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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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DOE OSTI2020

Lessons Learned from Hanford's Purex Tunnel 2 Structural Stabilization Project - 20509

In 2019, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) contractor CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) completed structurally stabilizing the Plutonium Uranium Extraction Plant (Purex) waste storage Tunnel 2 with engineered grout. This action significantly reduced risk to Hanford workers, the surrounding community and environment by preventing future collapse of the tunnel and possible release of radioactive materials. Decades of plutonium production at the Purex facility required construction of two large underground tunnels for storage of highly contaminated plutonium processing equipment that had failed during the operation of Purex and other facilities across the Hanford Site. Following the partial collapse of Purex Tunnel 1 on May 9, 2017, DOE and CHPRC took immediate action to safely stabilize the collapsed section of the tunnel. The hole in the tunnel was filled the next day as a temporary stabilization measure, and no contamination was detected as a result of the partial collapse of the tunnel. Workers then stabilized Tunnel 1 in its entirety by filling with engineered grout, which also encapsulated the radioactive equipment and railcars within the tunnel. Grouting eliminated the risk of further collapse and stabilized the tunnel contents, all while not precluding future remedial actions or final closure decisions. While conducting an integrity analysis of Tunnel 1 by using construction drawings, photos and other historical documents, project teams also analyzed the much larger Purex Tunnel 2. The analysis found Tunnel 2 did not meet current codes for structural integrity, and it may not be able to bear the weight of the soil above the tunnel. Therefore, it was determined that Tunnel 2 was also at risk of collapse. DoE's independent panel of experts determined grouting to be the best choice for stabilizing Tunnel 2 because it provides the highest level of stability and protection, and does not preclude future remedial actions. DOE authorized CHPRC to commence work and the Purex Tunnel 2 Structural Stabilization Project was launched in December of 2017. The paper will discuss the process of recognizing the following critical aspects and risks associated with stabilizing Tunnel 2, and the actions taken by the project team to mitigate these risks, including: - Tunnel investigation and data collection to assist with future remediation; - On-site batching and mock-ups to provide the large quantity of grout required for stabilizing the tunnel; - Workforce involvement and innovative actions that mitigated the project's most significant potential hazards, including traffic control; - Project team high level of execution translated into successful project execution. Sharing lessons learned from this critical risk-reduction effort can enhance the safety and efficiency of other complex and hazardous projects across the DOE complex. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Environmental Restorations Operations (Consolidated Quarterly Report Jul - Sep 2019)

This Environmental Restoration Operations (ER) Consolidated Quarterly Report (ER Quarterly Report) provides the status of ongoing corrective action activities being implemented at Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL/NM) during the July - September 2019 reporting period. Table I-1 lists the Solid Waste Management Units (SWMUs) and Areas of Concern (A0Cs) currently identified for corrective action at SNL/NM. This section of the ER Quarterly Report summarizes the work completed during this quarterly reporting period at sites undergoing corrective action. Corrective action activities were conducted during this reporting period at the three groundwater AOCs (Burn Site Groundwater [BSG] AOC, Technical Area-V [TA-V] Groundwater [TAVG] AOC, and Tijeras Arroyo Groundwater [TAG] AOC). Corrective action activities are deferred at the Long Sled Track (SWMU 83), the Gun Facilities (SWMU 84), and the Short Sled Track (SWMU 240) because these three sites are active mission facilities. These three active mission sites are located in Technical Area-III. There were no SWMUs or AOCs in the corrective action complete regulatory process during this quarterly reporting period.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

