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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 37 records · Page 2

OBSERVATION AND ANALYSIS OF BALLISTIC DOWNFLOWS IN AN M-CLASS FLARE WITH THE INTERFACE REGION IMAGING SPECTROGRAPH

Despite significant advances in instrumentation, there remain no studies that analyze observations of on-disk flare loop plasma flows covering the entire evolution from chromospheric evaporation, through plasma cooling, to draining downflows. We present results from an imaging and spectroscopic observation from the Interface Region Imaging Spectrograph ( IRIS ) of the SOL2015–03–12T11:50:00 M-class flare, at high spatial resolution and time cadence. Our analysis of this event reveals initial plasma evaporation at flare temperatures indicated by 100–200 km s{sup −1} blueshifts in the Fe xxi line. We subsequently observe plasma cooling into chromospheric lines (Si iv and O iv) with ∼11 minute delay, followed by loop draining at ∼40 km s{sup −1} as indicated by a “C”-shaped redshift structure and significant (∼60 km s{sup −1}) non-thermal broadening. We use density-sensitive lines to calculate a plasma density for the flare loops, and estimate a theoretical cooling time approximately equal to the observed delay. Finally, we use a simple elliptical free-fall draining model to construct synthetic spectra, and perform what we believe to be the first direct comparison of such synthetic spectra to observations of draining downflows in flare loops.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗

Materials Processing in Space: Model Experiments aboard the International Space Station

Direct observation of fluid flow, bubble movement and solidification during controlled melting and solidification of succinonitrile were conducted in the glovebox facility of the International Space Station (ISS). The samples were processed in the Pore Formation and Mobility Investigation (PFMI) apparatus in the glovebox facility (GBX) on board the ISS. Experimental processing parameters of temperature gradient and translation speed, as well as camera settings, were remotely monitored and manipulated from the ground Telescience Center (TSC) at the Marshall Space Flight Center. Real time visualization of the controlled directional melt back and resolidification reveals a number of microgravity dependent phenomena otherwise masked by Earth s gravity. These and some initial analysis of the observed events is presented.

Grugel, Richard↗

A systematic approach to the analysis of double faults within design basic accident methodology - 14501

Within the UK there is a general trend towards adopting Design Basis Accident (DBA) methodology for the assessment of radiological hazards, including criticality. DBA is a single fault methodology and comprises identifying the initiating event, its frequency and consequence. A fault with a very low initiating event frequency will not require further analysis. A fault sequence that terminates in a sub-critical configuration would also not require further analysis; although the identified passive features ensuring sub-criticality are subjected to engineering substantiation. Where faults do not pass this initial screening, two safety measures are generally required to ensure the fault does not progress to a criticality incident. This methodology provides a robust approach to single faults ensuring that an appropriate level and range of plant measures are identified and subjected to appropriate substantiation. However, a criticality is a cliff-edge effect and is dependent on multiple parameters. It is entirely possible under DBA to evaluate several single fault sequences and conclude that no measures are required because the single faults terminate in a sub-critical configuration. Importantly, for criticality safety, under DBA, there is no requirement to prevent important parameters from deviating from normal or upper bound 'safe' levels leaving the plant at greater risk in the event that further faults initiate. The combination of two faults could lead to a criticality incident but there is no current driver within DBA methodology to analyze these coincident or double faults. There is, therefore, potential to significantly under estimate the risk of criticality. This understanding is embodied within other methodologies such as the Double Contingency Principle. However, within the UK the DBA methodology has so significantly improved the analysis of single faults that, in some instances, consideration of double faults has taken a back seat. This is despite the UK regulator stating that 'criticality safety cases should employ the double contingency approach'. This paper presents a systematic approach to ensure that the potential for double faults or multiple parameter deviations to result in a criticality is effectively evaluated within the wider DBA methodology. The methodology determines which faults may be screened out from double fault analysis on the grounds of being 'unlikely' to initiate and being present for a 'short' duration. For those faults screened into double fault analysis, this guidance sets out the potential means of determining acceptable risk. These means include the specific evaluation of the risk of two criticality control parameters deviating simultaneously, the definition of additional safety measures and the definition of the boundary of safety for multiple parameters and the risk of exceeding this boundary. (authors)

