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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1999

Acceptance Testing of a Satellite SCADA Photovoltaic-Diesel Hybrid System

Savannah State University (SSU) and the Florida Solar Energy Center (FSEC) have been participating in the NASA Advanced Communications Technology Satellite (ACTS) program for the last five years. This program was designed by NASA to help maintain U.S. leadership in commercial space communications by funding high-risk research, and to flight-test next-generation digital satellite components. Launched in 1993, ACTS is an U.S. government funded technology test-bed that incorporates high power Ka-band transponders, small spot beams, and on-board digital storage and switching technology. Associated with the spacecraft, is a prototype satellite control center that supports various application experiments. The SSU/FSEC application experiment is to developing a Photovoltaic-Diesel Hybrid Power system complete with satellite Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA). The hybrid system was design to demonstrate the feasibility of using SCADA to maintain and operate remote village power systems. This configuration would enable experts at a central location to provide technical assistance to local technicians while they acquire a measure of proficiency with the hybrid system operation and maintenance. Upon full mastery of the technology, similar SCADA arrangement are planned to remotely monitor and control constellation of hybrid systems scattered overlarge rural areas. Two Orion Energy APEX-1000 hybrid systems were delivered in 1998, one was installed at SSU in eastern Georgia and the other was installed at FSEC in Central Florida. The project was designed to: (1) evaluate the performance of ACTS in a SCADA arrangement, (2) monitor the health and performance of all major hybrid subsystems, (3) investigate load control and battery charging strategies to maximize battery capacity and lifetime, and (4) develop satellite communication protocol. Preliminary results indicate that the hybrid design is suitable for satellite Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition. A modification to the controller software has produced a robust communication link capable of real time control and long term data collection.

Kalu, Alex↗
NASA NTRS2007

Recovery of Space Shuttle Columbia and Return to Flight of Space Shuttle Discovery

NASA has come a long way in our journey to reduce the risks of operating the Spse Shuttle system. The External Tank bipod Thermal Protection System has been redesigned to eliminate the proximate cause of the Columbia accident. In all areas, we have applied the collective knowledge and capabilities of our Nation to comply with the Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommendations and to raise the bar beyond that. We have taken prudent technical action on potential threats to review and verify the material condition of all critical areas where failure could result in catastrophic loss of the crew and vehicle. We are satisfied that critical systems and elements should operate as intended-safely and reliably. While we will never eliminate all the risks from our human space flight programs, we have eliminated those we can and reduced, controlled, and/or mitigated others. The remaining identified risks will be evaluated for acceptance. Our risk reduction approach has its roots in the system safety engineering hierarchy for hazard abatement long employed in aerospace systems engineering. The components of the hierarchy are, in order of precedence, to: design/redesign; eliminate the hazard/risk; reduce the hazard/risk; and control the hazard/risk and/or mitigate the consequence of the remaining hazard/risk through warning devices, special procedures/capabilities, and/or training. This proven approach to risk reduction has been applied to potential hazards and risks in all critical areas of the Space Shuttle and has guided us through the technical challenges, failures, and successes present in return to flight endeavors. This approach provides the structured deliberation process required to verify and form the foundation for accepting any residual risk across the entire Space Shuttle Program by NASA leadership.

Rudolphi, Michael U.↗
NASA NTRS2014

MAVEN Information Security Governance, Risk Management, and Compliance (GRC): Lessons Learned

As the first interplanetary mission managed by the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, the Mars Atmosphere and Volatile EvolutioN (MAVEN) had three IT security goals for its ground system: COMPLIANCE, (IT) RISK REDUCTION, and COST REDUCTION. In a multiorganizational environment in which government, industry and academia work together in support of the ground system and mission operations, information security governance, risk management, and compliance (GRC) becomes a challenge as each component of the ground system has and follows its own set of IT security requirements. These requirements are not necessarily the same or even similar to each other's, making the auditing of the ground system security a challenging feat. A combination of standards-based information security management based on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Risk Management Framework (RMF), due diligence by the Mission's leadership, and effective collaboration among all elements of the ground system enabled MAVEN to successfully meet NASA's requirements for IT security, and therefore meet Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) mandate on the Agency. Throughout the implementation of GRC on MAVEN during the early stages of the mission development, the Project faced many challenges some of which have been identified in this paper. The purpose of this paper is to document these challenges, and provide a brief analysis of the lessons MAVEN learned. The historical information documented herein, derived from an internal pre-launch lessons learned analysis, can be used by current and future missions and organizations implementing and auditing GRC.