Third-Party Aggregation Rulemaking in MISO and SPP Footprints

The report highlights key considerations for retail regulators in the footprints of the Southwest Power Pool (SPP) or Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) in states that previously opted out of allowing third-party aggregation participation under FERC Order 719 and that may want to explore reversing the decision due to a changing policy environment under new FERC orders (i.e., 2222) and/or tightening resource adequacy constraints. Through a document review and a series of 27 interviews with regulators, aggregators, and other industry professionals, this document provides a high-level policy overview of the retail regulator’s role in a selection of processes, rules, and regulations to better understand how states have treated and/or integrated aggregators into wholesale markets. The report summarizes findings in two sections: General Findings and Specific Policy Findings. The General Findings offer high level takeaways such as the fact that 17 of the 20 states in MISO and SPP footprints opted out of third party aggregations following Order 719. Additionally, there is only one state that is fully restructured in the MISO and SPP footprints whereas the rest are vertically integrated, and the majority of third-party aggregations in the U.S. take place in restructured states outside of these footprints. Even so, third-party aggregations do take place in MISO and SPP albeit in small numbers and in an ad hoc regulatory environment. The specific policy findings delve deeper into specific examples of state actions on the topics of jurisdiction, registration and licensing, data governance, dual participation, and dispute resolution. Tables in each category organize state actions into Tiers I-III, which roughly correspond to the possible level of involvement or possible change necessary by state regulators and/or legislators to implement these actions. The tier level does not indicate any value judgement, as each state has respective regulatory limitations and each decision comes with various tradeoffs. One main tradeoff is between simplicity and quick implementation versus comprehensive and prolonged implementation. In many cases, actions in Tier I could be implemented without significant changes by relying on the use of existing processes for an aggregator context. On the other hand, many actions in Tier III are more narrowly designed to address aggregators specifically, but often require more significant changes including the involvement of additional parties through stakeholder engagement or legislative action. In some cases, these tiers are discrete. However, state regulators may also choose to progress through these various tiers sequentially as they phase in aggregators while learning from their experience. With the ability to stack bulk system level services, distributed energy resource aggregations in MISO and SPP could provide various private benefits (e.g., increased value streams to the owner) as well as societally beneficial grid services (e.g., peaking capacity, ancillary services, and other services that increase the grid’s overall operational efficiency). In deciding how to best to enable these benefits, states and retail regulators must weigh various tradeoffs if considering reversing a previous opt out.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2026

Thermal, RGB, and Multispectral Unexploded Ordnance Data Collection

As of May 1, 2026 Landmine contamination affects 58 countries and many hundreds of thousands of km² of land. For example, the National Mine Action Program Demining Ukraine reporting that up to 144,000 km² of territory are potentially contaminated and require survey and clearance (National Mine Action Program “Demining Ukraine,” n.d.) alone. This contamination includes mines and other explosive remnants of war and continues to constrain civilian access, agricultural use, infrastructure recovery, and broader socioeconomic activity (International Campaign to Ban Landmines–Cluster Munition Coalition [ICBL-CMC], 2024; Mine Action Review, 2024). Current response activities rely on established mine-action approaches including non-technical survey, technical survey, clearance, and explosive ordnance disposal, consistent with international mine-action terminology and operational practice (United Nations Mine Action Service [UNMAS], 2024; Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining [GICHD], 2023). In this context, UAV-based sensing, including UAV-mounted thermal imaging, may provide a useful supplementary capability by supporting faster, safer detection and mapping of suspect hazards prior to ground intervention (Smiljanic, 2022).

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Dynamic Approach to Dependency Analysis in Human Reliability Analysis: Application in a Stream Generator Tube Rupture Scenario

Dependency analysis in human reliability analysis (HRA) is a method of adjusting the failure probability of a given action by considering the impact of the action preceding it. It plays a role in reasonably accounting for human actions in the context of probabilistic safety assessments (PSAs), preventing PSA results from being estimated too optimistically based on the HRA results. Nevertheless, the existing dependency methods present a couple of challenges in that the quantification approaches rarely explain the adjustment of human error probabilities (HEPs). For this reason, the authors’ previous research has pointed out challenges of the existing dependency approaches and conceptually, theoretically proposed a performance shaping factor (PSF)-based dynamic dependency analysis method for HRA in order to complement the existing dependency methods. The current paper explores the latest version of the method and guidance for applying it to a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) scenario.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2022

