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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS1992

NSPWG-recommended safety requirements and guidelines for SEI nuclear propulsion

An interagency Nuclear Safety Policy Working Group (NSPWG) was chartered to recommend nuclear safety policy, requirements, and guidelines for the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) nuclear propulsion program to facilitate the implementation of mission planning and conceptual design studies. The NSPWG developed a top-level policy to provide the guiding principles for the development and implementation of the nuclear propulsion safety program and the development of safety functional requirements. In addition, the NSPWG reviewed safety issues for nuclear propulsion and recommended top-level safety requirements and guidelines to address these issues. Safety requirements were developed for reactor start-up, inadvertent criticality, radiological release and exposure, disposal, entry, and safeguards. Guidelines were recommended for risk/reliability, operational safety, flight trajectory and mission abort, space debris and meteoroids, and ground test safety. In this paper the specific requirements and guidelines will be discussed.

Marshall, Albert C.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Some Challenges in the Design of Human-Automation Interaction for Safety-Critical Systems

Increasing amounts of automation are being introduced to safety-critical domains. While the introduction of automation has led to an overall increase in reliability and improved safety, it has also introduced a class of failure modes, and new challenges in risk assessment for the new systems, particularly in the assessment of rare events resulting from complex inter-related factors. Designing successful human-automation systems is challenging, and the challenges go beyond good interface development (e.g., Roth, Malin, & Schreckenghost 1997; Christoffersen & Woods, 2002). Human-automation design is particularly challenging when the underlying automation technology generates behavior that is difficult for the user to anticipate or understand. These challenges have been recognized in several safety-critical domains, and have resulted in increased efforts to develop training, procedures, regulations and guidance material (CAST, 2008, IAEA, 2001, FAA, 2013, ICAO, 2012). This paper points to the continuing need for new methods to describe and characterize the operational environment within which new automation concepts are being presented. We will describe challenges to the successful development and evaluation of human-automation systems in safety-critical domains, and describe some approaches that could be used to address these challenges. We will draw from experience with the aviation, spaceflight and nuclear power domains.

systems engineering↗
NASA NTRS1991

Heat transfer and core neutronics considerations of the heat pipe cooled thermionic reactor

The authors summarize the results of detailed neutronic and thermal-hydraulic evaluations of the heat pipe cooled thermionic (HPTI) reactor design, identify its key design attributes, and quantify its performance characteristics. The HPTI core uses modular, liquid-metal core heat transfer assemblies to replace the liquid-metal heat transport loop employed by in-core thermionic reactor designs of the past. The nuclear fuel, power conversion, heat transport, and heat rejection functions are all combined into a single modular unit. The reactor/converter assembly uses UN fuel pins to obtain a critical core configuration with in-core safety rods and reflector controls added to complete the subassembly. By thermally bonding the core heat transfer assemblies during the reactor core is coupled neutronically, thermally, and electrically into a modular assembly of individual power sources with cross-tied architecture. A forward-facing heat pipe radiator assembly extends from the reactor head in the shape of a frustum of a cone on the opposite side of the power system from the payload. Important virtues of the concept are the absence of any single-point failures and the ability of the core to effectively transfer the TFE waste heat load laterally to other in-core heat transfer assemblies in the event of multiple failures in either in-core and radiator heat pipes.

Determan, W. R.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Strategy for Developing Technologies for Megawatt-class Nuclear Electric Propulsion Systems

