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DOE OSTI2024

Improved Creep Testing Approach for Bentonite EBS

In the United States, the nuclear reactor contributes 18.7 percent of the nation’s total electricity generation and produces a significant amount of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level waste. Because SNF is being stored for longer periods than initially envisioned, the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy, Office of Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology is assessing the technical performance of the SNF storage systems after extended durations. The concept of a sustainable geologic repository for SNF disposal relies heavily on the safety provided by multiple barriers, such as repository host rock, overlying rock formation, and human-made engineered barrier systems (EBS). One of the major components of EBS is bentonite-based buffer materials that isolate the nuclear-waste canisters from the host rock and fill the void left in the horizontally drilled boreholes. The resaturated bentonite has a swelling characteristic, which is useful for self-sealing the microcracks in the host rock and supporting the canister’s heavy weight. However, factors such as nonuniformity in the saturation, swelling pressure of bentonite, and the high temperature at the canister-bentonite interface may lead to instability of the waste canister inside the borehole. Therefore, evaluating the long-term deformation of bentonite-based material is necessary. RESPEC Company, LLC recently completed a preliminary study for the U.S. Department of Energy (DE SC0022804) that is attempting to understand the time-dependent deformation in the consolidated sand/bentonite (SB) specimens through triaxial creep experiments and improve the understanding of EBS performance under anticipated repository conditions. The project included developing a standard testing procedure for preparing the consolidated core specimen from a mixture of sand and bentonite in a 50:50 ratio by weight, fabricating a new pressure vessel in-house, modifying existing creep equipment to perform triaxial creep experiments on consolidated SB specimens, and performing six long-term triaxial creep experiments under low-deviatoric stress at two different temperature conditions, which is representative of hypothetical conditions that might be encountered in a geologic repository within a reasonable rate of success in completing creep experiments. The consolidated SB specimen was prepared using the novel specimen preparation procedure and had physical characteristics (e.g., moisture content and bulk density) reasonably comparable with the properties of bentonite-based buffer, which is proposed to be used in the EBS in the Swedish KBS-3H design and the Swiss design of SNF disposal in the horizontal drifts. The newly fabricated pressure vessel could withstand the confining pressure of up to 15 megapascals (MPa) while maintaining the test temperature of up to 90 degrees Celsius (°C) for long-term creep experiments. The preliminary results from the triaxial creep experiments suggested that the consolidated SB specimen may experience time-dependent deformation at a low-deviatoric stress state and room temperature condition. Based on the deformation recorded in the SB specimen from axial and radial linear variable differential transformers (LVDTs) and physical characteristic changes, it is apparent that the time-dependent deformation is a combination of consolidation and creep, which is influenced by the level of deviatoric stresses and temperature. The systematic creep testing of bentonite-based specimens helped develop a standard testing procedure applicable for analyzing the similar characteristics of shale or clay-like materials in different geologic conditions outside repository science, including in civil engineering and infrastructure projects, underground and open pit mining, and deep drilling.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2021

Structural dynamics modeling of spent nuclear fuel during hypothetical package drop events

The response of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) to hypothetical package drop events is of particular interest in the scope of spent fuel storage and transportation because of the mechanical shock encountered in such scenarios. Previous testing and modeling by the U.S. Department of Energy has demonstrated that the shock and vibration environment of normal shipping and handling conditions (excluding package drop events) is relatively benign and does not challenge the integrity of spent nuclear fuel. Cask drop events are worth considering because SNF packages are required to withstand free drops onto unyielding surfaces as part of their licensing basis. The acceleration experienced during drop events can be orders of magnitude higher, and thus more advanced models are needed to encompass potential nonlinear behavior of the fuel, such as spacer grid buckling and rod-to-rod impact. This work describes a number of finite element models developed to calculate the response of spent nuclear fuel to various hypothetical drop events that have been validated by package and fuel assembly drop tests conducted in the last decade. Sensitivity of the model response to factors such as package drop orientation, secondary impacts, and irradiated material properties as well as their potential impacts to fuel cladding integrity, was also investigated. Cask drops are not expected as a regular occurrence during SNF transportation, but this work helps raise the understanding of SNF mechanical loads to the point of consistency with the package design requirements.