The HUNTER Dynamic Human Reliability Analysis Tool: Coupling an External Plant Code

The Human Unimodel for Nuclear Technology to Enhance Reliability (HUNTER) is a framework to support dynamic human reliability analysis (HRA) with the aim to develop standalone software to perform the dynamic HRA calculations. Within the HRA, human actions in nuclear power plants (NPPs) are predicated by plant states, and human actions influence the plant. In other words, plant operations are necessarily recursive, and it becomes challenging to model complex human-plant interactions. Consequently, we have linked two software simulations that complement those shortcomings. RELAP5-3D—the Reactor Excursion and Leak Analysis Program (RELAP; Aumiller, Tomlinson, and Bauer 2001) is the foundational thermal-hydraulic software used to model nuclear systems. Using RELAP5-3D, we have simulated the plant operations proceeding according to procedures developed to address emergent situations in NPPs. Plant operations include various actions such as the operator checking plant parameters, as well as actions that are continuously performed over time until a specific parameter reaches certain criteria. That means that HUNTER and RELAP5-3D exchange information with each other and should be carried out simultaneously over time. To simulate plant operations, which represent the actual operator checks of plant parameters and corresponding manual control actions, changes in plant status are identified through simulation and performed according to the criteria and order of the procedure. Thus, the goal of coupling HUNTER with RELAP5-3D is to facilitate synchronous coupling, where human and plant models provide iterative feedback loops that drive the course of actions. The advantage of coupling with RELAP5-3D to serve as the external environment module in HUNTER is the ability to customize the plant model and streamline for particular model applications. In this paper, we will address the key features of the coupling and the coupling structure built to perform the feedback loops.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Peripheral Nerve Magnetoneurography With Optically Pumped Magnetometers

Electrodiagnosis is routinely integrated into clinical neurophysiology practice for peripheral nerve disease diagnoses, such as neuropathy, demyelinating disorders, nerve entrapment/impingement, plexopathy, or radiculopathy. Measured with conventional surface electrodes, the propagation of peripheral nerve action potentials along a nerve is the result of ionic current flow which, according to Ampere’s Law, generates a small magnetic field that is also detected as an “action current” by magnetometers, such as superconducting quantum interference device (SQUID) Magnetoencephalography (MEG) systems. Optically pumped magnetometers (OPMs) are an emerging class of quantum magnetic sensors with a demonstrated sensitivity at the 1 fT/√Hz level, capable of cortical action current detection. But OPMs were ostensibly constrained to low bandwidth therefore precluding their use in peripheral nerve electrodiagnosis. With careful OPM bandwidth characterization, we hypothesized OPMs may also detect compound action current signatures consistent with both Sensory Nerve Action Potential (SNAP) and the Hoffmann Reflex (H-Reflex). In as much, our work confirms OPMs enabled with expanded bandwidth can detect the magnetic signature of both the SNAP and H-Reflex. Taken together, OPMs now show potential as an emerging electrodiagnostic tool.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

Analysis of Tasks in Autonomous Systems Using the EMRALD Dynamic Risk Assessment Tool

An autonomous system refers to the system that has the power and ability for self-governance in the performance of system functions. Autonomous systems have been actively pursued in a variety of domains such as automotive, aviation, maritime, medicine, and nuclear fields. As an unmanned concept employing the highest automation level, the autonomous system basically performs most of the work in normal operations or emergency situations. However, despite advances in technology, many researchers have noted these systems still require human actions. The nature of human actions on autonomous systems is different than the human actions that are considered in existing systems. Nevertheless, only a few studies have been conducted on 1) characterizing the different types of errors and risks associated with human actions interacting with autonomous systems and 2) how to evaluate human actions in the autonomous operations. As a starting point, this study aims to investigate differences of tasks in autonomous operation compared to those in existing nuclear power plant operation using the Event Modeling Risk Assessment Using Linked Diagram (EMRALD) software. In this paper, insights aspect of human error and time are derived out and discussed based on the output of the EMRALD models.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act Title II DOE Due Diligence and Lessons Learned from a Previous Site Transfer - 20352

