Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Event Trees”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 37 records · Page 2
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

Generic Pressurized Water Reactor Model for SAPHIRE

Generic Pressurized Water Reactor Model for SAPHIRE This report contains a data dump from a SAPHIRE Generic Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) model. The intent is to have this information reviewed for export control and classification so that the generic model can be used external to INL. The facility model is not applicable to any existing nuclear reactors. The Generic PWR model does not represent any existing power plant and was created to support research and training purposes. Three distinct types of data are used to create a SAPHIRE risk model: - Event trees representing typical PWR sequences - Fault trees representing generic system performance - Basic events (e.g., component failure information) Where possible, we have taken information from publicly available documents and referenced that information tagged to a specific item.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Linking classical PRA models to a dynamic PRA

Here, this paper presents a series of methods designed to incorporate classical Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) models such as Event Trees (ETs) and Fault Trees (FTs) into dynamic PRA. In contrast to classical PRA, dynamic PRA couples stochastic methods with system simulators to determine the risks associated with complex systems such as nuclear power plants. Compared with classical PRA methods, they can evaluate with higher resolution the safety impact of timing and sequencing of events on the progression of the accident. As part of a dynamic PRA analysis, it is not uncommon that parts of the system to be analyzed might not require a computationally expensive simulation model. These parts could be in fact modeled by employing classical PRA models (e.g., a FT). Here, we present a set of methods and tools that can be used to link the most common classical PRA models (ETs, FTs, reliability block diagrams and Markov models) to simulation codes such as RELAP5-3D: creating a “hybrid PRA.” In order to show the potential of such an hybrid PRA we employ this method to verify ET modeling assumptions (e.g., success criteria) using a large break loss of coolant accident initiating event as a test case. In this respect, we link a set of FTs from the original PRA to the RELAP5-3D code and perform a hybrid PRA. The FTs are employed to model the control logic of several safety systems and to propagate component failures throughout the system. Provided the generated dynamic PRA data, we show how conservative assumptions in the original PRA can be identified and how such original PRA can be modified by updating success criteria captured by the set of RELAP5-3D simulation runs.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Integrating static PRA information with risk informed safety margin characterization (RISMC) simulation methods

The overall objective of the project was to develop a computationally feasible and user-friendly mechanized process to integrate traditional probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and dynamic PRA (DPRA) results. Starting with the systematic identification of items in an existing PRA that need dynamic augmentation, the project used a generic 4-loop pressurized reactor (PWR) and 3-loop PWR as example plants. Station blackout (SBO) and large break loss of coolant accident SBLOCA) were selected as the example initiating events. Using the traditional event-tree (ET)/fault-tree (FT) methodology augmented by dynamic evet tree approach, the potential consequences of the initiating events were simulated with RELAP-3D and MELCOR/RASCAL codes to cover Level 1 through Level 3 of PRA. RAVEN and ADAPT software were used to generate Level 1 simulations with RELAP-3D and Level 2/3 simulations with MELCOR (Level 2)/RASCAL (Level 3), respectively. Example branching conditions (BCs) for SBO included AC power recovery time, valve repair failure time, reactor coolant pump leak time/break size and emergency power supply duration to a total of 9. Example BCs for LOCA included off-site power recovery time, diesel generator power recovery time, auxiliary feed water system operation time, safety relief valve failure to open upon demand, reactor coolant pump seal break time and size to a total of 21. Each RELAP-3D simulation (9,587 scenarios) was labelled OK or Core Damage based on the maximum allowed peak clad temperature (2,100oF). Each MELCOR simulation (4610 scenarios) was labeled as Bin over 10rem or Bin 0-10rem based on the dose at the site boundary. The scenarios were clustered based on the criteria above using the mean shift methodology. Classical PRA (CPRA) and DPRA results were compared to identify the ET sequences that need DPRA augmentation. Several approaches were proposed for the incorporation of these sequences into CPRA using clustering with the mean shift methodology, restructuring the CPRA ETs by adding new BCs/sequences, and using the concept of a limit surface. Procedures for decision making regarding the possible consequences of an initiating event (e.g. core damage or not, site evacuation or not) were developed using a convolutional neural network (CNN), a recurrent neural network (RNN) and a transformer neural network (TNN). The project has led to two PhD degrees, three archival journal papers and five refereed conference proceedings.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Climate Change Risks to Global Forest Health: Emergence of Unexpected Events of Elevated Tree Mortality Worldwide

