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At least 37 records · Page 2

Remote Sensing Improves Multi‐Hazard Flooding and Extreme Heat Detection by Fivefold Over Current Estimates

The co‐occurrence of multiple hazards is of growing concern globally as the frequency and magnitude of extreme climate events increases. Despite studies examining the spatial distribution of such events, there has been little work in examining if all relevant life threatening and damaging hazards are captured in existing hazard databases and by common hazard metrics. For example, local/regional flash flooding events are seldom captured by optical satellite instruments and are subsequently excluded from global hazard databases. Similarly, the heat hazard definitions most frequently used in multi‐hazard studies inherently fail to capture events that are life‐threatening but climatologically within an expected range. Our goal is to determine the potential for increasing multi‐hazard event detection capabilities by inferring additional hazard footprints from widely accessible satellite data. We use daily precipitation and temperature satellite data to develop an open‐source framework that infers additional hazard footprints that are not included in traditional methods. With the state of Texas as our study area, we detected 2.5 times as many flood hazards, equivalent to $320 million in property and crop damages. Furthermore, our expanded heat hazard definition increases the impacted area by 56.6%, equivalent to 91.5 million km 2 over an 18 year period. Increasing hazard detection capabilities and expanding existing definitions of hazards using daily satellite data increases the temporal and spatial resolutions at which multi‐hazard events are detected. Having more complete data sets of all relevant hazard extents improves our ability to track global trends and more accurately determine the magnitude of hazard exposure inequities.

equity↗

Advancing Multi-Hazard Risk and Safety Considerations for Aging Nuclear Facilities

While probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) of nuclear facilities is expected to include internal and external hazards for a risk-informed and performance-based design, the current state of practice treats each hazard independently. However, such an independent treatment of hazards may not account for the correlations between different hazards and their response of and damage to the structures, systems, and components (SSCs) in a plant resulting in underestimating the overall risk. This project proposes to advance the multi-hazard PRA of nuclear facilities to more adequately evaluate concurrent hazards and contribute to an increased safety of nuclear plants. A framework for multi-hazard PRA will be developed by identifying concurrent hazard events (both internal and external) and event sequences that include interdependencies through the response of SSCs. An example application of the multi-hazard PRA framework will be demonstrated by considering a generic pressurized water reactor (PWR) subjected to seismic and internal flooding hazards. Computational models for the response of components will be developed to generated multi-hazard fragility surfaces under seismic and flooding loads. A PRA model consisting of event and fault trees will also be developed to quantify the multi-hazard risk profile and compare it with the independent hazard risk profile. Overall, by advancing the multi-hazard PRA of nuclear facilities, this project enhances nuclear safety and reduces costs by mitigating unforeseen consequences caused by correlations between concurrent hazards.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Supporting Hazard Analysis for Wildfire Response Using fmdtools and MIKA

