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NASA NTRS2019

Managing Flagship Missions to Reduce Cost and Schedule

Flagship missions are highly complex with highly nested systems. This level of complexity poses unique management problems as complexity influences risk which, in turn, affects cost and schedule. Establishing a strong technical and programmatic leadership team is critical to mission success. Developing and using a mission architecture is critical to informing the management organization, product ownership, interface and integration relationships, schedule organization, and integration and test paths. In highly nested systems, the mission phasing can be significantly out of sync with product phasing. Targeted technology development prior to Phase A is critical to reducing risk. Early architecture, concept design, and requirements development is critical to reducing risk. Modular design; pathfinders; parallel manufacturing and integration and test paths; and properly handling institutional requirements across interfaces are all management techniques that can be applied to reduce risk. NASA’s large strategic missions, sometimes referred to as flagship missions, are designed to provide answers to some of the most compelling scientific questions being asked. These types of missions are a series of highly nested subsystems that pose unique management problems when compared to more traditional instrument and spacecraft designs. They typically have an overall architecture that is very complex and nested; they typically require a tremendous amount of technology development; they typically involve many contractors and subcontractors with many associated contracts; and they typically involve staff from all over the world. Successful management of a flagship requires the balance between science requirements, engineering and technology capabilities, and resource constraints. Mismanaging these flagship missions can and will lead to significant cost and schedule growth, both of which are detrimental to NASA’s overall reputation which, in turn, is detrimental to the development of future flagship missions. While many of the same management principles used on smaller instruments and spacecraft are relevant, managing flagship missions requires an evolution of those current best practices to better address the specific needs and additional complexity and vastness of these missions. This paper explores how to leverage lessons learned from previous flagship missions to better manage flagship missions in the future.

Hylan, Jason↗

NASA NTRS2010

Developing Expert Teams with a Strong Safety Culture

Would you like to lead a world renowned team that draws out all the talents and expertise of its members and consistently out performs all others in the industry? Ever wonder why so many organizations fail to truly learn from past mistakes only to repeat the same ones at a later date? Are you a program/project manager or team member in a high-risk organization where the decisions made often carry the highest of consequences? Leadership, communication, team building, critical decision-making and continuous team improvement skills and behaviors are mere talking points without the attitudes, commitment and strategies necessary to make them the very fabric of a team. Developing Expert Teams with a Strong Safety Culture, will provide you with proven knowledge and strategies to take your team soaring to heights you may have not thought possible. A myriad of teams have applied these strategies and techniques within their organization team environments: military and commercial aviation, astronaut flight crews, Shuttle flight controllers, members of the Space Shuttle Program Mission Management Team, air traffic controllers, nuclear power control teams, surgical teams, and the fire service report having spectacular success. Many industry leaders are beginning to realize that although the circumstances and environments of these teams may differ greatly to their own, the core elements, governing principles and dynamics involved in managing and building a stellar safety conscious team remain identical.

Rogers, David G.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evidence-Based Process for Assessing Teamwork Competencies in Applicant Performance in High-Risk, Operational Occupations

In this work, we provide a detailed look at how behavioral competencies necessary for high-risk, operational jobs, including task- and person-oriented aspects of teamwork, leadership, and followership, should be defined and operationalized in context. These competencies are thought to positively predict performance in aerospace professions. Indeed, the assessments applied in high stakes selection contexts and the way associated behavioral competencies are evaluated must be carefully considered to ensure that optimal applicants are selected. We provide insight into the behavioral competency development and measurement process, elaborating upon particularly critical competencies (i.e., team orientation) and describing challenges to measurement.

Isabel Bilotta↗

NASA NTRS2026

Integrated Computational Materials Engineering (ICME) Capability Maturity Levels for Ecosystems Enabling Digital Transformation

