Safety, Standards, and Regulations for Electrified Aircraft
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The nuclear criticality safety (NCS) consensus standards are developed as using rigorous procedures of the Standards Board of the American Nuclear Society. These procedures have been accredited by the American National Standards Institute, Inc., as meeting the criteria for American National Standards. The Nuclear Criticality Safety Consensus Committee (NCSCC) that approved all 18 NCS consensus standards is balanced to ensure that competent, concerned, and varied interests have had an opportunity to participate. The ANS-8 subcommittee (ANS-8) consists of 17 NCS experts with many years of experience as end users of ANS standards who serve on standard working groups to develop and maintain standards. ANS-8 ensures that the technical content of the standards is adequate for NCS community use. Attempts are made to ensure that ANS-8 consists of NCS professionals with a diverse range of experience such that all standards are applicable to as many sites as possible. ANS-8 is a very active subcommittee, and some active projects in progress are discussed in this paper: basis statement development for all standards, development of a glossary for consistency of definitions across all ANS-8 standards, and Considering the Criticality Safety Support Group (CSSG) Recommendation 2016-04 to the ANS Standards Board for changes in several ANS-8 standards.
Safety Standards contain technical and process-oriented safety requirements. Technical requirements are those such as "must work" and "must not work" functions in the system. Process-Oriented requirements are software engineering and safety management process requirements. Address the system perspective and some cover just software in the system > NASA-STD-8719.13B Software Safety Standard is the current standard of interest. NASA programs/projects will have their own set of safety requirements derived from the standard. Safety Cases: a) Documented demonstration that a system complies with the specified safety requirements. b) Evidence is gathered on the integrity of the system and put forward as an argued case. [Gardener (ed.)] c) Problems occur when trying to meet safety standards, and thus make retrospective safety cases, in legacy safety-critical computer systems.
We need well-founded means of determining whether software is t for use in safety-critical applications. While software in industries such as aviation has an excellent safety record, the fact that software aws have contributed to deaths illustrates the need for justi ably high con dence in software. It is often argued that software is t for safety-critical use because it conforms to a standard for software in safety-critical systems. But little is known about whether such standards `work.' Reliance upon a standard without knowing whether it works is an experiment; without collecting data to assess the standard, this experiment is unplanned. This paper reports on a workshop intended to explore how standards could practicably be assessed. Planning the Unplanned Experiment: Assessing the Ecacy of Standards for Safety Critical Software (AESSCS) was held on 13 May 2014 in conjunction with the European Dependable Computing Conference (EDCC). We summarize and elaborate on the workshop's discussion of the topic, including both the presented positions and the dialogue that ensued.
The Langley 0.3-Meter Transonic Cryogenic Tunnel (0.3-m TCT) was placed in operation at NASA's Langley Research Center in 1973 as the world's first cryogenic pressure tunnel. The 0.3-m TCT can operate from ambient to cryogenic temperatures over an absolute pressure range from about 1 to 6 atmospheres. Three major test section concepts were developed and refined in this unique facility. The 0.3-m TCT is a leader in the development of various cryogenic pressure wind tunnel experimental techniques, instrumentation, control, model technology and safety standards. The safety experience gained is examined. During this period of advanced research, new operating techniques, training policies, and procedures had to be established. The paper deals with the Do's and Don'ts of cryogenic wind tunnel testing. Hazards and safety requirements which are unique to cryogenic testing are discussed. Highlights of experience and lessons learned with the 0.3-m TCT are reviewed.
How can traceability of software safety requirements be created for legacy safety critical systems? Requirements in safety standards are imposed most times during contract negotiations. On the other hand, there are instances where safety standards are levied on legacy safety critical systems, some of which may be considered for reuse for new applications. Safety standards often specify that software development documentation include process-oriented and technical safety requirements, and also require that system and software safety analyses are performed supporting technical safety requirements implementation. So what can be done if the requisite documents for establishing and maintaining safety requirements traceability are not available?