The System Wide Safety (SWS) Safety Demonstrator (SD) Series drives development of an increasingly capable In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) focusing on humanitarian applications, starting with wildfire response (SD-1). The goals of this report are to (1) provide an early hazard analysis and mitigation evaluation of wildfire response to support these efforts and (2) provide a demonstration of capabilities of the Fault Model Design Tools (fmdtools) and Manager for Intelligent Knowledge Access (MIKA) tools. fmdtools provides a modeling, simulation, and resiliency analysis framework in which a wildfire response model, the System Modeling and Analysis of Resiliency in Scalable Traffic Management for Emergency Response Operations (SMARt-STEReO), is built. MIKA is an intelligent knowledge manager with several capabilities, including assisting in hazard analysis by extracting and analyzing hazards from historical incident reports. The following topics are covered in the report: Understanding Wildfire Hazard Dynamics. We provide a description and simulated examples of how hazards occur in the SMARt-STEReO model of wildfire response and their effect on its outcome. This provides a common mental model and focuses the analysis presented in the remainder of the report. Wildfire Hazard Identification. MIKA identifies wildfire hazards from three relevant datasets: the ICS-209-PLUS, SAFECOM, and SAFENET. Hazards are manually organized into a taxonomy and MIKA analyzes each hazard’s effects, likelihood, severity, and risk. Evaluating Mitigation Strategies. The SMARt-STEReO wildfire response model built in fmdtools evaluates a subset of identified hazards. Specifically, we simulate the effect of communications faults and equipment faults on operator safety, the effect of changing winds and flammability, and a scenario with multiple ignition points and heavy smoke. Tool Limitations and Usage Considerations. We provide a discussion of appropriate tool use cases as well as limitations and considerations for usage. The tool findings are used to synthesize recommendations for wildfire response operations, which can be captured as part of an IASMS. Key recommendations are as follows: Hazards are identified from a broad spectrum of sources including aircraft subsystems, operational sources, and ground crew operations. Highest risk operational environment hazards identified are Evacuations. The highest risk manned aerial operations hazard categorized is Jumper Operations Mishap. Ground crew hazards that are highest risk are Burns, Cargo Operations Overhead, Dehydration, Entrapment, Falling Objects, Heart Attacks, Heat Exhaustion, Inadequate Training or Certification, Vehicle Breakdown, and Vehicle Collision. Modelled containment failures arise from a mismatch between the difficulty of the firefighting scenario and the capacity (e.g., speed, effectiveness, awareness) of the response. In firefighting scenarios where containment is possible (e.g., because the fire does not spread too quickly), these mismatches can occur because of a change in environmental conditions (e.g., wind, flammability, etc) or because of planning, equipment, or communications faults. Improvements to communications increase the capacity of the firefighting response by reducing the time needed to respond to the fire. While surveillance does not increase this capacity by itself, it increases operator safety by increasing state awareness, enabling firefighters to evade approaching fires. Increasing both has a synergistic effect. In general, these performance and resilience increases generalize over fault scenarios as well as unforeseen changes to circumstances (i.e., wind, aridity, etc.). However, these improvements need to be designed so as not to make the system prone to persistent large-scale communications outages, which can reduce performance.

Hazard analysis↗

Advancing Multi-Hazard Risk and Safety Considerations for Aging Nuclear Facilities (Revision 1)

This project will demonstrate a multi-hazard time-dependent probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) approach for nuclear facilities considering aging-related deterioration of structures. A generic pressurized water reactor (PWR) reactor subjected to seismic mainshock-aftershock sequences considering the aging of the containment structure will be used as a case study to demonstrate the multi-hazard PRA approach. Using advanced modeling and simulation, seismic mainshock-aftershock fragility functions will be simulated for the containment structure considering aging effects. A multi-hazard PRA model for a generic PWR reactor will be built to quantify the multi-hazard core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF) with explicit time-dependent modeling of event sequences. To date, the cascading impacts of multi-hazards are not adequately accounted for in the PRA models for nuclear facilities. In addition, for both initial and periodic evaluation of facilities to withstand natural phenomena hazards (NPH), deterioration of the SSCs due to aging and other effects is not adequately considered. By advancing multi-hazard considerations accounting for aging effects, this project will contribute to improved understanding of the safety of aging nuclear facilities. Project outcomes such as the multi-hazard CDF and LERF will also allow facility owners to optimize upgrade and retrofit protocols. This project is divided into two components: (1) advanced modeling and simulations; and (2) multi-hazard PRA. For the first component, Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL) Multi-hazard Analysis for STOchastic time-DOmaiN phenomena (MASTODON) and BlackBear codes will be used to simulate the seismic response and damage of a containment structure under cascading mainshock-aftershock sequences with aging effects. Uncertainties related to the seismic inputs, material parameters, and environmental factors such as temperature and humidity will be identified and propagated to the fragility functions. These fragility functions, which consider aging effects, will be time dependent. The second component will take the fragility information from the first component to build a multi-hazard time-dependent PRA model starting from a generic PWR model to evaluate the multi-hazard CDF and LERF and characterize the associated consequences. For this component, OpenPRA Web Application and SAPHIRE code will be used. Events such as the Fukushima Daiichi accident have highlighted the importance of considering the cascading impacts of multi-hazards for PRA. Moreover, many of the reactors in the current nuclear fleet in the United States (US) are already operating well beyond their initially planned design life, and applications for further extensions to operating licenses are being considered. Therefore, considering multi-hazard effects and aging deterioration in the NPH risk assessment process will contribute to the safety of both existing and future nuclear facilities. Outcomes of this project will thus directly benefit the standards DOE-STD-1020-16 and DOE-HDBK-1224-18.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Idaho National Laboratory Integrated Multisite SSHAC Level 3: Probabilistic Volcanic Hazards Assessment

