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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 361 records · Page 20
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Design and Development of a Robotic Exoskeleton Device for use in Glove Boxes - 20374

Glovebox operators in nuclear facilities often operate under radioactive environment and typically perform monotonous, dull and repetitive work. This can result in muscle fatigue leading to increased levels of accidents. Current research work aims in assisting the glovebox operators by designing a novel upper limb exoskeleton device to reduce injuries and increase worker efficiency. Almost none of the commercially available hand and upper body exoskeletons are directly suitable for use in gloveboxes. This explains the novelty of the present work in developing a wearable powered robotic exoskeleton device. The device consists of electronics, motors and spring systems mounted on adjustable plates and is supported by a stationary frame behind the worker. The device is intended to be portable and adjustable according to the operator height. The elbow has a flexion movement assisted with motor control by way of a Bowden cable system. The system is floated on a spring and pulley combination that allows for extra safety and smoothness of operation. The end points are fixed near the pivot points to help minimize unwanted movement/torque. The extension movement of the upper and lower arm are assisted by gravity and a counter spring. The shoulder and upper arm movement are held in a neutral position with a spring system for counter balance allowing small movements within the glovebox. This initial concept considers only the vertical movement of the arm. The abduction and adduction movement will not be assisted or impeded by the over shoulder plate or at the forearm plate allowing for full range of motion. Several glovebox aspects such as the level of task assistance, ergonomic design, minimum hindrance in dexterity/operator movements and tear resistance for hazardous safety reasons will be considered in the design of the exoskeleton. Computer models will be simulated to test the load levels and stress conditions on the exoskeleton to enhance the designs. The exoskeleton focusses on major muscular involvement reduction through weight offset and active assistance with minimal parts and hence the device is derived with several joint links and contains both passive and active joints. The paper details the various stages in the design development and prototype testing of the exoskeleton device. Upon successful prototype device development, human testing will be conducted in a replica of the SRS-235F hot cell facility constructed at FIU-ARC. The final stage of the project will be potential testing/deployment of the exoskeleton device in one of the glovebox facilities in Savannah River Nuclear Waste site. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

The Use of Silver Chloride Injection in Remediation of Iodine-129 by In Situ Capture as Silver Iodide at the F-Area Seepage Basin - 20225

The Savannah River Site (SRS) produced tritium, plutonium, and special nuclear materials for national defense, medicine, and the space programs. As part of operations, the F-Area Seepage Basins operated until 1988 for the disposition of deionized acidic wastewater from the F Separations Facility. The wastewater contained dilute nitric acid and low concentrations of non-radioactive metals, and radionuclides, with the major isotopes being Cs-137, Sr-90, U-235, U-238, Pu-239, Tc-99, I-129, and tritium. The seepage basins were closed in 1988 and backfilled and capped by 1991. The groundwater emanating from beneath the closed and capped seepage basins is acidic and contains elevated levels of both chemical and radiological contaminants. Releases from the groundwater plumes sourced from the F-Area Seepage Basins have impacted the water quality of Fourmile Branch, which is a small tributary to the Savannah River, a regional water source. A large pump-and-treat system was constructed in 1997 and operated until 2003 in an attempt to capture the releases to Fourmile Branch. The system in F Area and a similar system in H Area were expensive (∼$1.3 M/month) to operate and produced large quantities of radioactive waste, with concentrations of I- 129 too high to be disposed of at the SRS. In 2004, SRS replaced pump-and-treat with a funnel and gate system that along with operation of a base injection system at the gates reduces the flux of contaminants to the wetlands adjacent to Fourmile Branch. The alkaline solution injected into the aquifer neutralizes the acidic plume and immobilizes many of the cationic constituents. However, base injection is not effective in managing the release of iodine-129, an anionic contaminant. To address iodine-129 SRS and the Savannah River National Laboratory developed an in situ technology that uses ultra-fine ground silver chloride (AgCl) as an injectable capture medium for the sequestration of iodine-129. The AgCl amendment has a very small particle size and is designed to be injected into the contaminated aquifer to capture iodine-129. Dissolved iodine-129 forms a stable and highly insoluble solid (silver iodide) upon contact with AgCl. Laboratory studies, a field scale pilot test (2009), and three deployments (2011, 2015 and 2019) of AgCl have been successfully performed at the F-Area Seepage Basins. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Ion-Exchange Modeling of Crystalline Silicotitanate for Cesium Removal - 20283