Recent observations of elevated tree mortality following climate extremes, like heat and drought, raise concerns about climate change risks to global forest health. We currently lack both sufficient data and understanding to identify whether these observations represent a global trend toward increasing tree mortality. In this work, we document events of sudden and unexpected elevated tree mortality following heat and drought events in ecosystems that previously were considered tolerant or not at risk of exposure. These events underscore the fact that climate change may affect forests with unexpected force in the future. We use the events as examples to highlight current difficulties and challenges for realistically predicting such tree mortality events and the uncertainties about future forest condition. Advances in remote sensing technology and greater availably of high-resolution data, from both field assessments and satellites, are needed to improve both understanding and prediction of forest responses to future climate change.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2026

Validating a Dynamic PWR Safety and Security Model?

Nuclear power plants (NPPs) are assessed for safety and security using separate models that cannot capture how an attacker's decisions and a plant's response unfold together in real time, leaving regulators and operators without a complete picture of true plant vulnerability. Traditional probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methods treat adversarial events as fixed initiators with predetermined outcomes, and are structurally incapable of representing the time-dependent interplay between physical security events, safety system response, and operator mitigative actions. At Idaho National Laboratory (INL), I contributed to the development and validation of Modeling and Analysis for Safety and Security using the Dynamic EMRALD Framework (MASS-DEF). Where static PRA relies on event-tree logic that cannot evolve mid-scenario, MASS-DEF couples a time-dependent dynamic PRA tool EMRALD (Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams) with attack simulation software, allowing attacker behavior, plant system states, and operator actions to interact across time. My work focused on validating a general Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) model. I traced model logic against PWR plant to identified errors in logic and confirm accuracy. I then built and tested attack scenarios against a general PWR model to verify that the model produced expected outcomes across all logical pathways. I also contributed a section to a related technical paper applying the same EMRALD platform to radiation dose modeling. Results show that MASS-DEF can quantitatively demonstrate that many plants exceed their regulatory security thresholds. This demonstrated margin provides a technically defensible basis for reducing the number of guards without compromising regulatory compliance. Physical security costs represent roughly 10% of annual operating budgets, making such reductions directly meaningful to INL's mission of sustaining existing commercial NPPs. This internship strengthened my understanding of nuclear systems, probabilistic modeling, and technical writing, and has solidified my pursuit of a career at a national laboratory.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗
DOE OSTI2024

Nuclear safety Enhanced: A Deep dive into current and future RAVEN applications

As the horizon of nuclear energy expands with the advent of small modular reactors, IV generation reactors, and fusion reactors, there is a growing perspective that the licensing process could benefit from a more comprehensive approach. Moving beyond traditional deterministic and PRA analysis might pave the way for a novel safety analysis paradigm propelled by the increasing computational power at our disposal. This paper explores different methodologies that can improve the outcomes of nuclear safety analysis. These range from uncertainty quantification techniques, aimed at enhancing the precision of safety margins, to deploying dynamic event trees by driving system code simulations, capturing the potential evolutions of severe accidents. These methodologies introduce innovative dimensions to safety analysis, considering the consequences of postulated events and the dynamics of accident sequences. However, they also bring forth challenges, especially in managing the complexity and sheer volume of potential scenarios. The paper touches upon some strategies to counter these challenges, emphasizing the importance of adaptability and continuous evolution in the face of emerging nuclear safety concerns. Additionally, the paper sheds light on the need for advanced tools to apply these methodologies. Among these tools is RAVEN, an open-source software designed for parametric and probabilistic analyses. Its core components, including distribution, sampler, and reduced order model, enable various applications, from risk assessment and mitigation to dynamic learning and plant control logic simulations.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Evaluation of Joint Cyber/Safety Risk in Nuclear Power Systems

