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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
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The contents include: 1) Experience Base; 2) Emergent Knowledge Processes; and 3) Lessons and Insights including flexibility and adaptability, embeddedness, measures of success, knowledge obsolescence, willingness to share and learning.
NASA's successful conduct of the Apollo Program greatly enhanced the prestige of the United States and remains broadly accepted as America's gift to all Mankind. NASA's accomplishments continue to amaze the world. With the Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) Americans once again tasked NASA to carry out a project that is expected to provide inspiration and economic stimulus to the United States and to the world. In preparation NASA has thoroughly examined space program precedents. There is, however, another precedent which has not been examined in this context but whose scope and environment in many ways parallel the VSE. This project was initiated by a team that had, ten years before, successfully completed an effort that, at a cost of $151 billion (2008 values), had pushed the envelope of technology, brought economic growth, established their country as the world leader in engineering, and been broadly accepted as their country s gift to Mankind. The new project was again inspired by popular desire to enhance national prestige and make yet another major contribution to Humanity. The new effort was predicted to require eight years and $156 billion (2008 values). However, after eight years and expenditures of 80% beyond the baseline, the project collapsed amid bankruptcy, political scandal, and criminal prosecution. This paper applies current aerospace project metrics, such as earned value analysis, to review the strategic decisions in this historic failure and describe its ultimate collapse. Key mistakes are identified, and lessons are drawn which may prove useful in guiding the VSE.
The Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter mission has as its primary objectives: advance our understanding of the current Mars climate, the processes that have formed and modified the surface of the planet and the extent to which water has played a role in surface processes; identify sites of possible aqueous activity indicating environments that may have been or are conducive to biological activity; and thus identify and characterize sites for future landed missions; and provide forward and return relay services for current and future Mars landed assets. MRO's crucial role in the long term strategy for Mars exploration requires a high level of reliability during its 5.4 year mission. This requires an architecture which incorporates extensive redundancy and cross-strapping. Because of the distances and hence light-times involved, the spacecraft itself must be able to utilize this redundancy in responding to time-critical failures. For cases where fault protection is unable to recognize a potentially threatening condition, either due to known limitations or software flaws, intervention by ground operations is required. These aspects of MRO's design were discussed in a previous paper [Ref. 1]. This paper provides an update to the original paper, describing MRO's significant in-flight anomalies over the past year, with lessons learned for redundancy and fault protection architectures and for ground operations.
This viewgraph presentation reviews the lessons learned from manned space flight on the International Space Station. The contents include: 1) Overview of space flight effects on crewmembers; 2) General overview of immune system; 3) How does space flight alter immune system? 4) What factors associated with space flight inteact with crewmember immune function and impact health risks? 5) What is the current understanding of space flight effects on the immune system? and 6) Why should NASA be interested in immunology? Why is it significant?
This slide presentation reviews selected lessons that were learned during the design, development, assembly and operation of the International Space Station. The critical importance of standards and common interfaces is emphasized to create a common operation environment that can lead to flexibility and adaptability.
In 2008, Dr. Thirsk was assigned to the crew of Expedition 20/21. This Expedition represented a milestone for the Canadian Space Program since it was the first time that a Canadian would take part in a long-duration mission. Robert Thirsk had the privilege of expanding the boundaries of space exploration by living and working on board the International Space Station for six months. The launch took place on May 27, 2009 aboard a Soyuz rocket from the Cosmodrome in Baikonur, Kazakhstan. This abstract was written before Dr. Thirsk returned to Kazakhstan. Objective: To gather all medically relevant data needed to support the first Canadian long-duration mission in space, and process it to derive lessons learned for presentation and for public disclosure. Methods: Sources of data used for analysis for Expedition 20 on International Space Station included flight selection data, maintenance annual physicals, Flight Medicine Clinic visits, parabolic flight experiments, preflight exams and baseline data collections, daily in-flight exercise countermeasure and science payloads, weekly periodic fitness, nutrition, radiation and payload assessments, postflight medical exams, rehabilitation, and science activities.