Kadooka, Kevin↗

DOE OSTI2023

A Comparison of As-loaded Dose Calculations to Measured Dose Rates

Demonstrating that the radiation dose fields surrounding spent nuclear fuel (SNF) storage and transportation systems meet the applicable limits set forth in 10 CFR 72 for storage and 10 CFR 71 for transportation is essential for the safe handling of radioactive material. The Used Nuclear Fuel-Storage, Transportation, and Disposal Analysis Resource and Data System (UNF-ST&DARDS) [2] is used to provide realistic estimates of SNF-related safety margins. The UNF-ST&DARDS dose rate analysis approach differs from that used in typical licensing approaches, which use design-basis assemblies with bounding source term characteristics to demonstrate the packaging design complies with the regulations. These bounding licensing approaches can increase the time needed to qualify fuel for loading into dry storage and the time a loaded system must wait prior to transportation. UNF-ST&DARDS dose rate assessments allow quantification of realistic, uncredited safety margins associated with actual fuel loading compared with the regulatory limits. While realistic estimation of the dose field surrounding SNF systems may allow for additional flexibility in operations, it is essential to understand how these predictions compare to measured doses. The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Integrated Waste Management and the Prairie Island Indian Community conducted a transportation dose assessment to estimate the site-specific incident-free radiation doses from shipping SNF by rail from the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) through the Prairie Island Indian Community Reservation and Trust Land [5,6]. For that effort, the dose rates were obtained for 50 TN-40 and TN-40HT systems in storage configurations. This work compares the predicted dose rates from UNF-ST&DARDS as-loaded calculations with dose rates measured from 50 SNF storage systems at PINGP. The remainder of this paper discusses the data obtained for the evaluation, the modeling methods, and the results of the calculations.

spent nuclear fuel (SNF), UNF-ST&DARDS, Validation↗

DOE OSTI2024

Remaining Life Prediction of SNF Storage Canisters Exposed to CISCC Environments

• DOE Standardized SNF Storage Canisters o DOE designed standard spent nuclear fuel (SNF) storage canisters for storage of DOE SNF. o DOE canisters are significantly different from commercial MultiPurpose Canisters (MPC) in size. o MPC canisters are large, a height = 15.8 ft, OD = 68”, WT = 0.5”. o DOE canisters are small with 18” / 24” diameter, 10’ / 15’ length. • Integrity Evaluation of DOE versus MPC Canisters o Many investigations have been performed for MPC canisters. o Limit investigations were performed for DOE standard canisters. Most were done at Idaho National Lab (INL). o DOE has sponsored integrity studies to evaluate weld integrity using drop tests and FEA simulations. o No evaluation on CISCC/service life of DOE canister in literature. o MPC canister: 4 axial welds, 1 center girth weld, 2 closing welds.

ZHU, Xiankui↗

DOE OSTI2025

Non-destructive evaluation and machine learning methods for inspection of spent nuclear fuel canisters: A state-of-the-art review

Nuclear energy is among the cleanest and most efficient energy sources currently available. The operation of nuclear power plants (NPPs) produces large amounts of high-level radioactive waste known as spent nuclear fuel (SNF). Currently, large amounts of SNF is stored in dry cask storage systems (DCSSs) for extended interim storage until a permanent disposal solution becomes available. During the extended interim storage, the DCSS, particularly the SNF canisters, may degrade and abnormal conditions may occur. Therefore, non-destructive evaluation (NDE) and machine learning (ML) approaches are necessary for inspection of SNF canisters. This paper presents a state-of-the-art review of literature by summarizing recent progress made on the applications of NDE and ML for inspection of SNF canisters. Sixteen NDE methods are examined and compared: visual inspection, ultrasonic guided waves (UGWs), laser-based approaches, acoustic emission (AE), eddy current testing (ECT), non-invasive acoustic sensing, dynamic modal testing, cosmic ray muons tomography, neutron imaging, gamma rays detection, fiber optical sensors, through-wall communications, X-ray computed tomography (CT), vibrothermography, monoenergetic photon sources, and surface acoustic wave (SAW) sensors. The technology readiness level (TRL) for each method is assessed and compared. Recent publications on ML-enhanced visual inspection, AE, non-invasive acoustic sensing, dynamic modal testing, and neutron imaging for SNF canisters are summarized and future research needs are identified. In conclusion, this review article provides a convenient reference on the state-of-the-art applications of NDE and ML methods for inspection of SNF canisters.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

