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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 361 records · Page 20

Predicting Saturated Hydraulic Conductivity over Time for Degrading Saltstone Vault Concrete - 20376

At the Savannah River Site (SRS), low-level liquid tank waste is mixed with cementitious materials to produce a solid, monolithic waste form referred to as saltstone. The liquid saltstone mixture is pumped into massive concrete structures referred to as saltstone disposal units (SDUs) for curing and long-term storage. SDUs are vaults made of high performance concrete forming a barrier between saltstone and the surrounding environment. Predicting the long-term performance of SDU vault concrete, as well as the saltstone material itself, is critical to understanding the potential releases of radionuclides to the surrounding environment as described in the Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF) performance assessment (PA). The hydraulic conductivity profile for SDU vault concrete was conservatively assumed to degrade linearly from the initial saturated hydraulic conductivity of the intact concrete over a long period of time. The initial hydraulic properties of saturated SDU vault concrete have been measured, and the final hydraulic properties of degraded vault concrete are assumed to be the same as the porous backfill material that will surround the vault after closure. The assumed final condition of the vault concrete is also conservative in that it provides a greater estimate of water penetration through the vault than would generally be expected. Therefore, insights that provide more realistic but conservative estimates as to how degradation processes may change the hydraulic properties of the SDU vault concrete, the time dependent relationship of the vault concrete hydraulic properties to degradation (and thus time), and the final hydraulic properties of the vault concrete provides useful additions to the SDF PA. This paper focuses on the assumption that the saltstone vault concrete saturated hydraulic conductivity would decrease linearly as a function of degradation time; this assumption resulted from a worst-case, weighted (by relative layer thickness), arithmetic average of intact and backfill material hydraulic conductivities representing flow parallel to a layered system. This research indicates that the effective saturated hydraulic conductivity of the degraded SDU vault concrete should be based on the relative thickness-weighted geometric mean of the intact and degraded layers hydraulic conductivities. This alternative, which is supported extensively in the relevant literature and evaluated in this paper, leads to a more realistic and defensible estimate of the effective saturated hydraulic conductivity in degraded vault concrete while remaining conservative. The impact of using the more realistic estimate of the effective saturated hydraulic conductivity for the degraded concrete decreases the effective saturated hydraulic conductivity by up to several orders of magnitude for early times (i.e., when the SDU vault concrete is assumed degraded via sulfate attack and carbonation). This revised estimate of the effective saturated hydraulic conductivity has been implemented in the recently revised SDF PA. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

WTEC monograph on instrumentation, control and safety systems of Canadian nuclear facilities

This report updates a 1989-90 survey of advanced instrumentation and controls (I&C) technologies and associated human factors issues in the U.S. and Canadian nuclear industries carried out by a team from Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Carter and Uhrig 1990). The authors found that the most advanced I&C systems are in the Canadian CANDU plants, where the newest plant (Darlington) has digital systems in almost 100 percent of its control systems and in over 70 percent of its plant protection system. Increased emphasis on human factors and cognitive science in modern control rooms has resulted in a reduced workload for the operators and the elimination of many human errors. Automation implemented through digital instrumentation and control is effectively changing the role of the operator to that of a systems manager. The hypothesis that properly introducing digital systems increases safety is supported by the Canadian experience. The performance of these digital systems has been achieved using appropriate quality assurance programs for both hardware and software development. Recent regulatory authority review of the development of safety-critical software has resulted in the creation of isolated software modules with well defined interfaces and more formal structure in the software generation. The ability of digital systems to detect impending failures and initiate a fail-safe action is a significant safety issue that should be of special interest to nuclear utilities and regulatory authorities around the world.

Uhrig, Robert E.↗

Past Approaches for Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level, and Transuranic Waste Disposal in the United States—Part 1: Safety Criteria and Treatment of Uncertainty

The United States (US), with its 50-year experience in developing deep geologic disposal for transuranic waste, spent nuclear fuel (SNF), and high-level radioactive waste (HLW), has much to share with other countries. Yet, other countries are better able to translate the US experience and corresponding policy decisions into solutions sensible for their country when they understand the compliance requirements in US laws and regulations. This paper presents past approaches in the generic and site-specific standards of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and implementing regulations of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) using the framework provided by (1) key questions of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, and (2) international consensus standards. Both the 1985 EPA generic standards, as updated in 1993 and applied at the operating Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in southern New Mexico for transuranic waste from atomic energy defense activities, and the EPA 2008 site-specific standards and implementing regulations, as applied at the proposed Yucca Mountain repository in southern Nevada for SNF and HLW, adopt the strategy of using quantitative, probabilistic analysis to assess performance and compliance.