The Tank Closure Cesium Removal (TCCR) system is a Savannah River Site (SRS) demonstration 'at-tank' process designed to remove {sup 137}Cs from the high-level aqueous tank waste so that the decontaminated solution can be disposed as low-level waste. Cesium is removed by ion exchange (IX) columns using engineered IONSIV{sup TM} R9120-B form of the Crystalline Silicotitanate (CST) media. The TCCR system is deployed at Tanks 10 and Tank 11 in the SRS H Tank Farm. Water is added to the salt-cake in Tank 10 H to dissolve it. The dissolved salt solution waste is pumped out of Tank 10H (feed tank), through filters and IX columns. The decontaminated salt solution is transferred to Tank 11 (receipt tank), and on to Tank 50H for final disposal in the Saltstone Production Facility. The current TCCR can accommodate lead-lag (two-column) or lead-lag-guard (three-column) configurations to optimize media utilization and achieve the target decontamination. To assist the TCCR operations, a parametric study was conducted to evaluate the impact of different parameters (e.g., column configurations (single column, two columns or three columns in series), waste characteristics, operating temperature, process flow rate, CST average particle size) on the IX column performance including CST bed utilization. The initial results indicate that the IX column performance is improved at slower process flow rate, at lower operating temperature, and with smaller CST average particle size. Multi-column configurations are recommended, because the single-column configuration does not utilize CST bed effectively. This paper demonstrates the versatility of the ion exchange modeling to evaluate the effects of CST characteristics and operational parameters on IX column performances. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Contaminant Transport Modeling for Technology Evaluation and Long-Term Monitoring in the Tims Branch Testbed, SC - 20343

Studies conducted at U.S. DOE sites have shown the presence of heavy metals, radionuclides, and volatile organic compounds in surface water, groundwater, and soil as a result of nuclear activity in the Cold War era. Since the 1990's, innovative cleanup methods have been implemented in the Tims Branch watershed at Savannah River Site (SRS) to limit the contaminant flux to the stream that have reduced the contaminant concentrations to acceptable regulatory levels in the dissolved phase. A tin-based treatment which effectively eliminated all local anthropogenic mercury inputs to this ecosystem resulted in a known step function addition of inert tin oxide particles which now serve as a potential tracer for sedimentation and particle transport processes in the stream. The long-term effectiveness of this and other remediation techniques and the potential for remobilization of adsorbed contaminant in sediment during extreme hydrologic conditions however remains unclear. It is therefore important to understand not only the fate and transport of dissolved contaminants, but also the movement of sediment and the relevant interactions with dissolved contaminant. To narrow this knowledge gap, a study is being conducted using the Tims Branch watershed as a stream-scale ecosystem test-bed to identify the primary transport processes of major contaminants of concern (such as mercury, nickel and uranium) with an emphasis on interactions with sediment transport. This involves the development of a fully distributed hydrologic watershed model of the Tims Branch watershed to predict streamflow under extreme weather conditions, as well as the development of a comprehensive contaminant transport model that can properly account for coupled contaminant and sediment transport. Review of relevant research reports and peer-reviewed journals revealed that aside from advection-dispersion transport of dissolved contaminants, adsorption and desorption with suspended solids and bed sediment also play an important role in the transport of those contaminants of concern. To develop the fully distributed hydrologic watershed model, the MIKE SHE 2-dimensional (2D) land surface/3D groundwater model that simulates surface/subsurface hydrologic processes (such as overland flow, evapotranspiration, and infiltration) was coupled with a 1D streamflow model that accounts for stream water hydraulics (such as hydraulic structures, cross-sections, and network). To model contaminant transport, the MIKE 11 streamflow component was coupled with the MIKE 11 AD module that simulates solute transport through advection and dispersion, and MIKE ECO Lab module that accounts for both sediment transport and interactions with dissolved contaminant. At this stage, the development and optimization of the fully distributed hydrologic model has been completed, achieving satisfactory statistical results between observed and predicted discharge as indicated by a root mean square error (RMSE) of 0.039 cms and a Nash-Sutcliffe efficiency coefficient (NSE) of 0.764. The ongoing development of the contaminant transport model has also yielded realistic results from preliminary tests. Results from this study are a key to evaluating the effectiveness of tin (II)-based mercury treatment of wetlands at the SRS site, and are also relevant to evaluating the potential of using this type of novel remediation technology in other mercury-contaminated stream systems. Knowledge acquired from this research will also support interpretation of historical data on the trends of contaminant concentration distribution in Tims Branch, particularly considering the effect of extreme hydrological events on the stream flow and pollutant transport. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