Digital engineering (DE) and integrated computational materials engineering (ICME) are widely recognized as critical enablers of faster, more affordable, and more reliable aerospace systems. However, many organizations have struggled to realize the promised return on investment (ROI) from digital initiatives. A primary reason is the absence of a shared, decision-focused framework that distinguishes simple digitization of existing workflows from true digital transformation that fundamentally changes how engineering decisions are made. This paper introduces an ICME capability maturity framework that fills this gap. The framework defines six cumulative ICME capability maturity levels (CMLs), explicitly tied to decision authority, engineering integration, optimization, and uncertainty management across material, process, structure, and performance scales. It is designed to complement established readiness metrics such as technology readiness levels (TRLs), manufacturing readiness levels (MRLs), and integration readiness levels (IRLs), by addressing a missing dimension: the conditions required for model-informed decision authority across scales. A unifying figure and capability table illustrate the six-level ICME Capability Maturity Framework, showing how organizations progress from digitization—with limited or negative ROI—to true digital transformation, where ICME-enabled workflows deliver measurable improvements in decision quality, cycle time, risk reduction, and reuse. The framework is intended for both technical practitioners and executive leadership, providing a common language to assess current state, guide roadmaps, align software ecosystem investments, and set realistic expectations for digital transformation outcomes. A regulatory-relevant statement clarifying the relationship between ICME capability and existing certification frameworks is provided.

ICME↗

NASA NTRS2016

Conceive, Believe and Achieve; A Path to Miniaturization, COTS Infusion, and Size Weight and Power Realization for Flight

JPL along with other aerospace agencies such as the US Air Force Space Pro-grams and a packaging technology innovator, i3 Electronics, Inc., are evaluating the use of state-of-the-art (SOA) commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) and alternative packaging technologies for future high performance and high reliability space applications. Utilization of SOA COTS technologies have resulted in large scale reduction in electronics volume, weight, power, cost and schedule with outstanding electrical performance and high reliability. We will share JPL’s joint design, architectural approach, alternative substrate materials selection, associated processes, and mission assurance role in identifying reliability and qualification risks, as part of the three year Heterogeneous Packaging/Device Integration effort under the guidance and leadership of JPL’s Mission Assurance Directorate.

Hunter, Don J.↗

NASA NTRS2018

Action Pathways for Transforming Cities

Transformation is required for cities to fulfil their leadership potential on climate change. Five action pathways can guide them: integrate mitigation and adaptation; coordinate risk reduction and climate adaptation; cogenerate risk information; focus on disadvantaged populations; and improve governance and knowledge networks.

Civil engineering↗

NASA NTRS2024

Alignment of NASA’s Human System Risks with Technological Capability Gaps to Enable Integrated Research and Technology Development Strategic Planning

BACKGROUND: Radiation, reduced gravity, distance from earth, isolation and confinement, and habitation within artificially created and controlled life support environments are hazards that present risk to human space explorers. NASA’s Human System Risk Board (HSRB) maintains a set of twenty-nine different Human System Risks with subject matter experts from across the agency providing regular updates to the estimated likelihood and consequence associated with each risk. The Human Research Program (HRP) has historically used these risk classifications as a primary basis for identifying and prioritizing human research investments aimed at characterizing and/or mitigating the respective human system risks. In many cases, technology development is required to mature and validate risk mitigation strategies, however, NASA’s primary technology development programs have not typically used Human System Risks as a basis for strategic planning. A primary function of the Environmental Control and Life Support Systems (ECLSS) – Crew Health and Performance (CHP) System Capability Leadership Team (SCLT) is to continually identify, review, and update technological capability gaps and to establish and oversee multiyear strategic roadmaps aimed at guiding NASA’s technology development priorities in these areas. These roadmaps are intended to be agency-wide and independent of any program, directorate, or other organization within NASA. DESCRIPTION: The SCLT and HRP collaborated to establish a set of Human System Capability Gaps, which establish a formal linkage between the capability gaps used to prioritize investments across much of NASA, and the Human System Risks that are primarily used to inform and prioritize human research. This set of twenty-eight gaps was developed by subject matter experts, and each gap mapped to the primary associated Human System Risks. The gaps and risk mapping were then reviewed and approved via the HSRB, thereby formally aligning the research-focused Human System Risks with the technology-focused capability gaps. DISCUSSION: This effort has enabled development of integrated roadmaps and budget coordination with research and technology development activities that are formally linked to agency-recognized capability gaps and Human System Risks. Close and ongoing coordination between the SCLT, HRP, Mars Campaign Office, and the Health & Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) is essential to ensure alignment and prioritization of CHP-related research and technology development to enable NASA’s future exploration missions.

