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Hydrogen Plus Other Alternative Fuels Risk Assessment Models (HyRAM+) Technical Reference Manual (V.6.0)

The HyRAM+ software is an open-source toolkit that provides publicly available models and default input values to enable straightforward and consistent safety assessments for hydrogen and other alternative fuel systems, such as natural gas and propane. The HyRAM+ quantitative risk assessment calculation incorporates annual likelihood of leaks or failures for both compressed gaseous and liquefied flammable fuels, as well as probabilistic models for the effects of heat flux and overpressure. HyRAM

08 HYDROGEN↗

An approach for spent nuclear fuel containment integrity verification using gas tagging

Verification of containment integrity is required for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) managed by the commercial nuclear industry and U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), especially after extended storage. Certain SNF storage systems, such as the DOE road-ready dry storage system, hold several packaged containments within a welded over-canister. These packaged containments are called Department of Energy Standard Canisters (DOESCs). DOESC leakage identification is challenging because their containment boundary cannot be accessed for testing and their contents (i.e., SNF and fill gas) are often similar. There are concerns that this could result in costly characterization and repackaging operations of DOE road-ready dry storage systems if compromised DOESCs are suspected. Here, to address these concerns, this paper presents an approach for applying a gas tagging process using xenon to uniquely identify compromised inaccessible containments following extended storage. The containments considered for this application are seven DOESCs, each packaged within a single over-canister. Two different SNF loading configurations from the Advanced Test Reactor and Fort Saint Vrain nuclear power plant are considered. These configurations are used to represent research reactor aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF) and TRi-structural ISOtropic (TRISO) SNF types. Results for this application show that for ASNF and TRISO type fuels for which the selected fuels are representative, the volume of taggant required at loading is determined primarily by the lower detection limit and leak rate of taggant from a compromised DOESC, rather than the amount of fission-generated xenon in the loaded fuel. While the application presented is suited for larger leaks, smaller leaks could be detected by modifying certain design parameters. This gas tagging approach can also be applied to other DOE containments and advanced reactor SNF storage systems.

07 - ISOTOPES AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Updated Filter Leak Frequencies for Use in Risk Assessments

Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) is highly dependent on data, leading to more robust models as new and updated data is acquired. The Hydrogen Plus Other Alternative Fuels Risk Assessment (HyRAM+) QRA capabilities include calculations of individual risk from leaks in a gaseous hydrogen facility due to the potential effects of jet fires and explosions. Leak frequencies are acquired through statistical analysis of published data from a variety of sources and industries. The filter leak frequencies in previous versions of the HyRAM+ software are substantially greater than the leak frequencies of other components, leading to QRA results for gaseous hydrogen in which filters consistently dominate the overall risk. Data that were previously used to derive the filter leak frequencies were reevaluated for applicability and additional data points were added to update the filter leak frequencies. The new frequencies are more comparable to leak frequencies for other components.

08 HYDROGEN↗

Pool Fire Analysis Methodology for Assessing Damage to Waste Containers

This document provides guidelines, whereby the physical parameters associated with postulated flammable/combustible liquid pool fires are determined (thermal analysis) in order to estimate the number of waste containers impacted. Pool fire damage to waste containers may occur due to a container being fully engulfed (within the periphery of the pool), partially engulfed, or within the critical heat flux distance. The methodology described here for estimating the size of the pool fire is developed using spill characteristics outlined in Chapter 65 of the SFPE Handbook (Ref. 7) and testing done by Hansen (Ref. 25). For exposures, the critical flux height is determined using the detailed method of Shokri and Beyler (Ref. 8) from the flame height, calculated as described by Heskestad (Ref. 7) and the average black body emissive power, determined using the method of Shokri and Beyler (Ref. 8). Three types of liquid pool fires should be considered; unconfined crash/instantaneous spill fires, unconfined continuously flowing (also called metered leak) spill fires, and confined spill fires. All fuel sources should be considered consistent with the facility Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA). However, the most likely liquid fuel sources present in TRU waste facilities are those present on TRU waste handling vehicles (forklifts, pallet movers, transport trucks, etc.). This method can also be used for assessing damage to items other than waste containers or other methods of analysis may be used with appropriate justification.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Hydrogen Plus Other Alternative Fuels Risk Assessment Models (HyRAM+) Version 5.1 Technical Reference Manual

