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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2005

Autonomous Assembly of Modular Structures in Space and on Extraterrestrial Locations

The fulfillment of the new US. National Vision for Space Exploration requires many new enabling technologies to accomplish the goal of utilizing space for commercial activities and for returning humans to the moon and extraterrestrial environments. Traditionally, flight structures are manufactured as complete systems and require humans to complete the integration and assembly in orbit. These structures are bulky and require the use of heavy launch vehicles to send the units to the desired location, e.g. International Space Station (ISS). This method requires a high degree of safety, numerous space walks and significant cost for the humans to perform the assembly in orbit. For example, for assembly and maintenance of the ISS, 52 Extravehicular Activities (EVA's) have been performed so far with a total EVA time of approximately 322 hours. Sixteen (16) shuttle flights haw been to the ISS to perform these activities with an approximate cost of $450M per mission. For future space missions, costs have to be reduced to reasonably achieve the exploration goals. One concept that has been proposed is the autonomous assembly of space structures. This concept is an affordable, reliable solution to in-space and extraterrestrial assembly operations. Assembly is autonomously performed when two components containing onboard electronics join after recognizing that the joint is appropriate and in the precise position and orientation required for assembly. The mechanism only activates when the specifications are correct and m a nominal range. After assembly, local sensors and electronics monitor the integrity of the joint for feedback to a master controller. To achieve this concept will require a shift in the methods for designing space structures. In addition, innovative techniques will be required to perform the assembly autonomously. Monitoring of the assembled joint will be necessary for safety and structural integrity. If a very large structure is to be assembled in orbit, then the number of integrity sensors will be significant. Thus simple, low cost sensors are integral to the success of this concept. This paper will address these issues and will propose a novel concept for assembling space structures autonomously. The paper will present Several autonomous assembly methods. Core technologies required to achieve in space assembly will be discussed and novel techniques for communicating, sensing, docking and assembly will be detailed. These core technologies are critical to the goal of utilizing space in a cost efficient and safe manner. Finally, these technologies can also be applied to other systems both on earth and extraterrestrial environments.

Alhorn, Dean C.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Rapid Cost Assessment of Space Mission Concepts Through Application of Complexity-Based Cost Indices

This slide presentation reviews the development of a rapid cost assessment models for evaluation of exploration missions through the application of complexity based cost indices. In Fall of 2004, NASA began developing 13 documents, known as "strategic roadmaps," intended to outline a strategy for space exploration over the next 30 years. The Third Strategic Roadmap, The Strategic Roadmap for Solar System Exploration, focused on strategy for robotic exploration of the Solar System. Development of the Strategic Roadmap for Solar System Exploration led to the investigation of a large variety of missions. However, the necessity of planning around scientific inquiry and budgetary constraints made it necessary for the roadmap development team to evaluate potential missions not only for scientific return but also cost. Performing detailed cost studies for each of the large number of missions was impractical given the time constraints involved and lack of detailed mission studies; so a method of rapid cost assessment was developed by us to allow preliminary analysis. It has been noted that there is a strong correlation between complexity and cost and schedule of planetary missions. While these correlations were made after missions had been built and flown (successfully or otherwise), it seemed likely that a similar approach could provide at least some relative cost ranking. Cost estimation relationships (CERs) have been developed based on subsystem design choices. These CERs required more detailed information than available, forcing the team to adopt a more high level approach. Costing by analogy has been developed for small satellites, however, planetary exploration missions provide such varying spacecraft requirements that there is a lack of adequately comparable missions that can be used for analogy.

cost estimation↗
NASA NTRS1994

Low Cost Mission Operations Workshop

The presentations given at the Low Cost (Space) Mission Operations (LCMO) Workshop are outlined. The LCMO concepts are covered in four introductory sections: Definition of Mission Operations (OPS); Mission Operations (MOS) Elements; The Operations Concept; and Mission Operations for Two Classes of Missions (operationally simple and complex). Individual presentations cover the following topics: Science Data Processing and Analysis; Mis sion Design, Planning, and Sequencing; Data Transport and Delivery, and Mission Coordination and Engineering Analysis. A list of panelists who participated in the conference is included along with a listing of the contact persons for obtaining more information concerning LCMO at JPL. The presentation of this document is in outline and graphic form.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1994

Navigation for Low-Cost Missions to Small Solar-System Bodies

A variety of low-cost space missions planned by NASA for flight in the late 1990's and early 2000's will involve rendevous with, and orbits about, small solar-system bodies such as asteroids and comets.