Follow-On Report of Analysis of Approaches to Supplemental Treatment of Low-Activity Waste at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation (Volumes I & II)

The Hanford Site, in southeast Washington State, is preparing to disposition approximately 56,000,000 gallons (56 Mgal) of radioactive and chemically hazardous wastes currently stored in underground tanks at the site. Tank wastes will be divided into a high-activity fraction and a low-activity fraction for subsequent treatment and disposition. A waste processing and treatment facility, the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP), will include the high-level waste (HLW) vitrification facility (WTP HLW Vitrification Facility) for immobilizing the high-activity fraction and a low-activity waste (LAW) vitrification facility (WTP LAW Vitrification Facility) for immobilizing the low-activity fraction. Both facilities will use vitrification technology to immobilize the Hanford tank wastes in a glass waste form.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Update to Transportation Analysis for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The goal of this transportation analysis (TA) is to update the 2008 TA in order to evaluate the impacts associated with the transportation of transuranic (TRU) waste from waste generator sites to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility and from waste generator sites to the Idaho National Laboratory (INL).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

What's the big deal with TA-55's trash?

There's a beast of hazardous waste, and we're learning how to tame it. Plutonium and production activities are ongoing at TA-55, which means the beast of hazardous waste is always looming around the corner. The Laboratory must dispose of this delicate type of waste properly and swiftly. Learning from previous snags and pitfalls in an incredibly complex process, TA-55 leadership and staff have worked together to greatly improve and streamline waste processes. The result: As of the last week of fiscal year 2020, 42 shipments containing 1,275 containers of transuranic (TRU) waste were sent to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in southern New Mexico, the nation’s only repository for defense-generated TRU waste. In FY 2019, we shipped less than half that amount.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

ARC-100 Reactor Security-by-Design Summary

This report applies the security-by-design methodology developed in a previous National Nuclear Security Administration–sponsored work to the Advanced Reactor Concepts 100 (ARC-100) sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) design. The report contains no proprietary information specific to the ARC 100 reactor. The insights developed in this report are high-level, and generally applicable to other sodium fast reactor designs. The information presented here is the result of a qualitative safety-based analysis and would not inform any potential adversary beyond what would be found in a docketed safety analysis report. The scope of this present report covers ARC-100’s reactor core, used fuel storage, and used fuel assembly wash station. These systems are also compared to a generic SFR design assumed in the previous study. The security assessment results show changes in structures, systems, and components (SSCs) safety importance relative to the generic SFR SSCs. However, the consequence assessment results are the similar to a previously assessed generic SFR. Several SSCs have higher importance rankings than others, and it is recommended that protection efforts are prioritized for these SSCs. This work will continue in the Fiscal Year 2025 for the remaining ARC-100 systems, including cesium trap, sodium cold trap, noble gas decay tanks (dewar bottles), and used fuel dry storage facility, to provide safety-and-security-by-design insights and recommendations on non-core systems. Results from this work will furnish a technical justification for the feasibility of these solutions for the ARC reactor's design and, where applicable, identify any regulatory benefits conferred by the proactive design aspect within a risk management framework. This initiative will contribute to a more secure design of the ARC reactor and support its licensing process.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2025