42 ENGINEERING↗

Plasma Observations During the Mars Atmospheric Plume Event of March-April 2012

We present initial analysis and conclusions from plasma observations made during the reported Mars Dust plume event of March - April 2012. During this period, multiple independent amateur observers detected a localized, high-altitude plume over the Martian dawn terminator [Sanchez-Lavega7 et al., Nature, 2015, doi:10.1038nature14162], the origin of which remains to be explained. We report on in-situ measurements of ionospheric plasma density and solar wind parameters throughout this interval made by Mars Express, obtained over the surface region, but at the opposing terminator. We tentatively conclude that the formation and/or transport of this plume to the altitudes where it was observed could be due in part the result of a large interplanetary coronal mass ejection (ICME) encountering the Martian system. Interestingly, we note that a similar plume detection in May 1997 may also have been associated with a large ICME impact at Mars.

Plumes↗

Initial Probabilistic Evaluation of Reactor Pressure Vessel Fracture with Grizzly and Raven

The Grizzly code is being developed with the goal of creating a general tool that can be applied to study a variety of degradation mechanisms in nuclear power plant components. The first application of Grizzly has been to study fracture in embrittled reactor pressure vessels (RPVs). Grizzly can be used to model the thermal/mechanical response of an RPV under transient conditions that would be observed in a pressurized thermal shock (PTS) scenario. The global response of the vessel provides boundary conditions for local models of the material in the vicinity of a flaw. Fracture domain integrals are computed to obtain stress intensity factors, which can in turn be used to assess whether a fracture would initiate at a pre-existing flaw. These capabilities have been demonstrated previously. A typical RPV is likely to contain a large population of pre-existing flaws introduced during the manufacturing process. This flaw population is characterized stastistically through probability density functions of the flaw distributions. The use of probabilistic techniques is necessary to assess the likelihood of crack initiation during a transient event. This report documents initial work to perform probabilistic analysis of RPV fracture during a PTS event using a combination of the RAVEN risk analysis code and Grizzly. This work is limited in scope, considering only a single flaw with deterministic geometry, but with uncertainty introduced in the parameters that influence fracture toughness. These results are benchmarked against equivalent models run in the FAVOR code. When fully developed, the RAVEN/Grizzly methodology for modeling probabilistic fracture in RPVs will provide a general capability that can be used to consider a wider variety of vessel and flaw conditions that are difficult to consider with current tools. In addition, this will provide access to advanced probabilistic techniques provided by RAVEN, including adaptive sampling and parallelism, which can dramatically decrease run times.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Vertical and Horizontal Wind Structure Prior to and During the 1997/1998 ENSO Event

Analyses of ECMWF and satellite wind products are used to investigate low frequency fluctuations in the wind fields immediately preceding and during the 1997/1998 ENSO event. An extended EOF analysis of the horizontal and vertical wind structure that allows for the study of propagating features indicates that the dominant mode of variability established in the lower levels of the atmosphere is a convergence in the central tropical Pacific. At mid-levels, the westerlies increase with time over most of the equatorial Pacific, and there are closed cyclonic features on either side of the equator. At upper levels, the flow tends to become divergent across the equatorial Pacific, and there is a strong flow from the northwest Pacific across Indonesia that then turns to the west along the equator in the Indian Ocean. The addition of satellite data for improved surface wind estimates reveal that the Indian Ocean winds were anomalously strong during the winter preceding the initiation of the ENSO event. An analysis of the momentum convergence flux at the surface indicates a very strong anomaly 9 months prior to the ENSO event that begins in the western Indian Ocean and propagates to the east, arriving over the Pacific warm pool area coincident with the beginning of the El Nino. Changes in the near surface thermal and water vapor structure over the Indian Ocean during this period will also be discussed.