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History of Ultrasonic Inspection of High-Level Waste Tanks at SRS - 20220

The Liquid Waste Disposition Projects (LWDP) Structural Authority and Inspection Engineering Support Group has teamed with the Materials Science and Technology Non-destructive Evaluation Group of Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) to implement a comprehensive In-Service Inspection (ISI) program for the High-Level Waste (HLW) tanks in the sites tank farms. The purpose of this program is to demonstrate the structural and leak integrity of the tanks to maintain the function of waste containment throughout the desired service life. Four types of waste tanks were constructed at Savannah River Site (SRS) from 1951 thru 1981 to store radioactive nuclear waste from the separations process. The Type I, II and III are carbon steel cylindrical tanks with varying degrees of access to the side walls and very limited access to the tank bottom. The tanks contain 750,000 to 1.3 million gallons of waste and are buried or backfilled with soil. The tanks are 75'-85' in diameter and 24'-33' from tank bottom to the tank roof. Inspection of the HLW tanks is made difficult by radiation, contamination, and small access openings. Through the years these challenges have been overcome by progressive improvements to programs and equipment resulting in the sophisticated wall crawler Ultrasonic Testing (UT) technology of today. A formal inspection program was developed and put in service in 1972. UT thickness measurements were first made in 1967 and 1969 of selected waste tanks using an analog-type instrument to measure the thickness of the carbon steel walls. Routine inspections for thinning were performed from 1972-1985 and then discontinued because no thinning had been observed and this technique could not detect pitting or cracking. UT inspections resumed in 1994 using a sophisticated robotic wall crawler with UT technology capable of detecting thinning, cracking and pitting. The current program focuses on the newer Type III tanks that are used primarily for storage. The program was upgraded in 2003 to include selected regions of the tank wall, secondary wall and annulus floor on a 7 to 10-year frequency. The facility is currently in its third cycle of tank inspections. Thus far, there have been no reportable indications of service induced degradation. This result provides assurance that the chemistry control program has been effective at mitigating corrosion and that the tanks remain structurally sound even after more than 40 years of service. This paper will present the UT technology first used at SRS and the evolution to the current systems and their capabilities. Additionally, plans for equipment upgrades that will improve the extent of inspection will be discussed. (authors)

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Regulatory Treatment of Non-Core Sources of Radioactivity for Advanced Reactor Designs

The recent resurgence in advance (non-light water) reactor development has been paralleled by the development of risk-informed performance-based (RIPB) licensing pathways. Specifically, the creation of the RIPB Licensing Modernization Project (LMP) approach and subsequent endorsement by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) now provides advanced reactor vendors with a defined RIPB method to develop an affirmative safety case for licensing. In addition, the Technology Inclusive Content of Applications Project (TICAP) has published guidance on developing a license application based on the LMP approach. To support the utilization of risk information as part of advanced reactor design and licensing efforts, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)/American Nuclear Society (ANS) Joint Committee on Nuclear Risk Management (JCNRM) has developed a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) standard for advanced reactors. The standard, which was formerly approved by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) in 2021 and recently endorsed by the NRC in trial use Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.247, is an integral standard, covering from initiating events to offsite consequence. A major feature of the standard is that it permits the inclusion of any source of radioactivity material at the site within the plant PRA. Therefore, non-core sources of radioactivity, such as fuel storage, fuel processing, and purification systems, can be included within a single comprehensive plant PRA. For those advanced reactor vendors utilizing a RIPB licensing approach, there is an opportunity to include the non-core sources of radioactivity within the RIPB framework for licensing decision-making, such as the categorization of events, classification of structures, systems, and components (SSCs), and evaluation of the adequacy of defense-in-depth (DID). For advanced reactor designs that contain multiple non-core sources of radioactivity, or for monolithic plant sites that include associated fuel facilities, this approach could potentially simplify licensing applications through the use of a single, uniform, and consistent decision-making framework across all radioactive sources at the site. In addition, a RIPB approach could provide additional insights regarding plant behavior, flexibility regarding licensing decision-making, and potentially allow the use of risk information as part of the plant oversight process. Risk-informing these aspects of advanced reactor licensing would also be consistent with the NRC’s risk policy statement. However, there is diverse regulation and guidance regarding the licensing of non-core sources of radioactivity and generally limited experience using RIPB approaches for the evaluation as part of licensing.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Emergency Radiation Dose Rate Monitoring During Prolonged Armed Conflict

