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After Action Report - Kazakhstan NSDD July 2015

On Monday 20 July, Caterina Fox, Ruth Kips and Kim Knight were invited to participate in Kazakhstan's nuclear material inventory management working group meeting coordinated by Alexander Vasilliev as nuclear forensics subject matter experts. The meeting included participants from Kazakhstan's nuclear regulatory agency (CAESC, the Committee on Atomic and Energetic Supervision and Control) and 3 institutes 1. Institute of Nuclear Physics, INP (Almaty), 2. National Nuclear Center, NNC (Kurchatov), and 3. Ulba Metallurgical Plant, UMP (Oskemen). CAESC requested attendance of an MC&A expert, an IT Specialist, and a Physical Security Specialist from each site. The general meeting concerned considerations for creating unified or compatible systems for nuclear material inventory management. NSDD representatives provided an overview of nuclear forensics and presented considerations for developments of inventory management that might be synergistic with future consideration of development of a National Nuclear Forensics Library to support nuclear forensics investigations.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Deferred Verification: The Role of New Verification Technologies and Approaches

Researchers at UNIDIR have recently proposed a fundamentally new approach to nuclear arms control verification, dubbed "deferred verification." The concept forgoes inspections at sensitive nuclear sites and inspections of nuclear materials or components in classified form. To implement this concept, a state first divides its territory into a closed segment and an open segment. The total fissile material inventory in the closed segment, which includes the weapon complex, is known and declared with very high accuracy. Essentially no inspections take place in the closed segment. Yet, inspectors have access to the open segment, which includes in particular the civilian nuclear sector. The fissile material inventory in the open segment is known with less accuracy, but uncertainties can be reduced over time using methods of nuclear archaeology. Deferred verification relies primarily on established safeguards techniques and avoids many unresolved verification challenges, including for example the need for information barriers for warhead confirmation measurements. At the same time, deferred verification faces some unique challenges. In this work, we explore some of these challenges and offer possible solutions while maintaining the strengths of the concept; to do so, we examine possible noncompliance strategies in which a state would seek to withhold a higher-than-declared inventory.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Using Enviro-Pod low altitude imagery to inventory building surface materials for an acid rain study - A Baltimore example

Low altitude, oblique and vertical color photography taken from EPA's Enviro-Pod Ka 85 camera system has provided the data for taking an inventory of building surface materials in a test area of downtown Baltimore. Photography was acquired from a gridded flight plan to provide views of all sides of buildings. Color, texture, and linear detail are employed in the photo interpretation aided by contextual reference to a classification of building construction type developed in an earlier study. The work could potentially support a materials inventory initiated by the National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program (NAPAP) by scientists from EPA, Geological Survey, and the Department of Energy. Initial results show the method to be viable. Discrete surface materials such as brick, both bare and painted, stone, and metal are identified.

Ellefsen, Richard↗

2023 Annual Explosives Inventory Completion

The 2023 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) annual explosives inventory was executed from May 18, 2023 to September 27, 2023 and was verified for accuracy effective September 28, 2023 following the LLNL Explosive Materials Inventory Plan. This year’s annual inventory includes changes incorporated based on the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Inspector General (OIG) Audit Report DOE-OIG-20-50, The Department of Energy’s Storage and Disposition of Explosives Material at Selected Sites, dated July of 2020. Based on the associated recommendations, explosives at DOE and National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) sites are considered "sensitive personal property" and applicable inventories must comply with 41 CFR 109, Personal Property Management. This regulation adds additional stipulations which require the annual inventory to include accountability of the total site inventory. In addition, the inventory must be performed by personnel other than the property owner, or alternatively must include independent verification. The development of the inventory plan was agreed to by the LLNL Explosives Safety Committee in conjunction with the LLNL Property and Business Division Leader. The LLNL Explosive Materials Inventory Plan was reviewed and approved by the DOE Explosives Safety Committee Chair on May 17, 2023 and by the NNSA Property Management Office on May 25, 2023.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Creating NDA working standards through high-fidelity spent fuel modeling

