Moon to Mars (M2M) Cross Program Utilization Payload Safety Requirements
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
payloads↗
SEARCH · Search NASA
Results for “safety requirements”
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
Range Flight Safety Requirements
The purpose of this NASA Technical Standard is to provide the technical requirements for the NPR 8715.5, Range Flight Safety Program, in regards to protection of the public, the NASA workforce, and property as it pertains to risk analysis, Flight Safety Systems (FSS), and range flight operations. This standard is approved for use by NASA Headquarters and NASA Centers, including Component Facilities and Technical and Service Support Centers, and may be cited in contract, program, and other Agency documents as a technical requirement. This standard may also apply to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory or to other contractors, grant recipients, or parties to agreements to the extent specified or referenced in their contracts, grants, or agreements, when these organizations conduct or participate in missions that involve range flight operations as defined by NPR 8715.5.1.2.2 In this standard, all mandatory actions (i.e., requirements) are denoted by statements containing the term “shall.”1.3 TailoringTailoring of this standard for application to a specific program or project shall be formally documented as part of program or project requirements and approved by the responsible Technical Authority in accordance with NPR 8715.3, NASA General Safety Program Requirements.
Flight↗
Adapting safety requirements analysis to intrusion detection
Several requirements analysis techniques widely used in safety-critical systems are being adapted to support the analysis of secure systems. Perhaps the most relevant system safety techique for Intrusion Detection Systems is hazard analysis.
requirements analysis safety intrusion detection↗
Analysis of Operational Hazards and Safety Requirements for Traffic Aware Strategic Aircrew Requests (TASAR)
Safety analyses of the Traffic Aware Strategic Aircrew Requests (TASAR) Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) application are provided to establish its Failure Effects Classification which affects certification and operational approval requirements. TASAR was developed by NASA Langley Research Center to offer flight path improvement opportunities to the pilot during flight for operational benefits (e.g., reduced fuel, flight time). TASAR, using own-ship and network-enabled information concerning the flight and its environment, including weather and Air Traffic Control (ATC) system constraints, provides recommended improvements to the flight trajectory that the pilot can choose to request via Change Requests to ATC for revised clearance. This study reviews the Change Request process of requesting updates to the current clearance, examines the intended function of TASAR, and utilizes two safety assessment methods to establish the Failure Effects Classification of TASAR. Considerable attention has been given in this report to the identification of operational hazards potentially associated with TASAR.
Koczo, Stefan, Jr.↗
Electrical safety requirements: Implications for the module designer
Commercial photovoltaic array installations, which include residential and intermediate applications, are subject to building and electrical codes and to product safety standards. The National Electrical Code (NEC) Article 690, titled Solar Photovoltaic Systems, contains provisions defining acceptable levels of system safety and emphasizes the system design and its installation. The Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. (UL), document titled: Proposed First Edition of the Standard for Flat Plate Photovoltaic Modules and Panels, UL-1703, identifies module and panel construction requirements that ensure product safety. Together these documents describe requirements intended to minimize hazards such as shock and fire. Although initial focus of these requirements is on single crystal silicon modules, they are generic in nature, and are equally applicable to high voltage ( 30 Vdc), multikilowatt, thin film systems. A major safety concern is insulation breakdown within the module or array wiring system, or discontinuities within the electrical conductors. These failures can result in ground faults, in circuit arcs, or exposure to hazardous electrical parts. Safeguards are discussed.
Sugimura, R. S.↗
Space-station crew-safety requirements
Baseline rescue and survival concepts for future space station crews are described. Preliminary studies are being carried out to identify potential threats to crew safety and means to counteract the dangers. Significant factors being considered include the type of threat, the warning time, the number of crewmembers, strategies for protection of the crew (including life-support measures redundancy), and the dependence of space station crews on ground personnel. Attention is being given to the impact of safety devices on the space station geometry and cost, as well as the equipment necessary to maintain the crew in a psychological status positive enough to cope with emergencies. Typical threats would be fire, crewmember illness or injury, and abandonment of the station. A Shuttle launch could take up to 12 days, while equipping the space station with an emergency return capsule would permit return on the same day as the capsule was occupied.