The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) resides on the eastern Snake River Plain (ESRP), part of the Snake River Plain (SRP) with a complex origin and geologic history of volcanism. Much of the Quaternary (last 2.58 million years) volcanism within 400 km of INL is genetically associated with a major thermal anomaly referred to as the Yellowstone hotspot, which is currently located more than 180 km northeast of INL. Near INL, local volcanic sources include silicic domes near its southern border, and numerous dike-fed basaltic vents of the ESRP, some of which are near or within the INL boundaries. Quantitative probabilistic assessments of screened-in volcanic hazardous phenomena for nine different facility complexes at the INL are presented for a Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee (SSHAC) Level 3 (SL3) study. The comprehensive, integrated multisite SSHAC study consists of a single regional Probabilistic Volcanic Hazards Assessment (PVHA) that pertains to all nine INL facility complexes, with site-specific information developed at each respective area of interest (AOI), referred to as the "INL facility AOI" (Figure ES-1). Hazard products are generated for specified INL facility AOIs for use by multiple stakeholders from different agencies in risk-informed decision-making regarding site selection, operations, and design of nuclear facilities at INL, consistent with U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulatory guidance. The study also serves as the basis for future periodic safety assessments required for existing DOE facilities, such as 10-year evaluations of natural-phenomena hazards. Elements of the INL PVHA including initial characterization, screening, quantitative assessments of eruption and hazard potential, and consideration of facility needs are conducted using the three phases of the SSHAC process: evaluation, integration, and documentation. As per regulatory guidance, the SSHAC framework provided the necessary processes and procedures for the PVHA Technical Integration (TI) team, at three workshops, five formal working meetings and many TI team remote meetings, to conduct initial characterization, screen the volcanic hazards, create PVHA model inputs, exercise those models in the PVHA, consider facility-specific volcanic hazard needs, and perform final hazard calculations. The Participatory Peer Review Panel (PPRP) provided independent oversight and performed process and technical reviews of the PVHA throughout its duration. The study included an extensive New Data Collection and Analyses (NDCA) program developed by the PVHA TI team to reduce uncertainties in hazard-significant elements in the PVHA model. NDCA activities generated 20 reports providing important contributory datasets and results to the project database for characterizing the ESRP. For example, a report compiling the dimensions of ESRP shield volcanoes and lava fields was used to construct volcanic footprints (areas of impact), was compared with data from INL subsurface cores, and was used to validate the results of lava-flow inundation modeling on the contemporary terrain. Another example is the acquisition of aeromagnetic data over INL and its surrounding area, with maps of buried magmatic features (e.g., subsurface volcanoes and swarms of feeder dikes) that informed the PVHA conceptual model of volcanism. The SSHAC evaluation process was used to conduct all elements of the PVHA including initial characterization and screening. Existing data and NDCA activities provided the foundation to develop the tectonomagmatic conceptual model of volcanism for the region of geographical interest in the SRP and Yellowstone hotspot volcanic system, and for considering volcanoes in the western US. Considering Quaternary volcanic sources active during this period, the screening approach identified and evaluated magma compositions, types of eruptive and intrusive phenomena, types of hazardous phenomena, and proximity of sources to INL. The PVHA TI team evaluated 18 types of magmatic sources in terms of 20 potentially hazardous phenomena, resulting in 360 screening decisions. The screening process resulted in 140 screened-in hazardous volcanic phenomena for Quaternary volcanic sources 1) proximal to INL facility complexes in the ESRP (64 basaltic and 54 silicic), 2) regional sources associated with the Yellowstone caldera system and Blackfoot Reservoir volcanic field (7), and 3) more distal sources from thirteen Cascade volcanoes and two volcanoes at Long Valley caldera (CA).