The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) is developing advanced non-destructive assay (NDA) techniques for spent nuclear fuel assemblies to advance the state-of-the-art in safeguards measurements. These measurements aim beyond the capabilities of existing methods to include the evaluation of plutonium and fissile material inventory, independent of operator declarations. Testing and evaluation of advanced NDA performance will require reference assemblies with well-characterized compositions to serve as working standards against which the NDA methods can be benchmarked and for uncertainty quantification. To support the development of standards for the NGSI spent fuel NDA project, high-fidelity modeling of irradiated fuel assemblies is being performed to characterize fuel compositions and radiation emission data. The assembly depletion simulations apply detailed operating history information and core simulation data as it is available to perform high fidelity axial and pin-by-pin fuel characterization for more than 1600 nuclides. The resulting pin-by-pin isotopic inventories are used to optimize the NDA measurements and provide information necessary to unfold and interpret the measurement data, e.g., passive gamma emitters, neutron emitters, neutron absorbers, and fissile content. A key requirement of this study is the analysis of uncertainties associated with the calculated compositions and signatures for the standard assemblies; uncertainties introduced by the calculation methods, nuclear data, and operating information. An integral part of this assessment involves the application of experimental data from destructive radiochemical assay to assess the uncertainty and bias in computed inventories, the impact of parameters such as assembly burnup gradients and burnable poisons, and the influence of neighboring assemblies on periphery rods. This paper will present the results of high fidelity assembly depletion modeling and uncertainty analysis from independent calculations performed using SCALE and MCNP. This work is supported by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security, National Nuclear Security Administration.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Disposition Options for Mk-42 Materials - 17072

In the late 1980s, the DOE Defense Programs identified a need to recover special isotopes of americium, curium, and plutonium (Am/Cm/Pu) from Mark-42 (Mk-42) targets that had been irradiated at the SRS. Eighty Mk-42 target segments were transferred from SRS to ORNL for recovery of these special isotopes. Approximately 65% of the target materials has been processed and converted to solids. The remaining Mk-42 materials are either targets stored in their irradiated forms or target material stored from various stages of processing. The Pu, Am-243 and Cm-244 in these targets are valuable materials; for example, the Am/Cm materials are potential feedstocks for production of heavy actinides (Cf-252, Bk-249, etc.). Although the isotopes in the Mk-42 materials have value, there is continual pressure to look at de-inventorying material in storage to only retain the most valuable materials needed to meet mission needs and to allow other materials to be added to the inventory as they become available. Evaluations are underway for potential disposition options for the Mk-42 materials. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Teaching Old Packaging New Tricks - 12593

Waste disposition campaigns have been an industry and government focus area since the mid- 1970's. With increased focus on this issue, and a lot of hard work, most waste packaging and transportation issues have been addressed. The material has been successfully shipped and dis-positioned. DOE has successfully de-inventoried materials from multiple sites to meet material consolidation, footprint reduction, nonproliferation, and regulatory obligations with cost savings from reduced maintenance and regulatory compliance. There has been a wide range of certified shipping packagings for the transportation of hazardous materials to meet most of the waste needs. The remaining materials are problematic, generally low volume, and do not meet the certified content of the existing inventory of packaging. Designing, testing and certifying new packaging designs can be a long and expensive process and for small volumes of material it is cost prohibitive. One very cost effective option is to lease and use a certified packaging to overpack waste containers. There are many robust certified packagings available with the capability to envelope the waste content. The capability to use inner containers, inside the current fleet of certified casks or packaging, to address specific content problems of additional shielding (e.g., U-233) or containment (e.g., sodium bonded nuclear material) has successfully expanded the capability for timely cost effective shipment of unique contents. This option has been used successfully in the NAC-LWT, T-3 and other packagings. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

MATERIAL TRACKING USING LANMAS

LANMAS is a transaction-based nuclear material accountability software product developed to replace outdated and legacy accountability systems throughout the DOE. The core underlying purpose of LANMAS is to track nuclear materials inventory and report transactions (movement, mixing, splitting, decay, etc.) to the Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS). While LANMAS performs those functions well, there are many additional functions provided by the software product. As a material is received onto a site or created at a site, its entire lifecycle can be tracked in LANMAS complete to its termination of safeguards. There are separate functions to track material movements between and within material balance areas (MBAs). The level of detail for movements within a MBA is configurable by each site and can be as high as a site designation or as detailed as building/room/rack/row/position. Functionality exists to track the processing of materials, either as individual items or by modeling a bulk process as an individual item to track inputs and outputs from the process. In cases where sites have specialized needs, the system is designed to be flexible so that site specific functionality can be integrated into the product. This paper will demonstrate how the software can be used to input material into an account and track it to its termination of safeguards.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Decommissioning Demonstration - San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station South Yard Facility - 16544