In recent years, the legislative and executive branches of the federal government have pushed to make government more efficient and responsive to the needs of the marketplace. One of these initiatives, Public Law 104-113, also known as the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (NTTAA), is designed to accelerate technology transfer to industry and promote government-industry partnership. Summarized, NTTAA states that '... all Federal agencies and departments shall use technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, using such technical standards as a means to carry out policy objectives or activities determined by the agencies and departments. Government agencies must now determine if their in-house requirement-setting activities are sufficiently unique that no public interest is served by having them adopted by a voluntary consensus organization (VCO), or if not, to use or develop voluntary consensus standards. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is chartered by the law to monitor federal agency progress and report the results to Congress. In response to NTTAA, agency-wide oxygen and hydrogen safety standards sponsored by the NASA Headquarters (HQ) Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) were obvious choices for early adoption by VCOs. In 1996, HQ sought assistance from the Johnson Space Center (JSC) White Sands Test Facility (WSTF), the technical lead for development of these safety standards, to evaluate their adoption by VCOs. At that time, WSTF-developed propellant hazards manuals were likewise identified for possible VCO adoption. Subsequently, WSTF was asked to represent NASA for development of an international ISO safety standard for hydrogen use. Concurrent with these WSTF standards activities are related efforts to develop and publish propellant hazards analysis protocols and safety courses for the industrial, propellant use of oxygen, hydrogen, and hypergols. This paper reports on these efforts and describes WSTF's overall voluntary consensus standards program to coordinate the interchange of NASA's propellant hazards and safety information with industry.
The first edition of the current American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/American Nuclear Society (ANS) standard ANSI/ANS-8.1-2014, “Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors,” was published in 1964 as ASA N6.1-1964, “Safety Standard for Operations with Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors.” In 1969, that standard was revised as ANSI N16.1-1969, “Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors.” ANSI N16.1-1969 includes a variety of subcritical limits (SCLs) for uniform aqueous solutions and metals containing fissile nuclides of 233 U, 235 U, and 239 Pu. Furthermore, SCLs are also included for uranium-water lattices. In the 1983 version of ANSI/ANS-8.1 (a revision of ANSI N16.1-1975), the suite of SCLs in the standard was expanded to include 235 U enrichment limits for homogeneous uranium-water mixtures and dry/damp oxides, uniform aqueous solutions of low-enriched uranium, and uniform aqueous mixtures of Pu(NO 3 ) 4 containing 240Pu in addition to the SCLs included in ANSI N16.1-1969. The SCLs have changed little in subsequent revisions (ANSI/ANS-8.1-1998 and ANSI/ANS-8.1-2014). The ANSI/ANS-8.1-2014 standard is currently being revised to include new SCLs (uranium metal and compounds with enrichments up to 20 wt% 235 U) and possible updates to the current SCLs already in the standard, although these new/updated SCLs will not be available to the nuclear criticality safety (NCS) community for a number of years. The original bases for these SCLs were documented in papers in journals such as Nuclear Science and Engineering and in ANS meeting transactions; however, these bases are ambiguous enough that sites and regulators in the United States have not widely endorsed them for safety purposes. Overall, the purpose of this paper is to present the results of a comparison study for the SCLs in the ANSI/ANS-8.1-2014 standard using modern codes (SCALE and MCNP) and cross sections (ENDF/B-VIII.0) to provide some assurance about their quality (bias and bias uncertainty) for use in NCS applications and for consideration by the ANS-8.1 Working Group as a reference for future revisions.
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The research presented in this paper is to be a contribution to a larger research project. The project was designed to test the safety standards of Sandia National Laboratories' ACRR. The MCNP model of the ACRR core is being used to simulate the environment. To test the safety standards, the dimensions and density of the fuel in the core were varied randomly. Each rod had its own dimension and density assigned to it randomly. Ten different cases of the ACRR core were randomly created. The different cases were studied using 640-group neutron fluxes. The fluxes were compared to see how the variations affected the system.