The HyRAM+ software toolkit provides a basis for conducting quantitative risk assessment and consequence modeling for hydrogen, natural gas, and autogas systems. HyRAM+ is designed to facilitate the use of state-of-the-art models to conduct robust, repeatable assessments of safety, hazards, and risk. HyRAM+ integrates deterministic and probabilistic models for quantifying leak sizes and rates, predicting physical effects, characterizing hazards (thermal effects from jet fires, overpressure effects from delayed ignition), and assessing impacts on people. HyRAM+ is developed at Sandia National Laboratories to support the development and revision of national and international codes and standards, and to provide developed models in a publicly-accessible toolkit usable by all stakeholders. This document provides a description of the methodology and models contained in HyRAM+ version 5.1. The most significant changes for HyRAM+ version 5.1 from HyRAM+ version 5.0 are updated default leak frequency values for propane, new default component counts for different fuel types, and an improved fuel specification view in the graphical user interface.

02 PETROLEUM↗

316L Stainless Steel Wire Arc Additive Manufacturing and Characterization for Potential SNF Canister Production

In this paper, 316L stainless steel (316L SS) straight walls, curved walls, and vessels were printed by wire arc additive manufacturing (WAAM) using the 316L SS welding wire, to demonstrate the feasibility of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) canisters using this advanced manufacturing technique. Helium leak test with leak tight criteria of 1 × 10-7 ref-cc/s were performed on printed vessels with various wall thickness, and testing pressures were from 0.345 MPa (50 psi) to 1.724 MPa (250 psi). Printed wall microstructures were characterized using optical microscopy (OM) and scanning electron microscopy (SEM). Tensile specimens were machined out from printed walls along the length, height, and thickness directions, respectively, and tested at different temperature conditions, room temperature, 80 °C, 150 °C and 250 °C, respectively. Results showed t hat, all five WAAM-printed canisters with different thickness passed the helium leaktight criteria of radioactive materials containers by the ANSI N14.5; Dispersed micrometer-level size inclusions/voids were observed at printed wall cross sections, dendritic microstructures were found with grain size variation through the welding torch shifting direction, and very small amount of δ-ferrite and σ-phase were also observed in those cross sections; The printed walls were ductile, all tensile specimens broke with large plastic deformation/elongation and without brittle failure, and printed specimens yield strengths and tensile strengths under room temperature and 80 °C conditions are higher than minimum values of 316L SS for pressure vessels and for general applications at room temperature required by the ASTM standard, respectively.

Tang, Wei↗

LaSalle Leaking Pin PIE Proposal

Determine the most probable root cause of the LaSalle fuel rod failure, distinguish primary failure mechanisms from post-failure degradation, and assess whether the condition is isolated or indicative of a broader issue affecting similar rods or assemblies. Results will support decisions related to core operation, fuel management, and corrective actions.

LaSalle↗

TEV-3349 "ATF-2 2A Loop Pin Cladding Requirements"

Industry partners, including Westinghouse, Framatome, General Electric, General Atomics, Toshiba, etc. require requirements for fuel pins they insert in the reactor for testing. This document contains those requirements. These requirements represent an agreement between ATR and NS&T, and include the requirements for pins fabricated at the INL. These include inspections such as radiography, helium leak check, etc.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Drop Analysis of the Advanced Test Reactor Fresh Fuel Shipping Container with Heavier Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel Contents