Andrew F J Abercromby↗

NASA NTRS2020

Trident: The Path to Triton on a Discovery Budget

This paper describes Trident, a proposed Discovery mission to Neptune’s moon Triton, 30 AU from the Sun. Triton formed in the Kuiper Belt but was captured by Neptune into a highly-inclined retrograde orbit, where tidal forces thawed its interior, forming an ocean that likely persists to the present day. Recent outer solar system missions like Cassini and New Horizons have yielded completely new models for processes on ocean worlds, active worlds, and KBOs. Triton isn’t just a key to solar system science, it’s a whole keyring: a singular captured KBO and evolved ocean world, with active plumes, an energetic ionosphere, and a young unique surface. The NASA OPAG Roadmap to Ocean Worlds identifies Triton as the highest priority candidate ocean world [1], ripe for investigation. The Trident mission concept is an excellent case study in “design to cost”: we show how exploration of Triton under Discovery is made possible by radioisotope power combined with a rare, extremely efficient Jupiter gravity assist, enabling a simple, lowmass spacecraft design on a ballistic trajectory. The Triton encounter sequence probes for an ocean, measures the ionosphere, and views nearly the whole of Triton as it traverses a single orbit around Neptune, mapping the >60% of the surface that is as yet unseen. The Triton encounter concludes with fullframe imaging illuminated by “Neptune-shine” when Trident is in Neptune eclipse, for direct comparison with Voyager 2’s observations nearly 50 years prior. Trident carries a mature complement of instruments: a Magnetometer, IR Spectrometer & Narrow Angle Camera, Wide-Angle Camera, Plasma Spectrometer, and telecom hardware-enabled Radio Science. The flight system design integrates heritage components from Ball with JPL leadership and expertise in key specialty areas to provide a Voyager-like, robust spacecraft commensurate with a Discovery cost and risk tolerance. Cost avoidance features include: use of existing instrument designs, small blowdown monopropellant propulsion system, a contributed X-band telecommunications system that also performs radio science, and a simple power system. Additionally, the passive thermal design accommodates the large solar dynamic range from Venus to Neptune by using the HGA for shade when close to the sun, and MMRTG excess heat, modulated by louvers.

Frazier, William↗

NASA NTRS1990

Teamwork in high-risk environments analogous to space

Mountaineering expeditions combine a number of factors which make them potentially good analogs to the planetary exploration facet of long-duration space missions. A study of mountain climbing teams was conducted in order to evaluate the usefulness of the environment as a space analog and to specifically identify the factors and issues surrounding teamwork and 'successful' team performance in two mountaineering environments. This paper focuses on social/organizational factors, including team size and structure, leadership styles and authority structure which were found in the sample of 22 climb teams (122 individuals). The second major issue discussed is the construction of a valid performance measure in this high-risk environment.

Kanki, Barbara G.↗

NASA NTRS2021

The Current State and Future of the Former Central Nervous System Risk Managed by Space Radiation Element Part of NASA’s Human Research Program

Historically, the Space Radiation Element, as part of the NASA Human Research Program, was responsible for the scientific strategy and funding of research focused on characterizing and mitigating the effects of space radiation exposure on the central nervous system (CNS). During the past few of years, there have been two major changes that have affected the management of the science associated with the CNS risk. The first major change was the integration of several related risks: CNS (C), Behavioral medicine (B), and sensorimotor (S) to be managed as an integrated effort called CBS. CBS was formed to accelerate research on combined spaceflight stressors, specifically space radiation, microgravity, isolation, and confinement. CBS was managed by Human Factors and Behavioral Performance (HFBP) with support and inputs from Space Radiation as well as Human Health Countermeasures. Secondly, and more recently, the CNS risk was absorbed by the behavioral medicine risk currently also held by HFPB. As a result, the gaps associated with CNS were removed and aspects of them are represented in the BMED gaps (link). However, due to recent changes in element leadership, budget, and timeline, extensive restructuring of CBS is in progress. In addition, in an effort to harmonize datasets to be used in modelling efforts, an Animal Standardization TIM was held in June 2021 to standardize the type of behavioral and cognitive tasks as well as experimental set-ups. This presentation is an effort to communicate with the radiation research community concerning the strategy, management, and future of the former central nervous system risk and the role of the Space Radiation Element.

central nervous system↗

NASA NTRS2015

Risk of Performance and Behavioral Health Decrements Due to Inadequate Cooperation, Coordination, Communication, and Psychosocial Adaptation within a Team

