in the reactor core, known as decay heat. The decay heat had not been circulated to an external heat sink and eventually the accumulative heat produced in the core led to damage to the reactor cores. After the Fukushima Daiichi accident, Design Extension Condition (DEC) such as total loss of feed water (TLOFW), and prolonged Station Black-Out (SBO) attracted the attention of nuclear experts. The attention focuses on the defense in depth concept, redundancy and sustainability of the systems, and development of the passive safety systems, which rely on natural physics laws. The topic of this paper is to discuss the possibility of attaching a Passive Safety Injection System (PSIS) to the APR1400. The PSIS is a safety system which provides adequate cooling water to the steam generators after the loss of the Auxiliary Feed Water System (AFWS) during an extended SBO accident. The PSIS will be available while the power supply of the plant is being recovered and the active safety systems take over the functionality. The anticipated PSIS will be automatically actuated to enhance the engineered safety feature and to reduce the human errors. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