Title II of the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA) established that a government agency will provide perpetual care for closed uranium and thorium ore-processing sites that were operating under an NRC source material license in 1978 or were licensed thereafter. Commercial owners (licensees) operating under an NRC or agreement state specific license when UMTRCA was passed are responsible for conducting reclamation of any byproduct material remaining from uranium-ore processing operations in accordance with an NRC or agreement state approved reclamation plan. Reclamation includes both surface and groundwater remedies. Upon completion of reclamation and approval by NRC, the site is required to be transferred to either the host state or the DOE for long-term surveillance and maintenance. Since UMTRCA's enactment, six Title II sites have been transferred to DOE; an additional 24 Title II sites are anticipated to be transferred before 2050. DoE's role mandated under UMTRCA Title II as the long-term care custodian is to perform 'monitoring, maintenance, and emergency measures necessary to protect the public health and safety.' UMTRCA requires that the licensee pay a long-term surveillance charge 'sufficient to cover the annual costs of site surveillance.' However, at some sites such as the Bluewater, New Mexico, Disposal Site, this mandate has required additional effort and expense by DOE, beyond the originally anticipated and intended scope within UMTRCA, but within the authority of DOE under UMTRCA. In 1997, the Bluewater site became the second UMTRCA Title II site to be transferred to DOE. The site was the location of a uranium mill operated from 1953 until 1982. The specific licensee began site reclamation in 1991, and by 1995 all tailings and contaminated materials were encapsulated in two tailings disposal cells and other disposal areas. In addition to surface contamination, milling activities impacted groundwater in the two upper aquifers. In 1989, the specific licensee attempted active groundwater remediation; however, no significant reduction in contaminant concentrations was observed. As a result, the specific licensee applied to NRC for alternate concentration limits (ACLs) in 1990, which were approved in 1996 as being protective, after additional corrective actions were performed. Since transfer of the Bluewater site to DOE, unforeseen challenges have occurred, requiring additional actions. The first challenge is the occurrence of surface depressions located on the northern section of the main tailings disposal cell. The depressions were first observed during DoE's initial inspection in 1998; however, evidence of these can be observed on satellite images taken prior to transfer. Since being first observed, the depressions have continued to grow both in depth and areal extent. Due to the design of the main tailings disposal cell, the depressions impede storm water from being effectively shed off the 101- hectare (250-acre) top slope of the main tailings disposal cell. Instead, storm water accumulates in the depressions, forming a large ephemeral pond that has stored up to 16.3 x 10{sup 6} liters (4.3 million gallons) of stormwater. The ponding poses a potential risk to the integrity of the main tailings disposal cell in the case of a large storm event, with the potential to cause the pond to overtop and erode the cover material and underlying waste. DOE has taken a number of short-term actions to monitor, measure, and reduce the ponding and is currently working with the US Army Corps of Engineers to design and construct a repair. Additional challenges are associated with groundwater at the Bluewater site. Nine wells were present on the 1335-hectare (3300-acre) site upon transfer. Groundwater compliance was called into question after the State of New Mexico reduced its uranium groundwater standard from 5.0 to 0.03 milligrams per liter in 2004, and when an ACL for uranium was exceeded in a site monitoring well in 2010. Acquiring historical groundwater data and subsequent evaluations as well as additional DOE groundwater monitoring led to installing 10 new monitoring wells and performing additional site hydrogeology recharacterization. DOE continues to evaluate groundwater conditions at the site and works with the NRC to determine regulatory requirements and a path forward. As a result of lessons learned at the Bluewater site and other Title II sites, improved processes have been implemented at a programmatic level to increase due diligence before site transfer and prevent similar issues from occurring at other UMTRCA Title II sites under long-term management. DoE's due diligence process is documented in the Process for Transition of UMTRCA Title II Disposal Sites to DOE for Long-Term Surveillance and Maintenance and is designed to ensure that DOE has no technical or compliance concerns with regulatory decisions that might compromise protectiveness following site transfer to DOE. Implementation of the due diligence process has increased DoE's role prior to site transfer and has been effective in identifying potential issues. Actions by NRC and specific licensees, in response to enhanced due diligence efforts by DOE, are expected to minimize, if not totally prevent, the need for unanticipated actions by DOE pertaining to the surface and groundwater remedies after site transfer. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