FISMA↗
NASA NTRS2001

Managing Programmatic Risk for Complex Space System Developments

Risk management strategies have become a recent important research topic to many aerospace organizations as they prepare to develop the revolutionary complex space systems of the future. Future multi-disciplinary complex space systems will make it absolutely essential for organizations to practice a rigorous, comprehensive risk management process, emphasizing thorough systems engineering principles to succeed. Project managers must possess strong leadership skills to direct high quality, cross-disciplinary teams for successfully developing revolutionary space systems that are ever increasing in complexity. Proactive efforts to reduce or eliminate risk throughout a project's lifecycle ideally must be practiced by all technical members in the organization. This paper discusses some of the risk management perspectives that were collected from senior managers and project managers of aerospace and aeronautical organizations by the use of interviews and surveys. Some of the programmatic risks which drive the success or failure of projects are revealed. Key findings lead to a number of insights for organizations to consider for proactively approaching the risks which face current and future complex space systems projects.

Panetta, Peter V.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Managing Flagship Missions to Reduce Cost and Schedule

Flagship missions are highly complex with highly nested systems. This level of complexity poses unique management problems as complexity influences risk which, in turn, affects cost and schedule. Establishing a strong technical and programmatic leadership team is critical to mission success. Developing and using a mission architecture is critical to informing the management organization, product ownership, interface and integration relationships, schedule organization, and integration and test paths. In highly nested systems, the mission phasing can be significantly out of sync with product phasing. Targeted technology development prior to Phase A is critical to reducing risk. Early architecture, concept design, and requirements development is critical to reducing risk. Modular design; pathfinders; parallel manufacturing and integration and test paths; and properly handling institutional requirements across interfaces are all management techniques that can be applied to reduce risk. NASA’s large strategic missions, sometimes referred to as flagship missions, are designed to provide answers to some of the most compelling scientific questions being asked. These types of missions are a series of highly nested subsystems that pose unique management problems when compared to more traditional instrument and spacecraft designs. They typically have an overall architecture that is very complex and nested; they typically require a tremendous amount of technology development; they typically involve many contractors and subcontractors with many associated contracts; and they typically involve staff from all over the world. Successful management of a flagship requires the balance between science requirements, engineering and technology capabilities, and resource constraints. Mismanaging these flagship missions can and will lead to significant cost and schedule growth, both of which are detrimental to NASA’s overall reputation which, in turn, is detrimental to the development of future flagship missions. While many of the same management principles used on smaller instruments and spacecraft are relevant, managing flagship missions requires an evolution of those current best practices to better address the specific needs and additional complexity and vastness of these missions. This paper explores how to leverage lessons learned from previous flagship missions to better manage flagship missions in the future.

Hylan, Jason↗
DOE OSTI2024

Unpinning the Lynchpin: Development of a system to introduce redundancy at Department of Energy laboratories

