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This review of the shiftwork area focuses on aspects of safety and productivity. It discusses the situations in which shiftworker performance is critical, the types of problem that can develop and the reasons why shiftworker performance can be impaired. The review ends with a discnssion of the various advantages and disadvantages of several shift rotation systems, and of other possible solutions to the problem.
Mission Operations and Command Assurance (MO&CA), a recent addition to flight operations teams at JPL. provides a system level function to instill quality in mission operations. MO&CA's primary goal at JPL is to help improve the operational reliability for projects during flight. MO&CA tasks include early detection and correction of process design and procedural deficiencies within projects. Early detection and correction are essential during development of operational procedures and training of operational teams. MO&CA's effort focuses directly on reducing the probability of radiating incorrect commands to a spacecraft. Over the last seven years at JPL, MO&CA has become a valuable asset to JPL flight projects. JPL flight projects have benefited significantly from MO&CA's efforts to contain risk and prevent rather than rework errors. MO&CA's ability to provide direct transfer of knowledge allows new projects to benefit directly from previous and ongoing experience. Since MO&CA, like Total Quality Management (TQM), focuses on continuous improvement of processes and elimination of rework, we recommend that this effort be continued on NASA flight projects.
Lessons Learne: 1. Design-out unnecessary risk to prevent excessive mitigation management during flight. 2. Consider iterative checkouts to confirm or improve human factor characteristics. 3. Consider the total flight test profile to uncover unanticipated human-algorithm interactions. 4. Consider test card cadence as a metric to assess test readiness. 5. Full-scale flight test is critical to development, maturation, and acceptance of adaptive control laws for operational use.
Most businesses recognize that people will make mistakes and assume errors are just part of the cost of doing business, but does it need to be? Companies with high risk, or major consequences, should consider the effect of human error. In a variety of industries, Human Errors have caused costly failures and workplace injuries. These have included: airline mishaps, medical malpractice, administration of medication and major oil spills have all been blamed on human error. A technique to mitigate or even eliminate some of these costly human errors is the use of Human Reliability Analysis (HRA). Various methodologies are available to perform Human Reliability Assessments that range from identifying the most likely areas for concern to detailed assessments with human error failure probabilities calculated. Which methodology to use would be based on a variety of factors that would include: 1) how people react and act in different industries, and differing expectations based on industries standards, 2) factors that influence how the human errors could occur such as tasks, tools, environment, workplace, support, training and procedure, 3) type and availability of data and 4) how the industry views risk & reliability influences ( types of emergencies, contingencies and routine tasks versus cost based concerns). The Human Reliability Assessments should be the first step to reduce, mitigate or eliminate the costly mistakes or catastrophic failures. Using Human Reliability techniques to identify and classify human error risks allows a company more opportunities to mitigate or eliminate these risks and prevent costly failures.
Companies at risk of accidents caused by human error that result in catastrophic consequences include: airline industry mishaps, medical malpractice, medication mistakes, aerospace failures, major oil spills, transportation mishaps, power production failures and manufacturing facility incidents. Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) is used to analyze the inherent risk of human behavior or actions introducing errors into the operation of a system or process. These assessments can be used to identify where errors are most likely to arise and the potential risks involved if they do occur. Using the basic concepts of HRA, an evolving group of methodologies are used to meet various industry needs. Determining which methodology or combination of techniques will provide a quality human reliability assessment is a key element to developing effective strategies for understanding and dealing with risks caused by human errors. There are a number of concerns and difficulties in "tailoring" a Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) for different industries. Although a variety of HRA methodologies are available to analyze human error events, determining the most appropriate tools to provide the most useful results can depend on industry specific cultures and requirements. Methodology selection may be based on a variety of factors that include: 1) how people act and react in different industries, 2) expectations based on industry standards, 3) factors that influence how the human errors could occur such as tasks, tools, environment, workplace, support, training and procedure, 4) type and availability of data, 5) how the industry views risk & reliability, and 6) types of emergencies, contingencies and routine tasks. Other considerations for methodology selection should be based on what information is needed from the assessment. If the principal concern is determination of the primary risk factors contributing to the potential human error, a more detailed analysis method may be employed versus a requirement to provide a numerical value as part of a probabilistic risk assessment. Industries involved with humans operating large equipment or transport systems (ex. railroads or airlines) would have more need to address the man machine interface than medical workers administering medications. Human error occurs in every industry; in most cases the consequences are relatively benign and occasionally beneficial. In cases where the results can have disastrous consequences, the use of Human Reliability techniques to identify and classify the risk of human errors allows a company more opportunities to mitigate or eliminate these types of risks and prevent costly tragedies.