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

EVA Hazards due to TPS Inspection and Repair

Tile inspection and repair activities have implicit hazards associated with them. When an Extra Vehicular Activities (EVA) crewmember and associated hardware are added into the equation, additional hazards are introduced. Potential hazards to the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU), the Orbiter or the crew member themselves are created. In order to accurately assess the risk of performing a TPS inspection or repair, an accurate evaluation of potential hazards and how adequately these hazards are controlled is essential. The EMU could become damaged due to sharp edges, protrusions, thermal extremes, molten metal or impact with the Orbiter. Tools, tethers and the presence of a crew member in the vicinity of the Orbiter Thermal Protection System (TPS) pose hazards to the Orbiter. Hazards such as additional tile or Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) damage from a loose tool, safety tethers, crewmember or arm impact are introduced. Additionally, there are hazards to the crew which should be addressed. Crew hazards include laser injury, electrical shock, inability to return to the airlock for EMU failures or Orbiter rapid safing scenarios, as well as the potential inadvertent release of a crew member from the arm/boom. The aforementioned hazards are controlled in various ways. Generally, these controls are addressed operationally versus by design, as the majority of the interfaces are to the Orbiter and the Orbiter design did not originally account for tile repair. The Shuttle Remote Manipulator System (SRMS), for instance, was originally designed to deploy experiments, and therefore has insufficient design controls for retention of the Orbiter Boom Sensor System (OBSS). Although multiple methods to repair the Orbiter TPS exist, the majority of the hazards are applicable no matter which specific repair method is being performed. TPS Inspection performed via EVA also presents some of the same hazards. Therefore, the hazards common to all TPS inspection or repair methods will be addressed.

Stewart, Christine E.↗

Hazard Detection Software for Lunar Landing

The Autonomous Landing and Hazard Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) Project is developing a system for safe and precise manned lunar landing that involves novel sensors, but also specific algorithms. ALHAT has selected imaging LIDAR (light detection and ranging) as the sensing modality for onboard hazard detection because imaging LIDARs can rapidly generate direct measurements of the lunar surface elevation from high altitude. Then, starting with the LIDAR-based Hazard Detection and Avoidance (HDA) algorithm developed for Mars Landing, JPL has developed a mature set of HDA software for the manned lunar landing problem. Landing hazards exist everywhere on the Moon, and many of the more desirable landing sites are near the most hazardous terrain, so HDA is needed to autonomously and safely land payloads over much of the lunar surface. The HDA requirements used in the ALHAT project are to detect hazards that are 0.3 m tall or higher and slopes that are 5 or greater. Steep slopes, rocks, cliffs, and gullies are all hazards for landing and, by computing the local slope and roughness in an elevation map, all of these hazards can be detected. The algorithm in this innovation is used to measure slope and roughness hazards. In addition to detecting these hazards, the HDA capability also is able to find a safe landing site free of these hazards for a lunar lander with diameter .15 m over most of the lunar surface. This software includes an implementation of the HDA algorithm, software for generating simulated lunar terrain maps for testing, hazard detection performance analysis tools, and associated documentation. The HDA software has been deployed to Langley Research Center and integrated into the POST II Monte Carlo simulation environment. The high-fidelity Monte Carlo simulations determine the required ground spacing between LIDAR samples (ground sample distances) and the noise on the LIDAR range measurement. This simulation has also been used to determine the effect of viewing on hazard detection performance. The software has also been deployed to Johnson Space Center and integrated into the ALHAT real-time Hardware-in-the-Loop testbed.

Huertas, Andres↗

Helicopter Flight Test of a Compact, Real-Time 3-D Flash Lidar for Imaging Hazardous Terrain During Planetary Landing