Adamec, David↗

Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System Failure Considering Safety and Security Initiating Events

In order to quantify the probable risk associated with a safety system, nuclear safety risk evaluation process is applied which is generally performed in three steps. The first step is to calculate the damage frequency of a critical system. This step is followed by the radioactive source term estimation due to the potential system damage. The final step is the assessment of off-site consequences. The safety risk formula is shown by Eq. (1). P{sub F} is the probability of safety system failure (the probability used describes a random, independent event), and C is the consequence value. R{sub SAF} = P{sub F} * C (1) The security risk associated with an attack on critical infrastructure and/or special nuclear materials theft is usually evaluated using three- term risk equation (probability of attack, probability of adversary success, and consequence). A security threat and the related initiating events are not considered in a pure safety risk analysis. The vulnerability of the physical protection system is performed independently even though the consequence resulting from a security initiating event can be similar to a safety related initiating event and thus gets double counted. The security risk can be calculated using Eq. (2) R{sub SEC} = P{sub A} * P{sub S} * C (2) PA is the probability of attack, P{sub S} is the probability of adversary success (P{sub S} = 1 - P{sub I} P{sub N}). P{sub I} being the probability of interruption which accounts for the probabilities of detection of all timely detection elements along an adversary path. PN being the probability of neutralization: the result of engagement of the response force with the adversaries after the interruption has occurred. C is the consequence magnitude from a successful attack. The two security probabilities do not describe random, independent events. As a result, because of the differences in the randomness and independence of the respective safety and security probabilities, the safety and the security risks are currently calculated separately. The consequence term in nuclear safety and security risk evaluation have the same definition. An effort is made here to study the effect on the overall risk by considering security initiating events along with the subsequent failure of the intermediate safety element. The target selected is a spent fuel storage pool for analyzing the public risk arising from the interplay between nuclear security and safety initiating events. EASI (Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption) model is used to calculate the probability of interruption related to a security system that leads to the calculation of the security initiating event frequency. Further progression of this initiating security event to a top event is analyzed using a Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) tool, SAPHIRE (version 8) to obtain a joint pool damage frequency. For the progression of events leading to a top event, the failure of the intermediate safety elements is assumed to be external random events such as heavy load drop and fire events. The objectives of this study is to (1) determine the double accounting of frequency of failure, risk and allocated resources in the scenario of a non-random security initiating event leading to a safety random event chain (2) compare the damage frequency from pure security with the frequency of combined security-safety failure event and pure safety failure events. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Advanced Mechanistic 3D Spatial Modeling and Analysis Methods to Accurately Represent Nuclear Facility External Event Scenarios

Probabilistic risk assessment of nuclear power plants initially focused on events initiated by internal faults at the plant, rather than external hazards including earthquakes and flooding. Although the importance of external hazards risk analysis is now well recognized, the methods for analyzing low probability external hazards rely heavily on subjective judgment of specialists, often resulting in substantial conservatism. This research developed a framework to integrate the risk of seismic and flooding events using realistic structural models and simulation of response of nuclear structures. The results of four application case studies are presented.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Risk-Informed Analysis of Accidents at Reactor Facilities with VVER

An accident with ‘rupture of steam line’ as the initial event was studied for a reactor facility with VVER-1000. A computational analysis was performed of different flow scenarios of an accident with singular and multiple failures of the safety systems. The realization probability and the consequences were evaluated for each accident sequence. The consequences of the accidents are ranked and the most instructive combinations of failures of systems and blockings are determined from the standpoint of risk. The presented method is based on multivariate calculations and an integrated combination of deterministic and probabilistic approaches to safety validation.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

A review for identification of initiating events in event tree development process on nuclear power plants

Initiating event is defined as any event either internal or external to the nuclear power plants (NPPs) that perturbs the steady state operation of the plant, if operating, thereby initiating an abnormal event such as transient or loss of coolant accident (LOCA) within the NPPs. These initiating events trigger sequences of events that challenge plant control and safety systems whose failure could potentially lead to core damage or large early release. Selection for initiating events consists of two steps i.e. first step, definition of possible events, such as by evaluating a comprehensive engineering, and by constructing a top level logic model. Then the second step, grouping of identified initiating event's by the safety function to be performed or combinations of systems responses. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to discuss initiating events identification in event tree development process and to reviews other probabilistic safety assessments (PSA). The identification of initiating events also involves the past operating experience, review of other PSA, failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA), feedback from system modeling, and master logic diagram (special type of fault tree). By using the method of study for the condition of the traditional US PSA categorization in detail, could be obtained the important initiating events that are categorized into LOCA, transients and external events.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