Dynamic probabilistic risk assessment and game theory for cyber security risk analysis in nuclear power plants

Nuclear Power Plants and energy systems have become more prone to cyber-attacks with their digitalization and the increased use of smart equipment. Hence, it is important to quantify the risk associated with cyber-attacks in such systems. Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment which involves studying the evolution of a system due to random events and operator and attacker actions during a cyber-attack by employing a physics-based model of the system is a suitable framework to quantify cybersecurity risk in nuclear power plants. In addition to the plant dynamics, it is also important to model the strategies of the attackers and plant operators for an effective cybersecurity risk assessment. Game theory provides a set of necessary tools to model such strategic interactions. In this research, a framework that integrates dynamic probabilistic risk assessment with game theory for cybersecurity risk analysis in nuclear power plants is presented. The mathematical formulation is derived based on the theory of continuous event trees. We propose a game theory based action model, that utilizes physics-based rewards to define the strategies of attackers and operators at every decision epoch. As a case study, the risk associated with cyber-attacks on the digital components in the secondary side of a pressurized water reactor is studied using a reduced order model. A set of attacker actions and a set of operator actions are defined for the system. The operator and attacker interactions were modelled using simultaneous game, their action policies were computed using the concept of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and the evolution of the system was studied.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Measurements of a 2.1 MeV H− beam with an Allison scanner

Transverse 2D phase space distributions of a 2.1 MeV, 5 mA H− beam are measured at the Proton Improvement Plan II Injector Test accelerator at Fermilab with an Allison scanner. This paper describes the design, calibration, and performance of the scanner along with the main results from beam measurements. Analyses of the recorded phase portraits are performed primarily in action-phase coordinates. The stability of the action under linear optics makes it easier to compare measurements taken under different beamline conditions. The amplitude of a single measured point (“pixel”) is proportional to the phase density in the corresponding portion of the beam. When the Twiss parameters are calculated using only the high-phase density part of the beam, the pixel amplitude in the beam core is found to be decreasing approximately exponentially with action and to be phase-independent. Outside of the core, the amplitudes decrease with action at a slower rate than in the core. This “tail” comprises 10%–30% of the beam, with 0.1% of the total measured intensity extending beyond action 10–20 times larger than the rms emittance. The transition from the core to the tail is accompanied by the appearance of two “branches” that are separated in phase and extend beyond the core. A set of selected measurements shows that there is no measurable emittance dilution along the beamline; the beam parameters are practically constant over a 0.5 ms pulse; and scraping in various parts of the beamline is an effective way to decrease the transverse tails by removing the branches.

Richard, C. (ORCID:000000029891135X)↗
DOE OSTI2024

Non-disruptive error field measurement in DIII-D low safety factor plasmas and projection to ITER

Previous experiments in DIII-D (Paz-Soldan et al 2022 Nucl. Fusion 62 126007) introduced a method to identify intrinsic error fields (EFs) in tokamaks with minimal disruption risk by promptly healing driven magnetic islands during the conventional 'compass scan'. This paper presents recent experimental and numerical advancements in extending this approach to low q 95 plasmas, and projects its applicability to ITER. Non-disruptive EF measurement is achieved at q 95 = 4.5 and 3.9 without any initial EF correction (EFC) by reducing the time between the occurrence of the locked mode (LM) and control action to 10 ms and increasing the density 50%–100%. However, 50% correction of the intrinsic EF is required to achieve island healing at q 95 = 3.2 with 10 ms delay for the control action. Nonlinear two-fluid modeling with the TM1 code reproduces the DIII-D experimental observations, indicating that promptly turning off the 3D coil current reduces both magnetic island width and electromagnetic force, while raising the density increases plasma viscosity, facilitating magnetic island healing. The simulations show that for scenarios with q 95 = 3.2, lowering the control action time to 5 ms will lead to island healing without EFC. TM1 simulations are extended to future ITER scenarios with 5 MA and 7.5 MA plasma currents, predicting the dependence of required density rise on action time and EF amplitude. These simulations indicate that, benefiting from the much longer resistive time, island healing can be successfully achieved in ITER when taking control action 100–500 ms after a LM occurrence.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗
DOE OSTI2022