Performing k eff Validation of As-Loaded Criticality Safety Calculations Using UNF-ST&DARDS: Applicable Experiment Selection

The general method for performing validation of as loaded criticality safety calculations using UNF ST&DARDS is presented in a paper by Clarity, which includes a description of the UNF-ST&DARDS system. Proof-of-principle analyses were performed in the summer of 2019 for MPC-32 dual purpose canisters (DPCs) containing pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuel assemblies. Summaries of these results are presented in this and a companion paper for this conference. The current paper describes the TSUNAMI-IP calculations performed to select applicable experiments for validation of 11 MPC-32 DPCs. The companion paper discusses the TSUNAMI-3D calculations used to generate sensitivity data to support the experiment selections discussed here. Experiment selection is based on the sensitivity/uncertainty (S/U) methods used to validate criticality safety calculations of as-loaded DPCs containing pressurized water reactor (PWR) spent nuclear fuel (SNF). This process has been demonstrated and is summarized in this paper. The approach is similar to that used in NUREG/CR-7109, which provides an approach for validation of PWR burnup credit (BUC), including major and minor actinides and major fission products. The premise of S/U-based validation is that applicable experiments—those having a similar bias to a given application system—will have similar sensitivities for each isotope and reaction in the two systems. It is assumed that cross sections with larger uncertainties are more likely to contain data errors which contribute to the bias. The integral index c k thus propagates the system sensitivities with the nuclear covariance data to calculate a correlation coefficient representing the similarity of the two systems. In this work, a c k value of 0.8 or higher is interpreted as identifying an experiment with sufficient similarity for use in validation. This paper presents a brief summary of the characteristics of the 11 MPC-32 DPCs used in the proof of-principle analysis for as-loaded criticality safety calculation validation and an overview of the critical experiment suite with which each of these DPC models was compared. A summary and discussion of c k results is also presented, followed by conclusions and a discussion of future work to be performed for validation of UNF ST&DARDS as-loaded criticality safety calculations.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Acoustic sensing and autoencoder approach for abnormal gas detection in a spent nuclear fuel canister mock-up

Currently, spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from commercial nuclear power plants is stored in stainless-steel canisters for interim dry storage. To provide an inert environment, these canisters are backfilled with helium after vacuum drying. However, the helium environment may be contaminated during extended storage because of the material degradation. For example, the heavier fission gas xenon may be released from the fuel rods into the canister cavity should the fuel cladding be breached. Other gases such as air and water vapor may also be present as a result of leakage caused by chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking on the canister walls or by insufficient vacuum drying. Therefore, monitoring the gas composition can provide critical information about the health of SNF canisters. In this study, noninvasive testing was conducted on a 2/3-scaled SNF canister mock-up using acoustic sensing. Ultrasonic transducers were placed on the exterior surface of the canister to probe the gas composition. A dataset was collected by sealing the canister mock-up and introducing up to 1.53% argon or 1.29% air into the helium background gas. Three methods were used to detect changes in the gas composition: the time-of-flight (TOF) method, the differential method, and the autoencoder method. Results showed that the TOF method had sufficient resolution to detect abnormal gas concentrations of less than 1.0%. The differential method demonstrated a periodic in-phase and out-of-phase behavior between the benchmark (i.e., pure helium) and abnormal (i.e., with argon or air) state signals. The variational autoencoder (VAE) and the Wasserstein autoencoder (WAE) were trained on the benchmark data and were applied directly to the abnormal state data. It was found that both the unsupervised VAE and the WAE were able to distinguish the benchmark and abnormal states of the canister mock-up based on the reconstruction error.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Augmented Monitoring and Condition Assessment Program for SNF Wet Storage Life Extension - 20489