MindSynchro

This report presents the developments and results of MindSynchro project as part of DOE OE FOA 1861. DOE and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) have made available to FOA awardees datasets containing years of real historical data recorded from various phasor measurement units (PMUs) which are installed in three large US interconnections: Texas (IC A), Western (IC B), and Eastern (IC C). The main goal of the project, which was successfully achieved, was to develop methods for detection and identification of events which are relevant for power grid operation. Tasks performed for achieving the project goals included data exploration and pre-processing, the development and application of physics-based features, data analysis and labeling based on unsupervised learning approaches, training and testing of DSSL models for classification of events which are relevant for power grid operation, and deployment of solutions to cloud environments. The methods developed in the project can potentially provide relevant benefits to power grid asset owners/operators in general in terms of situational awareness. Two main types of outcomes can be provided by these tools: Identification of specific relevant power grid event types: Semi-supervised ML methods developed in the project can adequately employ not only the relatively scarce labeled data but also the large amount of available unlabeled data to train models for detection of specific event types. Such methods enable the application of trained models for the detection of events in a population of PMUs much larger than that associated to the labeled events. Support in data labeling / label validation: Labels are critical for training of models for identification of specific types of events. However, labeling large amounts of data is a manual and tedious process. This means that such process is error prone and is not scalable. Methods developed in the project, based on ensembles of clustering models, have been successfully employed for turning manual labeling into a scalable process. Accurate identification of specific relevant events can provide the operators with immediate situational awareness that could otherwise require hours or days of analysis from domain experts. We envision that such methods could be initially employed in support of post-mortem analysis of events and, as confidence is gained, they could be employed for online/real-time support, providing, among other benefits, insights for avoiding major events which could happen due to a combination of smaller ones. On the longer term, related methods could potentially be employed to improve protection and control.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Development of criticality risk evaluation method for fuel debris in Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS - 14373

After the accident of Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station, there has been still damaged nuclear fuel in the reactor buildings, which is called 'fuel debris' and contains an amount of fissile materials show that it is currently subcritical, which must be kept until finishing retrieval work. In the latest plan, retrieving fuel debris is to start in 2025. The International Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning, IRID, has been developing the technology for decontamination in reactor building. A developed method will be reviewed and granted by the Nuclear Regulatory Authority in Japan, NRA, before the start of the retrieving. Criticality risk information will be needed for decision making on following two subcriticality issues, -Criticality control of fuel debris to keep is subcritical until the end of retrieval work. -Safe operation for retrieving fuel debris to keep it subcritical. Because fuel debris has been out of criticality control and the key condition for its current subcriticality is unknown, it is important to obtain criticality risk information as soon as possible. Applying conventional Probabilistic Safety Assessment, PSA, to fuel debris is difficult, because it is based on the probability of becoming out of criticality control due to troubles such as equipment failure, operation mistake and so on. A new method, which has been developed by Japan Atomic Energy Agency to technically support the NRA, is designed to estimate criticality risk based on a probability distribution of k{sub eff} due to uncertainty of composition and geometry of fuel debris, which method will provide risk information for the two subcriticality issues as well as for the tolerance level of criticality risk if it is unavoidable. Developed method contains four steps: two steps of analysis of criticality risk and two steps of quantification of the risk. A procedure of risk quantification has been defined, in which systematic analysis of criticality risk can be done by making 'status matrix'. A trial analysis by using the procedure shows that some events which can initiate criticality are able to be supposed to happen during maintenance period until the beginning of retrieving fuel debris, and that analysis also indicates countermeasures should be considered as soon as possible in order to reduce criticality risk for public and workers. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