Reinforcement Learning for Volt- Var Control: A Novel Two-stage Progressive Training Strategy

This paper develops a reinforcement learning (RL) approach to solve a cooperative, multi-agent Volt-Var Control (VVC) problem for high solar penetration distribution systems. The ingenuity of our RL method lies in a novel two-stage progressive training strategy that can effectively improve training speed and convergence of the machine learning algorithm. In Stage 1 (individual training), while holding all the other agents inactive, we separately train each agent to obtain its own optimal VVC actions in the action space: fconsume, generate, do-nothingg. In Stage 2 (cooperative training), all agents are trained again coordinatively to share VVC responsibility. Rewards and costs in our RL scheme include (i) a system-level reward (for taking an action), (ii) an agent-level reward (for doing-nothing), and (iii) an agent-level action cost function. This new framework allows rewards to be dynamically allocated to each agent based on their contribution while accounting for the trade-off between control effectiveness and action cost. The proposed methodology is tested and validated in a modified IEEE 123-bus system using realistic PV and load profiles. Simulation results confirm that the proposed approach is robust and computationally efficient; and it achieves desirable volt-var control performance under a wide range of operation conditions.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

MACCS Theory Manual

This report describes the models of the MACCS computer code as presented in MACCS Version 3.10.0. The purpose of MACCS is to simulate the impact of severe accidents at nuclear power plants on the surrounding environment. MACCS has been developed by Sandia National Laboratories for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. From a given release of radioactive material into the atmosphere, MACCS estimates the extent and magnitude of radiological contamination, offsite doses, protective actions, socioeconomic impacts and costs, and health effects. Since the weather at the time of an accident is not predictable, MACCS supports various sampling options to run a representative set of simulations to evaluate weather variability. MACCS simulates atmospheric transport with a straight-line Gaussian plume segment model. From the estimated air and ground concentrations, MACCS models dose projections through several dose exposure pathways. These exposures can be offset by protective actions during the emergency response and long-term recovery of the accident. MACCS users directly specify the evacuation and sheltering area, while other protective actions (e.g., relocation, farmland restrictions, decontamination) are based on user-specified dose or concentration limits. While protective actions help reduce dose accumulation, they also cause social and economic impacts. MACCS models the extent of displaced individuals and land contamination, and the cost of offsite property damage, economic disruptions, and various accident expenditures caused by protective actions. Finally, from the dose accumulation, MACCS estimates early and stochastic health effects according to dose-response models. The purpose of consequence analyses is to be able to understand and estimate the impact of nuclear accidents. Consequence analysis is an essential tool to inform determinations of adequate protection of the public, to understand nuclear power hazards, to measure the value of regulations, and to help us appreciate the importance of nuclear safety. As such, MACCS has a variety of regulatory uses including environmental analyses (10 CFR 51.53, 52.47), regulatory cost-benefit analyses, backfit analyses (10 CFR 50.109), consequence analysis studies such as SOARCA (NUREG-1935), Level 3 PRA studies, and risk-informing of emergency planning (10 CFR 50 App. E and 50.47). This report updates the previous MACCS theory manual (NUREG/CR-4691 Vol. 2; Chanin, Sprung, Ritchie, & Jow, 1990) and accompanies the MACCS User's Guide (SAND-2021-1588) that describes the use and input requirements of the graphical user interface of MACCS known as WinMACCS. The MACCS User's Guide is also a reference guide that describes data input file formats, describes various software components in the MACCS code suite, and provides a set of example tutorials for running WinMACCS. Also, soon to be published is a MACCS input parameter guidance report (NUREG/CR-7270) that provides technical bases for commonly used MACCS input values. This page left blank