This report presents an analysis of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) for a generic Boiling Water Reactor (BWR)-4 NPP. The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) developed Hazards and Consequences Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS) process is applied to the ECCS and its subsystems to identify unsafe control actions (UCAs) which act as possible cyber events of concern. The analysis is performed for two design basis events: Small-break Loss of Coolant Accident (SLOCA) and general transients (TRANS), such as unintended reactor trip. In previous work, HAZCADS UCAs were combined with other cyber-attack analysis to develop a risk-informed approach; however, this was for a single system. This report explores advanced systems engineering modeling approaches to model the interactions between digital assets across multiple systems which may be targeted by cyber adversaries. The complex and interdependent design of digital systems has the potential to introduce emergent cyber properties that are generally not covered by hazard analyses nor formal nuclear Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). The R&D and supporting analysis presented here explores approaches to predict and manage how interdependent system properties effect risk. To show the potential impact of a successful cyber-attack to formal PRA event tree probabilities, HAZCADS analysis was also used. HAZCADS was also used to model the automatic depressurization system (ADS) automatic actuation. This analysis extended to an integrated system analysis for common-cause failure (CCF). In this aspect, the HAZCADS analysis continued by analyzing plant design details for system connectivity in support of critical plant functions. A dependency matrix was developed to depict the integrated functionality of the interconnected systems. Areas of potential CCF are indicated. Future work could include adversary attack development to show how CCF could be caused, resulting in PRA events. Across the multiple systems that comprise the ECCS, the analysis shows that the change in such probabilities was very different between systems. This indicates that some systems have a larger potential risk impact from successful cyber-attack or digital failure, which indicates a need for these systems to have a higher priority for design and defensive measures. Furthermore, we were able to establish that a risk analysis using any arbitrary threat model establishes an ordering of components with regard to cyber-risk. This ordering can be used to influence the overall system design with an eye to lowering risk, or as a way to understand real-time risk to operational systems based on a current threat landscape. Expert knowledge of both the analysis process and the system being analyzed is required to perform a HAZCADS analysis. The need for a tiered risk analysis is demonstrated by the results of this report.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Dynamic probabilistic risk assessment and game theory for cyber security risk analysis in nuclear power plants

Nuclear Power Plants and energy systems have become more prone to cyber-attacks with their digitalization and the increased use of smart equipment. Hence, it is important to quantify the risk associated with cyber-attacks in such systems. Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment which involves studying the evolution of a system due to random events and operator and attacker actions during a cyber-attack by employing a physics-based model of the system is a suitable framework to quantify cybersecurity risk in nuclear power plants. In addition to the plant dynamics, it is also important to model the strategies of the attackers and plant operators for an effective cybersecurity risk assessment. Game theory provides a set of necessary tools to model such strategic interactions. In this research, a framework that integrates dynamic probabilistic risk assessment with game theory for cybersecurity risk analysis in nuclear power plants is presented. The mathematical formulation is derived based on the theory of continuous event trees. We propose a game theory based action model, that utilizes physics-based rewards to define the strategies of attackers and operators at every decision epoch. As a case study, the risk associated with cyber-attacks on the digital components in the secondary side of a pressurized water reactor is studied using a reduced order model. A set of attacker actions and a set of operator actions are defined for the system. The operator and attacker interactions were modelled using simultaneous game, their action policies were computed using the concept of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and the evolution of the system was studied.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Incorporating FLEX Strategies in Multi-Unit Probabilistic Risk Assessment

The catastrophic Fukushima nuclear accident reminded nuclear community about the possibilities of extreme accident scenarios, including those involving multiple reactor units on the same site. As the responses to the Fukushima accident, the nuclear power industry developed and implemented a series of strategies, including the Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX), to enhance the coping capacities of nuclear power plants (NPPs) under extreme accidents. This study intends to examine the impact of FLEX strategies on the risk from all the reactor units on the same NPP site, including risks from accidents involving a single unit and from accidents involving multiple units. The fundamental, methodological element of this study is Multi-Unit Probabilistic Risk Assessment (MUPRA), which requires a shift in Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) from a “one-reactor-at-a-time” mindset to a “considering all reactors sharing a site as a unity” one. An integrated modeling approach for multi-unit event sequence development will be leveraged to develop MUPRA model and address the intra-unit and inter-unit dependencies. Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE), a PRA software developed and maintained by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), will serve as the platform for MUPRA modeling. This study selects Loss Of Offsite Power (LOOP) as a representative initiating event, which may occur on a generic two-unit NPP site and impacts both reactor units on the site. First, an MUPRA model, including multi-unit event trees, will be developed to obtain single-unit and multi-unit accident scenarios. Next, different FLEX strategies will be assumed, including FLEX equipment for a unit cannot be used for another unit, FLEX equipment for multiple units can be used in a cross-connected manner, etc. Lastly, the effectiveness of each postulated FLEX strategy will be evaluated by incorporating the corresponding FLEX equipment and deployment logic in the MUPRA model.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Design of Defensive Cybersecurity Architectures for High Temperature, Gas-Cooled Reactors