A team is defined as: "two or more individuals who interact socially and adaptively, have shared or common goals, and hold meaningful task interdependences; it is hierarchically structured and has a limited life span; in it expertise and roles are distributed; and it is embedded within an organization/environmental context that influences and is influenced by ongoing processes and performance outcomes" (Salas, Stagl, Burke, & Goodwin, 2007, p. 189). From the NASA perspective, a team is commonly understood to be a collection of individuals that is assigned to support and achieve a particular mission. Thus, depending on context, this definition can encompass both the spaceflight crew and the individuals and teams in the larger multi-team system who are assigned to support that crew during a mission. The Team Risk outcomes of interest are predominantly performance related, with a secondary emphasis on long-term health; this is somewhat unique in the NASA HRP in that most Risk areas are medically related and primarily focused on long-term health consequences. In many operational environments (e.g., aviation), performance is assessed as the avoidance of errors. However, the research on performance errors is ambiguous. It implies that actions may be dichotomized into "correct" or "incorrect" responses, where incorrect responses or errors are always undesirable. Researchers have argued that this dichotomy is a harmful oversimplification, and it would be more productive to focus on the variability of human performance and how organizations can manage that variability (Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson, 2006) (Category III1). Two problems occur when focusing on performance errors: 1) the errors are infrequent and, therefore, difficult to observe and record; and 2) the errors do not directly correspond to failure. Research reveals that humans are fairly adept at correcting or compensating for performance errors before such errors result in recognizable or recordable failures. Astronauts are notably adept high performers. Most failures are recorded only when multiple, small errors occur and humans are unable to recognize and correct or compensate for these errors in time to prevent a failure (Dismukes, Berman, Loukopoulos, 2007) (Category III). More commonly, observers record variability in levels of performance. Some teams commit no observable errors but fail to achieve performance objectives or perform only adequately, while other teams commit some errors but perform spectacularly. Successful performance, therefore, cannot be viewed as simply the absence of errors or the avoidance of failure Johnson Space Center (JSC) Joint Leadership Team, 2008). While failure is commonly attributed to making a major error, focusing solely on the elimination of error(s) does not significantly reduce the risk of failure. Failure may also occur when performance is simply insufficient or an effort is incapable of adjusting sufficiently to a contextual change (e.g., changing levels of autonomy).

Landon, Lauren Blackwell↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Current State and Future of the Former Central Nervous System Risk Managed by Space Radiation Element Part of NASA’s Human Research Program

Historically, the Space Radiation Element, as part of the NASA Human Research Program, was responsible for the scientific strategy and funding of research focused on characterizing and mitigating the effects of space radiation exposure on the central nervous system (CNS). During the past few years, there have been two major changes that have affected the management of the science associated with the CNS risk. The first major change was the integration of several related risks: CNS (C), behavioral medicine (B), and sensorimotor (S) to be managed as an integrated effort called CBS. CBS was formed to accelerate research on combined spaceflight stressors, specifically space radiation, microgravity, isolation, and confinement. CBS was managed by Human Factors and Behavioral Performance (HFBP) with support and inputs from Space Radiation as well as Human Health Countermeasures. Secondly, and more recently, the CNS risk was absorbed by the behavioral medicine risk currently also held by HFPB. As a result, the gaps associated with CNS were removed and aspects of them are represented in the BMED gaps (link). However, due to recent changes in element leadership, budget, and timeline, extensive restructuring of CBS is in progress. In addition, in an effort to harmonize datasets to be used in modeling efforts, an Animal Standardization TIM was held in June 2021 to standardize the type of behavioral and cognitive tasks as well as experimental set-ups used in animal models of future funded research. This presentation is an effort to communicate with the radiation research community concerning the strategy, management, and future of the former central nervous system risk and the role of the Space Radiation Element.

Janice A Zawaski↗

NASA NTRS2003

The Space Shuttle

As missions have become increasingly more challenging over the years, the most adaptable and capable element of space shuttle operations has proven time and again to be human beings. Human space flight provides unique aspects of observation. interaction and intervention that can reduce risk and improve mission success. No other launch vehicle - in development or in operation today - can match the space shuttle's human space flight capabilities. Preserving U.S. leadership in human space flight requires a strategy to meet those challenges. The ongoing development of next generation vehicles, along with upgrades to the space shuttle, is the most effective means for assuring our access to space.