low-cost missions solar system bodies asteroid exp↗
NASA NTRS2012

Microhard MHX 2420 Orbital Performance Evaluation Using RT Logic T400CS

A major upfront cost of building low cost Nanosatellites is the communications sub-system. Most radios built for space missions cost over $4,000 per unit. This exceeds many budgets. One possible cost effective solution is the Microhard MHX2420, a commercial off-the-shelf transceiver with a unit cost under $1000. This paper aims to support the Nanosatellite community seeking an inexpensive radio by characterizing Microhard's performance envelope. Though not intended for space operations, the ability to test edge cases and increase average data transfer speeds through optimization positions this radio as a solution for Nanosatellite communications by expanding usage to include more missions. The second objective of this paper is to test and verify the optimal radio settings for the most common cases to improve downlinking. All tests were conducted with the aid of the RT Logic T400CS, a hardware-in-the-loop channel simulator designed to emulate real-world radio frequency (RF) link effects. This study provides recommended settings to optimize the downlink speed as well as the environmental parameters that cause the link to fail.

Microhard MHX 2420↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Inertial Transfer: Concept and Multi-Agent Approach

Research and development of cost saving technologies is vital to the success of NASA’s strategic goal to extend human presence deeper into space and to the moon for sustainable long-term exploration and utilization. Reduction of mass has long been a method of reducing space mission costs. In this submission, Inertial Transfer, a new approach to mass transfer in space, is presented. A Multi-Agent System solution to the problem space is discussed. A scaled base-line simulator is constructed and demonstrated which will enable the development of AI capabilities necessary to perform Inertial Transfer. Finally, future work and key challenges are discussed.

Multi-Agent↗
NASA NTRS2020

History and Logic Model NASA Goddard Space Flight Center Instrument and Payload Systems Engineering Technical Performance Study

Historically, some NASA missions have exceeded schedule and cost commitments. Studies suggest technical performance is a contributor. The 1980 NASA Project Management Study concluded, "one of the most significant contributors to cost and schedule growth is inadequate definition of technical and management aspects of a program..." (as cited in GAO/NSIAD-93-97, p. 11). The 1991 NASA Roles and Missions Report identified a "need for increased emphasis on technological readiness and requirements on the front end of a program" (as cited in GAO/NSIAD-93-97, p. 11). The 1992 NASA Program Costs Report stated that NASA officials identified, among other things, "insufficient definition studies... [and] program redesigns and technical complexities" as reasons for cost and schedule overruns (GAO/NSAID-93-97, p. 11). The 2002 Task Force on Acquisition of National Security Space Programs found "requirements definition and control issues, unhealthy cost bias in proposal evaluation, widespread lack of budget reserves required to implement high risk programs on schedule, and an overall underappreciation of the importance of appropriately staffed and trained system engineering staff to manage the technologically demanding and unique aspects of space programs" (DoD, 2003, p.i.) In 2007, The NASA Office of the Chief Engineer chartered the NASA Instrument Capability Study (NICS) “to determine whether NASA instrument developers are facing challenges that impact the capability to design and build quality instruments or whether there are flaws in the acquisition strategy evidenced by schedule delays, cost overruns, and increased technical risk via design deficiencies. The... team was also chartered to determine if occurrences [are]... isolated cases or if there are generic issues... If the issues [are] found to be generic, the team [is] to offer solutions to recover such capability" (NICS Report, 2008, p. vi). The 2008 NICS Report, led by Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), identified challenges to instrument technical performance consistent with findings from previous reports. In 2017, the Instrument Project Division (IPD) Implementation Study was initiated to determine if there was a change in meeting schedule and cost commitments after implementing certain NICS recommendations. In 2018, the Instrument Technical Performance Study was initiated to determine the current state of Instrument Technical Performance in the GSFC Payload & Instrument Systems Engineering Branch. The purpose of the combined studies is to answer the question, "Is there a relationship between meeting NASA scientific instrument technical success and meeting schedule and cost commitments? If yes, what is the relationship?" References Department of Defense Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. (2003). The report of the defense science board/ air force scientific advisory board joint task force on acquisition of national security space programs. Washington DC. Government Accounting Office. (1992). NASA program costs: Space missions require substantially more funding than initially estimated. GAO/NSIAD-93-97. Washington DC. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency, Department of Defense. (2008). The NASA instrument capability study final report. NP-2008-11-058-GSFC. Washington DC.

Robbins, Geraldine↗
NASA NTRS2000

Parametric Cost Modeling of Space Missions Using the Develop New Projects (DMP) Implementation Process

This paper presents an overview of a parametric cost model that has been built at JPL to estimate costs of future, deep space, robotic science missions. Due to the recent dramatic changes in JPL business practices brought about by an internal reengineering effort known as develop new products (DNP), high-level historic cost data is no longer considered analogous to future missions. Therefore, the historic data is of little value in forecasting costs for projects developed using the DNP process. This has lead to the development of an approach for obtaining expert opinion and also for combining actual data with expert opinion to provide a cost database for future missions. In addition, the DNP cost model has a maximum of objective cost drivers which reduces the likelihood of model input error. Version 2 is now under development which expands the model capabilities, links it more tightly with key design technical parameters, and is grounded in more rigorous statistical techniques. The challenges faced in building this model will be discussed, as well as it's background, development approach, status, validation, and future plans.