Composite materials have emerged as the materials of choice for increasing the performance and reducing the weight and cost of military, general aviation, and transport aircraft and space launch vehicles. Major advancements have been made in the ability to design, fabricate, and analyze large complex aerospace structures. The recent efforts by Boeing and Airbus to incorporate composite into primary load carrying structures of large commercial transports and to certify the airworthiness of these structures is evidence of the significant advancements made in understanding and use of these materials in real world aircraft. NASA has been engaged in research on composites since the late 1960 s and has worked to address many development issues with these materials in an effort to ensure safety, improve performance, and improve affordability of air travel for the public good. This research has ranged from synthesis of advanced resin chemistries to development of mathematical analyses tools to reliably predict the response of built-up structures under combined load conditions. The lessons learned from this research are highlighted with specific examples to illustrate the problems encountered and solutions to these problems. Examples include specific technologies related to environmental effects, processing science, fabrication technologies, nondestructive inspection, damage tolerance, micromechanics, structural mechanics, and residual life prediction. The current state of the technology is reviewed and key issues requiring additional research identified. Also, grand challenges to be solved for expanded use of composites in aero structures are identified.
This slide presentation reviews the Constellation Program Problem Reporting, Analysis and Corrective Action Process and System (Cx PRACA). The goal of the Cx PRACA is to incorporate Lessons learned from the Shuttle, ISS, and Orbiter programs by creating a single tool for managing the PRACA process, that clearly defines the scope of PRACA applicability and what must be reported, and defines the ownership and responsibility for managing the PRACA process including disposition approval authority. CxP PRACA is a process, supported by a single information gathering data module which will be integrated with a single CxP Information System, providing interoperability, import and export capability making the CxP PRACA a more effective and user friendly technical and management tool.
This slide presentation reviews specific "lessons learned" approaches ot ensure interface requirements lead the way in communicating project element requirements across the interfaces.
Resurrecting the legacy Inner Loop Thrust Vectoring research flight controller to investigate the tail shock region brought unique challenges. This report documents these challenges and lessons learned from a stability and controls perspective. The flight test approach for flight envelope expansion and probing tests, as well as limited flight test results, are presented. Recent advances in sonic boom reduction technology have contributed to a resurgent interest in civilian supersonic cruise flight. These advances have focused only on fore body shaping, however, and little, if any, experimental flight data are available to develop and validate design tools for the tail shock region. In January of 2009, the NASA Dryden Flight Research Center completed research flights to investigate the tail shock region of a highly modified F-15 aircraft by probing the shock waves around it, using another F-15 aircraft. To adjust the lift distribution and plume shape, a decade-old research flight controller from the Inner Loop Thrust Vectoring project was required. To investigate the tail shock region, the lift distribution was changed by adjusting the canard position, and the plume shape was changed by adjusting the nozzle area and thrust vectoring.
This paper will present options to evolutionary changes in several philosophical areas of extravehicular activity (EVA) operations. These areas will include single person verses team EVAs; various loss of communications scenarios (with Mission Control, between suited crew, suited crew to rover crew, and rover crew A to rover crew B); EVA termination and abort time requirements; incapacitated crew ingress time requirements; autonomous crew operations during loss of signal periods including crew decisions on EVA execution (including decision for single verses team EVA). Additionally, suggestions as to the evolution of the make-up of the EVA flight control team from the current standard will be presented. With respect to the flight control team, the major areas of EVA flight control, EVA Systems and EVA Tasks, will be reviewed, and suggested evolutions of each will be presented. Currently both areas receive real-time information, and provide immediate feedback during EVAs as well as spacesuit (extravehicular mobility unit - EMU) maintenance and servicing periods. With respect to the tasks being performed, either EMU servicing and maintenance, or the specific EVA tasks, daily revising of plans will need to be able to be smoothly implemented to account for unforeseen situations and findings. Many of the presented ideas are a result of lessons learned by the NASA Johnson Space Center Mission Operations Directorate operations team support during the 2009 NASA Desert Research and Technology Studies (Desert RATS). It is important that the philosophy of both EVA crew operations and flight control be examined now, so that, where required, adjustments can be made to a next generation EMU and EVA equipment that will complement the anticipated needs of both the EVA flight control team and the crews.
The Ares I-X flight test, scheduled for 2009, is the first opportunity for the Constellation Program and Ares Projects to obtain important data on the in-flight loads, first stage recovery, and ground-handling characteristics of the Ares I crew launch vehicle. The flight test vehicle will incorporate a mix of flight and mockup hardware, reflecting an acceptable representation of the mass and outer mold line characteristics of the operational Ares I vehicle. It will be powered by a four-segment solid rocket motor from the Space Shuttle inventory and will include a fifth, inert spacer segment and new forward structures to make it the same shape as the Ares I first stage. The vehicle also includes mass simulators for the upper stage, Orion crew module, and launch abort system to match the outer mold line of Ares I; an active roll control system; and avionics derived from Shuttle and Atlas hardware. This suborbital mission will take the flight test vehicle from stacking in the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) through liftoff, maximum dynamic pressure, first stage separation, and recovery. Ares I-X presented NASA with unique project management challenges. This presentation will address those unique challenges, including managing a virtual nationwide team under a constrained timeline; designing and building the launch vehicle and ground systems; working concurrently with Space Shuttle activities; and integrating technical and management functions. It also will identify key data collected and lessons learned from the flight that will be applied to future exploration missions.