Approximately 27 MTHM of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) owned and managed by the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Management is stored in the L Basin at the Savannah River Site (SRS). This 'DOE SNF' is comprised of approximately 12,000 aluminum-clad, aluminum-based fuel assemblies (∼7 MTHM), and approximately 2000 non-aluminum fuel assemblies (∼20 MTHM). A program is in progress to perform Non-Destructive Examination (NDE) of the fuel and their storage containers to characterize the materials' condition, and to evaluate the effects of service to enable continued safe wet storage of the SNF. The Augmented Monitoring and Condition Assessment Program (AMCAP), a two-part program to develop and implement remote underwater Non-Destructive Examination of the aluminum SNF, and of the containers of the non-aluminum SNF, respectively, is aimed at the characterization and evaluation of corrosion degradation of aluminum fuel and container materials. The predominant design of the aluminum SNF (ASNF) stored in L Basin is the Materials Test Reactor (MTR) equivalent design, a plate fuel design. These SNF are stored in 5'' diameter tubes or 5'' x 5'' squares (called bundles) that are nominally 12' or up to 14' long. The SNF is de-bundled and inspected using a custom-designed MTR Fuel Inspection Table. The inspection table provides for indexed fuel positioning for a video camera examination with controlled lighting. A total of 10 of the SNF originating from foreign research and test reactors were selected for examination based on burnup, enrichment, and prior damage caused by service/storage history. A special inspection campaign of these 10 assemblies is in progress. The observed corrosion damage included minor to moderate attack from general corrosion, pitting, crevice, end grain and galvanic corrosion. Example results from the completed inspections are shown and discussed. The focus is a comparison of the as-received condition versus the as-found current storage condition that will serve to validate Water Chemistry and Corrosion Monitoring Programs. The non-aluminum SNF (NASNF) stored in L Basin are of diverse design that includes various geometries with claddings of stainless steel, Zircaloy, and Hastelloy. The fuel core materials include uranium alloys, oxides/mixed oxides, and carbides. These SNF materials, originating from early experimental and test reactors, are in various physical forms including single fuel elements and cut pieces. The fuel is stored in L Basin in various configurations including in direct bundled storage in aluminum tubes and in isolation cans that are in the bundles or in a larger over-size storage container (OSC). Concern with inside-out corrosion and the potential loss of configuration control and ability to handle the storage containers prompted the development of remote NDE methods that include visual and UT technologies to assess the condition of the containers. Candidate stored materials were selected for a special inspection campaign; the development of the NDE methods for the inspection for galvanic, crevice and sediment-induced corrosion (inside-out) are discussed. A summary of the SNF storage in L Basin at the SRS, and an overview of the AMCAP to enable continued safe storage of DOE SNF are described. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

Performing k eff Validation of As-Loaded Criticality Safety Calculations Using UNF-ST&DARDS: Sensitivity Calculations