The Advanced Test Reactor Fresh Fuel Shipping Container (ATR FFSC) is a rectangular stainless steel container used for shipping radioactive material. The container is described in the ATR FFSC Safety Analysis Report (SAR). Per the ATR FFSC SAR, the ATR FFSC is designated a Type AF-96 packaging per the definition of 10 CFR §71.4, and was originally designed to transport high enriched uranium (HEU) reactor fuel elements for the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), the Advanced Test Reactor Critical (ATRC) facility, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Reactor (MITR), and the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR). The Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA), Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3) is working with the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to develop and qualify new low enriched uranium (LEU) fuels and technologies for use in the ATR, ATRC, MITR, and MURR reactors. The LEU fuel elements will weigh significantly more than the current HEU designs and, combined with their associated Fuel Handling Enclosures for packaging, some configurations will exceed the 50 lbf used in the ATR FFSC qualifying drop tests. There are LEU versions of MITR, MURR, and ATR fuel elements. However, for this evaluation, drop analysis of the ATR FFSC with only the heavier ATR Low Enrichment (LOWE) fuel element is considered in this evaluation because the LOWE fuel element is the heaviest of the considered LEU fuel elements. The ATR HEU fuel element and the ATR LOWE fuel element are identical in every design aspect except for the fuel meat inside the 19 fuel plates. The LEU fuel meats are made using a U-10Mo high-density foil rather than uranium dispersed in aluminum in the HEU fuel elements. The high density of the uranium in the LEU fuel meat increases the LOWE fuel element weight to just under 44 lbf (versus the 22.1 lbf weight of the tested ATR HEU fuel element). ATR fuel elements are placed in a thin-gauge aluminum weldment called a "Fuel Handling Enclosure" during packaging. The Fuel Handling Enclosure is used to cover and protect the element during loading and unloading operations. The ATR Fuel Handling Enclosure weighs about 15 lbf per the drawings in the ATR FFSC SAR and the weight is accounted for in this evaluation. Transporting the heavier LEU fuel elements require evaluation of two issues. The first is the effect of the increased mass of the LEU fuel elements on the survivability of the ATR FFSC package following the requisite drop qualifications. The second is the effect of the increased mass of the fuel plates on the fuel element during the same drops. The ATR FFSC containing an ATR HEU fuel element in an ATR Fuel Handling Enclosure was physically dropped multiple times to qualify the container as a Type AF-96 package. The ATR FFSC SAR describes the drop tests performed with an actual ATR HEU fuel element weighing 22.1 lbf contained in a 14.3 lbf Fuel Handling Enclosure for a total payload of 36.4 lbf. Those drop tests showed that the ATR FFSC maintained containment of the ATR HEU fuel element and the fuel element was not significantly damaged. (Containment herein is not defined as a leak tight but is retention of the radioactive contents.) The purpose of the evaluation is to analytically show that, for a similar set of tests, the ATR FFSC maintains containment of the heavier ATR LOWE fuel element and to assess the damage to the fuel element during the drops. The approach was to create finite element analysis (FEA) models that produce the same results as the physical drops. Those models were then used as the benchmarks for the follow-on analyses using the heavier contents. FEA models of the drops of ATR FFSC using up to a 115 lbf fuel element were run and evaluated. Likewise, drops of a LOWE fuel element weighing 44 lbf in the ATR FFSC were run and evaluated. It is important to note that this report was done at the quality level necessary to be included in a nuclear facility safety basis. However, it is not the intent of this report to conclude the suitability of the ATR FFSC for transporting the heavier payloads. This report only describes the results of the FEA as related to the required drop scenarios. Incorporation of the FEA into the safety basis will be evaluated by the ATR FFSC design authority. The physical drop tests of the HEU fuel element and FEA drop analysis for the LOWE fuel element showed noteworthy damage to the fuel plates. An aluminum protective block was conceived to mitigate the damage. The concept requires the blocks to be placed in the fuel element between the end boxes and fuel plates. Additional FEA drop analyses were performed using the protective block. The addition of the blocks is primarily intended to mitigate the damage to the LOWE fuel element fuel plates. However, FEA drop analyses of the ATR HEU fuel element with the blocks were also performed and included for information.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Sub-second and ppm-level optical sensing of hydrogen using templated control of nano-hydride geometry and composition

Abstract The use of hydrogen as a clean and renewable alternative to fossil fuels requires a suite of flammability mitigating technologies, particularly robust sensors for hydrogen leak detection and concentration monitoring. To this end, we have developed a class of lightweight optical hydrogen sensors based on a metasurface of Pd nano-patchy particle arrays, which fulfills the increasing requirements of a safe hydrogen fuel sensing system with no risk of sparking. The structure of the optical sensor is readily nano-engineered to yield extraordinarily rapid response to hydrogen gas (<3 s at 1 mbar H 2 ) with a high degree of accuracy (<5%). By incorporating 20% Ag, Au or Co, the sensing performances of the Pd-alloy sensor are significantly enhanced, especially for the Pd 80 Co 20 sensor whose optical response time at 1 mbar of H 2 is just ~0.85 s, while preserving the excellent accuracy (<2.5%), limit of detection (2.5 ppm), and robustness against aging, temperature, and interfering gases. The superior performance of our sensor places it among the fastest and most sensitive optical hydrogen sensors.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Development of Real-Time System Identification to Detect Abnormal Operations in a Gas Turbine Cycle

