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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 415 records · Page 23
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1991

National Launch System Space Transportation Main Engine

The present liquid-oxygen/liquid-hydrogen engine is described as meeting the specific requirements of the National Launch System (NLS) Program including cost-effectiveness and robustness. An overview of the NLS and its objectives is given which indicates that the program aims to develop a flexible launch system to meet security, civil, and commercial needs. The Space Transportation Main Engine (STME) provides core and boost propulsion for the 1.5-stage vehicle and core propulsion for the solid booster vehicle. The design incorporates step-throttling, order-of-magnitude reductions in welds, and configuration targets designed to optimize robustness. The STME is designed to provide adaptable and dependable propulsion while minimizing recurring costs and is designed to meet the needs of NLS and other typical space-transportation programs currently being planned.

Hoodless, Ralph M., Jr.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Ground Wind Loads on the Space Launch System’s Mobile Launcher Crew Access Arm

An aerodynamic database for the crew access arm during deployment is generated. While initial attempts used data derived from wind tunnel testing, limitations lead to the use of computational fluid dynamics to improve analysis. This computational data compared favorably to the experimental data increasing confidence in both. Further analysis lead to simplification showing the ability to build the database with a single relative wind variable which takes into account both arm deployment angle and wind direction. Eventually geometric simplifications and conservative results lead to the use of simulations of the CAA alone to build the database.Finally these static conditions are then compared to a dynamic simulation where the CAA rotates into position to test the quasi-steady state assumptions used to generate the database. The dynamic case showed an increase in the moment of interest but within acceptable bounds for now.

SLS↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Space Launch System Engine Out Capabilities

NASA's SLS is being developed with the primary purpose of returning people to the Moon and eventually landing people on Mars. With these lofty goals, ensuring mission completion is paramount even in the event of an in-flight mishap. One possible mishap is the loss of an engine in flight. While SLS was not required to show full engine out capability, the program took an ``assess to'' approach to see when the launch vehicle could complete the mission after an engine failure versus when the launch vehicle targets required a down-mode to an alternate mission target to ensure at least some flight objectives were complete, or at a minimum ensure safe return of Orion and the Crew. While this paper will focus on Artemis I, an uncrewed mission, some comparisons will be made to how the engine out capability will change for the subsequent Crewed flights of SLS and Orion.

Space Launch System↗
NASA NTRS1987

Space launch systems - Current United States plans and the next logical steps through 2000

The United States space transportation plans are discussed with emphasis on returning the Titan and the Shuttle to operational status. In particular, Shuttle enhancements via advanced solid rocket boosters and replacement of solid rocket boosters by liquid rocket boosters are examined. The Shuttle-C vehicle is then discussed as the next logical step that could provide a heavy launch capability in the early 1990s. The Shuttle-C will provide assured and flexible access to space for large Centaur-class payloads, for Space Station assembly, and for planetary missions.

Branscome, Darrell R.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Space Launch System Update

NASA has a phased approach to ensure our nation's leadership in space exploration, beginning in Earth orbit, developing our skills in lunar space, and extending those skills and technologies to a human mission to Mars. We're currently in Phase 0, using the ISS to better understand living and working in space. You may have heard about our "twin study" with astronauts Scott and Mike Kelly that's giving us valuable information on the effects of microgravity environments on the human body during long stays in LEO. During Phase 1 in the 2020s, SLS will be used to lift the pieces of a "deep space gateway" outpost to lunar orbit. Developing and operating the gateway will get us to Mars in a step-by-step fashion, with lessons learned in each phase of the process informing the next steps. First step of moving humans farther into the solar system is completing and flying SLS and Orion.

Cobb, Sharon↗
NASA NTRS2013

The Space Launch System: NASA's Exploration Rocket

Powerful, versatile, and capable vehicle for entirely new missions to deep space. Vital to NASA's exploration strategy and the Nation's space agenda. Safe, affordable, and sustainable. Engaging the U.S. aerospace workforce and infrastructure. Competitive opportunities for innovations that affordably upgrade performance. Successfully meeting milestones in preparation for Preliminary Design Review in 2013. On course for first flight in 2017.

Blackerby, Christopher↗
NASA NTRS2024

Evaluating Liftoff Debris for NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Prior to the Artemis I Launch