The 2022 Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine has introduced unprecedented challenges for the nuclear power generation and radiological safety communities, including occupation and disturbance of highly-contaminated areas, occupation of a nuclear power plant, and strikes near and within boundaries of nuclear sites. The war has necessitated the implementation of a supplementary dose rate sensor network to provide resilient measurement data for public protection and leadership awareness. This paper discusses the implementation of such a system, the factors determining what equipment is best suited for the purpose, and practical factors regarding deployment of the system and data management. The crucial factors for operating a supplementary dose rate sensing network are backup power and communications options for dose rate sensors to make the network resilient to the effects of military operations. The most important implementation factor is to plan for extended operations beyond those typically considered for emergency response given the unpredictable nature of warfare.

resilience↗

Dynamic Instructions for Nuclear Power Plant Field Workers

Most tasks conducted at a nuclear power plant are guided by a procedure in one way or another. Some tasks must be conducted by strictly adhering to the prescribed steps, while other tasks use the procedures as a reference guide. Traditionally, the procedure process in the nuclear industry has been paper heavy. In recent years however, the nuclear industry has considered adopting more dynamic solutions to improve the efficiency of their work management process, advance human and system performance, as well as reduce the cost of handling paper copies of documentation. As a first step, many nuclear utilities in the U.S. deployed solutions that electronically route the documents through the review and approval processes and where the worker in the field uses an electronic copy of the instruction or procedure on a handheld device. These electronic copies are very similar to the format of the paper instruction but do have some additional capabilities to capture recorded input and notes.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Fast Advective Water Flow through Nanochannels in Clay Interlayers: Implications for Moisture Transport in Soils and Unconventional Oil/Gas Production

Water flow in nanometer or sub-nanometer hydrophilic channels bears special importance in diverse fields of science and engineering. However, the nature of such water flow remains elusive. In this work, we report our molecular-modeling results on water flow in a sub-nanometer clay interlayer between two montmorillonite layers. We show that a fast advective flow can be induced by evaporation at one end of the interlayer channel, that is, a large suction pressure created by evaporation (~818 MPa) is able to drive the fast water flow through the channel (~0.88 m/s for a 46 Å-long channel). Scaled up for the pressure gradient to a 2 μm particle, the velocity of water is estimated to be about 95 μm/s, indicating that water can quickly flow through a μm-sized clay particle within seconds. The prediction seems to be confirmed by our thermogravimetric analysis of bentonite hydration and dehydration processes, which indicates that water transport at the early stage of the dehydration is a fast advective process, followed by a slow diffusion process. The possible occurrence of a fast advective water flow in clay interlayers prompts us to reassess water transport in a broad set of natural and engineered systems such as clay swelling/shrinking, moisture transport in soils, water uptake by plants, water imbibition/release in unconventional hydrocarbon reservoirs, and cap rock integrity of supercritical CO 2 storage.

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Workshop on Establishing and Operating a National Nuclear Security Support Centre Hypothetical Scenario: “Centralia Nuclear Security Support Centre Technical Support Plan”

This plan outlines the systemic and coordinated management of the CNSSC technical support programme. In accordance with the CNSSC Strategy Implementation Plan and Memoranda of Understanding among stakeholders, Centralia Border Guards (CBG) and Centralia Nuclear Energy Agency (CNEA) will lead the effort to develop standardized approach to technical support and will provide technical support to the following CNSSC stakeholders: CBG, CNEA, Centralia National Police (CNP), Centralia Coast Guard (CCG), and CentrAtom/Centralia Nuclear Power Plant (CNPP).

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Design and Development of a Robotic Exoskeleton Device for use in Glove Boxes - 20374