A second generation, compact, real-time, air-cooled 3-D imaging Flash Lidar sensor system, developed from a number of cutting-edge components from industry and NASA, is lab characterized and helicopter flight tested under the Autonomous Precision Landing and Hazard Detection and Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) project. The ALHAT project is seeking to develop a guidance, navigation, and control (GN&C) and sensing system based on lidar technology capable of enabling safe, precise crewed or robotic landings in challenging terrain on planetary bodies under any ambient lighting conditions. The Flash Lidar incorporates a 3-D imaging video camera based on Indium-Gallium-Arsenide Avalanche Photo Diode and novel micro-electronic technology for a 128 x 128 pixel array operating at a video rate of 20 Hz, a high pulse-energy 1.06 μm Neodymium-doped: Yttrium Aluminum Garnet (Nd:YAG) laser, a remote laser safety termination system, high performance transmitter and receiver optics with one and five degrees field-of-view (FOV), enhanced onboard thermal control, as well as a compact and self-contained suite of support electronics housed in a single box and built around a PC-104 architecture to enable autonomous operations. The Flash Lidar was developed and then characterized at two NASA-Langley Research Center (LaRC) outdoor laser test range facilities both statically and dynamically, integrated with other ALHAT GN&C subsystems from partner organizations, and installed onto a Bell UH-1H Iroquois "Huey" helicopter at LaRC. The integrated system was flight tested at the NASA-Kennedy Space Center (KSC) on simulated lunar approach to a custom hazard field consisting of rocks, craters, hazardous slopes, and safe-sites near the Shuttle Landing Facility runway starting at slant ranges of 750 m. In order to evaluate different methods of achieving hazard detection, the lidar, in conjunction with the ALHAT hazard detection and GN&C system, operates in both a narrow 1deg FOV raster-scanning mode in which successive, gimbaled images of the hazard field are mosaicked together as well as in a wider, 4.85deg FOV staring mode in which digital magnification, via a novel 3-D superresolution technique, is used to effectively achieve the same spatial precision attained with the more narrow FOV optics. The lidar generates calibrated and corrected 3-D range images of the hazard field in real-time and passes them to the ALHAT Hazard Detection System (HDS) which stitches the images together to generate on-the-fly Digital Elevation Maps (DEM's) and identifies hazards and safe-landing sites which the ALHAT GN&C system can then use to guide the host vehicle to a safe landing on the selected site. Results indicate that, for the KSC hazard field, the lidar operational range extends from 100m to 1.35 km for a 30 degree line-of-sight angle and a range precision as low as 8 cm which permits hazards as small as 25 cm to be identified. Based on the Flash Lidar images, the HDS correctly found and reported safe sites in near-real-time during several of the flights. A follow-on field test, planned for 2013, seeks to complete the closing of the GN&C loop for fully-autonomous operations on-board the Morpheus robotic, rocket-powered, free-flyer test bed in which the ALHAT system would scan the KSC hazard field (which was vetted during the present testing) and command the vehicle to landing on one of the selected safe sites.

Roback, VIncent E.↗

Los Alamos National Laboratory Hazardous Waste Facility Permit Community Relations Plan

The requirements of the Hazardous Waste Facility Permit are fulfilled through execution of LANL's fourth strategic goal: “Enabling mission delivery through next-generation facility, infrastructure, and operational excellence.” With input from our stakeholders, we will continue to fulfill those requirements and to improve our waste operations. In 2015, the Laboratory purpose statement focused waste management efforts by directing delivery of mission success through operational effectiveness and scientific excellence. This Plan advances that purpose through community involvement. In the process of achieving our national security mission, Los Alamos National Laboratory generates some hazardous and mixed waste. Hazardous waste is solid waste that is dangerous or potentially harmful to human health or the environment. Hazardous wastes can be liquids, solids, gases, or sludges. They can be discarded as commercial products, such as cleaning fluids or pesticides, or as the byproducts of operations. Specific substances are listed in 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 261: 40 CFR Part 261. Hazardous waste management activities are regulated by the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency and the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) pursuant to New Mexico Hazardous Waste Act (HWA; Chapter 74, Article 4 NMSA 1978) and regulations under the Act. In 1989, NMED issued the Hazardous Waste Facility Permit (EPA ID Number NM0890010515-1) that established standards for the Laboratory to manage, store, and treat hazardous wastes on-site and to undertake the closure, post closure care, and cleanup as necessary, of permitted waste management units. On November 30, 2010, NMED renewed the Hazardous Waste Facility Permit (the Permit). In June 2020 the Permittees submitted a permit renewal application to the NMED for their review and approval. The Hazardous Waste Facility Permit Community Relations Plan (CRP) describes the scope of public involvement in the activities of the Permit. The CRP is specifically designed to facilitate the community outreach, engagement, and relations activities concerning the Laboratory’s Hazardous Waste Facility Permit and coordinates with but does not include public involvement for other Laboratory programs, initiatives, or environmental activities.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Hazard Analysis for Building 34 Vacuum Glove Box Assembly