Rosenberg, Leigh↗
NASA NTRS2001

Satellite Mission Operations Best Practices

The effort of compiling a collection of Best Practices for use in Space Mission Operations was initiated within a subcommittee of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) Space Operations and Support Technical Committee (SOSTC). The idea was to eventually post a collection of Best Practices on a website so as to make them available to the general Space Operations community. The effort of searching for available Best Practices began in the fall of 1999. As the search progressed, it became apparent that there were not many Best Practices developed that were available to the general community. Therefore, the subcommittee decided to use the SOSTC Annual Workshop on Reducing Space Mission Costs as a forum for developing Best Practices for our purpose of sharing them with a larger audience. A dedicated track at the April 2000 workshop was designed to stimulate discussions on developing such Best Practices and forming working groups made up of experienced people from various organizations to perform the development. These groups were solicited to help outside the workshop to bring this effort to fruition. Since that time, biweekly teleconferences have been held to discuss the development of the Best Practices and their posting.

Galal, Ken↗
NASA NTRS1994

PV Technology for Low Intensity, Low Temperature (LILT) Applications

As a result of the recent NASA emphasis on smaller, lower cost space missions, PV is now being considered for a number of missions operating at solar distances of 3 AU or greater. In the past, many of these missions would utilize an RTG (radioisotope thermoelectric generator). Historically, silicon solar cell behavior at these distances has been compromised by a number of mechanisms including shunting, nonohmic back contacts, and the 'broken knee' curve shape. The former two can usually be neglected for modern silicon cells, but the latter has not been eliminated. This problem has been identified with localized diffusion at the top contact/silicon interface which leads to structural changes at the local junction. This is believed to create a resistive metal-semiconductor-like (MSL) interface in parallel with the junction which results in the characteristic forms of the LILT (low intensity, low temperature) 'broken knee'. This paper discusses a TaSiN contact barrier that will prevent the MSL structure in the junction.

spacecraft power LILT low temperature low intensit↗
NASA NTRS1994

(abstract) PV Technology for Low Intensity, Low Temperature (LILT) Applications

As a result of the recent NASA emphasis on smaller, lower cost space missions, PV is now being considered for a number of missions operating at solar distances of 3 AU or greater. In the past, many of these missions would utilize an RTG (radioisotope thermoelectric generator). Historically, silicon solar cell behavior at these distances has been compromised by a number of mechanisms including shunting, nonohmic back contacts, and the 'broken knee' curve shape. The former two can usually be neglected for modern silicon cells, but the latter has not been eliminated. This problem has been identified with localized diffusion at the top contact/silicon interface which leads to structural changes at the local junction. This is believed to create a resistive metal-semiconductor-like (MSL) interface in parallel with the junction which results in the characteristic forms of the LILT (low intensity, low temperature) 'broken knee'. This paper discusses a TaSiN contact barrier that will prevent the MSL structure in the junction.

spacecraft power LILT low temperature low intensit↗
NASA NTRS1990

Long-range planning cost model for support of future space missions by the deep space network

A simple model is suggested to do long-range planning cost estimates for Deep Space Network (DSP) support of future space missions. The model estimates total DSN preparation costs and the annual distribution of these costs for long-range budgetary planning. The cost model is based on actual DSN preparation costs from four space missions: Galileo, Voyager (Uranus), Voyager (Neptune), and Magellan. The model was tested against the four projects and gave cost estimates that range from 18 percent above the actual total preparation costs of the projects to 25 percent below. The model was also compared to two other independent projects: Viking and Mariner Jupiter/Saturn (MJS later became Voyager). The model gave cost estimates that range from 2 percent (for Viking) to 10 percent (for MJS) below the actual total preparation costs of these missions.

Sherif, J. S.↗
NASA NTRS2013

30-kW SEP Spacecraft as Secondary Payloads for Low-Cost Deep Space Science Missions