Data lifecycle management awareness is common today; planners are more likely to consider lifecycle issues at mission start. NASA remote sensing missions are typically subject to life cycle management plans of the Distributed Active Archive Center (DAAC), and NASA invests in these national centers for the long-term safeguarding and benefit of future generations. As stewards of older missions, it is incumbent upon us to ensure that a comprehensive enough set of information is being preserved to prevent the risk for information loss. This risk is greater when the original data experts have moved on or are no longer available. Preservation of items like documentation related to processing algorithms, pre-flight calibration data, or input-output configuration parameters used in product generation, are examples of digital artifacts that are sometimes not fully preserved. This is the grey area of information preservation; the importance of these items is not always clear and requires careful consideration. Missing important metadata about intermediate steps used to derive a product could lead to serious challenges in the reproducibility of results or conclusions. Organizations are rapidly recognizing that the focus of life-cycle preservation needs to be enlarged from the strict raw data to the more encompassing arena of information lifecycle management. By understanding what constitutes information, and the complexities involved, we are better equipped to deliver longer lasting value about the original data and derived knowledge (information) from them. The NASA Earth Science Data Preservation Content Specification is an attempt to define the content necessary for long-term preservation. It requires new lifecycle infrastructure approach along with content repositories to accommodate artifacts other than just raw data. The NASA Goddard Earth Sciences Data and Information Services Center (GES DISC) setup an open-source Preservation System capable of long-term archive of digital content to augment its raw data holding. This repository is being used for such missions as HIRDLS, UARS, TOMS, OMI, among others. We will provide a status of this implementation; report on challenges, lessons learned, and detail our plans for future evolution to include other missions and services.
Mission Operations and Command Assurance (MO&CA) is a Total Quality Management (TQM) task on JPL projects to instill quality in flight mission operations. From a system engineering view, MO&CA facilitates communication and problem-solving among flight teams and provides continuous process improvement to reduce risk in mission operations by addressing human factors. The MO&CA task has evolved from participating as a member of the spacecraft team to an independent team reporting directly to project management and providing system level assurance. JPL flight projects have benefited significantly from MO&CA's effort to contain risk and prevent rather than rework errors. MO&CA's ability to provide direct transfer of knowledge allows new projects to benefit from previous and ongoing flight experience.
Cryogenic fluids, while offering higher energy density than storable propellants, present several handling challenges, including gradual boil-off and tank self-pressurization. Transferring these propellants between tanks can be problematic, as the receiving tank's temperature and pressure often lead to flashing and rapid boil-off upon injection. The No-Vent Fill (NVF) technique mitigates these risks by preventing liquid fuel from being expelled overboard. By controlling tank pressure and ensuring appropriate condensation in the ullage region, the NVF process avoids exceeding vent pressure limits. In this study, Loci/STREAM-VOF simulations were compared with data from NASA K-site test runs on a 2.1 cubic meter tank with a bottom orifice under various no-vent fill conditions, including different wall temperatures, flow rates, and inlet liquid temperatures. The effort demonstrated that Loci/STREAM-VOF is capable of quantitatively capturing the important physics of NVF with submerged jets: (1) validation of the liquid-vapor interface turbulence velocity using previous experimental data showed good agreement at different fill levels; (2) validation of the CFD Stanton number for mass transfer provided an adequate mass transfer coefficient range; (3) consistent pressure agreements were found in the pressure history for both cold and warm conditions; and (4) the variations of final pressure with flow rate and inlet liquid temperature were well predicted by the CFD simulation. The application of NVF for low-gravity conditions will be studied in future work.
Cryogenic fluids, while offering higher energy density than storable propellants, present several handling challenges, including gradual boil-off and tank self-pressurization. Transferring these propellants between tanks can be problematic, as the receiving tank's temperature and pressure often lead to flashing and rapid boil-off upon injection. The No-Vent Fill (NVF) technique mitigates these risks by preventing liquid fuel from being expelled overboard. By controlling tank pressure and ensuring appropriate condensation in the ullage region, the NVF process avoids exceeding vent pressure limits. In this study, Loci/STREAM-VOF simulations were compared with data from NASA K-site test runs on a 2.1 cubic meter tank with a bottom orifice under various no-vent fill conditions, including different wall temperatures, flow rates, and inlet liquid temperatures. The effort demonstrated that Loci/STREAM-VOF is capable of quantitatively capturing the important physics of NVF with submerged jets: (1) validation of the liquid-vapor interface turbulence velocity using previous experimental data showed good agreement at different fill levels; (2) validation of the CFD Stanton number for mass transfer provided an adequate mass transfer coefficient range; (3) consistent pressure agreements were found in the pressure history for both cold and warm conditions; and (4) the variations of final pressure with flow rate and inlet liquid temperature were well predicted by the CFD simulation. The application of NVF for low-gravity conditions will be studied in future work.