In late fiscal year 2020, the Space Nuclear Propulsion (SNP) project began the process of formulating an investment strategy to support development of the technologies required for a high-power (megawatt-class) nuclear electric propulsion (NEP) system capable of performing human-scale missions. This activity was initiated concurrent with several high-level studies and assessments were either under way or had just concluded. Studies of human-scale Mars missions have been performed several times over the past two decades. One of the most recent studies examined opposition-class human Mars missions to occur in the late 2030s timeframe [1,2]. The mission architecture assumed a hybrid NEP/chem-propelled vehicle that used a high specific impulse (Isp) NEP-system and a liquid oxygen (LOx)-liquid methane high thrust chemical stage (two 110 kN (25 klbf) thrust, 365 s Isp engines) for maneuvers performed to enter and exit gravity wells. Trajectory analyses performed in this study showed that such a mission could be performed with 2-4 MWe directed into the electric propulsion system (operating for 20,000+ hours), with the large range representing different opposition-class Mars mission opportunities and permutations on the trajectory design, concept of operations, and technology choices. In 2020, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) performed a study to evaluate the maturity of the different technologies required for nuclear propulsion systems [3]. The executive summary of this report provided the following top-level conclusions: • “The majority of critical technologies for… NEP/Chem… systems are relatively immature” • “TRLs [technology readiness levels] in the literature are often overestimated” • “The majority of critical technologies… for NEP/Chem… systems are at a relatively high level of advancement degree of difficulty (AD2 > 4) for maturation, requiring a dual development approach” • “The proper assessment of baseline TRL and AD2 values and the estimation of requirements and resources required for advancement have been consistent issues for NEP,” • “Non-advocate reviews should occur at the start of a technology program and at all key milestones.” In 2021, the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) issued a separate report [4] identifying the “primary technical and programmatic challenges, merits, and risks for maturing space nuclear propulsion technologies of interest to a future human Mars exploration mission.” That work contained several important findings, including: • “Developing a MWe-class NEP system for the baseline mission would require increasing power by orders of magnitude relative to NEP system flight- or ground-based technology demonstrations completed to date.” • “Subscale in-space flight testing of NEP systems cannot address many of the risks and potential failure modes associated with the baseline mission NEP system. With sufficient M&S [modeling & simulation] and ground testing, including modular subsystem tests at full scale and power, flight qualification requirements can be met by the cargo missions that will precede the first crewed mission to Mars. Fully integrated ground testing may not be required.” • “As a result of low and intermittent investment over the past several decades, it is unclear if even an aggressive program would be able to develop an NEP system capable of executing the baseline mission in 2039.” These efforts motivated the SNP project to investigate the technologies available for a megawatt-class high power nuclear electric propulsion system. That system is illustrated schematically in Figure 1 and is comprised of five separate top-level critical technology elements (CTEs). 1. Nuclear Reactor – Thermal power source for the system, utilizing high-assay low enriched uranium (HALEU) as the nuclear fuel. Reactor radiation shielding is also included in this CTE. 2. Power Conversion – Operates as a thermodynamic cycle, accepting nuclear reactor thermal power as an input and converting it to mechanical power. 3. Power Management and Distribution (PMAD) – Accepts as an input mechanical power from the power conversion system, which is used to generate electrical power. The PMAD system also distributes the generated electrical power to all other parts of the spacecraft, including the high-power EP system. The PMAD system may also perform duties such as isolation, fault detection, and power transformation/rectification for different spacecraft systems, including the thrusters. 4. Electric Propulsion (EP) – Accepts as an input electrical power, which is used to accelerate a propellant to high speeds to produce thrust. This system includes the power processing unit (PPU), which converts the power it receives to the correct current and voltage required by the thrusters, and the propellant storage and feed systems, which contain and meter the flow of propellant to the thrusters. 5. Thermal Management (Radiators/Heat Rejection) – The cold side of the thermodynamic power conversion cycle, accepts thermal power from the power conversion system and radiatively rejects that heat to space. In this paper, we describe the SNP project formulation and investment strategy that aims to accomplish the research and development required to advance the technology readiness for each CTE. The strategy relies heavily upon experimental testing supported by modeling and simulation to yield realistic assessments of the technologies, which in turn will be used to inform future NEP system-level design decisions and any potential technology downselects.