Glovebox operators in nuclear facilities often operate under radioactive environment and typically perform monotonous, dull and repetitive work. This can result in muscle fatigue leading to increased levels of accidents. Current research work aims in assisting the glovebox operators by designing a novel upper limb exoskeleton device to reduce injuries and increase worker efficiency. Almost none of the commercially available hand and upper body exoskeletons are directly suitable for use in gloveboxes. This explains the novelty of the present work in developing a wearable powered robotic exoskeleton device. The device consists of electronics, motors and spring systems mounted on adjustable plates and is supported by a stationary frame behind the worker. The device is intended to be portable and adjustable according to the operator height. The elbow has a flexion movement assisted with motor control by way of a Bowden cable system. The system is floated on a spring and pulley combination that allows for extra safety and smoothness of operation. The end points are fixed near the pivot points to help minimize unwanted movement/torque. The extension movement of the upper and lower arm are assisted by gravity and a counter spring. The shoulder and upper arm movement are held in a neutral position with a spring system for counter balance allowing small movements within the glovebox. This initial concept considers only the vertical movement of the arm. The abduction and adduction movement will not be assisted or impeded by the over shoulder plate or at the forearm plate allowing for full range of motion. Several glovebox aspects such as the level of task assistance, ergonomic design, minimum hindrance in dexterity/operator movements and tear resistance for hazardous safety reasons will be considered in the design of the exoskeleton. Computer models will be simulated to test the load levels and stress conditions on the exoskeleton to enhance the designs. The exoskeleton focusses on major muscular involvement reduction through weight offset and active assistance with minimal parts and hence the device is derived with several joint links and contains both passive and active joints. The paper details the various stages in the design development and prototype testing of the exoskeleton device. Upon successful prototype device development, human testing will be conducted in a replica of the SRS-235F hot cell facility constructed at FIU-ARC. The final stage of the project will be potential testing/deployment of the exoskeleton device in one of the glovebox facilities in Savannah River Nuclear Waste site. (authors)

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The Use of Silver Chloride Injection in Remediation of Iodine-129 by In Situ Capture as Silver Iodide at the F-Area Seepage Basin - 20225

The Savannah River Site (SRS) produced tritium, plutonium, and special nuclear materials for national defense, medicine, and the space programs. As part of operations, the F-Area Seepage Basins operated until 1988 for the disposition of deionized acidic wastewater from the F Separations Facility. The wastewater contained dilute nitric acid and low concentrations of non-radioactive metals, and radionuclides, with the major isotopes being Cs-137, Sr-90, U-235, U-238, Pu-239, Tc-99, I-129, and tritium. The seepage basins were closed in 1988 and backfilled and capped by 1991. The groundwater emanating from beneath the closed and capped seepage basins is acidic and contains elevated levels of both chemical and radiological contaminants. Releases from the groundwater plumes sourced from the F-Area Seepage Basins have impacted the water quality of Fourmile Branch, which is a small tributary to the Savannah River, a regional water source. A large pump-and-treat system was constructed in 1997 and operated until 2003 in an attempt to capture the releases to Fourmile Branch. The system in F Area and a similar system in H Area were expensive (∼$1.3 M/month) to operate and produced large quantities of radioactive waste, with concentrations of I- 129 too high to be disposed of at the SRS. In 2004, SRS replaced pump-and-treat with a funnel and gate system that along with operation of a base injection system at the gates reduces the flux of contaminants to the wetlands adjacent to Fourmile Branch. The alkaline solution injected into the aquifer neutralizes the acidic plume and immobilizes many of the cationic constituents. However, base injection is not effective in managing the release of iodine-129, an anionic contaminant. To address iodine-129 SRS and the Savannah River National Laboratory developed an in situ technology that uses ultra-fine ground silver chloride (AgCl) as an injectable capture medium for the sequestration of iodine-129. The AgCl amendment has a very small particle size and is designed to be injected into the contaminated aquifer to capture iodine-129. Dissolved iodine-129 forms a stable and highly insoluble solid (silver iodide) upon contact with AgCl. Laboratory studies, a field scale pilot test (2009), and three deployments (2011, 2015 and 2019) of AgCl have been successfully performed at the F-Area Seepage Basins. (authors)

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Ion-Exchange Modeling of Crystalline Silicotitanate for Cesium Removal - 20283

The Tank Closure Cesium Removal (TCCR) system is a Savannah River Site (SRS) demonstration 'at-tank' process designed to remove {sup 137}Cs from the high-level aqueous tank waste so that the decontaminated solution can be disposed as low-level waste. Cesium is removed by ion exchange (IX) columns using engineered IONSIV{sup TM} R9120-B form of the Crystalline Silicotitanate (CST) media. The TCCR system is deployed at Tanks 10 and Tank 11 in the SRS H Tank Farm. Water is added to the salt-cake in Tank 10 H to dissolve it. The dissolved salt solution waste is pumped out of Tank 10H (feed tank), through filters and IX columns. The decontaminated salt solution is transferred to Tank 11 (receipt tank), and on to Tank 50H for final disposal in the Saltstone Production Facility. The current TCCR can accommodate lead-lag (two-column) or lead-lag-guard (three-column) configurations to optimize media utilization and achieve the target decontamination. To assist the TCCR operations, a parametric study was conducted to evaluate the impact of different parameters (e.g., column configurations (single column, two columns or three columns in series), waste characteristics, operating temperature, process flow rate, CST average particle size) on the IX column performance including CST bed utilization. The initial results indicate that the IX column performance is improved at slower process flow rate, at lower operating temperature, and with smaller CST average particle size. Multi-column configurations are recommended, because the single-column configuration does not utilize CST bed effectively. This paper demonstrates the versatility of the ion exchange modeling to evaluate the effects of CST characteristics and operational parameters on IX column performances. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Contaminant Transport Modeling for Technology Evaluation and Long-Term Monitoring in the Tims Branch Testbed, SC - 20343