Witcofski, R. D.↗
Capturing Safety Requirements to Enable Effective Task Allocation Between Humans and Automaton in Increasingly Autonomous Systems
There is a current drive towards enabling the deployment of increasingly autonomous systems in the National Airspace System (NAS). However, shifting the traditional roles and responsibilities between humans and automation for safety critical tasks must be managed carefully, otherwise the current emergent safety properties of the NAS may be disrupted. In this paper, a verification activity to assess the emergent safety properties of a clearly defined, safety critical, operational scenario that possesses tasks that can be fluidly allocated between human and automated agents is conducted. Task allocation role sets were proposed for a human-automation team performing a contingency maneuver in a reduced crew context. A safety critical contingency procedure (engine out on takeoff) was modeled in the Soar cognitive architecture, then translated into the Hybrid Input Output formalism. Verification activities were then performed to determine whether or not the safety properties held over the increasingly autonomous system. The verification activities lead to the development of several key insights regarding the implicit assumptions on agent capability. It subsequently illustrated the usefulness of task annotations associated with specialized requirements (e.g., communication, timing etc.), and demonstrated the feasibility of this approach.
Neogi, Natasha A.↗
Evaluation of Hydrogen Storage Quantity Limits for Safety Requirements
As hydrogen storage facilities increase in size and capacity, it may be necessary to evaluate codes and standards that regulate hydrogen, especially in relation to allowable aggregate quantities. Existing regulations for other substances with comparable hazards such as oxygen, natural gas, and petroleum were reviewed; most fuels do not have aggregate quantity limits despite sometimes having individual tank capacity restrictions or limits for certain non-industrial, indoor, or small-scale applications. This precedent suggests that specifying a hydrogen quantity limit may not be necessary. Several possible methods for identifying an appropriate limit are presented to illustrate different approaches for a limit basis. These methods are based on overall risk, or the specific consequences inflicted by a jet fire or an explosion on people and infrastructure. However, these example metrics tend to require assumptions about potential leak sizes, suggesting that a general aggregate quantity limit would be difficult to justify without more system-specific requirements.
08 HYDROGEN↗
System safety requirements for manned space flight
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Source record↗
Lunar mission safety and rescue: Hazards analysis and safety requirements
The results are presented of the hazards analysis which was concerned only with hazards to personnel and not with loss of equipment or property. Hazards characterization includes the definition of a hazard, the hazard levels, and the hazard groups. The analysis methodology is described in detail. The methodology was used to prepare the top level functional flow diagrams, to perform the first level hazards assessment, and to develop a list of conditions and situations requiring individual hazard studies. The 39 individual hazard study results are presented in total.
Source record↗
Experimental study of the flight envelope and research of safety requirements for hang-gliders
The flight mechanic computations were computed, providing both the flight envelopes with all sorts of limits and a fairly precise idea of the influence of several parameters, such as pilot's weight, wing settings, aeroelasticity, etc... The particular problem of luffing dives was thoroughly analyzed, and two kinds of causes were exhibited in both the rules of luffing and aeroelastic effects. The general analysis of longitudinal stability showed a strong link with fabric tension, as expected through Nielsen's and Twaites' theory. Fabric tension strongly depending upon aeroelasticity, that parameter was found to be the most effective design one for positive stability. Lateral stability was found to be very similar in all gliders except perhaps the cylindro-conical. The loss of stability happens in roll at low angle of attack, whereas it happens in yaw at high angle. Turning performance was a bit suprising, with a common maximum value of approximately 55 deg of bank angle for a steady turn.