Moffitt, William L.↗

NASA NTRS2006

NASA Exploration Launch Projects Overview: The Crew Launch Vehicle and the Cargo Launch Vehicle Systems

The U.S. Vision for Space Exploration (January 2004) serves as the foundation for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) strategic goals and objectives. As the NASA Administrator outlined during his confirmation hearing in April 2005, these include: 1) Flying the Space Shuttle as safely as possible until its retirement, not later than 2010. 2) Bringing a new Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) into service as soon as possible after Shuttle retirement. 3) Developing a balanced overall program of science, exploration, and aeronautics at NASA, consistent with the redirection of the human space flight program to focus on exploration. 4) Completing the International Space Station (ISS) in a manner consistent with international partner commitments and the needs of human exploration. 5) Encouraging the pursuit of appropriate partnerships with the emerging commercial space sector. 6) Establishing a lunar return program having the maximum possible utility for later missions to Mars and other destinations. In spring 2005, the Agency commissioned a team of aerospace subject matter experts to perform the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS). The ESAS team performed in-depth evaluations of a number of space transportation architectures and provided recommendations based on their findings? The ESAS analysis focused on a human-rated Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) for astronaut transport and a heavy lift Cargo Launch Vehicle (CaLV) to carry equipment, materials, and supplies for lunar missions and, later, the first human journeys to Mars. After several months of intense study utilizing safety and reliability, technical performance, budget, and schedule figures of merit in relation to design reference missions, the ESAS design options were unveiled in summer 2005. As part of NASA's systems engineering approach, these point of departure architectures have been refined through trade studies during the ongoing design phase leading to the development phase that begins in 2008. Comprehensive reviews of engineering data and business assessments by both internal and independent reviewers serve as decision gates to ensure that systems can fully meet customer and stakeholder requirements. This paper provides the current CLV and CaLV configuration designs and gives examples of the progress being made during the first year of this significant effort. Safe, reliable, cost-effective space transportation systems are a foundational piece of America s future in space and the next step in realizing the plan for revitalizing lunar capabilities on the passageway to the human exploration of Mars. While building on legacy knowledge and heritage hardware for risk reduction, NASA will apply lessons learned from developing these new launch vehicles to the growth path for future missions. The elements for mission success and continued U.S. leadership in space have been assembled over the past year. As NASA designs and develops these two new systems over the next dozen years, visible progress, such as that reported in this paper, may sustain the national will to stay the course across political administrations and weather the inevitable trials that will be experienced during this challenging endeavor.

Snoddy, Jimmy R.↗

NASA NTRS2012

NASA Space Technology Roadmaps and Priorities: Restoring NASA's Technological Edge and Paving the Way for a New Era in Space

Success in executing future NASA space missions will depend on advanced technology developments that should already be underway. It has been years since NASA has had a vigorous, broad-based program in advanced space technology development, and NASA's technology base is largely depleted. As noted in a recent National Research Council report on the U.S. civil space program: Future U.S. leadership in space requires a foundation of sustained technology advances that can enable the development of more capable, reliable, and lower-cost spacecraft and launch vehicles to achieve space program goals. A strong advanced technology development foundation is needed also to enhance technology readiness of new missions, mitigate their technological risks, improve the quality of cost estimates, and thereby contribute to better overall mission cost management. Yet financial support for this technology base has eroded over the years. The United States is now living on the innovation funded in the past and has an obligation to replenish this foundational element. NASA has developed a draft set of technology roadmaps to guide the development of space technologies under the leadership of the NASA Office of the Chief Technologist. The NRC appointed the Steering Committee for NASA Technology Roadmaps and six panels to evaluate the draft roadmaps, recommend improvements, and prioritize the technologies within each and among all of the technology areas as NASA finalizes the roadmaps. The steering committee is encouraged by the initiative NASA has taken through the Office of the Chief Technologist (OCT) to develop technology roadmaps and to seek input from the aerospace technical community with this study.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2011