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Big Data For Operation and Maintenance Cost Reduction

The purpose of this research is to develop a first-of-a-kind framework for integrating Big Data capability into the daily activities of our current fleet of nuclear power plants. Big Data is traditionally defined as data sets with high volume, velocity, and heterogeneity, and the existing Big Data analytics capabilities are now widely popular in fields such as finance, weather, e-commerce, healthcare and sports. In the nuclear industry, while the volume and velocity of data may present computational challenges for existing analytics capabilities, data heterogeneity are seen to present the major challenge. This research project mainly focuses on incorporating the wide range of data heterogeneities in nuclear power plants into an integrated Big Data Analytics capability. The primary end-product of this project is a Big Data framework that is capable of dealing with the large volume and heterogeneity of the data found in nuclear power plants to extract timely and valuable information on equipment performance. The framework can generate system insights that are actionable relations between measurable impacts and the corresponding maintenance action plans and enable optimization of plant operation and maintenance based on the extracted information. The developed framework is capable of handling heterogeneous data including both image data and time-series sensor data. Specifically, this developed framework includes the following components. The first component is an overarching maintenance ontology which includes system insights required by maintenance optimization. The maintenance ontology interacts with other components in the developed framework. The second component handles Piping & Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) data. It can be used to extract system components and their relations automatically from the P&IDs. This extracted information is stored in the first component, i.e., maintenance ontology, and is also used as input to the third component, i.e., a tool for generating the fault tree for the corresponding system. The generated fault tree in turn is stored in the ontology for assessing risk that is used as a criterion in maintenance policy optimization. The fourth component is a tool for inferring the parameters in the Markov degradation model for a nuclear system. It uses basic information from the ontology. The fifth component is a tool for assessing the degradation level using sensor measurement data, for example, pressure, flowrate. This tool can be used for determining corrective maintenance actions. The results obtained from components four and five are returned to the ontology. The sixth component of the framework is a tool for optimizing the maintenance policy for a nuclear system of interest. It takes certain basic information from the ontology, e.g., costs of maintenance actions and system failures, as input, and returns the optimal maintenance policy to the ontology. This tool can be used for determining predictive maintenance actions. A set of experiments have also been conducted to verify the algorithms developed in this project for nuclear system degradation monitoring. The experiments are based on four solenoid valves, similar to the ones used in nuclear power plants. The analyses based on the experimental data using two algorithms, i.e., the Randomized Window Decomposition (RWD) algorithm and the particle filtering algorithm, and the results are introduced in the report. The Big Data framework developed in this project can be used as a support tool in daily activities of plant operation and maintenance and will reduce current costs while maintaining or improving safety levels. Overall, the project will not only benefit existing reactors, however it will open new frontiers to realize the long overdue value of Big Data Analytics in the nuclear sphere.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2023

Reinforcement Learning Approach to Cybersecurity in Space (RELACSS)