The SLS Artemis I launch vehicle is the first of several planned Artemis launch vehicles, with a number of design differences from earlier NASA missions that incur liftoff debris risk to the mission. As a test vehicle, the Artemis I hardware also endured environments and tests not planned for future missions, which led to several additional factors contributing to an evolving liftoff debris risk to the SLS vehicle. This paper will summarize these risk factors and address the processes used to evaluate and communicate the risks to support a successful Artemis I launch. It will discuss how the evolving risks that were quantified and evaluated by a Cross-Program team of debris Subject Matter Experts to mitigate liftoff debris hazards and communicate updated risk to the SLS vehicle. This process was performed through the inaugural use of an SLS debris day-of-launch (DOL) standard operating procedure that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions. This paper addresses the risk of liftoff debris, debris released by the vehicle or from the launch pad during liftoff through vehicle tower clear. Expected liftoff debris is well understood from previous NASA programs’ experience and from tests of materials, processes and functions that are known to release liftoff debris. These expected sources were assessed and cleared well ahead of launch day. However, given the ever-changing schedules and environments, processes were in place to evaluate any additional potential liftoff debris risks identified during launch countdown. Although many of the Artemis vehicle hardware components are similar to those on the NASA Shuttle Program, there are important differences in the architecture of the Artemis I vehicle which require new assessments of liftoff debris risk for the Artemis missions. The more favorable Artemis crew module location and surfaces are far less vulnerable to debris impacts; however, the longer vehicle can result in higher liftoff debris impact energies to those components on the aft end of the vehicle. Additionally, the positional change of the RS-25 liquid engines to nearer the Booster nozzle exit plane along with the change in Booster throat plug design is a disadvantage to the overall liftoff debris risk which resulted in additional test and analysis efforts for evaluating the integrated vehicle debris risk. In spite of the comprehensive tests and analyses of Artemis I expected liftoff debris, a number of additional tests/processes were completed prior to the Artemis I mission that were required to support a complete understanding of a new launch vehicle, but increased the risk of releasing liftoff debris. The hardware endured several additional cryogenic loading cycles, including the Green Run tests at Stennis Space Center, Wet Dress Rehearsals at Kennedy Space Center, and multiple launch attempts. Each of these cycles induced stresses in the thermal protection system (TPS) materials, increasing the risk of damage to and release of the TPS. Additionally, induced and weather environmental factors that could increase the likelihood of debris release were significant. Vibrations and stresses in the TPS were induced by a required roll-back to the Vehicle Assembly Building before Hurricane Ian to protect the vehicle from damage by high winds. Wind damage and potential internal stresses to several outer mold line materials on the integrated SLS vehicle and mobile launcher were caused by weathering Hurricane Nicole at Pad 39B the week before launch. A thorough imagery scan of the vehicle was performed after each event and the damage observed was repaired, removed, or assessed and the risk to the mission evaluated. Mitigation of debris risk can occur by tests and analyses to show debris impacted components as damage tolerant, by new/improved processes for prevention of debris availability, or redesign. Risk mitigation processes for Artemis I-specific liftoff debris events and the development and use of the SLS debris day of launch (DOL) procedures that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions will be described.

Space Launch System↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evaluating Liftoff Debris for NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Prior to the Artemis I Launch

The SLS Artemis I launch vehicle is the first of several planned Artemis launch vehicles, with a number of design differences from earlier NASA missions that incur liftoff debris risk to the mission. As a test vehicle, the Artemis I hardware also endured environments and tests not planned for future missions, which led to several additional factors contributing to an evolving liftoff debris risk to the SLS vehicle. This paper will summarize these risk factors and address the processes used to evaluate and communicate the risks to support a successful Artemis I launch. It will discuss how the evolving risks that were quantified and evaluated by a Cross-Program team of debris Subject Matter Experts to mitigate liftoff debris hazards and communicate updated risk to the SLS vehicle. This process was performed through the inaugural use of an SLS debris day-of-launch (DOL) standard operating procedure that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions. This paper addresses the risk of liftoff debris, debris released by the vehicle or from the launch pad during liftoff through vehicle tower clear. Expected liftoff debris is well understood from previous NASA programs’ experience and from tests of materials, processes and functions that are known to release liftoff debris. These expected sources were assessed and cleared well ahead of launch day. However, given the ever-changing schedules and environments, processes were in place to evaluate any additional potential liftoff debris risks identified during launch countdown. Although many of the Artemis vehicle hardware components are similar to those on the NASA Shuttle Program, there are important differences in the architecture of the Artemis I vehicle which require new assessments of liftoff debris risk for the Artemis missions. The more favorable Artemis crew module location and surfaces are far less vulnerable to debris impacts; however, the longer vehicle can result in higher liftoff debris impact energies to those components on the aft end of the vehicle. Additionally, the positional change of the RS-25 liquid engines to nearer the Booster nozzle exit plane along with the change in Booster throat plug design is a disadvantage to the overall liftoff debris risk which resulted in additional test and analysis efforts for evaluating the integrated vehicle debris risk. In spite of the comprehensive tests and analyses of Artemis I expected liftoff debris, a number of additional tests/processes were completed prior to the Artemis I mission that were required to support a complete understanding of a new launch vehicle, but increased the risk of releasing liftoff debris. The hardware endured several additional cryogenic loading cycles, including the Green Run tests at Stennis Space Center, Wet Dress Rehearsals at Kennedy Space Center, and multiple launch attempts. Each of these cycles induced stresses in the thermal protection system (TPS) materials, increasing the risk of damage to and release of the TPS. Additionally, induced and weather environmental factors that could increase the likelihood of debris release were significant. Vibrations and stresses in the TPS were induced by a required roll-back to the Vehicle Assembly Building before Hurricane Ian to protect the vehicle from damage by high winds. Wind damage and potential internal stresses to several outer mold line materials on the integrated SLS vehicle and mobile launcher were caused by weathering Hurricane Nicole at Pad 39B the week before launch. A thorough imagery scan of the vehicle was performed after each event and the damage observed was repaired, removed, or assessed and the risk to the mission evaluated. Mitigation of debris risk can occur by tests and analyses to show debris impacted components as damage tolerant, by new/improved processes for prevention of debris availability, or redesign. Risk mitigation processes for Artemis I-specific liftoff debris events and the development and use of the SLS debris day of launch (DOL) procedures that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions will be described.