HFIR High Power HEU Neutronics Analyses

Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Material Management and Minimization’s mission includes the conversion of civilian research reactors from highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. Analyses have shown that the Oak Ridge National Laboratory High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) will need to operate at 95 MW for the LEU silicide dispersion fuel designs to match key performance metrics obtained with HEU fuel at 85 MW. To prove safe operation of HFIR after installation of plant modifications to increase power, a high power HEU test cycle was proposed. Neutronics model updates and reactor physics analyses are performed to support the development of safety design reports for the high power (HP) HEU test cycle. Reactor physics metrics evaluated herein include fuel depletion, actinide production, cycle length, fission rate density distributions, axial power peaking factors, and reactor kinetic parameters. These reactor physics analyses support the development of future LEU safety design reports by providing key input for future HP HEU HFIR thermal hydraulics and reactor transient safety analyses.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Developing and Implementing New Waste Chemistry Controls for Hanford's Double-Shell Tanks - 20041

Waste chemistry controls for the Hanford double-shell tanks (DSTs) were established in the 1980's in response to tank failures caused by stress corrosion cracking (SCC) at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The controls were established based on a combination of SRS chemistry limits and corrosion testing results. Conditions in the Hanford DSTs have changed over time, with the temperature in the majority of the DSTs dropping below 50 deg. C. Testing indicated that the original chemistry control specification and SCC testing performed in 2010 did not protect against pitting corrosion mechanisms - what is believed to have caused the failure of tank 241-AY-102. New waste chemistry controls are necessary to protect the DSTs from both SCC and pitting corrosion. Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), with input from the Tank Integrity Expert Panel (TIEP) Corrosion Subgroup (CSG), performed a statistically based investigation of nitrate and halide ion induced pitting corrosion. The investigation was intended to develop a comprehensive waste chemistry envelope that minimizes the risk of both SCC and pitting caused by halide and nitrate ions. The waste chemistry envelope needed to be robust enough to address future waste retrieval and process changes which could significantly change the waste composition of the DSTs. The experimental design allowed the statistically significant ions and their effect on pitting corrosion to be determined. SRNL developed the 'pitting factor' which is an empirical relationship between the statistically significant inhibitive species (hydroxide, and nitrite), and pitting inducing species (nitrate, chloride, and fluoride). The coefficients are weighted factors that show the degree of influence the species have on the propensity for pitting. New waste chemistry control limits were recommended by SRNL, and concurred with by the TIEP CSG, that incorporated the pitting factor along with other limits. The controls developed to reduce the risk of pitting corrosion were evaluated to determine if they also protected against SCC. Hundreds of test results were reviewed and compared against the proposed limits. With the exception of one test result, instances where cracking was observed corresponded to chemistry that was outside of the proposed limits - indicating that the chemistry controls developed for pitting also adequately addressed SCC concerns. Existing tank composition estimates were evaluated against the new chemistry controls - three current tank chemistries are suspect, and may not meet the new chemistry control requirements. These included the interstitial liquid (liquid associated with solids) of DSTs 241-AN-102, 241-AN-106, 241-AN-107, and 241-AY-101. Measures are ongoing to evaluate the tanks with the suspect chemistry. These include varying combinations of: performing additional evaluations (history of use, modeling); DST specific laboratory testing; and, pursuing core samples of the DSTs. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Technology Development for Dry Storage of Aluminum-Clad Spent Nuclear Fuel - 20490