Here, we present a novel online system identification methodology for monitoring the performance of power systems. This methodology was demonstrated in a gas turbine recuperated power plant designed for a hybrid configuration. A 120-kW Garrett microturbine modified to test dynamic control strategies for hybrid power systems designed at the National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL) was used to implement and validate this online system identification methodology. The main component of this methodology consists of an empirical transfer function model implemented in parallel to the turbine speed operation and the fuel control valve, which can monitor the process response of the gas turbine system while it is operating. During fully closed-loop operations or automated control, the output of the controller, fuel valve position, and the turbine speed measurements were fed for a given period of time to a recursive algorithm that determined the transfer function parameters during the nominal condition. After the new parameters were calculated, they were fed into the transfer function model for online prediction. The turbine speed measurement was compared against the transfer function prediction, and a control logic was implemented to capture when the system operated at nominal or abnormal conditions. To validate the ability to detect abnormal conditions during dynamic operations, drifting in the performance of the gas turbine system was evaluated. A leak in the turbomachinery working fluid was emulated by bleeding 10% of the airflow from the compressor discharge to the atmosphere, and electrical load steps were performed before and after the leak. This tool could detect the leak 7 s after it had occurred, which accounted for a fuel flow increase of approximately 15.8% to maintain the same load and constant turbine speed operations.

algorithms↗

LPG Component Leak Frequency Estimation

Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) is used in heating, cooking, and as a vehicle fuel (called autogas). A safety risk assessment may be needed to assess potential hazard scenarios and inform the regulations, codes, and standards that apply to LPG facilities, such as autogas refueling facilities. The frequency of unintended releases in an LPG system is an important aspect of a system quantitative risk assessment. This report documents estimation of leakage frequencies for individual components of LPG systems. These frequencies are described using uncertainty distributions obtained with Bayesian statistical methods, generic data, and LPG data which were publicly available. There was a lack of LPG data in the literature, so frequencies for most components were developed with generic data and should be used cautiously; without additional information about component leak frequencies in LPG systems, it is not known whether these generic frequencies may be conservative or non-conservative.

02 PETROLEUM↗

Temperature Rise on Liner Surfaces of Fuel Cell Electric Vehicle Tanks during Fueling Process

Herein, the temperature of the inner tank walls, or plastic liners, of composite pressure tanks in fuel cell electric vehicles during fueling using three‐dimensional computational fluid dynamics (CFD) models is evaluated. The liner materials are limited to 85.0 °C to prevent thermal stress causing material failure that would result in a hydrogen leak. Therefore, the temperature of hydrogen gas must be limited to below 85.0 °C during the fueling process as dictated by the current fueling protocol. However, there are limited experimental or simulation data confirming that the temperature changes do not exceed the threshold. Herein, the liner temperatures with CFD tank models for two sizes of type IV tanks representative of the upper and lower system bounds that are close to the SAE J2601 fueling protocol (36.0 and 244.0 L) are evaluated. First, each model's reliability is validated with experimental data and then analyzed, and the data are used to evaluate the maximum hydrogen and liner temperatures under real‐world fueling conditions. The evaluation shows that the maximum liner surface temperature of each tank model is at least 7 °C lower than that of the hydrogen. Additionally, there is at least 12 °C difference found between the upper limit and actual liner temperatures.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

Assessment of the Griffin Reactor Multiphysics Application Using the Empire Micro Reactor Design Concept