Laburthe, C.↗
Impacting Space Station Freedom design with operations and safety requirements - An availability process
The unusually long mission duration of Space Station Freedom leads to operations costs that have significant impacts on life-cycle cost relative to previous manned space programs. Maintaining an affordable program requires that operations costs be considered throughout the design process. An appropriate means of impacting the design with operations concerns is to specify requirements that ensure operational effectiveness when implemented. The Space Station Freedom Program has developed a process defining such requirements. It focuses on specifying functional profiles and allocating resources such that designers gain a better understanding of the operational envelope in which their systems must perform. This paper examines the details of the process, where it came from, and why it is effective.
Garegnani, Jerry J.↗
Phase Two Feasibility Study for Software Safety Requirements Analysis Using Model Checking
A feasibility study was performed on a representative aerospace system to determine the following: (1) the benefits and limitations to using SCADE , a commercially available tool for model checking, in comparison to using a proprietary tool that was studied previously [1] and (2) metrics for performing the model checking and for assessing the findings. This study was performed independently of the development task by a group unfamiliar with the system, providing a fresh, external perspective free from development bias.
Turgeon, Gregory↗
Aircraft Design Considerations to Meet One Engine Inoperative (OEI) Safety Requirements
Commercial airlines are obligated to operate such that an aircraft can suffer an engine failure at any point in its mission and terminate the flight without an accident. Only minimal aircraft damage is allowable, such as brake replacement due to very heavy application, or an engine inspection and/or possible removal due to use of an emergency rating. Such performance criteria are often referred to as zero exposure, referring to zero accident exposure to an engine failure. The critical mission segment for meeting one engine inoperative (OEI) criteria is takeoff. For a given weight, wind, and ambient condition, fixed wing aircraft require a balanced field length. This is the longer of the distance to take off if an engine fails at a predetermined critical point in the takeoff profile, or the distance to reject the takeoff and brake to a stop. Rotorcraft have requirements for horizontal takeoff procedures that are equivalent to a balanced field length requirements for fixed wing aircraft. Rotorcraft also perform vertical procedures where no runway or heliport distance is available. These were developed primarily for elevated heliports as found on oil rigs or rooftops. They are also used for ground level operations as might be found at heliports at the end of piers or other confined areas.
Scott, Mark W.↗
Proposed Draft Ground Safety Requirements for Flight Metallic Pressure Vessels for Inclusion in AIAA S-080
No abstract available
Hamilton Joseph B.↗
Proposed Draft Ground Safety Requirements for COPV and Composite Pressure Structures (CPS) for Inclusion in AIAA S-081 and AIAA S-089
No abstract available
Hamilton, Joseph B.↗
Crewed Space Vehicle Battery Safety Requirements
This requirements document is applicable to all batteries on crewed spacecraft, including vehicle, payload, and crew equipment batteries. It defines the specific provisions required to design a battery that is safe for ground personnel and crew members to handle and/or operate during all applicable phases of crewed missions, safe for use in the enclosed environment of a crewed space vehicle, and safe for use in launch vehicles, as well as in unpressurized spaces adjacent to the habitable portion of a space vehicle. The required provisions encompass hazard controls, design evaluation, and verification. The extent of the hazard controls and verification required depends on the applicability and credibility of the hazard to the specific battery design and applicable missions under review. Evaluation of the design and verification program results shall be completed prior to certification for flight and ground operations. This requirements document is geared toward the designers of battery systems to be used in crewed vehicles, crew equipment, crew suits, or batteries to be used in crewed vehicle systems and payloads (or experiments). This requirements document also applies to ground handling and testing of flight batteries. Specific design and verification requirements for a battery are dependent upon the battery chemistry, capacity, complexity, charging, environment, and application. The variety of battery chemistries available, combined with the variety of battery-powered applications, results in each battery application having specific, unique requirements pertinent to the specific battery application. However, there are basic requirements for all battery designs and applications, which are listed in section 4. Section 5 includes a description of hazards and controls and also includes requirements.
Jeevarajan, Judith A.↗