The United States Department of Energy (DOE) laboratory system employs over 78,000 people and had a budget of $8.1 billion for Fiscal Year 2023 (FY23). This diverse workforce includes employees at all levels from operational support staff to senior level management. Together, the labs take on incredibly complex and unique technical challenges in an attempt to address fundamental National and global needs. These technical challenges often require specialized training such that only a single person is truly capable of completing specific tasks. With the modern competitive environment, and an aging workforce, the risk of technical capability loss is highly probable with potentially severe impact. An online survey of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories (LLNL) employees, a typical DOE lab, found that of responders with greater than 10 years of experience, 100% of respondents felt burnt out, 40% felt they were not paid fairly, and 50% believe that not enough is done by leadership to retain them as an employee. Couple that to an aging workforce, and the risk of losing institutional knowledge due to single point of failure, or lynchpin, is significant. There is a need for a system which reduces the risk of operational and technical losses due to lynchpin employees leaving the organization. A mitigation of this risk would lead to the successful transfer of knowledge from one generation to the next, improving the rate of development and minimizing general risk of mistakes.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
NASA NTRS2010

Developing Expert Teams with a Strong Safety Culture

Would you like to lead a world renowned team that draws out all the talents and expertise of its members and consistently out performs all others in the industry? Ever wonder why so many organizations fail to truly learn from past mistakes only to repeat the same ones at a later date? Are you a program/project manager or team member in a high-risk organization where the decisions made often carry the highest of consequences? Leadership, communication, team building, critical decision-making and continuous team improvement skills and behaviors are mere talking points without the attitudes, commitment and strategies necessary to make them the very fabric of a team. Developing Expert Teams with a Strong Safety Culture, will provide you with proven knowledge and strategies to take your team soaring to heights you may have not thought possible. A myriad of teams have applied these strategies and techniques within their organization team environments: military and commercial aviation, astronaut flight crews, Shuttle flight controllers, members of the Space Shuttle Program Mission Management Team, air traffic controllers, nuclear power control teams, surgical teams, and the fire service report having spectacular success. Many industry leaders are beginning to realize that although the circumstances and environments of these teams may differ greatly to their own, the core elements, governing principles and dynamics involved in managing and building a stellar safety conscious team remain identical.

Rogers, David G.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evidence-Based Process for Assessing Teamwork Competencies in Applicant Performance in High-Risk, Operational Occupations

In this work, we provide a detailed look at how behavioral competencies necessary for high-risk, operational jobs, including task- and person-oriented aspects of teamwork, leadership, and followership, should be defined and operationalized in context. These competencies are thought to positively predict performance in aerospace professions. Indeed, the assessments applied in high stakes selection contexts and the way associated behavioral competencies are evaluated must be carefully considered to ensure that optimal applicants are selected. We provide insight into the behavioral competency development and measurement process, elaborating upon particularly critical competencies (i.e., team orientation) and describing challenges to measurement.

Isabel Bilotta↗
NASA NTRS2026

Integrated Computational Materials Engineering (ICME) Capability Maturity Levels for Ecosystems Enabling Digital Transformation

Digital engineering (DE) and integrated computational materials engineering (ICME) are widely recognized as critical enablers of faster, more affordable, and more reliable aerospace systems. However, many organizations have struggled to realize the promised return on investment (ROI) from digital initiatives. A primary reason is the absence of a shared, decision-focused framework that distinguishes simple digitization of existing workflows from true digital transformation that fundamentally changes how engineering decisions are made. This paper introduces an ICME capability maturity framework that fills this gap. The framework defines six cumulative ICME capability maturity levels (CMLs), explicitly tied to decision authority, engineering integration, optimization, and uncertainty management across material, process, structure, and performance scales. It is designed to complement established readiness metrics such as technology readiness levels (TRLs), manufacturing readiness levels (MRLs), and integration readiness levels (IRLs), by addressing a missing dimension: the conditions required for model-informed decision authority across scales. A unifying figure and capability table illustrate the six-level ICME Capability Maturity Framework, showing how organizations progress from digitization—with limited or negative ROI—to true digital transformation, where ICME-enabled workflows deliver measurable improvements in decision quality, cycle time, risk reduction, and reuse. The framework is intended for both technical practitioners and executive leadership, providing a common language to assess current state, guide roadmaps, align software ecosystem investments, and set realistic expectations for digital transformation outcomes. A regulatory-relevant statement clarifying the relationship between ICME capability and existing certification frameworks is provided.