Studies conducted at U.S. DOE sites have shown the presence of heavy metals, radionuclides, and volatile organic compounds in surface water, groundwater, and soil as a result of nuclear activity in the Cold War era. Since the 1990's, innovative cleanup methods have been implemented in the Tims Branch watershed at Savannah River Site (SRS) to limit the contaminant flux to the stream that have reduced the contaminant concentrations to acceptable regulatory levels in the dissolved phase. A tin-based treatment which effectively eliminated all local anthropogenic mercury inputs to this ecosystem resulted in a known step function addition of inert tin oxide particles which now serve as a potential tracer for sedimentation and particle transport processes in the stream. The long-term effectiveness of this and other remediation techniques and the potential for remobilization of adsorbed contaminant in sediment during extreme hydrologic conditions however remains unclear. It is therefore important to understand not only the fate and transport of dissolved contaminants, but also the movement of sediment and the relevant interactions with dissolved contaminant. To narrow this knowledge gap, a study is being conducted using the Tims Branch watershed as a stream-scale ecosystem test-bed to identify the primary transport processes of major contaminants of concern (such as mercury, nickel and uranium) with an emphasis on interactions with sediment transport. This involves the development of a fully distributed hydrologic watershed model of the Tims Branch watershed to predict streamflow under extreme weather conditions, as well as the development of a comprehensive contaminant transport model that can properly account for coupled contaminant and sediment transport. Review of relevant research reports and peer-reviewed journals revealed that aside from advection-dispersion transport of dissolved contaminants, adsorption and desorption with suspended solids and bed sediment also play an important role in the transport of those contaminants of concern. To develop the fully distributed hydrologic watershed model, the MIKE SHE 2-dimensional (2D) land surface/3D groundwater model that simulates surface/subsurface hydrologic processes (such as overland flow, evapotranspiration, and infiltration) was coupled with a 1D streamflow model that accounts for stream water hydraulics (such as hydraulic structures, cross-sections, and network). To model contaminant transport, the MIKE 11 streamflow component was coupled with the MIKE 11 AD module that simulates solute transport through advection and dispersion, and MIKE ECO Lab module that accounts for both sediment transport and interactions with dissolved contaminant. At this stage, the development and optimization of the fully distributed hydrologic model has been completed, achieving satisfactory statistical results between observed and predicted discharge as indicated by a root mean square error (RMSE) of 0.039 cms and a Nash-Sutcliffe efficiency coefficient (NSE) of 0.764. The ongoing development of the contaminant transport model has also yielded realistic results from preliminary tests. Results from this study are a key to evaluating the effectiveness of tin (II)-based mercury treatment of wetlands at the SRS site, and are also relevant to evaluating the potential of using this type of novel remediation technology in other mercury-contaminated stream systems. Knowledge acquired from this research will also support interpretation of historical data on the trends of contaminant concentration distribution in Tims Branch, particularly considering the effect of extreme hydrological events on the stream flow and pollutant transport. (authors)

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Follow-On Report of Analysis of Approaches to Supplemental Treatment of Low-Activity Waste at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation (Volumes I & II)

The Hanford Site, in southeast Washington State, is preparing to disposition approximately 56,000,000 gallons (56 Mgal) of radioactive and chemically hazardous wastes currently stored in underground tanks at the site. Tank wastes will be divided into a high-activity fraction and a low-activity fraction for subsequent treatment and disposition. A waste processing and treatment facility, the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP), will include the high-level waste (HLW) vitrification facility (WTP HLW Vitrification Facility) for immobilizing the high-activity fraction and a low-activity waste (LAW) vitrification facility (WTP LAW Vitrification Facility) for immobilizing the low-activity fraction. Both facilities will use vitrification technology to immobilize the Hanford tank wastes in a glass waste form.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Update to Transportation Analysis for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The goal of this transportation analysis (TA) is to update the 2008 TA in order to evaluate the impacts associated with the transportation of transuranic (TRU) waste from waste generator sites to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility and from waste generator sites to the Idaho National Laboratory (INL).

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