This report presents the design of defensive cybersecurity architectures (DCSAs) for High Temperature, Gas-Cooled Reactors (HTGRs). A DCSA is a cybersecurity design feature that places systems into security zones in a graded approach according to the importance of the functions performed by the systems. DCSA design efforts for advanced reactors may commence as early as the system-level design phase. This design approach is consistent with the draft regulatory guide for advanced reactor cybersecurity programs (DG-5075) and enables advanced reactor designers to consider the effects of security-by-design (SeBD) features on their DCSAs. Integration of DCSA design and other cybersecurity activities with the traditional design process as part of a SeBD framework may enable advanced reactor designers to improve the security posture of their plants while reducing implementation and operating costs. This report provides a DCSA template for an exemplar HTGR and describes a DCSA design process using event tree analysis so that the template may be optimized for a given HTGR design.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Large-Scale Hydrogen Storage Cyber Risk Assessment

Hydrogen storage systems may become more widely deployed throughout the country, and so it is possible that individual and interconnected systems will be exposed to cyber-attacks. These events can cause physical and financial harm to employees, people in the vicinity of the facility, and the company that owns the facility. The two main ways bad actors may access information or control from a hydrogen storage facility are through information technology and operations technology devices, the former of which refers to data and information from networked devices and the latter of which refers to onsite controls for the physical system. Both types of entryways into the system should be considered when companies conduct cyber risk assessments and when regulators develop or revise relevant codes and standards. This report analyzes cybersecurity risks associated with a generic hydrogen storage system by outlining the system's purpose and the importance of its cybersecurity. The hydrogen storage system architecture and communication protocols are provided to understand potential cyber vulnerabilities. Later, an event tree analysis is performed on hydrogen operation to identify system weaknesses by outlining potential attack scenarios. This report also identifies critical cyber assets related to different hydrogen operations followed by an examination of potential threats, and the impact of cyber assets on those operational assets.

08 HYDROGEN↗
DOE OSTI2024

Large-Scale Hydrogen Storage Cyber Risk Assessment

Hydrogen storage systems are becoming more widely deployed throughout the country, and as their presence continues to grow, it is possible that individual and interconnected systems will be exposed to cyber-attacks. These events can cause physical and financial harm to employees, people in the vicinity, and to the company that owns the facility. The two main mechanisms malicious actors may access information or control from a hydrogen storage facility are through information technology and operations technology devices, the former of which refers to data and information from networked devices and the latter of which refers to onsite controls for the physical system. Both types of entryways into the system should be considered when facility managers conduct cyber risk assessments and when regulators develop or revise relevant codes and standards. This report analyzes cybersecurity risks applicable to a wide variety of hydrogen storage systems by outlining the system's purpose and the importance of its cybersecurity. The hydrogen storage system architecture and communication protocols are provided to understand potential cyber vulnerabilities. Later, an event tree analysis is performed on hydrogen operation to identify system weaknesses by outlining potential attack scenarios. This report also identifies critical cyber assets related to different hydrogen operations followed by an examination of potential threats, and the impact of cyber assets on those operational assets.

08 HYDROGEN↗
DOE OSTI2021

Dynamic, risk informed decision support systems and methods

The present disclosure is directed to a decision support system or tool based on a Bayesian Network (BN) framework. The diagnostic support tool is created by using advanced Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) method(s) to construct Bayesian Networks (BNs) that form a Bayesian Decision Support Process (BDSP) to provide science-based decision support for understanding and managing events in complex systems. In an embodiment, the PRA method(s) may include Discrete Dynamic Event Trees (DDETs) and simulations.