ICME↗
NASA NTRS2016

Conceive, Believe and Achieve; A Path to Miniaturization, COTS Infusion, and Size Weight and Power Realization for Flight

JPL along with other aerospace agencies such as the US Air Force Space Pro-grams and a packaging technology innovator, i3 Electronics, Inc., are evaluating the use of state-of-the-art (SOA) commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) and alternative packaging technologies for future high performance and high reliability space applications. Utilization of SOA COTS technologies have resulted in large scale reduction in electronics volume, weight, power, cost and schedule with outstanding electrical performance and high reliability. We will share JPL’s joint design, architectural approach, alternative substrate materials selection, associated processes, and mission assurance role in identifying reliability and qualification risks, as part of the three year Heterogeneous Packaging/Device Integration effort under the guidance and leadership of JPL’s Mission Assurance Directorate.

Hunter, Don J.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Action Pathways for Transforming Cities

Transformation is required for cities to fulfil their leadership potential on climate change. Five action pathways can guide them: integrate mitigation and adaptation; coordinate risk reduction and climate adaptation; cogenerate risk information; focus on disadvantaged populations; and improve governance and knowledge networks.

Civil engineering↗
DOE OSTI2023

Low Cost Glass-Ceramic Matrix Composite Heat Exchanger

As part of ARPA-E’s High Intensity Thermal Exchange through Materials and Manufacturing Processes (HITEMMP) program, this project sought to develop novel heat exchanger (HX) capabilities to enable efficient and power dense power generation cycles. This class of HX comes under the category of ceramic/composite materials with the higher temperature goal in the program of ≥1100 °C inlet temperature operation. The enabling capability of this effort is the use of glass-ceramic matrix composite (GCMC) material which provides the high temperature durability of a ceramic, the flaw tolerance of a composite, a significantly faster and lower cost manufacturing process than conventional matrix CMCs and very low porosity levels < 0.5%. For thin-walled HX structures and the need to minimize leakage, the low porosity differentiator is particularly important. RTRC has prior experience with this material system and in the current project advanced the component design and manufacturing methods into new territory to produce features required for effective heat exchange under high pressures. In this approach, silicon carbide fiber is fabricated into a fiber preform using various textile processes. Graphite tooling is used both during the build-up of the fiber preform (interior tooling) and after the fiber preform has been completed (exterior tooling). This tooling assembly is heated to high temperature in an environment that has been evacuated and backfilled with inert gas. A reservoir of specialty glass is present and once the desired temperature has been reached to achieve the desired glass viscosity, an actuator distributes the glass throughout the fiber preform using passageways which are part of the tooling design in a process known as glass transfer molding. After the tooling has been removed, the composite is heat treated to convert the amorphous glass to a crystalline ceramic, providing improved properties. The project was divided into three phases focusing on the following: 1) 10 kW HX design and coupon-level tube sheet fabrication, 2) 10 kW HX fabrication, 3) 50 kW HX fabrication. During Budget Period 1 (BP1), additional risks were encountered and the need for additional funds was agreed upon by ARPA-E program leadership. Due to a variety of factors, the contract modification required nominally 18 months to execute at which time the HITEMMP program was effectively concluding. Because of this and the time that would be required to perform BP2 tasks, it was decided to conclude the project at the end of BP1. During the design of the 10 kW HX, manufacturing constraints were learned and incorporated, leading to a revised configuration for the fiber preform and HX. Heat exchange and pressure drop predictions also played a role in modifying the original design concept to be a higher aspect ratio shell-and-tube HX, simplifying the manufacturing process and improving the heat exchanger performance. Good gravimetric and volumetric thermal power densities of 11.2 kW/kg and 10,200 kW/m3 for the entire HX were projected that involved thermo-structural Finite Element Analysis to determine the structural mass needed for the high operation pressures of 250 bar cold inlet and 80 bar hot inlet. Fiber preforms using textile processes were produced for multiple headered tube sheets. Additional challenges were encountered during the glass transfer molding step for which solutions were identified, but programmatics did not allow them to be implemented in BP1. While complete HX test articles were not fabricated, the benefits of this GCMC material for a variety of high temperature applications remain.