SRR's 'Next Step' in the Lean Journey -Taking Lean to the Workforce - 17247

The Savannah River Site, a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facility, contracted Savannah River Remediation (SRR) to manage its liquid waste project, which is a unique, high hazard nuclear waste treatment and disposal facility consisting of 51, one million-gallon underground waste tanks, a solvent extraction processing unit, a vitrification facility for the highest radioactive waste, and a grout solidification and disposal facility for a decontaminated salt solution. Our Project mission is to treat the nuclear waste and close the associated storage and treatment facilities, of which, 8 tanks have been closed to date. At SRR, the Lean business management system has been adopted to address site inefficiencies, aging infrastructure concerns and budget constraints. The Lean philosophy took root decades ago in the manufacturing sector and started with the work of W. Edwards Deming and his contemporaries. In more recent years the process has matured in the Toyota Production System and migrated into fields as diverse as services industries, health-care, and now the DOE complex. The first step of the SRR Lean Journey was to formally identify areas of improvement and initiate Value Stream Analysis (VSAs) and Rapid Improvement Events (RIEs). SRR has achieved improvements in procedure implementation, work planning and control, project schedule compression, and engineering requirements. SRR is now phasing in the next phase of Lean through Managing for Daily Improvement (MDI), Visual Management and 5S (sort, set in order, shine, standardize, and sustain). MDI is a fundamental Lean principle in that we use our most valuable asset, our employees, to drive continuous improvement versus a smaller population through formal events. Part of MDI includes visual management where the workforce can go to a 'dashboard' to see and understand the company mission and status. 5S is a process where a work group improves performance in an area by addressing physical organization, efficiency, uniformity, standardization, and mechanisms to sustain improvements. 5S stands for: Sort, Set in Order, Shine, Standardize, and Sustain. This paper will focus on the 'Next Step' in SRR's Lean journey by address how SRR is implementing MDI and 5S to improve CONOPs, Project efficiencies, and worker engagement in day to day operations. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Risk-Informed Safety Margin Characterization Methods Development Work

This report summarizes the research activity developed during the Fiscal year 2014 within the Risk Informed Safety Margin and Characterization (RISMC) pathway within the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) campaign. This research activity is complementary to the one presented in the INL/EXT-??? report which shows advances Probabilistic Risk Assessment Analysis using RAVEN and RELAP-7 in conjunction to novel flooding simulation tools. Here we present several analyses that prove the values of the RISMC approach in order to assess risk associated to nuclear power plants (NPPs). We focus on simulation based PRA which, in contrast to classical PRA, heavily employs system simulator codes. Firstly we compare, these two types of analyses, classical and RISMC, for a Boiling water reactor (BWR) station black out (SBO) initiating event. Secondly we present an extended BWR SBO analysis using RAVEN and RELAP-5 which address the comments and suggestions received about he original analysis presented in INL/EXT-???. This time we focus more on the stochastic analysis such probability of core damage and on the determination of the most risk-relevant factors. We also show some preliminary results regarding the comparison between RELAP5-3D and the new code RELAP-7 for a simplified Pressurized Water Reactors system. Lastly we present some conceptual ideas regarding the possibility to extended the RISMC capabilities from an off-line tool (i.e., as PRA analysis tool) to an online-tool. In this new configuration, RISMC capabilities can be used to assist and inform reactor operator during real accident scenarios.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

The Impact of Ocean Data Assimilation on Seasonal-to-Interannual Forecasts: A Case Study of the 2006 El Nino Event

This study investigates the impact of four different ocean analyses on coupled forecasts of the 2006 El Nino event. Forecasts initialized in June 2006 using ocean analyses from an assimilation that uses flow-dependent background error covariances are compared with those using static error covariances that are not flow dependent. The flow-dependent error covariances reflect the error structures related to the background ENSO instability and are generated by the coupled breeding method. The ocean analyses used in this study result from the assimilation of temperature and salinity, with the salinity data available from Argo floats. Of the analyses, the one using information from the coupled bred vectors (BV) replicates the observed equatorial long wave propagation best and exhibits more warming features leading to the 2006 El Nino event. The forecasts initialized from the BV-based analysis agree best with the observations in terms of the growth of the warm anomaly through two warming phases. This better performance is related to the impact of the salinity analysis on the state evolution in the equatorial thermocline. The early warming is traced back to salinity differences in the upper ocean of the equatorial central Pacific, while the second warming, corresponding to the mature phase, is associated with the effect of the salinity assimilation on the depth of the thermocline in the western equatorial Pacific. The series of forecast experiments conducted here show that the structure of the salinity in the initial conditions is important to the forecasts of the extension of the warm pool and the evolution of the 2006 El Ni o event.