A candidate disposition pathway for the > 13 MTHM of aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF), owned and managed by the U.S. Department of Energy, is the drying and placement of the SNF into sealed-canister dry storage, with the ASNF-in- canisters 'road-ready' for transportation to and final direct disposal in a repository waste package. Technical information gaps in fuel drying, and fuel dry storage behavior, have previously challenged the declaration of technology readiness for drying and placement of this fuel into the DOE Standard Canister design for > 50 years of safe dry storage. The principal technical information gaps included: i) characterization and thermal dehydration behavior of aluminum (oxy)hydroxide films attendant on the cladding due to film formation during reactor operation and during post-discharge up to long-term wet storage histories; and ii) G-value data to enable estimation of the radiolytic gas generation from the cladding with its (oxy)hydroxide films. Thus, the oxide films on the ASNF challenged the safety of a sealed storage canister with thermal and radiolytic decomposition of the waters on the films that can lead to corrosion, pressurization, and flammability issues. These gaps in the technical information base have largely been closed. This paper discusses the investigations at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and the Savannah River National laboratory (SRNL), and outlines the pending technology development work for input to an engineering design to enable a road-ready dry storage system for ASNF. The ASNF inventory considered for road-ready dry storage is stored at the Savannah River Site (SRS) and at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) at the INL. The ASNF inventory in the SRS L Basin is from foreign and domestic research reactors (FRR and DRR), and is diverse in terms of design, irradiation, and post-reactor-discharge storage conditions; these factors yield a range of characteristics of cladding oxide films on ASNF. Mixed aluminum (oxy)hydroxide (boehmite and bayerite/gibbsite) films, non-uniform in thicknesses up to a maximum local thickness bounded by 25 μm, were observed on ASNF materials removed from wet storage in the L Basin and in non-sealed dry storage at the SRS following reactor service and a long-term (up to 40+ years) interim storage history. The ASNF inventory at INTEC, in both wet and vented dry storage, is predominantly from the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), but it also includes DRR and FRR fuel. To address a profound behavior of these films, radiolysis testing of aluminum specimens with mixed type boehmite/bayerite oxide films was performed to develop basic data on G-values for production of radiolytic hydrogen under dry storage conditions with nominal relative humidity, temperature, and cover gas. Modeling and simulation of canister internal environments with postulated inventories of oxide films provides estimation of the evolution of the conditions of the canister loaded with ASNF. Simultaneous Thermal Analysis (TGA/DSC) of hydrated oxide powders, and laboratory-scale aluminum specimens with a bayerite film (∼10 μm) using TGA methods, inform drying time/temperature conditions to be used for the ASNF. A demonstration project is recommended for Verification and Validation of the drying and storage of the ASNF. Remaining major tasks leading up to the hot demonstration include scale-up radiolysis testing and scale-up drying testing. Engineering design with the information from the technology program will establish the safety basis and enable long-term (> 50 years) dry storage compatibility with ASNF in the DOE Standard Canister pending its transportation to and disposal in a repository. This full capability would show the ASNF-in-canister storage system to be road-ready. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Modernization of Technical Requirements for Licensing of Advanced Non-Light Water Reactors: Risk-Informed and Performance-Based Evaluation of Defense-in-Depth Adequacy