30 DIRECT ENERGY CONVERSION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Securing the Modern Grid: Federal Investments, Digitization, and Supply Chain Strategy

Across the United States (U.S.) grid expansion and modernization is underway, paving the way for accelerated load growth and intelligent resource management. Digitization of the grid is supported by several state and federal programs, providing support for utilities installing advanced metering infrastructure (AMI), AI-powered analytics systems, battery energy storage systems (BESS), and distributed energy resource management systems (DERMS) to transform the grid from a one-way power delivery system into an intelligent, responsive network that will enable faster load growth and power expansion of data centers for advanced artificial intelligence (AI) applications. The digital transformation of America's grid presents opportunity for increased efficiency and resiliency but also introduces new digital risks that require careful management. Digital equipment often contains several vulnerabilities such as unencrypted communication protocols, and persistent remote access capabilities that could be exploited to manipulate device settings, coordinate service disruptions, or inject false data into grid operations. These digital risks become particularly important as the grid must rapidly scale to support AI-driven data centers, which the administration has identified as essential for maintaining U.S. technological leadership and economic competitiveness. These vulnerabilities are compounded by supply chain realities: Chinese manufacturers currently produce 70-90% of essential grid components including inverters, batteries, and control systems, with the U.S. lacking domestic manufacturing capacity for critical assets like extra-high voltage transformers. Recent federal legislation has established Foreign Entity of Concern (FEOC) restrictions to address these risks, requiring projects to achieve escalating thresholds of non-FEOC content to receive tax credits while utilities work to expand sourcing channels for their supply chains and strengthen security measures. These restrictions arrive precisely when utilities face unprecedented electricity demand growth driven by the rapid growth in data centers, creating a considerable challenge: rapidly expanding infrastructure while navigating complex compliance requirements while lacking viable alternatives for many critical components. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and its partners have developed practical approaches to help utilities navigate these intersecting challenges as they leverage federal investment to strengthen and grow the grid. These solutions include Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles that build resilience directly into systems, the Cirrus tool for secure cloud migration, and enhanced procurement guidance that embeds security requirements throughout equipment lifecycles. Federal initiatives, such as the Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance (TADA) project, provide direct support to utilities implementing these approaches while facilitating knowledge sharing across the industry. While these tools and frameworks cannot eliminate all risks inherent in foreign supply chain dependencies, they offer pragmatic pathways for strengthening security posture without sacrificing the deployment momentum essential to meeting surging electricity demand. Ultimately, securing America's digital energy infrastructure demands dedicated coordination across multiple fronts: building domestic supply chains, implementing robust digital assurance practices, and maintaining the aggressive modernization timeline necessary for reliability, resilience, and energy independence.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
NASA NTRS2024

Alignment of NASA’s Human System Risks with Technological Capability Gaps to Enable Integrated Research and Technology Development Strategic Planning