Groth, Katrina↗
DOE OSTI2020

Limitations of traditional tools for beyond design basis external hazard PRA

Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is being used increasingly by the nuclear industry for safety during normal operations as well as for the protection against external hazards. Computation of total risk in an external hazard PRA is dependent on hazard assessment, fragility assessment, and systems analysis. A systems analysis for propagation of component fragilities is conducted using event and fault trees. The event and fault trees for an actual power plant can be fairly large in size, which imposes computational challenges. Hence, certain assumptions are employed for computational efficiency. These assumptions typically represent the conditions imposed during the design basis (DB) scenario. The traditional PRA tools based on these assumptions are also widely applied to perform risk assessment in the context of beyond design basis (BDB) scenarios. However, some of these assumptions may not be valid for certain BDB scenarios. In addition, the probability of dependent failures also increases in BDB scenarios due to common cause failures (CCF) which usually results from design modifications, human errors, etc. In this manuscript, a simple and a relatively more complex illustrative examples are used to show the limitation of these assumptions in the numerical quantification of risk for the case of BDB conditions. Case studies with CCF events across multiple fault trees are also presented to illustrate the effect of these assumptions when traditional approach is used in BDB risk assessment. It is shown that the assumptions are valid for the case of DB conditions but may lead to excessively conservative risk estimates in the case of BDB conditions. Finally, a Bayesian network based top-down algorithm is proposed as an alternative tool for accurate numerical quantification of total risk in systems analysis.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Data-driven Event Identification in the U.S. Power Systems Based on 2D-OLPP and RUSBoosting Trees

Accurate event identification is an essential part of situation awareness ability for power system operators. Therefore, this work proposes an integrated event identification algorithm for power systems. First, to obtain and filter suitable inputs for event identification, an event detection trigger based on the rate of change of frequency (RoCoF) is presented. Then, the wave arrival time difference-based triangulation method considering the anisotropy of wave propagation speed is utilized to estimate the location of the detected event. Next, the two-dimensional orthogonal locality preserving projection (2D-OLPP)-based method, which is suitable for multiple types of measured data, is employed to achieve higher effectiveness in extracting the event features compared with traditional one-dimensional projection and principle component analysis (PCA). Finally, the random undersampling boosted (RUSBoosted) trees-based classifier, which can mitigate the data sample imbalance issue, is utilized to identify the type of the detected event. Furthermore, the proposed approach is demonstrated using the actual measurement data of U.S. power systems from FNET/GridEye. Comparison results show that the proposed event identification algorithm can achieve better performance than existing approaches.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

Legacy effects of drought on tree growth responses to hurricanes

Natural perturbations, including hurricanes and severe droughts, are becoming more frequent and intense in the tropics, yet our understanding of forest responses to these events is still limited. While the relationships between extreme climatic events and tree mortality are frequently studied, responses of trees that survived such perturbations have been rarely reported. Perturbations and their effects can be quite variable, and trees can respond both positively and negatively to them, depending on their sensitivity and opportunistic behavior. Understanding the potential variation in responses both within and among species is important for building predictions of forest responses. We studied tree growth responses (i.e., changes relative to standard conditions) to hurricanes and drought events in Puerto Rico across six common and broadly distributed species. We examined whether there is a congruence in responses to these contrasting extreme climatic events. We show that trees are particularly susceptible to droughts but display a wide range of responses to hurricanes. Despite the high stochasticity in the impacts of hurricanes, trees that showed reduced growth during previous droughts tend to show reduced growth during the hurricanes as well. Our results demonstrate that trees subjected to different and successive major climatic stresses have consistent declines in their performance. Projected increases in the severity of droughts and tropical storms could have an accumulated, and possibly compound, impact on tree growth. Long-term demographic studies are necessary to understand legacy effects of species responses to extreme climatic perturbations.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

MicroBooNE's First Search for the MiniBooNE Anomalous Excess Under a Photon-Like Hypothesis with High-Sensitivity Search for Neutrino-Induced Neutral Current Delta Production and Radiative Decay

MicroBooNE is a liquid argon time projection chamber that collected neutrino data at Fermilab's Booster Neutrino Beam from 2015 to 2020. One of its primary goals is to investigate the “Low Energy Excess” of neutrino events observed by the MiniBooNE experiment, for which candidate photon-like interpretations include an underestimation of neutrino neutral current (NC) resonant $\Delta$ production with subsequent radiative decay or another anomalous source of single photon production in neutrino interactions. In particular, NC $\Delta$ radiative decay is poorly constrained background process to electron neutrino measurements and could be a sizable contribution to the “Low Energy Excess.” This thesis will present the analysis developed to search for NC $\Delta \rightarrow N\gamma$ events in MicroBooNE, consisting of a boosted decision tree based event selection with an NC neutral pion background constraint, using data from the first three years of operations corresponding to $6.9\times10^{20}$ POT.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