This document supports the work contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 18-04 “Risk-Informed Performance-Based Technology Inclusive Guidance for Advanced Reactor Licensing Basis Development” Revision 0. NEI 18-04 presents a modern, technology-inclusive, risk-informed, and performance-based (TI-RIPB) process for selection of Licensing Basis Events (LBEs); safety classification of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and associated risk-informed special treatments; and determination of defense-in-depth (DID) adequacy for non-LWRs. The NEI guidance document provides one acceptable means for addressing the aforementioned topics as part of demonstrating a specific design provides reasonable assurance of adequate radiological protection. This report provides the framework and associated methodology guidelines and discussion for establishing, then evaluating, confirming, and documenting the adequacy of defense-in-depth (DID) for advanced non-light-water reactor technologies. It was developed as part of the Licensing Modernization Project led by Southern Company and cost-shared by the United States Department of Energy and has benefited from considerable NRC formal reviews and public workshops. The methodology converts the DID philosophy into a structured process that is implementable, embraces existing United States and international definitions and philosophies of DID that set the foundation for the process. It builds on the DID framework developed in the Department of Energy Next Generation Nuclear Plant Project and earlier works on this subject. The approach to establishing DID adequacy involves the incorporation of DID attributes into the plant capabilities and programmatic elements of DID. The integrated evaluation of DID adequacy includes both quantitative elements to incorporate risk-informed and performance-based (RIPB) considerations and qualitative elements that address uncertainties and limitations in the quantitative models and supporting data. Demonstration of DID adequacy ensures that there are multiple layers of defense for risk-significant challenges to the design and that the plant capabilities and programs that support each layer are provided in a manner that minimizes dependencies among these layers. The focus of this report is assurance of DID adequacy with respect to protection of the public from radiological exposures resulting from accidental releases of radioactive material. While other hazards are not specifically addressed, this methodology is expected to be beneficial for determining DID adequacy for them as well. Risk-informed evaluation of DID considers the integrated performance of all plant SSCs and associated programs to manage daily operational activities, transients, and accidents, including the evaluation of strategies for accident prevention and mitigation. The RIPB LBE scenario methodology used in this evaluation defines the challenges to the plant safety features included in the plant design basis and beyond, and the scope of all deterministic and probabilistic safety evaluations. By examining event sequences across the whole spectrum of LBEs, a systematic assessment of DID can be accomplished.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Evaluation of Joint Cyber/Safety Risk in Nuclear Power Systems

This report presents an analysis of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) for a generic Boiling Water Reactor (BWR)-4 NPP. The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) developed Hazards and Consequences Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS) process is applied to the ECCS and its subsystems to identify unsafe control actions (UCAs) which act as possible cyber events of concern. The analysis is performed for two design basis events: Small-break Loss of Coolant Accident (SLOCA) and general transients (TRANS), such as unintended reactor trip. In previous work, HAZCADS UCAs were combined with other cyber-attack analysis to develop a risk-informed approach; however, this was for a single system. This report explores advanced systems engineering modeling approaches to model the interactions between digital assets across multiple systems which may be targeted by cyber adversaries. The complex and interdependent design of digital systems has the potential to introduce emergent cyber properties that are generally not covered by hazard analyses nor formal nuclear Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). The R&D and supporting analysis presented here explores approaches to predict and manage how interdependent system properties effect risk. To show the potential impact of a successful cyber-attack to formal PRA event tree probabilities, HAZCADS analysis was also used. HAZCADS was also used to model the automatic depressurization system (ADS) automatic actuation. This analysis extended to an integrated system analysis for common-cause failure (CCF). In this aspect, the HAZCADS analysis continued by analyzing plant design details for system connectivity in support of critical plant functions. A dependency matrix was developed to depict the integrated functionality of the interconnected systems. Areas of potential CCF are indicated. Future work could include adversary attack development to show how CCF could be caused, resulting in PRA events. Across the multiple systems that comprise the ECCS, the analysis shows that the change in such probabilities was very different between systems. This indicates that some systems have a larger potential risk impact from successful cyber-attack or digital failure, which indicates a need for these systems to have a higher priority for design and defensive measures. Furthermore, we were able to establish that a risk analysis using any arbitrary threat model establishes an ordering of components with regard to cyber-risk. This ordering can be used to influence the overall system design with an eye to lowering risk, or as a way to understand real-time risk to operational systems based on a current threat landscape. Expert knowledge of both the analysis process and the system being analyzed is required to perform a HAZCADS analysis. The need for a tiered risk analysis is demonstrated by the results of this report.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2023