BACKGROUND: Radiation, reduced gravity, distance from earth, isolation and confinement, and habitation within artificially created and controlled life support environments are hazards that present risk to human space explorers. NASA’s Human System Risk Board (HSRB) maintains a set of twenty-nine different Human System Risks with subject matter experts from across the agency providing regular updates to the estimated likelihood and consequence associated with each risk. The Human Research Program (HRP) has historically used these risk classifications as a primary basis for identifying and prioritizing human research investments aimed at characterizing and/or mitigating the respective human system risks. In many cases, technology development is required to mature and validate risk mitigation strategies, however, NASA’s primary technology development programs have not typically used Human System Risks as a basis for strategic planning. A primary function of the Environmental Control and Life Support Systems (ECLSS) – Crew Health and Performance (CHP) System Capability Leadership Team (SCLT) is to continually identify, review, and update technological capability gaps and to establish and oversee multiyear strategic roadmaps aimed at guiding NASA’s technology development priorities in these areas. These roadmaps are intended to be agency-wide and independent of any program, directorate, or other organization within NASA. DESCRIPTION: The SCLT and HRP collaborated to establish a set of Human System Capability Gaps, which establish a formal linkage between the capability gaps used to prioritize investments across much of NASA, and the Human System Risks that are primarily used to inform and prioritize human research. This set of twenty-eight gaps was developed by subject matter experts, and each gap mapped to the primary associated Human System Risks. The gaps and risk mapping were then reviewed and approved via the HSRB, thereby formally aligning the research-focused Human System Risks with the technology-focused capability gaps. DISCUSSION: This effort has enabled development of integrated roadmaps and budget coordination with research and technology development activities that are formally linked to agency-recognized capability gaps and Human System Risks. Close and ongoing coordination between the SCLT, HRP, Mars Campaign Office, and the Health & Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) is essential to ensure alignment and prioritization of CHP-related research and technology development to enable NASA’s future exploration missions.

Andrew F J Abercromby↗
DOE OSTI2022

US Department of Energy, Office of Science High Performance Computing Facility Operational Assessment 2021: Oak Ridge Leadership Computing Facility

Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s (ORNL’s) Leadership Computing Facility (OLCF) continues to surpass its operational target goals of supporting users; delivering fast, reliable computational ecosystems; creating innovative solutions for high-performance computing (HPC) needs; contributing to the community to build the next generation HPC workforce, and managing risks, safety, and security associated with operating some of the most powerful computers in the world. The results can be seen in the cutting-edge science conducted by users and the praise from the research community. Calendar year (CY) 2021 saw continued excellence in research supported by the OLCF’s leadership-class computing resources, including Summit (the nation’s most powerful supercomputer), the global scratch file system Alpine, the Scalable Protected Infrastructure (SPI), the Exploratory Visualization Environment for Research in Science and Technology (EVEREST), and the archival mass-storage resource High-Performance Storage System (HPSS). While maintaining access and exceptional user support for Summit, the OLCF continued to make progress on the installation and deployment of Frontier, which will be the nation’s first exascale system when it comes online at the start of CY 2023. Users have already begun running and optimizing scientific codes on Crusher, the OLCF test and development system equipped with Frontier’s architecture. Throughout the year, the OLCF maintained a strong culture of operational excellence, including risk management, workplace safety, and cybersecurity. The OLCF’s rigorous risk management strategy anticipated and mitigated risks, and at this time there are no high-priority operational risks. Similarly, ORNL and the OLCF were committed to operating under the US Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) safety regulations that ensure a safe workplace. Technical staff tracked and monitored existing threats and vulnerabilities within the OLCF while continually developing tools and practices to enhance operations without increasing the facility’s risk. CY 2021 was filled with outstanding results and accomplishments, including a very high rating from users on overall satisfaction for the eighth consecutive year; a tremendous number of node hours delivered to 1,671 researchers on Summit; and the successful delivery of the allocation split of roughly 60%, 20%, and 20% of core-hours offered for the Innovative and Novel Computational Impact on Theory and Experiment (INCITE), Advanced Scientific Computing Research Leadership Computing Challenge (ALCC), and Director’s Discretionary (DD) programs, respectively (Section 2). COVID-19 research remained a focus in 2021, and the ALCC and DD programs allocated over 1 million Summit hours to the COVID-19 High Performance Computing Consortium. These accomplishments, coupled with the high utilization rates (i.e., overall and capability usage), represent the fulfillment of the promise of leadership class machines: efficient facilitation of leadership-class computational applications.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
NASA NTRS2020