One of the characteristics of an effective safety program is the recognition and control of hazards before mishaps or failures occur. Conducting potentially hazardous tests necessitates a thorough hazard analysis in order to prevent injury to personnel, and to prevent damage to facilities and equipment. The primary purpose of this hazard analysis is to define and address the potential hazards and controls associated with the Building 34 Vacuum Glove Box Assembly, and to provide the applicable team of personnel with the documented results. It is imperative that each member of the team be familiar with the hazards and controls associated with his/her particular tasks, assignments and activities while interfacing with facility test systems, equipment and hardware. In fulfillment of the stated purposes, the goal of this hazard analysis is to identify all hazards that have the potential to harm personnel, damage the facility or its test systems or equipment, test articles, Government or personal property, or the environment. This analysis may also assess the significance and risk, when applicable, of lost test objectives when substantial monetary value is involved. The hazards, causes, controls, verifications, and risk assessment codes have been documented on the hazard analysis work sheets in Appendix A of this document. The preparation and development of this report is in accordance with JPR 1700.1, "JSC Safety and Health Handbook" and JSC 17773 Rev D "Instructions for Preparation of Hazard Analysis for JSC Ground Operations".

Meginnis, Ian↗

Natural Hazard Risk Assessments at the Global Scale

Since 1990, natural hazards have led to over 1.6 million fatalities globally, and economic losses are estimated at an average of around USD 260–310 billion per year. The scientific and policy communities recognise the need to reduce these risks. As a result, the last decade has seen a rapid development of global models for assessing risk from natural hazards at the global scale. In this paper, we review the scientific literature on natural hazard risk assessments at the global scale, and we specifically examine whether and how they have examined future projections of hazard, exposure, and/or vulnerability. In doing so, we examine similarities and differences between the approaches taken across the different hazards, and we identify potential ways in which different hazard communities can learn from each other. For example, there are a number of global risk studies focusing on hydrological, climatological, and meteorological hazards that have included future projections and disaster risk reduction measures (in the case of floods), whereas fewer exist in the peer-reviewed literature for global studies related to geological hazards. On the other hand, studies of earthquake and tsunami risk are now using stochastic modelling approaches to allow for a fully probabilistic assessment of risk, which could benefit the modelling of risk from other hazards. Finally, we discuss opportunities for learning from methods and approaches being developed and applied to assess natural hazard risks at more continental or regional scales. Through this paper, we hope to encourage further dialogue on knowledge sharing between disciplines and communities working on different hazards and risk and at different spatial scales.

Philip J. Ward↗

Wildfire Emergency Response Hazard Extraction and Analysis of Trends (HEAT) through Natural Language Processing and Time Series

A methodology for Hazard Extraction and Analysis of Trends (HEAT) is proposed and conducted on a data set of wildfire incident response forms, known as ICS-209-PLUS.The HEAT processes: (1) extract a set of hazards from a data set, (2) calculate hazard-relevant metrics in a primary analysis, (3) analyze trends over time in metrics using timeseries, and (4) examine potential explanations for metric trends using a secondary analysis. Hazards are extracted from narrative data in the ICS-209-PLUS based on a framework previously developed by the authors, using natural language processing. Metrics examined for each hazard include operational time to occurrence, rate of occurrence, frequency, and severity. Primary results include a taxonomy of hazards present in the data set with relevant quantitative metrics. The most frequent hazards identified are environmental and include hazardous terrain. Most hazards occur on average between 35-55% containment. Incidents with hazards tend to have a higher average severity score when compared to the average score for all incidents. Time series of the metrics and relevant predictors, including fire characteristics, fire intensity, and operations, are created to facilitate further analysis. Secondary results used to determine which factors best predict hazard frequency include a correlation matrix and regression analysis. These findings are relevant to safety for current, as well as emerging wildfire operations, and are an exploratory first step in developing historical data-driven risk assessment models.

Sequoia R. Andrade↗

Pre-Flight Hazardous Gas Assessment Methodology for the Space Launch System

The complexity of the Artemis I liquid rocket propulsion systems produces many sources of hazards during the operation of the vehicle. Pre-flight hazardous gas leakages pose fire and explosion risks to rocket that could potentially lead to loss of the vehicle, mission, and crew. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) uses a probability risk assessment strategy to assess the likelihood of the hazard and the consequence should the hazardous situation occur. For high probability hazards that pose a potentially catastrophic consequence to the vehicle, the most effective strategy for reducing the risk is accomplished by engineering and implementing systems that actively mitigate the hazard. A hazards analysis is completed to determine the likelihood and severity of each hazard. These hazard analyses are informed using relevant empirical data and physics-based analytical models. Time-accurate Computational Fluid Dynamics models used to quantify and understand the risks posed to Artemis I due to expulsions of hazardous gas near the vehicle. Several sources of hazardous gas that posed a risk to Artemis I during nominal pre-flight operations are analyzed in this work. The results of the analyses were used to develop flight rationale and make risk acceptance decisions for the Artemis I launch.