Most failures occur at interfaces between organizations and hardware. Processing interface requirements at the start of a project life cycle will reduce the likelihood of costly interface changes/failures later. This can be done by adding Interface Control Documents (ICDs) to the Project top level drawing tree, providing technical direction to the Projects for interface requirements, and by funding the interface requirements function directly from the Project Manager's office. The interface requirements function within the Project Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I) Office would work in-line with the project element design engineers early in the life cycle to enhance communications and negotiate technical issues between the elements. This function would work as the technical arm of the Project Manager to help ensure that the Project cost, schedule, and risk objectives can be met during the Life Cycle. Some ICD Lessons Learned during the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) Life Cycle will include the use of hardware interface photos in the ICD, progressive life cycle design certification by analysis, test, & operations experience, assigning interface design engineers to Element Interface (EI) and Project technical panels, and linking interface design drawings with project build drawings
During testing a Space Shuttle Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) pressure garment and life-support backpack was destroyed in a flash fire in the Johnson Space Center's Crew systems laboratory. This slide presentation reviews the accident, probable causes, the lessons learned and the effect this has on the testing and the environment for testing of the Space Suit for the Constellation Program.
This paper describes the theoretical background and implementation methodology of using a thermoelectric converter (TEC) for operating temperature control of a loop heat pipe (LHP). In particular, experimental results from ambient and thermal vacuum tests of an LHP are presented for illustrations. The most commonly used state-of-the-art method to control the LHP operating temperature is to cold bias its compensation chamber (CC) and use an electrical heater to maintain the CC at the desired set point temperature. Although effective, this approach has its shortcomings in that the electrical heater can only provide heating to the CC, and the required power can be large under certain conditions. An alternative method is to use a TEC, which is capable of providing both heating and cooling to the CC. In this method, one side of the TEC is attached to the CC, and the other side is connected to the evaporator via a thermal strap. Using a bipolar power supply and a control algorithm, a TEC can function as a heater or a cooler, depending on the direction of the current flow. Extensive ground tests of several LHPs have demonstrated that a TEC can provide very tight temperature control for the CC. It also offers several additional advantages: (1) The LHP can operate at temperatures below its natural operating temperature at low heat loads; (2) The required heater power for a TEC is much less than that for an electrical heater; and (3) It enhances the LHP start-up success. Although the concept of using a TEC for LHP temperature control is simple, there are many factors to be considered in its implementation for space applications because the TEC is susceptible to the shear stress and yet has to sustain the dynamic load under the spacecraft launch environment. The added features that help the TEC to withstand the dynamic load will inevitably affect the TEC thermal performance. Some experiences and lessons learned are addressed in this paper.
The Texas Space Grant Consortium (TSGC) and the NASA Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) Education Office both have programs that present design challenges for university senior design classes that offer great opportunities for educational outreach and workforce development. These design challenges have been identified by NASA engineers and scientists as actual design problems faced by the Constellation Program in its exploration missions and architecture. Student teams formed in their senior design class select and then work on a design challenge for one or two semesters. The senior design class follows the requirements set by their university, but it must also comply with the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET) in order to meet the class academic requirements. Based on a one year fellowship at a TSGC university under the NASA Administrator's Fellowship Program (NAFP) and several years of experience, lessons learned are presented on the NASA Design Challenge Program.
This slide presentation reviews some of the lessons learned in the sphere of international cooperation during the development, assembly and operation of the International Space Station. From the begining all Partners shared a common objective to build, operate and utilize a crewed laboratory in low orbit as an international partnership. The importance of standards is emphasized.
This presentation has shown the accomplishments of the PASS project over three decades and highlighted the lessons learned. Over the entire time, our goal has been to continuously improve our process, implement automation for both quality and increased productivity, and identify and remove all defects due to prior execution of a flawed process in addition to improving our processes following identification of significant process escapes. Morale and workforce instability have been issues, most significantly during 1993 to 1998 (period of consolidation in aerospace industry). The PASS project has also consulted with others, including the Software Engineering Institute, so as to be an early evaluator, adopter, and adapter of state-of-the-art software engineering innovations.