In late 2019, INL and ANL agreed to jointly develop the reactor physics code named Griffin based on the integration of the two code suites, MAMMOTH/Rattlesnake (INL) and MC2 - 3/PROTEUS (ANL). Griffin is being developed based on the MOOSE framework and MOOSE quality assurance procedures. This decision was made to be able to allow DOE-NE to efficiently invest funding to this area and to provide effective and timely support for existing and potential users; the latter includes industry and government organizations who are developing various types of advanced reactors in the near and long term. Since MAMMOTH/Rattlesnake has been developed based on the MOOSE framework, the INL/ANL Griffin development team agreed to build Griffin beginning with a merger of MAMMOTH and Rattlesnake into a single code and moving forward by implementing capabilities from the PROTEUS suite into Griffin. Moving forward, both ANL and INL efforts are equally invested in the Griffin project, with management support, to provide an advanced reactor multiphysics tool to assist in reactor design, optimization, and safety analysis. Much work remains in moving Griffin forward to migrate PROTEUS capabilities and to optimize performance to meet user needs. The main objective of this work is to assess the current status of Griffin capabilities in terms of performance and accuracy, to determine priorities for PROTEUS migration, and to identify capabilities and features to improve for supporting the code integration effort. For this assessment, the Empire micro reactor problem that was developed in the ARPA-E MEITNER program was selected as an advance reactor concept of interest to the technical community. The Empire reactor problem was expanded from its original incomplete specification to be a small heat-pipe-cooled micro reactor core with ~113 cm radius and 70 cm in height, composed of 18 fuel assemblies, 12 control drums, and beryllium radial and axial reflectors. In the current model, using 5 cm axial reflectors specified in the original Empire assembly model, more than 10% of neutrons leak axially and through the empty center safety hole, as well as through heat pipe channels in fuel assembly elements that extend through the top reflector region. Several calculation models of the core were defined for systematic assessment, including 2-D and 3-D fuel assemblies and whole cores with cylindrical boundaries. Cross sections were generated using Serpent 2, and meshes were produced using the Argonne mesh tool or the INL neutronics meshing tools combined with CUBIT. Cross sections and meshes were converted to the ISOXML and Exodus formats, respectively, so that Griffin and PROTEUS could use consistent data for solving the reactor problems. With the prepared cross sections and meshes, PROTEUS was run first to ensure that all input data were correctly generated and input options in terms of angle, mesh, and energy group were accurately determined. Comparisons against Serpent 2 solutions were made in terms of eigenvalue and pin power. The same calculations and comparisons were then conducted using Griffin. For the fuel assembly and whole core problems, the PROTEUS eigenvalues agreed well with reference Serpent 2 solutions within 100 and 30 pcm, respectively, and pin power differences relative to Serpent 2 were overall less than 2.2% and RMS 0.8% for the whole core models. This indicated that all input data were properly prepared. Using the same data, Griffin was run selecting the SAAF-CFEM SN solver with Legendre-Gaussian quadrature and NDA and DSA for acceleration. It was found that the SAAF-CFEM solver of Griffin required finer meshes to achieve eigenvalue and pin power solutions in good agreement with Serpent 2, consequently requiring more memory requirement and longer computation time. On the other hand, the SPH-Diffusion 2-D core calculations performed using Griffin were able to recover the exact eigenvalue from the reference Serpent 2 solutions, resulting in a pin-power distribution with an RMS of 0.6% and maximum absolute difference of less than 1.4%. The runtimes for SPH-Diffusion for the 2-D core were less than 3 minutes on 40 cores. During this evolution of this evaluation, many updates were made in Griffin by the Griffin development team of INL (focusing on software updates) and ANL (reviewing and supporting software updates) to complete this assessment. Observations from the code assessment are presented in the conclusion section of this report, followed by a discussion of recommendations for future work.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Microbial Analysis of 100-N Borehole Samples: Estimation of Diesel and BTEX Degrading Bacterial Populations

Historical unplanned releases at the UPR-100-N-17 166-N Diesel Oil Supply Line Leak waste site located within the 100-NR-1 OU resulted in diesel fuel contamination of the unsaturated vadose zone and site groundwater. Enhanced in situ bioremediation of the deep vadose zone was the final remedy decision for the 100-NR-1 Operable Unit (OU) and the full-scale bioventing demo began in 2012. For this remedy, oxygen is actively supplied to the deep vadose zone to stimulate aerobic hydrocarbon degrading microorganisms to metabolize petroleum contamination. Degradation rate calculations based on vadose zone respirometry measurements, however, have indicated declining activity over recent years, though the precise reason for this apparent decline has not been determined. In this investigation 100-NR-1 OU sediment cores were analyzed for total microbial biomass, as well as enumeration of diesel and BTEX degrading bacteria to determine if these microbial populations have declined relative to previous measurements taken in 2009.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Composition, Emissions, and Air Quality Impacts of Hazardous Air Pollutants in Unburned Natural Gas from Residential Stoves in California