A principal too under development as part of the NASA Failure Detection and Prevention Program is the Defect Detection and Prevention(DDP) tool.
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Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) has been applied in different industries for many years. Each industry and technology area presents varying challenges and priorities, and the risk models therefore need to be somewhat different. This paper compares aspects of risk modeling of offshore drilling, nuclear plant operation, and human spaceflight. Risk models in all three technology areas have certain high-level similarities: (1) they employ redundancy and diversity in their means to prevent or mitigate risk, including a mix of active and passive systems designed to respond to off-normal evolutions; (2) they are affected by human reliability; (3) their models require consideration of coupling between scenario structure and scenario phenomenology. But in examining the models in more detail, one sees important differences in methodology and emphasis. For purposes of comparison, this paper discusses aspects of a risk model of an offshore drilling operation in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico, focusing on where such a development differs in important ways from models of commercial U.S. nuclear plants and models developed for human spaceflight.
Uncertainties always exist in atmospheric entry aeroheating environments and the thermal response of thermal protection system (TPS) material. These uncertainties are mitigated in the design by ap-plying margin and factors of safety to the TPS. Entry vehicle TPS is often conservatively over-sized for the heat loads that are experienced along the entry trajectory by stacking worst-case scenarios together. Additionally, the current TPS design and margin process used by NASA offers very little insight into the risk of over-temperature during flight and the reliability of the heat shield performance [1,3]. A probabilistic margin process can be used to calculate the amount of TPS margin necessary to survive a given entry heat load at a specified level of risk [2,3,4]. The vehicle’s initial entry state (entry velocity, flight path angle, and entry mass) determines the expected atmospheric entry environmental conditions and resulting heat load that the entry vehicle will experience. If there is flexibility in the entry state, then this process can be used to select an appropriate combination of entry state parameters and TPS size to target a desired reentry reliability. This probabilistic margin process allows engineers to make informed aeroshell design, entry-trajectory design, and TPS performance risk trades while preventing excessive TPS margin from being applied. The probabilistic TPS margin process has been performed to determine TPS thickness and entry heating constraints given an acceptable risk level for the Low Earth Orbit Flight Experiment of an Inflatable Decelerator (LOFTID) flight project. The process is used in a manner to size the entry heat load for a given flexible TPS (FTPS) thickness so that it meets project reliability standards while allowing the FTPS and the underlying inflatable structure (IS) to be pushed to adequately high temperatures. Since the LOFTID project is an experimental flight demonstration, it is de-sired to drive the FTPS and IS to temperatures that cover a large range of their thermal response models’ applicability. This will allow the thermal response models to be better improved and validated post-flight using LOFTID’s extensive instrumentation embedded within the aeroshell. The presentation demonstrates how uncertainty analysis is carried out using an end-to-end Monte Carlo process where three separate Monte Carlo simulations are run in sequence. The first Monte Carlo simulation operates on the entry trajectory model to generate trajectory parameter dispersions that are fed into the second Monte Carlo simulation. The second Monte Carlo simulation operates on the aerothermodynamics model to generate aeroheating parameter dispersions that are fed into the third Monte Carlo simulation. The third Monte Carlo simulation operates on the FTPS material thermal response model to generate the final FTPS/IS thermal response dispersions. The end-to-end Monte Carlo simulation propagates the uncertainties of each model into the next to quantify the resulting uncertainty of the FTPS/IS thermal response. The fractional contributions of the uncertain parameters in the trajectory, aerothermal, and thermal response models to the variance in the FTPS/IS thermal response is determined as a byproduct of the Monte Carlo analysis. The structural uncertainty of the FTPS thermal response model is evaluated by flight relevant ground testing and model error analysis using test measurements. This probabilistic TPS margin process had never been applied to an entry vehicle and it is one of the LOFTID project’s goals to demonstrate its merits.
Atmospheric entry vehicle thermal protection systems are margined due to the uncertainties that exist in entry aeroheating environments and the thermal response of the materials and structures. Entry vehicle thermal protections systems are traditionally over-margined for the heat loads that are experienced along the entry trajectory by designing to survive stacked worst-case scenarios. Additionally, the conventional heat shield design and margin process offers very little insight into the risk of over-temperature during flight and the corresponding reliability of the heat shield performance. A probabilistic margin process can be used to appropriately margin the thermal protection system based on rigorously calculated risk of failure. This probabilistic margin process allows engineers to make informed aeroshell design, entry-trajectory design, and risk trades while preventing excessive margin from being applied. This study presents the methods of the probabilistic margin process and how the uncertainty analysis is used to determine the reliability of the entry vehicle thermal protection system and associated risks of failure.
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