Following the decision to retire Units 2 and 3 at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS), Southern California Edison (SCE) staffed a multi-discipline team to investigate decommissioning best practices. SCE also tasked this team with reducing the overall radiological footprint and radioactive material inventory in the near term. The SCE decommissioning activities investigation team targeted projects at the facility which could reduce the source term and risk, and investigate management approaches with decommissioning contractors. SCE, through this team, contracted EnergySolutions to provide a solution for processing and disposal of equipment and materials at a storage facility south of the plant. The South Yard Facility included offices, instrument repair facilities, a large machine shop, outage equipment storage, waste management facilities, and decontamination facilities. SCE contracted EnergySolutions to manage, supervise, plan, and provide labor for the disposition of the legacy waste stored at the South Yard to include the Radioactive Equipment/Materials Storage (REMS) Pad and South Yard Facility. Under the Contractor Work Authorization (CWA), SCE authorized EnergySolutions to consolidate, package, transport, and dispose of the Low Level Radioactive Waste (Class A) and Mixed Low Level Radioactive Waste from the aforementioned areas. The scope also included disposition of material that was expected to be free from radiological contamination, but required management as a hazardous waste. The legacy waste consisted of an inventory of containers designated as trash provided by SCE, as well as, all materials stored within the rooms of the SYF. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Leveraging Available Data to Support Extension of Transportation Packages Service Life

Data obtained from testing shipping package materials have been leveraged to support extending the service life of select shipping packages while in nuclear materials transportation. Increasingly, nuclear material inventories are being transferred to an interim storage location where they will reside for extended periods of time. Use of a shipping package to store nuclear materials in an interim storage location has become more attractive for a variety of reasons. Shipping packages are robust and have a qualified pedigree for their performance in normal operation and accident conditions within the approved shipment period and storing nuclear material within a shipping package results in reduced operations for the storage facility. However, the shipping package materials of construction must maintain a level of integrity as specified by the safety basis of the storage facility through the duration of the storage period, which is typically well beyond the one year transportation window. Test programs have been established to obtain aging data on materials of construction that are the most sensitive/susceptible to aging in certain shipping package designs. The collective data are being used to support extending the service life of shipping packages in both transportation and storage.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

LEVERAGING AGING MATERIALS DATA TO SUPPORT EXTENSION OF TRANSPORTATION SHIPPING PACKAGES SERVICE LIFE

Nuclear material inventories are increasingly being transferred to interim storage locations where they may reside for extended periods of time. Use of a shipping package to store nuclear materials after the transfer has become more common for a variety of reasons. Shipping packages are robust and have a qualified pedigree for performance in normal operation and accident conditions but are only certified over an approved transportation window. The continued use of shipping packages to contain nuclear material during interim storage will result in reduced overall costs and reduced exposure to workers. However, the shipping package materials of construction must maintain integrity as specified by the safety basis of the storage facility throughout the storage period, which is typically well beyond the certified transportation window. In many ways, the certification processes required for interim storage of nuclear materials in shipping packages is similar to life extension programs required for dry cask storage systems for commercial nuclear fuels. The storage of spent nuclear fuel in dry cask storage systems is federally-regulated, and over 1500 individual dry casks have been in successful service up to 20 years in the US. The uncertainty in final disposition will likely require extended storage of this fuel well beyond initial license periods and perhaps multiple re-licenses may be needed. Thus, both the shipping packages and the dry cask storage systems require materials integrity assessments and assurance of continued satisfactory materials performance over times not considered in the original evaluation processes. Test programs for the shipping packages have been established to obtain aging data on materials of construction to demonstrate continued system integrity. The collective data may be coupled with similar data for the dry cask storage systems and used to support extending the service life of shipping packages in both transportation and storage.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

SU-E-T-388: Estimating the Radioactivity Inventory of a Cyclotron Based Pencil Beam Proton Therapy Facility

Purpose: Parts of the cyclotron and energy degrader are incidentally activated by protons lost during the acceleration and transport of protons for radiation therapy. An understanding of the radioactive material inventory is needed when regulatory requirements are assessed. Methods: First, the tumor dose and volume is used to determine the required energy deposition. For spot scanning, the tumor length along the beam path determines the number of required energy layers. For each energy layer the energy deposition per proton can be calculated from the residual proton range within the tumor. Assuming a typical layer weighting, an effective energy deposition per proton can then be calculated. The total number of required protons and the number of protons per energy layer can then be calculated. For each energy layer, proton losses in the energy degrader are calculated separately since its transmission efficiency, and hence the amount of protons lost, is energy dependent. The degrader efficiency also determines the number of protons requested from the cyclotron. The cyclotron extraction efficiency allows a calculation of the proton losses within the cyclotron. The saturation activity induced in the cyclotron and the degrader is equal to the production rate R for isotopes whose half-life is shorter that the projected cyclotron life time. R can be calculated from the proton loss rate and published production cross sections. Results: About 1/3 of the saturation activity is produced in the cyclotron and 2/3 in the energy degrader. For a projected case mix and a patient load of 1100 fractions per week at 1.8 Gy per fraction a combined activity of 180 mCi was estimated at saturation. Conclusion: Calculations were used to support to application of a radioactive materials license for the possession of 200 mCi of activity for isotopes with atomic numbers ranging from 1-83.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Nuclear Materials Process Modeling at the Y-12 National Security Complex

The Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) has implemented process modeling for various accountable nuclear materials operations that are performed throughout the plant. Using a discrete, event-based dynamic simulation program, key nuclear material streams are modeled, allowing Y-12 to effectively manage numerous points of interest within the plant’s production operations. Integration of the various material processes into a single, interdependent supply and demand model is one of the ongoing focuses within Y-12’s process modeling effort. The primary purpose of using dynamic simulation modeling is to allow for analysis of the nuclear materials inventories and forecasted supplies based on future demands. Analysis of these inventories includes capacity evaluation, bottleneck mitigation, and assessments of individual pieces of equipment to inform future facility investment decisions and associated project schedules. Modeling of the nuclear materials processes throughout the complex also allows for incorporation of changes relevant to production capabilities such as the upcoming transition of specific operations to the new Uranium Processing Facility. Prior to implementation of process modeling, Y-12 forecasted supply and demand of accountable nuclear materials streams using Microsoft Excel. With deterministic models such as Microsoft Excel, the annual forecasts, generated within data input condition parameters, can only provide a fixed point of data. Fixed data cannot simulate integrated material streams and account for the possibility of occurrences and other changes that dynamic simulations take into consideration. Y-12’s dynamic process modeling allows integrated simulations of multiple accountable nuclear materials processes, including supply and demand forecasting and analysis, and is a coordinated effort involving many steps of verification and validation (V&V), site briefings, testing, reporting, data mining, planning, and documentation that spans various programs throughout the Y-12 complex.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Preparation of Waste Fingerprints for the Miscellaneous Beta Gamma Waste Feeds to the Box Encapsulation Plant at Sellafield - 16080

There are a number of legacy pond and silo storage facilities on Sellafield Site that contain a broad range of ILW arising from the early Windscale Pile and Magnox Fuel Reprocessing Programmes. The waste comprises of solid Miscellaneous Beta Gamma Waste (MBGW) from operations (including filters, containerised waste, thermocouple wire, support struts, pumps, soft wastes) and associated sludges that have arisen from the corrosion of the fuel, Magnox Swarf cladding and the MBGW. It is intended to retrieve and package this waste to meet the requirements of interim storage and final disposal in the Box Encapsulation Plant (BEP) at Sellafield. As part of this process each package must be assigned a realistic and justifiable radionuclide and material inventory. These inventories can either be assigned by radiometric measurements including the associated errors or developed by fundamental data underpinning these assessments and a 'chain of custody' approach of knowing where the waste has been and how it has evolved. The subject of this paper is concerned with the development of the waste fingerprints for these legacy waste streams. As the wastes have arisen over a ∼70 year period there have been an assortment of different working practices and developments in equipment design that have led to significant variations in the waste condition and its composition. During storage the waste items have become mixed, corroded and sludge deposits have arisen. Because of this, and that early consignment records are either incomplete or missing, the task of assigning material and radionuclide fingerprints has been very challenging. In addition, to comply with regulatory requirements the inventory assignment has to be sufficiently robust to meet the processing envelope of the encapsulation process i.e. to allow controls to be made on the amounts of reactive materials (e.g. aluminium, Magnox and uranium) that can be processed within each product and allow identification of excluded items from being consigned from the donor plants. Also, as the waste comprises actinides, fission and activation products it was noted that whilst the UK standard inventory code FISPIN10 predicts the actinides and fission products well, there was a significant discrepancy in the prediction of activation products when compared with those predicted by the specialised fusion code FISPACT. It should be noted that the use of FISPACT to predict actinides and fission products is not recommended. To address these issues, - position statements were produced for each of the waste streams that would be consigned to BEP; - gaps within the data were assessed and where possible inactive trial work was identified to address it; - material and radionuclide fingerprint justification documents were developed from the position statements based upon available data, the experimental work and justified assumptions; - where FISPIN runs were required, these were run with a modified activation data library based on the European Activation File 2010 (EAF2010) to model the activation products. This paper summarises the BEP process, discusses examples of how the material and radionuclide waste stream fingerprints have been justified by revisiting the sample data, original consignment records, engineering drawings and recent remotely operated vehicle (ROV) pond surveys and making reasoned assumptions based on operational practices and non-active experimental work. Incorporation of the EAF2010 library within the FISPIN code has offered significant benefits to BEP and indeed other plants processing mixed fission and activated wastes as it allows comparable predictions of activation products compared with that made by FISPACT and for the plant to maintain one data processing stream rather than two if it had to utilise both modelling codes. This work will underpin the inventory submission in support of the Interim Letter of Compliance (ILoC) to Radioactive Waste Management Limited (RWM). The process of examining the original records, plant operation schedules and engineering drawings has enabled removal of some of the pessimisms that have been made in previous assessments. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Challenges and Opportunities Specific to Microreactors: Compact and Light-Weight Shielding During Operation and Transportation