The Solar Array System contracts awarded by NASA's Space Technology Mission Directorate are developing solar arrays in the 30 kW to 50 kW power range (beginning of life at 1 AU) that have significantly higher specific powers (W/kg) and much smaller stowed volumes than conventional rigid-panel arrays. The successful development of these solar array technologies has the potential to enable new types of solar electric propulsion (SEP) vehicles and missions. This paper describes a 30-kW electric propulsion vehicle built into an EELV Secondary Payload Adapter (ESPA) ring. The system uses an ESPA ring as the primary structure and packages two 15-kW Megaflex solar array wings, two 14-kW Hall thrusters, a hydrazine Reaction Control Subsystem (RCS), 220 kg of xenon, 26 kg of hydrazine, and an avionics module that contains all of the rest of the spacecraft bus functions and the instrument suite. Direct-drive is used to maximize the propulsion subsystem efficiency and minimize the resulting waste heat and required radiator area. This is critical for packaging a high-power spacecraft into a very small volume. The fully-margined system dry mass would be approximately 1120 kg. This is not a small dry mass for a Discovery-class spacecraft, for example, the Dawn spacecraft dry mass was only about 750 kg. But the Dawn electric propulsion subsystem could process a maximum input power of 2.5 kW, and this spacecraft would process 28 kW, an increase of more than a factor of ten. With direct-drive the specific impulse would be limited to about 2,000 s assuming a nominal solar array output voltage of 300 V. The resulting spacecraft would have a beginning of life acceleration that is more than an order of magnitude greater than the Dawn spacecraft. Since the spacecraft would be built into an ESPA ring it could be launched as a secondary payload to a geosynchronous transfer orbit significantly reducing the launch costs for a planetary spacecraft. The SEP system would perform the escape from Earth and then the heliocentric transfer to the science target.

Dawn spacecraft↗
NASA NTRS2000

In Space Nuclear Power as an Enabling Technology for Deep Space Exploration

Deep Space Exploration missions, both for scientific and Human Exploration and Development (HEDS), appear to be as weight limited today as they would have been 35 years ago. Right behind the weight constraints is the nearly equally important mission limitation of cost. Launch vehicles, upper stages and in-space propulsion systems also cost about the same today with the same efficiency as they have had for many years (excluding impact of inflation). Both these dual mission constraints combine to force either very expensive, mega systems missions or very light weight, but high risk/low margin planetary spacecraft designs, such as the recent unsuccessful attempts for an extremely low cost mission to Mars during the 1998-99 opportunity (i.e., Mars Climate Orbiter and the Mars Polar Lander). When one considers spacecraft missions to the outer heliopause or even the outer planets, the enormous weight and cost constraints will impose even more daunting concerns for mission cost, risk and the ability to establish adequate mission margins for success. This paper will discuss the benefits of using a safe in-space nuclear reactor as the basis for providing both sufficient electric power and high performance space propulsion that will greatly reduce mission risk and significantly increase weight (IMLEO) and cost margins. Weight and cost margins are increased by enabling much higher payload fractions and redundant design features for a given launch vehicle (higher payload fraction of IMLEO). The paper will also discuss and summarize the recent advances in nuclear reactor technology and safety of modern reactor designs and operating practice and experience, as well as advances in reactor coupled power generation and high performance nuclear thermal and electric propulsion technologies. It will be shown that these nuclear power and propulsion technologies are major enabling capabilities for higher reliability, higher margin and lower cost deep space missions design to reliably reach the outer planets for scientific exploration.

Sackheim, Robert L.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Determining the Best-Fit FPGA for a Space Mission: An Analysis of Cost, SEU Sensitivity,and Reliability

This viewgraph presentation reviews the selection of the optimum Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) for space missions. Included in this review is a discussion on differentiating amongst various FPGAs, cost analysis of the various options, the investigation of radiation effects, an expansion of the evaluation criteria, and the application of the evaluation criteria to the selection process.

Berg, Melanie↗
NASA NTRS2010

Results from the NASA Spacecraft Fault Management Workshop: Cost Drivers for Deep Space Missions

Fault Management, the detection of and response to in-flight anomalies, is a critical aspect of deep-space missions. Fault management capabilities are commonly distributed across flight and ground subsystems, impacting hardware, software, and mission operations designs. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Discovery & New Frontiers (D&NF) Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for five missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that four out of the five missions studied had significant overruns due to underestimating the complexity and support requirements for fault management. As a result of this and other recent experiences, the NASA Science Mission Directorate (SMD) Planetary Science Division (PSD) commissioned a workshop to bring together invited participants across government, industry, and academia to assess the state of the art in fault management practice and research, identify current and potential issues, and make recommendations for addressing these issues. The workshop was held in New Orleans in April of 2008. The workshop concluded that fault management is not being limited by technology, but rather by a lack of emphasis and discipline in both the engineering and programmatic dimensions. Some of the areas cited in the findings include different, conflicting, and changing institutional goals and risk postures; unclear ownership of end-to-end fault management engineering; inadequate understanding of the impact of mission-level requirements on fault management complexity; and practices, processes, and tools that have not kept pace with the increasing complexity of mission requirements and spacecraft systems. This paper summarizes the findings and recommendations from that workshop, particularly as fault management development issues affect operations and the development of operations capabilities.

Newhouse, Marilyn E.↗