This presentation begins with an Introduction and the current Status to ANS-8. The presentation then segues into active projects and some new projects. The lecture concludes with some highlights and insights to take away.
Since the Second European Conference on Space Debris in 1997, the Orbital Debris Program Office at the NASA Johnson Space Center has undertaken a major effort to update and improve the principal software tools employed to model the space debris environment and to evaluate mission risks. NASA's orbital debris engineering model, ORDEM, represents the current and near-term Earth orbital debris population from the largest spacecraft to the smallest debris in a manner which permits spacecraft engineers and experimenters to estimate the frequency and velocity with which a satellite may be struck by debris of different sizes. Using expanded databases and a new program design, ORDEM2000 provides a more accurate environment definition combined with a much broader array of output products in comparison with its predecessor, ORDEM96. Studies of the potential long-term space debris environment are now conducted with EVOLVE 4.0, which incorporates significant advances in debris characterization and breakup modeling. An adjunct to EVOLVE 4.0, GEO EVOLVE has been created to examine debris issues near the geosynchronous orbital regime. In support of NASA Safety Standard 1740.14, which establishes debris mitigation guidelines for all NASA space programs, a set of evaluation tools called the Debris Assessment Software (DAS) is specifically designed for program offices to determine whether they are in compliance with NASA debris mitigation guidelines. DAS 1.5 has recently been released with improved WINDOWS compatibility and graphics functions. DAS 2.0 will incorporate guideline changes in a forthcoming revision to NASA Safety Standard 1740.14. Whereas DAS contains a simplified model to calculate possible risks associated with satellite reentries, NASA's higher fidelity Object Reentry Survival Analysis Tool (ORSAT) has been upgraded to Version 5.0. With the growing awareness of the potential risks posed by uncontrolled satellite reentries to people and property on Earth, the application of both DAS and ORSAT has increased markedly in the past two years.
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I spent my summer working for United Space Alliance, LLC (USA). In the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB), it was my job this summer to go thr ough and "5S" the available storage space.
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Safety adequacy assessment is central to nuclear power plant (NPP) licensing. Either NPP accident mitigation or prevention can result in adequate safety. Accident prevention, along with the the prevention of accident escalation, can be evaluated using either deterministic or probabilistic methods. Acceptable means to develop principal design criteria (PDCs) via probabilistic methods are provided in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.233 while advanced reactor design criteria are provided in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.232 (RG 1.232). Accident mitigation-based regulatory guidance for non-power reactors is provided in NUREG 1537. While RG 1.232 included class specific guidance for both sodium-cooled fast reactors and modular high-temperature gas-cooled reactors, it did not provide molten salt reactor (MSR) class specific guidance. Class specific design criteria more closely align with reactors in their class so will require less effort to employ to develop design specific PDCs. The American Nuclear Society has recently released a liquid-fueled MSR design safety standard (ANSI/ANS-20.2-2023) that provides class specific design criteria.
Safe use of software in safety-critical applications requires well-founded means of determining whether software is fit for such use. While software in industries such as aviation has a good safety record, little is known about whether standards for software in safety-critical applications 'work' (or even what that means). It is often (implicitly) argued that software is fit for safety-critical use because it conforms to an appropriate standard. Without knowing whether a standard works, such reliance is an experiment; without carefully collecting assessment data, that experiment is unplanned. To help plan the experiment, we organized a workshop to develop practical ideas for assessing software safety standards. In this paper, we relate and elaborate on the workshop discussion, which revealed subtle but important study design considerations and practical barriers to collecting appropriate historical data and recruiting appropriate experimental subjects. We discuss assessing standards as written and as applied, several candidate definitions for what it means for a standard to 'work,' and key assessment strategies and study techniques and the pros and cons of each. Finally, we conclude with thoughts about the kinds of research that will be required and how academia, industry, and regulators might collaborate to overcome the noted barriers.