Securing satellite groundstations against cyber-attacks is vital to national security missions. However, these cyber threats are constantly evolving. As vulnerabilities are discovered and patched, new vulnerabilities are discovered and exploited. In order to automate the process of discovering existing vulnerabilities and the means to exploit them, a reinforcement learning framework is presented in this report. We demonstrate that this framework can learn to successfully navigate an unknown network and detect nodes of interest despite the presence of a moving target defense. The agent then exfiltrates a file of interest from the node as quickly as possible. This framework also incorporates a defensive software agent that learns to impede the attacking agents progress. This setup allows for the agents to work against each other and improve their abilities. We anticipate that this capability will help uncover unforeseen vulnerabilities and the means to mitigate them. The modular nature of the framework enables users to swap out learning algorithms and modify the reward functions in order to adapt the learning tasks to various use cases and environments. Several algorithms, viz., tabular Q learning, deep Q networks, proximal policy optimization, advantage actor-critic, generative adversarial imitation learning, are explored for the agents and the results highlighted. The agent learns to solve the tasks in a light-weight abstract environment. Once the agent learns to perform sufficiently well, it can be deployed in a minimega virtual machine environment (or a real network) with wrappers that map abstract actions to software commands. The agent also uses a local representation of the actions called a ‘slot-mechanism’. This allows the agent to learn in a certain network and generalize it to different networks. The defensive agent learns to predict the actions taken by an offensive agent and uses that information to anticipate the threat. This information can then either be used to raise an alarm or to take actions to thwart the attack. We believe that with the appropriate reward design, a representative environment, and action set, this framework can be generalized to tackle other cybersecurity tasks. By sufficiently training these agents, we can anticipate vulnerabilities leading to robust future designs. We can also deploy automated defensive agents that can help secure satellite groundstation and their vital national security missions.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

Towards Provable Security in Industrial Control Systems Via Dynamic Protocol Attestation

Industrial control systems (ICSs) increasingly rely on digital technologies vulnerable to cyber attacks. Cyber attackers can infiltrate ICSs and execute malicious actions. Individually, each action seems innocuous. But taken together, they cause the system to enter an unsafe state. These attacks have resulted in dramatic consequences such as physical damage, economic loss, and environmental catastrophes. This paper introduces a methodology that restricts actions using protocols. These protocols only allow safe actions to execute. Protocols are written in a domain specific language we have embedded in an interactive theorem prover (ITP). The ITP enables formal, machine-checked proofs to ensure protocols maintain safety properties. We use dynamic attestation to ensure ICSs conform to their protocol even if an adversary compromises a component. Since protocol conformance prevents unsafe actions, the previously mentioned cyber attacks become impossible. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our methodology using an example from the Fischertechnik Industry 4.0 platform. We measure dynamic attestation's impact on latency and throughput. Our approach is a starting point for studying how to combine formal methods and protocol design to thwart attacks intended to cripple ICSs.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Integrated Issues and Risk Management: A Theoretical Framework Overview

The contractor requirements document for DOE O 226.1B, Implementation of Department of Energy Oversight Policy, requires DOE/NNSA contractors to establish an assurance system that includes, among other things, “Rigorous, risk-informed, and credible self-assessment and feedback and improvement activities. Assessment programs must be risk-informed, formally described and documented, and appropriately cover potentially high consequence activities” and “Contains an issues management process that is capable of categorizing the significance of findings based on risk and priority and other appropriate factors….” However, the term “risk-informed” is not defined in this or any other DOE order, and no formal guidance on how to integrate the two concepts currently exists. The Risk Management Guide for Defense Programs released by NA-18, Office of Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I), states it is “a framework and general guidance to program office personnel on the effective management of program risks and issues”, however it then defines issues as “events with 100% likelihood of affecting program objectives” and states “unless specified otherwise, the term “risk” will also serve to represent issues for the remainder of this plan,” severally limiting its ability to provide adequate guidance on this topic. Outside of DOE scope, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S. NRC) imposes similar requirements. ASME NQA-1-2015 Requirement 16 states “Conditions adverse to quality shall be identified promptly and corrected as soon as practicable. In the case of a significant condition adverse to quality, the cause of the condition shall be determined, and corrective action taken to preclude recurrence. The identification, cause, and corrective action for significant conditions adverse to quality shall be documented and reported to appropriate levels of management. Completion of corrective actions shall be verified”. The purpose of this document is to provide a best-in-class framework for an integrated risk and issues management process. This process would provide a robust feedback loop between risk management and issues management to: Enhance risk identification and characterization, use risk handling principles to improve corrective action planning, and ensure regulatory compliance.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