Kurt A Polzin↗
NASA NTRS1992

NASA/DOE/DOD nuclear propulsion technology planning: Summary of FY 1991 interagency panel results

Interagency (NASA/DOE/DOD) technical panels worked in 1991 to evaluate critical nuclear propulsion issues, compare nuclear propulsion concepts for a manned Mars mission on a consistent basis, and to continue planning a technology development project for the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI). Panels were formed to address mission analysis, nuclear facilities, safety policy, nuclear fuels and materials, nuclear electric propulsion technology, and nuclear thermal propulsion technology. A summary of the results and recommendations of the panels is presented.

Clark, John S.↗
NASA NTRS1993

WTEC monograph on instrumentation, control and safety systems of Canadian nuclear facilities

This report updates a 1989-90 survey of advanced instrumentation and controls (I&C) technologies and associated human factors issues in the U.S. and Canadian nuclear industries carried out by a team from Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Carter and Uhrig 1990). The authors found that the most advanced I&C systems are in the Canadian CANDU plants, where the newest plant (Darlington) has digital systems in almost 100 percent of its control systems and in over 70 percent of its plant protection system. Increased emphasis on human factors and cognitive science in modern control rooms has resulted in a reduced workload for the operators and the elimination of many human errors. Automation implemented through digital instrumentation and control is effectively changing the role of the operator to that of a systems manager. The hypothesis that properly introducing digital systems increases safety is supported by the Canadian experience. The performance of these digital systems has been achieved using appropriate quality assurance programs for both hardware and software development. Recent regulatory authority review of the development of safety-critical software has resulted in the creation of isolated software modules with well defined interfaces and more formal structure in the software generation. The ability of digital systems to detect impending failures and initiate a fail-safe action is a significant safety issue that should be of special interest to nuclear utilities and regulatory authorities around the world.

Uhrig, Robert E.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Technology Maturation Plan for the Development of Nuclear Electric Propulsion

Over the last two years NASA’s Space Nuclear Propulsion (SNP) Project formulated a Technology Maturation Plan (TMP) for development of the sub-systems needed for a MW-class Nuclear Electric Propulsion (NEP) system which, combined with a high thrust chemical propulsion stage, would be suitable for human missions to Mars. Two recent assessments, independently conducted by the National Academies for Science, Engineering, and Medicine and the NASA Engineering & Safety Center, concluded that the technologies required for a high-power NEP system are immature and the attendant risks insufficiently quantified to justify initiating a flight project. For NEP to be available as a viable option to meet flight opportunities in the late 2030s / 2040s time frame, development of the key sub-systems must begin now. SNP has subdivided the NEP system into five Critical Technology Elements (CTE): the nuclear reactor, power conversion, power management and distribution, electric propulsion sub-system, and the primary heat rejection system. Development plans for each of these CTEs have been drafted which will serve as the template for a focused milestone-driven research and development campaign intended to advance each CTE to Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 5. This will be accomplished by building and testing hardware at relevant power levels (~ 1 MW) and for relevant durations (2,500 hours, ~10% of the required operational lifetime) and conducting numerical modeling of the CTEs anchored by the accumulated test data to predict system performance and reliability. Concurrent with this work, high-level coupled system/mission modeling will be carried out to refine the key performance parameters that the various CTEs must achieve. Non-advocate reviews will be held at milestone points to assess progress and inform down-select decisions. The strategy for formulating the TMP was described previously; this paper describes ongoing progress on the drafting and baselining of the plan, including key specific details.