The presence of hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) entrained in end-use natural gas (NG) is an understudied source of human health risks. We performed trace gas analyses on 185 unburned NG samples collected from 159 unique residential NG stoves across seven geographic regions in California. Our analyses commonly detected 12 HAPs with significant variability across region and gas utility. Mean regional benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, and total xylenes (BTEX) concentrations in end-use NG ranged from 1.6–25 ppmv–benzene alone was detected in 99% of samples, and mean concentrations ranged from 0.7–12 ppmv (max: 66 ppmv). By applying previously reported NG and methane emission rates throughout California’s transmission, storage, and distribution systems, we estimated statewide benzene emissions of 4,200 (95% CI: 1,800–9,700) kg yr –1 that are currently not included in any statewide inventories–equal to the annual benzene emissions from nearly 60,000 light-duty gasoline vehicles. Additionally, we found that NG leakage from stoves and ovens while not in use can result in indoor benzene concentrations that can exceed the California Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment 8-h Reference Exposure Level of 0.94 ppbv–benzene concentrations comparable to environmental tobacco smoke. This study supports the need to further improve our understanding of leaked downstream NG as a source of health risk.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Hydrogen Leak Modeling for Development of Smart Distributed Monitoring Under Unintended Releases

Hydrogen is a versatile and clean energy carrier that can be produced from various renewable sources such as wind, solar, and hydropower. Hydrogen has the potential to play a crucial role in decarbonizing industrial processes that are currently reliant on fossil fuels and provide long-duration and/or seasonal energy storage to enable electricity decarbonization. Hydrogen can also be used as a fuel for fuel cell vehicles, providing a zero-emission alternative to traditional internal combustion engines. DOE launched the Hydrogen Energy Earthshot (Hydrogen Shot) in June 2021 to reduce the cost of clean hydrogen by 80% to $1 per 1 kilogram in 1 decade ("1 1 1"). While promising, Hydrogen is highly-flammable, and in the presence of oxygen, it can form explosive mixtures. . Therefore, understanding leak scenarios is essential to evaluate and mitigate the safety risks associated with potential hydrogen leaks. An increased understanding of leak behavior, and having tools to model leaks, can help assess how hydrogen would disperse in different environments, influencing emergency response plans and safety measures, and identify potential issues with materials and design systems that can withstand the challenges posed by hydrogen. Recently, researchers have attempted to study hydrogen leaks for development of risk management strategies. However, the focus has been on closed or semi-closed spaces like storage rooms, vehicles, garages, and fueling stations - all promising locations for future hydrogen infrastructure. In this presentation, the modeling environment extends the span of research further by modeling hydrogen leak in an outdoor, open space. We will present the key challenges with modeling hydrogen leaks in an uncontrollable environment, how they were handled, and how modeling results informed sensor selection and placement. A Hydrogen research facility at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) was used as a case study to model hydrogen leaks. In the future, Hydrogen wide area detection methodologies will be developed and tested at this site to monitor for unintended and operational hydrogen releases. The data generated from modeling will be used to develop a predictive model to detect hydrogen leak location based on concentration measured by sensors in this open space. Furthermore, the facility was also chosen because controlled hydrogen releases can be performed. A computational fluid dynamics (CFD) based modeling approach was taken to model hydrogen leak. The full-scale hydrogen facility was modeled with a large ambient domain. The electrolyzer at the facility can produce a controlled release rate of 27 kg-H2/hr. Site-specific atmospheric and weather condition data such as wind direction, wind speed at various altitudes, and temperature were used as inputs to the model. To capture the variability of weather conditions, a subset of the weather conditions experienced during daytime hours without precipitation over the course of three months was generated; using established data clustering techniques, a total of 100 condition sets were chosen. The results show statistical distributions and ranges of hydrogen concentrations at locations throughout the domain. These distributions are compared to experimental data from a constant mass flow, controlled hydrogen release at the facility. The stochastic wind conditions of the release make direct validation difficult, therefore, statistical comparison approaches were used. Wind conditions are found to significantly impact the release behavior, including direction and concentration. Sensor selection and placement is proposed for the facility and is now based on release behavior predicted for the facility given its weather patterns; this is much more informed than without the modeling results. The methodology and analysis procedure can be translated to other facilities using modified geometries and site-specific weather conditions. Hydrogen holds great promise as a renewable energy fuel, but ensuring safety in its production, storage, and use is paramount. Studying potential leak scenarios in an open space will help develop sensors to detect hydrogen on a large spectrum of concentration and eventually build a smart distributed monitoring system.

CFD↗