On the Language of Reliability: A System Engineer Perspective

In its classical definition, risk is defined by three elements: what can go wrong, what are its consequences, and how likely is it to occur? While this definition makes sense in a regulatory-based framework where for the current fleet of operating light water reactors (LWRs), the risks associated with nuclear power plants typically are characterized in terms of core damage and large early release frequency (LERF), this approach does not provide a useful snapshot of the health of the plant from a broader perspective. This is due to the very narrow context in which the term “risk” typically is defined as nuclear safety aspects that have the potential to impact public health. In this paper, we take the viewpoint of nuclear safety that is reflective of the current fleet of operating LWRs for which core damage frequency and LERF are appropriate metrics. For other advanced reactor designs, other more applicable technology neutral metrics of reactor safety metrics would be specified. A possible alternate path would start by redefining the word risk with a broader meaning that better reflects the needs of a system health and asset management decision-making process. Rather than asking how likely an event could occur (in probabilistic terms), we can ask how far this event is from occurring. Our approach starts by defining and quantifying component and system health in terms of a “distance” between its actual and limiting conditions, i.e., determination of the margin that exists between the current state/condition and the state where the component/system is no longer capable of achieving its intended function. A margin is a measure that is more reflective of the current state or performance of a component, and therefore more closely tied to decisions that are made on an ongoing basis. Further, we will show how, given the data available from plant equipment reliability and monitoring (e.g., pump vibration data) and prognostic (e.g., component remaining useful life estimation) data, a margin can be described and determined for all types of maintenance approaches (e.g., corrective or predictive maintenance). We show how classical reliability models (e.g., fault trees) can be used to quantify the system margin provided component margin values. In the approach described in this paper, the propagation of margin values through classical reliability models are not performed using classical probabilistic calculations applied to sets (as performed in a typical plant probabilistic risk assessment). Instead, we show how it is possible to propagate margin values through Boolean logic gates (i.e., AND and OR operators) through distance-based operations.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Field Validation of Electrocoagulation Treatment for Oily Wastewater at Cleveland-Cliffs Steel Mill in Cleveland, OH

The Industrial Technology Validation (ITV) program aims to identify and demonstrate the performance of new, emerging, and underutilized technologies in the industrial sector to help inform decisions towards accelerating commercialization and deployment. This initiative aims to identify, validate, and showcase new, emerging, and underutilized technologies in the industrial sector to expedite their commercialization and widespread deployment. By conducting thorough validations and demonstrating the efficacy of these technologies, the ITV program facilitates informed decision-making among industry stakeholders, contributing to the transition towards more sustainable and efficient industrial processes. This ITV demonstration involved the testing of an electrocoagulation (EC) treatment system at a steel plant in Ohio. The system was designed to treat oily wastewater generated from cold rolling operations.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

Data Integration and Visualization for Enhanced Resilience and Sustainability in Hydropower (DIVERS-H)

U.S. hydropower plants face potential threats from shrinking water supply, rising demands, and warmer stream temperatures from various causes. Power plant owners, operators, and regulators require new tools to take advantage of and interpret the diverse range of scientific data being produced by both observational methods (for example, satellite, radar, stream gauges) and computer modeling methods that evaluate and predict how earth's dynamic systems (atmosphere, oceans, land surface, and sea ice) are changing and interacting. Combining datasets such as these with AI-based analyses introduces a novel decision support system to help users anticipate and address potential impacts on power generation stations. This new technology has been named DIVERS-H for "Data Integration and Visualization for Enhanced Resilience and Sustainability in Hydropower." In Phase I, technical feasibility was established with the development and demonstration of all the new technologies that are required. Most notably, DIVERS-H will use new artificial intelligence (AI) methods to capture the complex dynamics of water availability, demand, and environmental changes. In addition, new data management software was developed, and a prototype user interface was implemented as the precursor to a full scale decision support system. With technical research complete, the project focus now shifts to development of a commercial software product to provide users with actionable insight into water availability and the risk/resilience of critical systems at their locations of interest. Although DIVER-H was originally conceived as a tool for hydroelectric power applications, the same underlying technology can be readily applied to other water-consuming systems including coal, natural gas, oil, and nuclear power plants.