SOFIA Program SE and I Lessons Learned

Once a "Troubled Project" threatened with cancellation, the Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA) Program has overcome many difficult challenges and recently achieved its first light images. To achieve success, SOFIA had to overcome significant deficiencies in fundamental Systems Engineering identified during a major Program restructuring. This presentation will summarize the lessons learn in Systems Engineering on the SOFIA Program. After the Program was reformulated, an initial assessment of Systems Engineering established the scope of the problem and helped to set a list of priorities that needed to be work. A revised Systems Engineering Management Plan (SEMP) was written to address the new Program structure and requirements established in the approved NPR7123.1A. An important result of the "Technical Planning" effort was the decision by the Program and Technical Leadership team to re-phasing the lifecycle into increments. The reformed SOFIA Program Office had to quickly develop and establish several new System Engineering core processes including; Requirements Management, Risk Management, Configuration Management and Data Management. Implementing these processes had to consider the physical and cultural diversity of the SOFIA Program team which includes two Projects spanning two NASA Centers, a major German partnership, and sub-contractors located across the United States and Europe. The SOFIA Program experience represents a creative approach to doing "System Engineering in the middle" while a Program is well established. Many challenges were identified and overcome. The SOFIA example demonstrates it is never too late to benefit from fixing deficiencies in the System Engineering processes.

Ray, Ronald J.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA’s Top Human System Research and Technology Needs for Mars

NASA is working with industry and international partners to return humans to the moon and eventually enable a human Mars mission. Within NASA, several organizations work together to identify, prioritize, fund, execute, and operationalize the crew health and performance (CHP) research and technology development (R&D) necessary to enable these future missions. These organizations include flight programs as well as other organizations such as the Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA), Human Research Program, Space Technology Mission Directorate, and System Capability Leadership Teams, each of which existed for several years prior to the creation of the Moon-to-Mars (M2M) Program Office in 2023. A variety of constructs, vocabularies, and processes exist for the management of risks and strategic planning across these organizations. For example, M2M objectives, program risks, human system risks, human research gaps, capability gaps, and envisioned futures are all constructs currently used within NASA for identifying and prioritizing R&D needs. Alignment and evolution of these strategic planning constructs is ongoing and will allow for alignment and traceability between M2M objectives and R&D investments at a detailed level. While this reorganization is ongoing, and even after it is established, there is a recognized need among stakeholder organizations to identify and communicate the highest CHP R&D priorities in a unified and digestible way that synthesizes the considerations and perspectives of the CHP community across NASA. To achieve this, the HMTA facilitated a series of group discussions with representatives of NASA’s CHP community, which culminated in a product identifying the eight highest priority mission-enabling CHP capabilities for human missions to Mars, referred to as the “Top Human System Capability Needs for Mars”. The list includes Earth-Independent Human Operations; Mars Duration Food System; Mars Duration Effects on Human Physiology; Risks Mitigations for Vehicle Atmospheres; Computational Injury & Anthropometric Models; Exploration Exercise Countermeasures; Individual Variability in Responses to Spaceflight; and Sensorimotor Countermeasures. Existing strategic planning and risk management tools and processes were considered, as well as practicalities of technical, cost, and schedule feasibility associated with potential R&D risk mitigations and technology solutions. The product is not owned by any one organization and does not replace existing strategic or program planning processes; rather it aims to complement and inform them with a unified set of community generated priorities. It is anticipated that this list will be re-evaluated periodically based on R&D progress and the evolving M2M architecture.

Life Support↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Introduction of an Agile Systems Engineering Process to the NASA Armstrong Flight Research Center

This paper will provide background on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) ARMD Test Data Portal (ATDP) effort along with the rationale that motivated the ATDP team to consider implementing an agile systems engineering (SE) process. The primary motivation for using this new SE process was based on the desire to mitigate a major risk to project success. Since the agile SE process had never been used before at the NASA Armstrong Flight Research Center (AFRC), utilizing this new SE process required a trailblazing effort to introduce it to NASA AFRC leadership. As a result, the ATDP team chose to adhere to the agile SE process in addition to the trusted classical waterfall SE process on ATDP. Through successful execution of this hybrid SE process during Phase I, along with demonstrating the value and rigor of the agile SE process, NASA AFRC leadership ultimately permitted the ATDP project to solely use the agile SE process for developments beyond Phase I. While it is the opinion of the authors that the classical SE process is more effective for most projects at NASA AFRC, some projects may deem that the agile SE process is more advantageous. Although this paper is focused on introducing the agile SE process to NASA AFRC, lessons learned will be valuable to other organizations as well. Details of how the ATDP team implemented the agile SE process during Phase I will be summarized, along with how the team met all required classical SE milestones. Lessons learned throughout Phase I of this effort will also be highlighted.

Daniel S. Jones↗