Space Nuclear Propulsion↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Technology Maturation Plan for the Development of Nuclear Electric Propulsion

Over the last two years NASA’s Space Nuclear Propulsion (SNP) Project formulated a Technology Maturation Plan (TMP) for development of the sub-systems needed for a MW-class Nuclear Electric Propulsion (NEP) system which, combined with a high thrust chemical propulsion stage, would be suitable for human missions to Mars. Two recent assessments, independently conducted by the National Academies for Science, Engineering, and Medicine and the NASA Engineering & Safety Center, concluded that the technologies required for a high-power NEP system are immature and the attendant risks insufficiently quantified to justify initiating a flight project. For NEP to be available as a viable option to meet flight opportunities in the late 2030s / 2040s time frame, development of the key sub-systems must begin now. SNP has subdivided the NEP system into five Critical Technology Elements (CTE): the nuclear reactor, power conversion, power management and distribution, electric propulsion sub-system, and the primary heat rejection system. Development plans for each of these CTEs have been drafted which will serve as the template for a focused milestone-driven research and development campaign intended to advance each CTE to Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 5. This will be accomplished by building and testing hardware at relevant power levels (~ 1 MW) and for relevant durations (2,500 hours, ~10% of the required operational lifetime) and conducting numerical modeling of the CTEs anchored by the accumulated test data to predict system performance and reliability. Concurrent with this work, high-level coupled system/mission modeling will be carried out to refine the key performance parameters that the various CTEs must achieve. Non-advocate reviews will be held at milestone points to assess progress and inform down-select decisions. The strategy for formulating the TMP was described previously*; this paper describes ongoing progress on the drafting and baselining of the plan, including key specific details. * “Strategy for Developing Technologies for Megawatt-class Nuclear Electric Propulsion Systems”, K.A. Polzin, et. al., International Electric Propulsion Conference IEPC 2022, IEPC-2022-155

Nuclear Electric Propulsion↗
NASA NTRS1991

Reactor safety for the Space Exploration Initiative

A task force was created by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to conduct a 90-day study to support efforts to determine requirements to meet the goals of the Space Exploration Initiative. The task force identified the need for a nuclear reactor to provide the electrical power required as the outpost power demands on the moon and Mars evolve into hundreds of kilowatts. A preliminary hazards analysis has been performed to examine safety aspects of nuclear reactor power systems for representative missions to the moon and Mars. Mission profiles were defined for reference lunar and Martian flights. Potential alternatives to each mission phase were also defined. Accident scenarios were qualitatively defined for the mission phases. The safety issues decay heat removal, reactor control, disposal, criticality, end-of-mission shutdown, radiation exposure, the Martian environment, high speed impact on the surfaces of the moon or Mars, and return flyby trajectories were identified.

Dix, Terry E.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Preliminary Findings of the Experimental Development Unit Cold Flow Test for a Generation Zero Nuclear Propulsion Engine

Nuclear thermal propulsion (NTP) technology will greatly benefit human travel to Mars by significantly shortening transit times, improving crew safety, and providing more mission flexibility than traditional chemical rockets. As part of DRACO follow-on work to develop, build, and fly a generation zero NTP engine, a full scale flight-like experimental design unit (EDU) reactor was constructed to collect sufficient on-ground performance data to characterize flow induced vibrations (FIV) of critical reactor structures/components, inform development of the engine and reactor control algorithm, and collect pressure drop and flow distribution data across the reactor. The fluid conditions for the test program were designed to achieve system responses equivalent to that of an operational engine through all phases of engine operation including reactor startup, mainstage operation, reactor shutdown, and reactor cooldown. Over 100 tests were executed, flowing either GN2 or GHe through the EDU at varying flow rates and pressures. This experiment provided early validation of flow behavior and vibration risks before nuclear testing, boosted critical subsystem TRLs, informed design iterations, and reduced future test costs. The steady-state flow parameters for the experiment were modeled in Ansys Thermal Desktop, allowing rapid tuning and experiment-informed updates to a flight-like test matrix. The EDU dynamic environment was characterized with accelerometers, strain gauges, and high-frequency pressure transducers all sampled at 20 kHz. While many narrow-band oscillations were identified, no significant FIV occurred; the reactor structural responses tend to be enveloped by typical launch vehicle ascent vibration environments (defined up to 2 kHz), although significant energy is also present at higher frequencies.