The general method for performing validation of as loaded criticality safety calculations using UNF ST&DARDS is presented in a paper by Clarity, which includes a description of the UNF-ST&DARDS system. Proof-of-principle analyses were performed in the summer of 2019 for MPC-32 dual purpose canisters (DPCs) containing pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuel assemblies. Summaries of these results are presented in this and a companion paper for this conference. The current paper describes the TSUNAMI-3D calculations performed to generate sensitivity data, and the companion paper discusses the selection of critical experiments applicable for validation of the 11 MPC-32 DPCs considered. The generation of sensitivity data for as-loaded spent nuclear fuel (SNF) DPCs is a challenge given the detailed model of the fuel compositions generated by UNF ST&DARDS. Each fuel assembly is modeled with its own irradiation history in 18 axial nodes, unless the fuel assembly is damaged and thus considered as fresh by design basis. This results in a set of 576 fuel compositions, each of which must be processed separately in a multigroup (MG) calculation. Therefore, a continuous-energy (CE) TSUNAMI-3D method was chosen to alleviate this challenge. Two CE TSUNAMI-3D methods are available in SCALE 6.2.3: the iterated fission probability (IFP) and contribution-linked eigenvalue sensitivity/uncertainty estimation via track-length importance characterization (CLUTCH). Since the IFP method is not feasible because of memory requirements associated with its implementation in SCALE, the CLUTCH method was selected for these calculations. CLUTCH has been implemented in SCALE in parallel, allowing long calculations to be performed in reasonable timeframes. The two primary user inputs necessary for CLUTCH calculations are the F*(r) mesh and the number of latent generations used in determining the F*(r) function. This F*(r) function is used as the importance function for fission chains originating in a given volume element (voxel), and it is calculated using the IFP method in the skipped generations. A large number of skipped generations is thus required to ensure accurate calculation of this importance function. In these calculations, 500 generations were used to calculate the F*(r) function. For more information regarding the calculation of F*(r), see Jones [4]. The remainder of this paper is focused on the selection of the F*(r) mesh and the number of latent generations.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Preliminary Analysis of Advanced Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage, Transportation, and Disposal

Due to increased interest in advanced reactor deployment and their associated potential new fuel cycles, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) program has begun to evaluate the possible implications of long term management and final disposition of the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) generated. Safely managing and dispositioning this SNF, along with any other associated radioactive waste, is the primary focus of this initial preliminary assessment. This paper summarizes efforts to evaluate the characteristics and packaging options for three types of advanced reactor SNF forms: (1) tristructural isotropic (TRISO), (2) metallic, and (3) irradiated fuel salt presented in the report titled “Storage, Transportation, and Disposal of Advanced Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Waste”. TRISO and metallic SNF and their associated waste streams were emphasized because of the near-term anticipated demonstrations of X-energy’s Xe-100 and TerraPower and GE Hitachi’s Natrium advanced reactors. Preliminary information on spent fuel salts discharged from molten-salt reactors (MSRs) was also examined to provide a baseline for future efforts. All calculations and assumptions were based on publicly available information. This paper identifies several different reactors that produce either TRISO or metallic SNF as well as a few of the reactor and fuel characteristics used for the assessments. Based on these characteristics, calculations were performed to determine the applicability of packaging SNF into existing canister designs. The evaluations included geometric (e.g., dimension, volume) and mass/weight considerations, known operational approaches and loading procedures, physical and chemical considerations/conditions for storage environments, and as-loaded radiation, thermal, and criticality analyses to identify constraints on storage, transportation, and disposal. Gaps in publicly available data pertaining to reactor operation and/or fuel composition provide increased uncertainty in some evaluations. Additionally, uncertainty in packaging and SNF management operations provide additional uncertainty. However, preliminary conclusions can still be assessed through this work and are presented in this paper.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Preliminary Analysis of Advanced Reactors Storage, Transportation, and Disposal