Yang, Shu-Chih↗

Study of quark and gluon jet substructure in Z+jet and dijet events from pp collisions

Measurements of jet substructure describing the composition of quark- and gluon-initiated jets are presented. Proton-proton (pp) collision data at √s = 13 TeV collected with the CMS detector are used, corresponding to an integrated luminosity of 35.9 fb -1 . Generalized angularities are measured that characterize the jet substructure and distinguish quark- and gluon-initiated jets. These observables are sensitive to the distributions of transverse momenta and angular distances within a jet. The analysis is performed using a data sample of dijet events enriched in gluon-initiated jets, and, for the first time, a Z+jet event sample enriched in quark-initiated jets. The observables are measured in bins of jet transverse momentum, and as a function of the jet radius parameter. Additionally, each measurement is repeated applying a “soft drop” grooming procedure that removes soft and large angle radiation from the jet. Using these measurements, the ability of various models to describe jet substructure is assessed, showing a clear need for improvements in Monte Carlo generators.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

Framework for Modeling High-Impact, Low-Frequency Power Grid Events to Support Risk-Informed Decisions

Natural and man-made hazardous events resulting in loss of grid infrastructure assets challenge the electric power grid’s security and resilience. However, the planning and allocation of appropriate contingency resources for such events requires an understanding of their likelihood and the extent of their potential impact. Where these events are of low likelihood, a risk-informed perspective on planning can be problematic as there exists an insufficient statistical basis to directly estimate the probabilities and consequences of their occurrence. Since risk-informed decisions rely on such knowledge, a basis for modeling the risk associated with high-impact low frequency events (HILFs) is essential. Insights from such a model can inform where resources are most rationally and effectively expended. The present effort is focused on development of a HILF risk assessment framework. Such a framework is intended to provide the conceptual and overarching technical basis for the development of HILF risk models that can inform decision makers across numerous stakeholder sectors. The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) 2014 Standard TPL-001-4 considers severe events for transmission reliability planning, but does not address events of such severity that they have the potential to fail a substantial fraction of grid assets over a region, such as geomagnetic disturbances (GMD), extreme seismic events, and coordinated cyber-physical attacks. These are beyond current planning guidelines. As noted, the risks associated with such events cannot be statistically estimated based on historic experience; however, there does exist a stable of risk modeling techniques for rare events that have proven of value across a wide range of engineering application domains. There is an active and growing interest in evaluating the value of risk management techniques in the State transmission planning and emergency response communities, some of this interest in the context of grid modernization activities. The availability of a grid HILF risk model, integrated across multi-hazard domains which, when interrogated, can support transparent, defensible and effective decisions, is an attractive prospect among these communities. In this report, we document an integrated HILF risk framework intended to inform the development of risk models. These models would be based on the systematic and comprehensive (to within scope) characterization of hazards to the level of detail required for modeling risk, identification of the stressors associated with the hazards (i.e., the means of impacting grid and supporting infrastructure), characterization of the vulnerability of assets to these stressors and the probabilities of asset compromise, the grid’s dynamic response to the asset failures, and assessment of subsequent severities of consequence with respect to selected impact metrics, such as power outage duration and geographic reach. Specifically, the current framework is being developed to;1. Provide the conceptual and overarching technical paradigms for the development of risk models; 2. Identify the classes of models required to implement the framework - providing examples of existing models, and also identifying where modeling gaps exist; 3. Identify the types of data required, addressing circumstances under which data are sparse and the formal elicitation of informed judgment might be required; and 4. Identify means by which the resultant risk models might be interrogated to form the necessary basis for risk management.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