Flow Induced Vibration↗
NASA NTRS1993

Nuclear safety policy working group recommendations on nuclear propulsion safety for the space exploration initiative

An interagency Nuclear Safety Working Group (NSPWG) was chartered to recommend nuclear safety policy, requirements, and guidelines for the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) nuclear propulsion program. These recommendations, which are contained in this report, should facilitate the implementation of mission planning and conceptual design studies. The NSPWG has recommended a top-level policy to provide the guiding principles for the development and implementation of the SEI nuclear propulsion safety program. In addition, the NSPWG has reviewed safety issues for nuclear propulsion and recommended top-level safety requirements and guidelines to address these issues. These recommendations should be useful for the development of the program's top-level requirements for safety functions (referred to as Safety Functional Requirements). The safety requirements and guidelines address the following topics: reactor start-up, inadvertent criticality, radiological release and exposure, disposal, entry, safeguards, risk/reliability, operational safety, ground testing, and other considerations.

Marshall, Albert C.↗
NASA NTRS2000

Remote Diagnosis of the International Space Station Utilizing Telemetry Data

Modern systems such as fly-by-wire aircraft, nuclear power plants, manufacturing facilities, battlefields, etc., are all examples of highly connected network enabled systems. Many of these systems are also mission critical and need to be monitored round the clock. Such systems typically consist of embedded sensors in networked subsystems that can transmit data to central (or remote) monitoring stations. Moreover, many legacy are safety systems were originally not designed for real-time onboard diagnosis, but a critical and would benefit from such a solution. Embedding additional software or hardware in such systems is often considered too intrusive and introduces flight safety and validation concerns. Such systems can be equipped to transmit the sensor data to a remote-processing center for continuous health monitoring. At Qualtech Systems, we are developing a Remote Diagnosis Server (RDS) that can support multiple simultaneous diagnostic sessions from a variety of remote subsystems.

Deb, Somnath↗
NASA NTRS1973

Nuclear safety considerations for the design of a shuttle launched 500 to 2000 watt isotope Brayton power system.

An extensive study was conducted to evaluate the safety requirements for the design of a heat source assembly for use in a shuttle launched, isotope Brayton electric power system for the 500-W(e) to 2 kWe range. The assembly is a self-contained package which supplies heat to a power conversion system. A typical mission profile for a shuttle launched, earth orbital mission was assumed. Critical mission accidents were identified and evaluated to determine their impact upon the design of the Heat Source Assembly. Earth-orbital decay reentry analyses were performed to demonstrate survivability of the heat source. Safety design requirements were developed to ensure survivability under credible accident conditions including loss of the power conversion system in orbit.

Garate, J. A.↗
NASA NTRS1978

A critical review of the state of foreign space technology

A conference was held to exchange technical information in the area of space technology. Soviet system capability and technology both in Intersputnik and in the domestic Ekran system was discussed in detail. The thermonic power conversion system used in the Soviet Topaz nuclear power reactor was described in detail. Other areas of examination included: (1) Bioastronautics; (2) Space based industry; (3) Propulsion; (4) Astrodynamics; (5) Contact with extraterrestrial intelligence; and (6) Space rescue and safety.

Grey, J.↗
NASA NTRS1994

Reliability-Based Design of a Safety-Critical Automation System: A Case Study

In 1986, NASA funded a project to modernize the NASA Ames Research Center Unitary Plan Wind Tunnels, including the replacement of obsolescent controls with a modern, automated distributed control system (DCS). The project effort on this system included an independent safety analysis (ISA) of the automation system. The purpose of the ISA was to evaluate the completeness of the hazard analyses which had already been performed on the Modernization Project. The ISA approach followed a tailoring of the risk assessment approach widely used on existing nuclear power plants. The tailoring of the nuclear industry oriented risk assessment approach to the automation system and its role in reliability-based design of the automation system is the subject of this paper.