Based on the higher interest in Advanced Reactor (AR) deployment (e.g., ARDP[1]) for potential new fuel cycles, the Spent Fuel & Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) Program has begun to evaluate the possible implications of long-term management and final disposition of potential Advance Reactor spent nuclear fuels (SNF) that would be generated in potential advanced reactors. Safely managing and dispositioning the potential future AR SNF, and any other associated radioactive wastes, is the primary focus of this initial preliminary assessment of those. This paper summarizes the efforts by the Spent Fuel & Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) in evaluating characteristics and packaging options for advanced reactor spent nuclear fuel forms. The fuel forms were categorized into three types: (1) tristructural isotropic (TRISO), (2) metallic, and (3) fuel salt. This work emphasized TRISO and metallic SNF and waste streams because of the near-term anticipated operation of the Xe-100 and the Natrium reactors as advanced-reactor demonstrations. Preliminary information for the spent-fuel salts discharged from molten-salt reactors (MSRs) is also examined to provide a baseline for future efforts. All calculations and assumptions used publicly available information. The following characteristics are calculated or estimated for use in the preliminary assessments: SNF volume and mass, radiation/activity levels through time, thermal conditions through time, potential radionuclide source terms, chemical interactions and evolutions, disposal inventories, and waste-form lifetime. Using those characteristics, calculations to determine the applicability of existing canister designs were performed. These evaluations included geometric (e.g., dimension, volume) and mass/weight considerations, known operational approaches and loading procedures, physical and chemical considerations/conditions for storage environments, as-loaded radiation, thermal, and criticality analyses to identify constraints for storage, transportation, and disposal. The paper also includes a literature review and analysis on the storage, transportation, and disposal evaluations and experiences from reactors with similar fuel forms. Advanced-reactor vendors cite past experiences with Fort St. Vrain for TRISO and the Experimental Breeder Reactor II (EBR-II) for metallics that have major influences on fuel design. Finally, the paper includes preliminary concepts of operation for advanced-reactor SNF. This encompasses storage, transportation, potential treatment, and disposal activities from both a per-canister and systems-integration perspective.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Considerations for Managing DOE Standard Canisters within an Over-canister as Part of an Integrated Waste Management System PPT

To better enable informed decision making regarding the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle, the Integrated Waste Management Program within the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) has been sponsoring research into a comprehensive integrated waste management system (IWMS) that considers all major back-end aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle (i.e., transportation, storage, and disposal). An important aspect of the IWMS is DOE-managed Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF). DOE and its predecessor agencies have generated, transported, received, stored, and reprocessed SNF at DOE facilities nationwide, and DOE is responsible for managing the SNF currently in its possession. These fuels come from a wide range of reactor types that employ various cladding materials, fuel materials, and enrichments. To enable interim, road-ready dry storage (RRDS) of the wide variety of SNF types found in the DOE inventory, a standardized canister system (i.e., the DOE Standard Canister) was proposed for the packaging demonstration. This robust, welded canister system is designed to confine radionuclides, prevent criticality by precluding content moderation, and satisfy other requirements as part of a larger storage, transportation, and disposal system. While SNF has yet to be loaded into a DOE Standard Canister, DOE Standard Canister designs were included in past storage facility and disposal facility design licensing endeavors. In a renewed effort to evaluate packaging SNF at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in a RRDS configuration, researchers are planning the RRDS Packaging Demonstration. This demonstration is supplemented by analytical structural, criticality, and material compatibility evaluations that support management of SNF in DOE Standard Canisters, taking advantage of past analysis work to the extent possible. One of the largest differences between the current Packaging Demonstration and past analytical evaluations is the inclusion of an over-canister containing multiple DOE Standard Canisters. For the Packaging Demonstration, DOE Standard Canisters loaded with SNF are planned to be placed in a larger diameter over-canister. The sealed over-canister could then be placed in a storage overpack for onsite storage, or in a transportation overpack for shipment to an offsite storage location or disposal site once one becomes available. This paper examines the relevant considerations and provides a preliminary evaluation of integrating the over-canister configuration into the storage, transportation, and disposal processes of the overall waste management system. For storage and transportation, the over-canister can be considered analogous to a multi-purpose canister (MPC) for commercial SNF. For disposal, the DOE Standard Canisters could be removed from the over-canister and placed in a co-disposal waste package with canisters containing vitrified high-level radioactive waste (HLW) similar to configurations examined previously, or the sealed over-canisters might be capable of direct disposal in a waste package.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2022

System Analysis Modeling and Intermodal Transportation for Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel

The United States Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy is applying knowledge and understanding in the areas of systems level engineering, analysis, and decision making to better inform the waste management pathways for U.S. spent nuclear fuel (SNF). Currently there are 93 operating and 23 shutdown commercial nuclear reactors in the United States. SNF at most of these locations is being stored in spent fuel pools, dry storage, or both [1, 2]. This paper initially goes over the basics of the agent-based simulation tool known as the Next Generation System Analysis Model (NGSAM) that has the capability to model interaction and movements of individual components or groups like casks, railcars etc. The next section covers some of the methods implemented in the Java Transportation Operations Model (JTOM) to facilitate the movement of assemblies, casks, railcars etc. and the various intermodal transfer options. This section also covers the current cask loading and intermodal transfer times implemented in NGSAM. The last section goes over the proposed values for intermodal transportation, and cask transfer/loading operations.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2026

Flaw Tolerance Assessment for DOE Standard SNF Dry Storage Canisters - 26550

The U.S. DOE has designed four spent nuclear fuel (SNF) dry storage canisters for storing DOE standardized SNFs. The DOE standard canisters are cylindrical shells with a diameter of 24 inches (610 m) or 18 inches (457 m), a wall thickness of 0.5 inches (12.7 m) or 0.375 inches (9.53 m), and a length of 15 feet (4.57 m) or 10 feet (3.05 m). These DOE canister geometries are completely different from commercial canisters. The latter may experience chloride-induced stress cracking corrosion (CI-SCC) because they are stored near coastal regions. The former may not experience CI-SCC but face different challenges because they are stored in the SNF storage facilities. Because of large residual stresses, mechanical flaws may occur in the DOE canisters during long-distance transportation or lifting handling. To date, only limited structural integrity analyses were carried out through drop tests on the DOE canisters, but a more general flaw tolerance assessment has not been performed. Therefore, the failure assessment diagram (FAD)-based fracture mechanics method, as codified by the latest API 579-1/ASME FFS-1-2021 Edition, is adopted in this work to assess surface flaw tolerance for DOE canisters under operation loading and welding residual stresses (WRS), where the new code-recommended WRS distributions are used. To more adequately consider the transverse distribution of WRS, an equivalent WRS distribution is proposed to account for the WRS reduction with distance from the weld centerline. Moreover, the closed-form solutions of stress intensity factor K, which serves as the crack driving force during subcritical crack growth, are developed from the tabular data of the K factors provided in API 579-1/ASME FFS-1 and used to determine more accurate flaw sizes at flaw instability. Subsequently, the Level 2 assessment procedures with 12 assessment steps, as codified and detailed in API 579-1 and ASME FFS-1, are followed to assess the flaw tolerance for the surface flaws in the DOE standard canisters with consideration of normal or accident operation loads combined with WRS. The assessment results show that the four designs of DOE standard canisters can tolerate all surface flaws that meet the code permitted maximum sizes of a flaw length of 8 inches (i.e., 200 mm) and a flaw depth of 80% wall thickness. This demonstrates that all designs of DOE standard canisters are robust and reliable.

DOE standard canister↗

DOE OSTI2023

FY23 Status Report: SNF Interim Storage Canister Corrosion and Surface Environment Investigations

Work evaluating spent nuclear fuel (SNF) dry storage canister surface environments and canister corrosion progressed significantly in FY23, with the goal of developing a scientific understanding of the processes controlling initiation and growth of stress corrosion cracking (SCC) cracks in stainless steel canisters in relevant storage environments. The results of the work performed at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) will guide future work and will contribute to the development of better tools for predicting potential canister penetration by SCC.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2022

Review of Experimental Data for Validating Computer Codes Used in Shielding Calculations for Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation Systems

This report presents a review of available radiochemical assay data and shielding benchmarks applicable to spent nuclear fuel (SNF) shielding calculations. The relevant information reviewed herein includes the Spent Fuel Composition (SFCOMPO) database, the Shielding Integral Benchmark Archive and Database (SINBAD), the International Handbook of Evaluated Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments, and published measurements of external dose rates of casks loaded with SNF. The relevant experimental data identified in this report may be used to support verification and validation of computer codes used in SNF cask/transport shielding applications, as well as development of calculation uncertainties. It should be noted that a relatively small subset of the identified experimental data (e.g., criticality alarm experiments) is available in a standard format established by the international community participating in experimental isotopic and shielding data evaluations. An effort of the SFCOMPO Technical Review Group (TRG) is underway to publish first isotopic evaluations of individual assay data using a standard data evaluation format. The SINBAD TRG has recently initiated benchmark evaluations and modernization of the database. Therefore, more relevant information is expected in the future that will enable users to select quality experimental data in depletion code and shielding code validations for SNF applications.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2021