The problem of designing a shield for a mobile microreactor has been addressed. The principal challenges encountered in this endeavor are the dual goals of increasing radiation protection and decreasing weight. It is recognized that these two goals are contradictory. Increasing shielding naturally increases weight. Conversely, decreasing weight naturally calls for decreasing material inventory, including possibly decreasing shield mass. The operational and regulatory drivers for shielding and transportation constraints are identified and summarized. The main constraints pertain to volume, mass, radiation dose, material feasibility and availability, and decommissioning expectations. The latter are limits on residual contamination and dose rates after the reactor is removed. Progress toward solving the challenge of shielding a transportable microreactor is made by considering a tungsten tetraboride (WB4) shell surrounding the reactor vessel. The shield and a generic microreactor were modeled using the MCNP code. It was determined that the presence of a 16-cm-thick WB4 shield reduces the dose equivalent rate during operations to 3.6 mrem/h just outside of a concrete vault and dome and soil berm surrounding the reactor, which is very near the occupational dose rate limits. Without the WB4 layer, the dose rate at the same location outside the berm would be 120 mrem/h. Most importantly, the presence of the WB4 shield substantially protects the surrounding concrete and soil from activation, thus decreasing the duration of administrative control for the site following removal of the reactor from 16 to 3.4 years. At that point, the site may be decommissioned and returned to unrestricted public access. A limitation on the incorporation of a WB4 shield as an intrinsic component of a microreactor is that it results in a design that is transportable only by using the largest road conveyances and that the load would require special permits for transit through the U.S. highway system. New directions for further improvements and possibly more effective solutions to the shielding problem of a mobile microreactor are discussed in the conclusion section.

Microreactor↗

Hybrid statistical testing for nuclear material accounting data and/or process monitoring data in nuclear safeguards

The aim of nuclear safeguards is to ensure that special nuclear material is used for peaceful purposes. Historically, nuclear material accounting (NMA) has provided the quantitative basis for monitoring for nuclear material loss or diversion, and process monitoring (PM) data is collected by the operator to monitor the process. PM data typically support NMA in various ways, often by providing a basis to estimate some of the in-process nuclear material inventory. We develop options for combining PM residuals and NMA residuals (residual = measurement - prediction), using a hybrid of period-driven and data-driven hypothesis testing. The modified statistical tests can be used on time series of NMA residuals (the NMA residual is the familiar material balance), or on a combination of PM and NMA residuals. The PM residuals can be generated on a fixed time schedule or as events occur.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Investigation of Additive Manufactured GRCop-42 Alloy Developed by Directed Energy Deposition Methods

GRCop is an alloy family constructed of copper, chromium, and niobium and was developed by NASA for high heat flux applications. GRCop-alloys were specifically formulated for the requirements in channel-cooled main combustion chambers allowing for repeat use in high heat flux environments[1]. GRCop-84 was evolved using additive manufacturing techniques under a NASA development program. To further increase thermal conductivity while maintaining material strength characteristics, the percentage of alloying elements were cut in half and GRCop-42 was developed. In recent years, NASA has successfully additively manufactured GRCop-42 with comparable material characteristics to extrudedGRCop-42 using a Laser Powder Bed Fusion (L-PBF) process. Benefits of this process include fabrication of intricate internal cooling channels as well as a decrease in manufacturing time. However, there are some large disadvantages in using this process. The nature of the powder bed process imposes a strict volume constraint as well as an excessive amount of material inventory required. A Directed Energy Deposition (DED) process addresses these limitations while also speeding up the manufacturing process. With little data on how DED performs with GRCop-42, an investigation into the mechanical properties was conducted. More specifically, Blown Powder Directed Energy Deposition (BPD), was used to compare material properties to that of the L-PBF manufactured GRCop-42. The DED manufactured material was found to have less than 0.1% porosity. Tensile tests concluded that the DED manufactured GRCop-42 had lower tensile strengths at room temperature. The results point towards a process capable of producing fully dense parts capable of meeting mechanical strength requirements with some possible refinement of printing parameters.

GRCop-42↗