Carroll, Carol W.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Instrumentation and Control Needs for Reliable Operation of Lunar Base Surface Nuclear Power Systems

As one of the near-term goals of the President's Vision for Space Exploration, establishment of a multi-person lunar base will require high-endurance power systems which are independent of the sun, and can operate without replenishment for several years. These requirements may be obtained using nuclear power systems specifically designed for use on the lunar surface. While it is envisioned that such a system will generally be supervised by humans, some of the evolutions required maybe semi or fully autonomous. The entire base complement for near-term missions may be less than 10 individuals, most or all of which may not be qualified nuclear plant operators and may be off-base for extended periods thus, the need for power system autonomous operation. Startup, shutdown, and load following operations will require the application of advanced control and health management strategies with an emphasis on robust, supervisory, coordinated control of, for example, the nuclear heat source, energy conversion plant (e.g., Brayton Energy Conversion units), and power management system. Autonomous operation implies that, in addition to being capable of automatic response to disturbance input or load changes, the system is also capable of assessing the status of the integrated plant, determining the risk associated with the possible actions, and making a decision as to the action that optimizes system performance while minimizing risk to the mission. Adapting the control to deviations from design conditions and degradation due to component failures will be essential to ensure base inhabitant safety and mission success. Intelligent decisions will have to be made to choose the right set of sensors to provide the data needed to do condition monitoring and fault detection and isolation because of liftoff weight and space limitations, it will not be possible to have an extensive set of instruments as used for earth-based systems. Advanced instrumentation and control technologies will be needed to enable this critical functionality of autonomous operation. It will be imperative to consider instrumentation and control requirements in parallel to system configuration development so as to identify control-related, as well as integrated system-related, problem areas early to avoid potentially expensive work-arounds . This paper presents an overview of the enabling technologies necessary for the development of reliable, autonomous lunar base nuclear power systems with an emphasis on system architectures and off-the-shelf algorithms rather than hardware. Autonomy needs are presented in the context of a hypothetical lunar base nuclear power system. The scenarios and applications presented are hypothetical in nature, based on information from open-literature sources, and only intended to provoke thought and provide motivation for the use of autonomous, intelligent control and diagnostics.

Turso, James↗
NASA NTRS1982

Nuclear reactor system study for NASA/JPL

Reactor shielding, safety studies, and heat pipe development work are described. Monte Carlo calculations of gamma and neutron shield configurations show that substantial weight penalties are incurred if exposure at 25 m to neutrons and gammas must be limited to 10 to the 12th power nvt and 10 to the 6th power rad, instead of the 10 to the 13th power nvt and 10 to the 7th power rad values used earlier. For a 1.6 MW sub t reactor, the required shield weight increases from 400 to 815 kg. Water immersion critically calculations were extended to study the effect of water in fuel void spaces as well as in the core heat pipes. These show that the insertion into the core of eight blades of B4C with a mass totaling 2.5 kg will guarantee subcriticality. The design, fabrication procedure, and testing of a 4m long molybdenum/lithium heat pipe are described. It appears that an excess of oxygen in the wick prevented the attainment of expected performance capability.

Palmer, R. G.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Fission Surface Power Technology Development Status

Power is a critical consideration in planning exploration of the surfaces of the Moon, Mars, and beyond. Nuclear power is an important option, especially for locations in the solar system where sunlight is limited in availability or intensity. NASA is maintaining the option for fission surface power for the Moon and Mars by developing and demonstrating technology for an affordable fission surface power system. Because affordability drove the determination of the system concept that this technology will make possible, low development and recurring costs result, while required safety standards are maintained. However, an affordable approach to fission surface power also provides the benefits of simplicity, robustness, and conservatism in design. This paper will illuminate the multiplicity of benefits to an affordable approach to fission surface power, and will describe how the foundation for these benefits is being developed and demonstrated in the Exploration Technology Development Program s Fission Surface Power Project.

Palac, Donald T.↗