Chaudhary, Aashish [Kitware, Inc., Clifton Park, N↗
DOE OSTI2023

Development of Analysis Methods that Integrate Numeric and Textual Equipment Reliability Data

Within the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program, the Risk-Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway is performing collaborative research on the development and deployment of technologies designed to assist operating nuclear power plants (NPPs) to reduce operating costs improve plant reliability and availability. One of the RISA research areas is focusing on the development of methods and tools designed to optimize plant operations (e.g., maintenance/replacement schedules, optimal maintenance postures for plant structures, systems, and components [SSCs]) in a manner that is more cost effective than current approaches and makes better use of available SSC health data. The Risk-Informed Asset Management (RIAM) project targets this research area by creating a direct bridge between component equipment reliability (ER) data and system engineer decision making regarding maintenance activity scheduling and component aging management. In this respect, one challenge that NPP system engineers are facing is that the amount of ER data being continuously generated is not only extremely large in size, but it comes in different forms: textual (e.g., condition or maintenance reports) and numeric (e.g., generated by monitoring systems). All these data elements provide them with valuable insights and information regarding: 1) the discovery of anomalous behaviors or degradation trends, 2) the identification of the possible causes behind such behaviors/trends, and 3) the prediction of their direct consequences. However, several challenges have proved to be roadblocks to this process. While some of these challenges are technical in nature (i.e., data are often distributed over several physical servers/databases), others are conceptual in nature: data elements come in different formats (e.g., numeric or textual), and measured values have different scales (e.g., vibration spectra and oil temperature). The activities performed by the RIAM project during FY23 directly tackles the need to simultaneously integrate the analysis of ER data in all its forms, numeric and textual. Note that such task has never been performed before due to the complexity of the systems under consideration but, most importantly, because of the technical challenges behind the harmonization of ER data formats and the lack of adequate computational methods to analyze them. Our approach borrows ideas and concepts from the medical field where integration of several data sources is vital to assist medical practitioners to perform correct diagnosis and indicate optimal treatments. In our view a NPP asset is equivalent to a patient in a medical context. The main difference is the complexity of a human body is a magnitude more complex when compared to typical assets commonly present in NPPs (e.g., centrifugal pumps, or motor operated valves). This simplifies our first requirement when analyzing heterogenous ER data formats: to put data into “context”. Context is here intended as the additional piece of information that is needed by ER data analysis tools to understand what these data elements are referring to, i.e., which king of knowledge they are generating. In our context, this knowledge can be translated into models that capture the form and functional architecture of assets/systems, their dependencies, and how they interact. These models actually emulate the knowledge that that NPP system engineers possess about assets and systems; this is their key of success when analyzing ER data, their challenge is ability to handle large amount of data. Here, we employ model-based system engineering (MBSE) models of systems and assets to represent and capture their architecture and functional, i.e. cause-effect, relations. Then, ER data elements are processed by identifying first of all which elements of the developed MBSE elements they are referring to. For numeric ER data this task is fairly easy since it is possible to precisely pinpoint what MBSE elements the corresponding sensor are observing (e.g., bearing temperature of a centrifugal pump). Task is much harder for textual data since the information contained in issue or maintenance reports needs to “be understood” by a computational tool. Here we called this process as “knowledge extraction”. Once again, we borrow the experience in the medical field where methods to extract knowledge from textual data have been developed in the past decade. The missing element for us is the availability of a complete dictionary of NPP related concepts (in addition to the MBSE models presented earlier) that can put “text into context”. In FY23, such dictionary has been developed along with all the computational elements required for knowledge extraction. Lastly, once numeric and textual ER data elements have been processed and “understood”, then the last step is the discovery of possible cause-effect relations among them. This is performed by observing if a logical connection through the MBSE models exists, and if the

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