Brian R. Richardson↗

Pre-Flight Hazardous Gas Assessment Methodology for the Space Launch System

The complexity of the Artemis I liquid rocket propulsion systems produces many sources of hazards during the operation of the vehicle. Pre-flight hazardous gas leakages pose fire and explosion risks to rocket that could potentially lead to loss of the vehicle, mission, and crew. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) uses a probability risk assessment strategy to assess the likelihood of the hazard and the consequence should the hazardous situation occur. For high probability hazards that pose a potentially catastrophic consequence to the vehicle, the most effective strategy for reducing the risk is accomplished by engineering and implementing systems that actively mitigate the hazard. A hazards analysis is completed to determine the likelihood and severity of each hazard. These hazard analyses are informed using relevant empirical data and physics-based analytical models. Time-accurate Computational Fluid Dynamics models used to quantify and understand the risks posed to Artemis I due to expulsions of hazardous gas near the vehicle. Several sources of hazardous gas that posed a risk to Artemis I during nominal pre-flight operations are analyzed in this work. The results of the analyses were used to develop flight rationale and make risk acceptance decisions for the Artemis I launch.

Brian R. Richardson↗

Identifying human failure events (HFEs) for external hazard probabilistic risk assessment

In recent years, several advancements in nuclear power plant (NPP) probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) have been driven by increased understanding of external hazards, plant response, and uncertainties. However, major sources of uncertainty associated with external hazard PRA remain. One important source is how risk-significant human actions that are carried out to enable plant response and recovery from natural hazards cause the close coupling of physical impacts on plants and overall plant risk during these hazard events. This makes human reliability and human-plant interactions important elements to consider in resolving PRA gaps in external hazards. One of the challenges in considering human response in external hazard probabilistic risk assessment (XHPRA) is that most existing human reliability analysis (HRA) models were not developed for assessing actions outside the control room (termed ex-control room actions) and hazard response. To support this new scope, HRA models will need to be developed or modified to support identification of human activities, causal factors, and uncertainties inherent in external hazard response, thereby providing insights regarding event timing and physical event conditions as they relate to human performance. In this study, there are two main objectives: (1) evaluate the applicability of an existing cognitive-based HRA method, Phoenix, to ex-control room actions, and (2) identify sources of uncertainty to be characterized or reduced in order to make this method suitable for XHPRA. The first step of such work is performed by assessing the suitability of existing HRA methods to support identifying human failure events (HFEs) for human response to flooding hazards. These HFEs are human actions or inactions that are involved in human responses to flooding hazards and could contribute to the loss of a critical function for the plant in the scenario being examined. Here, in this work, decomposition analyses using the cognitive-based Phoenix HRA model are used to identify HFEs. The Phoenix method was found to be suitable for analyzing ex-control room actions as well as identifying specific HFEs and underlying crew failure modes (CFMs). However, the method's suitability for use in ex-control room actions would benefit from expanding the available CFMs to accommodate a larger variety of physical and communication tasks.

42 ENGINEERING↗

NASA LaRC Hazardous Material Pharmacy

In 1993-1994 the Office of Environmental Engineering contracted SAIC to develop NASA Langley's Pollution Prevention (P2) Program. One of the priority projects identified in this contract was the development of a hazardous waste minimization (HAZMIN)/hazardous materials reutilization (HAZMART) program in the form of a Hazardous Materials Pharmacy. A hazardous materials pharmacy is designed to reduce hazardous material procurement costs and hazardous waste disposal costs. This is accomplished through the collection and reissue of excess hazardous material. Currently, a rarely used hazardous material may be stored in a shop area, unused, until it passes its expiration date. The material is then usually disposed of as a hazardous waste, often at a greater expense than the original cost of the material. While this material was on the shelf expiring, other shop areas may have ordered new supplies of the same material. The hazardous material pharmacy would act as a clearinghouse for such materials. Material that is not going to be used would be turned in to the pharmacy. Other users could then be issued this material free of charge, thereby reducing procurement costs. The use of this material by another shop prevents it from expiring, thereby reducing hazardous waste disposal costs.