Spent Nuclear Fuel Mechanical Loads in the General Package Drop Scenario

The US Department of Energy Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology program is performing research to determine the mechanical loading conditions applied to spent nuclear fuel (SNF) during normal conditions of transportation to inform mechanical tests of SNF and close an important knowledge gap related to the practical disposition of SNF in the US. A recent multi-national collaborative test campaign measured SNF assembly impact response to the 30 cm horizontal package drop scenario, which is a common regulatory basis test of SNF package design. Researchers at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) are using the test data to validate explicit finite element models to calculate the mechanical loads and structural response of spent nuclear fuel assemblies in the as-tested 30 cm horizontal package drop scenario. Once the as-tested package drop model is validated, the next step is to apply the model to the general 30 cm drop scenario, which includes all impact angles, all fuel assembly types, and all burnup conditions. PNNL is developing a damage model that will incorporate the results of finite element parametric studies to establish trends in SNF mechanical loading to various input parameters, like impact orientation and burnup. The damage model will have the capability to estimate mechanical loads for any single set of input parameters, but it will first be used to describe the upper bounds of potential SNF loading in the 30 cm drop scenario. This paper describes PNNL’s progress toward developing the general solution to the problem of spent nuclear fuel mechanical loads in the 30 cm package drop scenario and it describes the next steps in closing the knowledge gap.

Klymyshyn, Nicholas A.↗

DOE OSTI2023

Overview of System Integration Analysis Activities for Integrated Waste Management

Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) generated by the current fleet of commercial nuclear reactors is being stored at the reactor sites in spent fuel pools (SFPs) and in dry independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs). The US Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) is developing an Integrated Waste Management Program (IWMP) comprising a suite of options and supporting analyses to enable future informed choices. The IWMP is organized into the following five major areas: 1) Consent-Based Siting, 2) IWM Facilities and Equipment Concepts and Development, 3) Transportation Capability Analysis and Support, 4) Information Technology Solutions and Support, and 5) System Integration Analysis and Support. This paper discusses the activities ongoing in the IWMP System Integration Analysis and Support area. Two main areas of research in system integration are data and tools development, as well as system analysis assessments. One of the tools being developed in the system integration area is the Used Nuclear Fuel-Storage, Transportation & Disposal Analysis Resource and Data System (UNF-ST&DARDS) tool. It is being developed as a foundational resource for DOE-NE to manage SNF data, along with several compatible analysis tools for time-dependent characterization of SNF and related systems. UNF-ST&DARDS has the unparalleled ability to track SNF through the entire back end of the fuel cycle—from the time the fuel is discharged from a reactor through its disposal in a geological repository. UNF ST&DARDS interfaces with the SCALE code system for nuclear analysis and COBRA-SFS for thermal analysis. Another main tool being developed is the Next Generation System Analysis Model (NGSAM). NGSAM is an agent-based simulation software tool expressly designed to be capable of modeling the waste management system. NGSAM has been developed to enable informed decision-making by providing the capability of analyzing various potential system options for the management of SNF and HLW. Using NGSAM, system architecture analyses are being conducted to support the future deployment of a comprehensive nuclear waste management system that considers all major back-end aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle (i.e., transportation, storage, and disposal). System analysis assessments may investigate the implications of various strategies such as different acceptance rates, acceptance queues, facility capacities and options, standardized canisters, and different assumed system operation start dates. Recently, some system analysis effort has begun to look at how the waste management system might operate for advanced reactor fuel cycles.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