Trident: The Path to Triton on a Discovery Budget

This paper describes Trident, a proposed Discovery mission to Neptune’s moon Triton, 30 AU from the Sun. Triton formed in the Kuiper Belt but was captured by Neptune into a highly-inclined retrograde orbit, where tidal forces thawed its interior, forming an ocean that likely persists to the present day. Recent outer solar system missions like Cassini and New Horizons have yielded completely new models for processes on ocean worlds, active worlds, and KBOs. Triton isn’t just a key to solar system science, it’s a whole keyring: a singular captured KBO and evolved ocean world, with active plumes, an energetic ionosphere, and a young unique surface. The NASA OPAG Roadmap to Ocean Worlds identifies Triton as the highest priority candidate ocean world [1], ripe for investigation. The Trident mission concept is an excellent case study in “design to cost”: we show how exploration of Triton under Discovery is made possible by radioisotope power combined with a rare, extremely efficient Jupiter gravity assist, enabling a simple, lowmass spacecraft design on a ballistic trajectory. The Triton encounter sequence probes for an ocean, measures the ionosphere, and views nearly the whole of Triton as it traverses a single orbit around Neptune, mapping the >60% of the surface that is as yet unseen. The Triton encounter concludes with fullframe imaging illuminated by “Neptune-shine” when Trident is in Neptune eclipse, for direct comparison with Voyager 2’s observations nearly 50 years prior. Trident carries a mature complement of instruments: a Magnetometer, IR Spectrometer & Narrow Angle Camera, Wide-Angle Camera, Plasma Spectrometer, and telecom hardware-enabled Radio Science. The flight system design integrates heritage components from Ball with JPL leadership and expertise in key specialty areas to provide a Voyager-like, robust spacecraft commensurate with a Discovery cost and risk tolerance. Cost avoidance features include: use of existing instrument designs, small blowdown monopropellant propulsion system, a contributed X-band telecommunications system that also performs radio science, and a simple power system. Additionally, the passive thermal design accommodates the large solar dynamic range from Venus to Neptune by using the HGA for shade when close to the sun, and MMRTG excess heat, modulated by louvers.

Frazier, William↗
NASA NTRS1990

Teamwork in high-risk environments analogous to space

Mountaineering expeditions combine a number of factors which make them potentially good analogs to the planetary exploration facet of long-duration space missions. A study of mountain climbing teams was conducted in order to evaluate the usefulness of the environment as a space analog and to specifically identify the factors and issues surrounding teamwork and 'successful' team performance in two mountaineering environments. This paper focuses on social/organizational factors, including team size and structure, leadership styles and authority structure which were found in the sample of 22 climb teams (122 individuals). The second major issue discussed is the construction of a valid performance measure in this high-risk environment.

Kanki, Barbara G.↗
NASA NTRS2021

The Current State and Future of the Former Central Nervous System Risk Managed by Space Radiation Element Part of NASA’s Human Research Program

Historically, the Space Radiation Element, as part of the NASA Human Research Program, was responsible for the scientific strategy and funding of research focused on characterizing and mitigating the effects of space radiation exposure on the central nervous system (CNS). During the past few of years, there have been two major changes that have affected the management of the science associated with the CNS risk. The first major change was the integration of several related risks: CNS (C), Behavioral medicine (B), and sensorimotor (S) to be managed as an integrated effort called CBS. CBS was formed to accelerate research on combined spaceflight stressors, specifically space radiation, microgravity, isolation, and confinement. CBS was managed by Human Factors and Behavioral Performance (HFBP) with support and inputs from Space Radiation as well as Human Health Countermeasures. Secondly, and more recently, the CNS risk was absorbed by the behavioral medicine risk currently also held by HFPB. As a result, the gaps associated with CNS were removed and aspects of them are represented in the BMED gaps (link). However, due to recent changes in element leadership, budget, and timeline, extensive restructuring of CBS is in progress. In addition, in an effort to harmonize datasets to be used in modelling efforts, an Animal Standardization TIM was held in June 2021 to standardize the type of behavioral and cognitive tasks as well as experimental set-ups. This presentation is an effort to communicate with the radiation research community concerning the strategy, management, and future of the former central nervous system risk and the role of the Space Radiation Element.

central nervous system↗