Esquenet, Remy↗

Hazard Analysis for Pneumatic Flipper Suitport/Z-1 Manned Evaluation, Chamber B, Building 32

One of the characteristics of an effective safety program is the recognition and control of hazards before mishaps or failures occur. Conducting potentially hazardous tests necessitates a thorough hazard analysis in order to protect our personnel from injury and our equipment from damage. The purpose of this hazard analysis is to define and address the potential hazards and controls associated with the Z1 Suit Port Test in Chamber B located in building 32, and to provide the applicable team of personnel with the documented results. It is imperative that each member of the team be familiar with the hazards and controls associated with his/her particular tasks, assignments, and activities while interfacing with facility test systems, equipment, and hardware. The goal of this hazard analysis is to identify all hazards that have the potential to harm personnel and/or damage facility equipment, flight hardware, property, or harm the environment. This analysis may also assess the significance and risk, when applicable, of lost test objectives when substantial monetary value is involved. The hazards, causes, controls, verifications, and risk assessment codes have been documented on the hazard analysis work sheets in appendix A of this document. The preparation and development of this report is in accordance with JPR 1700.1, JSC Safety and Health Handbook.

Source record↗

Lidar Sensor Performance in Closed-Loop Flight Testing of the Morpheus Rocket-Propelled Lander to a Lunar-Like Hazard Field

For the first time, a suite of three lidar sensors have been used in flight to scan a lunar-like hazard field, identify a safe landing site, and, in concert with an experimental Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) system, guide the Morpheus autonomous, rocket-propelled, free-flying test bed to a safe landing on the hazard field. The lidar sensors and GN&C system are part of the Autonomous Precision Landing and Hazard Detection and Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) project which has been seeking to develop a system capable of enabling safe, precise crewed or robotic landings in challenging terrain on planetary bodies under any ambient lighting conditions. The 3-D imaging flash lidar is a second generation, compact, real-time, air-cooled instrument developed from a number of cutting-edge components from industry and NASA and is used as part of the ALHAT Hazard Detection System (HDS) to scan the hazard field and build a 3-D Digital Elevation Map (DEM) in near-real time for identifying safe sites. The flash lidar is capable of identifying a 30 cm hazard from a slant range of 1 km with its 8 cm range precision at 1 sigma. The flash lidar is also used in Hazard Relative Navigation (HRN) to provide position updates down to a 250m slant range to the ALHAT navigation filter as it guides Morpheus to the safe site. The Doppler Lidar system has been developed within NASA to provide velocity measurements with an accuracy of 0.2 cm/sec and range measurements with an accuracy of 17 cm both from a maximum range of 2,200 m to a minimum range of several meters above the ground. The Doppler Lidar's measurements are fed into the ALHAT navigation filter to provide lander guidance to the safe site. The Laser Altimeter, also developed within NASA, provides range measurements with an accuracy of 5 cm from a maximum operational range of 30 km down to 1 m and, being a separate sensor from the flash lidar, can provide range along a separate vector. The Laser Altimeter measurements are also fed into the ALHAT navigation filter to provide lander guidance to the safe site. The flight tests served as the culmination of the TRL 6 journey for the lidar suite and included launch from a pad situated at the NASA-Kennedy Space Center Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) runway, a lunar-like descent trajectory from an altitude of 250m, and landing on a lunar-like hazard field of rocks, craters, hazardous slopes, and safe sites 400m down-range just off the North end of the runway. The tests both confirmed the expected performance and also revealed several challenges present in the flight-like environment which will feed into future TRL advancement of the sensors. The flash lidar identified hazards as small as 30 cm from the maximum slant range of 450 m which Morpheus could provide, however, it was occasionally susceptible to an increase in range noise due to heated air from the Morpheus rocket plume which entered its Field-of-View (FOV). The flash lidar was also susceptible to pre-triggering on dust during the HRN phase which was created during launch and transported by the wind. The Doppler Lidar provided velocity and range measurements to the expected accuracy levels yet it was also susceptible to signal degradation due to air heated by the rocket engine. The Laser Altimeter, operating with a degraded transmitter laser, also showed signal attenuation over a few seconds at a specific phase of the flight due to the heat plume generated by the rocket engine.

Roback, Vincent E.↗