Space Launch System↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Space Launch System Booster Separation Supersonic Powered Testing with Surface and Off-body Measurements

A wind tunnel test was run in the NASA Langley Unitary Plan Wind Tunnel simulating the separation of the two solid rocket boosters (SRB) from the core stage of the NASA Space LaunchSystem (SLS). The test was run on a 0.9% scale model of the SLS Block 1B Cargo (27005) configuration and the SLS Block 1B Crew (28005) configuration at a Mach of 4.0. The SRBs weremounted separately from the core, and could be pitched, yawed, and translated in the X, Y, andZ directions relative to the core. High pressure air was used to simulate plumes from the booster separation motors located at the nose and aft skirt of the two boosters. Force and moment data were taken on both SRBs and on the core stage. Schlieren still photos and video were recorded throughout testing. A set of points were acquired using Cross-correlation Doppler Global Velocimetry (CCDGV) readings to get 3 component velocity measurements between the core and the left-hand SRB. The CCDGV laser was utilized to record flow visualization in the same location, between the core and the left-hand SRB. Pressure Sensitive Paint (PSP) data were taken on a separate set of runs. Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) runs were computed on a subset of the wind tunnel data points for comparison. A combinationof the force and moment, CCDGV, and PSP data (as well as schlieren images) at the CFD-specified test conditions will be used to validate the CFD simulations that will be used to build an SLS booster separation database at flight conditions.

SLS↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Pre-Flight Hazardous Gas Assessment Methodology for the Space Launch System

The complexity of the Artemis I liquid rocket propulsion systems produces many sources of hazards during the operation of the vehicle. Pre-flight hazardous gas leakages pose fire and explosion risks to rocket that could potentially lead to loss of the vehicle, mission, and crew. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) uses a probability risk assessment strategy to assess the likelihood of the hazard and the consequence should the hazardous situation occur. For high probability hazards that pose a potentially catastrophic consequence to the vehicle, the most effective strategy for reducing the risk is accomplished by engineering and implementing systems that actively mitigate the hazard. A hazards analysis is completed to determine the likelihood and severity of each hazard. These hazard analyses are informed using relevant empirical data and physics-based analytical models. Time-accurate Computational Fluid Dynamics models used to quantify and understand the risks posed to Artemis I due to expulsions of hazardous gas near the vehicle. Several sources of hazardous gas that posed a risk to Artemis I during nominal pre-flight operations are analyzed in this work. The results of the analyses were used to develop flight rationale and make risk acceptance decisions for the Artemis I launch.

Brian R. Richardson↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Pre-Flight Hazardous Gas Assessment Methodology for the Space Launch System

The complexity of the Artemis I liquid rocket propulsion systems produces many sources of hazards during the operation of the vehicle. Pre-flight hazardous gas leakages pose fire and explosion risks to rocket that could potentially lead to loss of the vehicle, mission, and crew. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) uses a probability risk assessment strategy to assess the likelihood of the hazard and the consequence should the hazardous situation occur. For high probability hazards that pose a potentially catastrophic consequence to the vehicle, the most effective strategy for reducing the risk is accomplished by engineering and implementing systems that actively mitigate the hazard. A hazards analysis is completed to determine the likelihood and severity of each hazard. These hazard analyses are informed using relevant empirical data and physics-based analytical models. Time-accurate Computational Fluid Dynamics models used to quantify and understand the risks posed to Artemis I due to expulsions of hazardous gas near the vehicle. Several sources of hazardous gas that posed a risk to Artemis I during nominal pre-flight operations are analyzed in this work. The results of the analyses were used to develop flight rationale and make risk acceptance decisions for the Artemis I launch.

Brian R. Richardson↗
NASA NTRS2017

Update on Risk Reduction Activities for a Liquid Advanced Booster for NASA's Space Launch System

Goals of NASA's Advanced Booster Engineering Demonstration and/or Risk Reduction (ABEDRR) are to: (1) Reduce risks leading to an affordable Advanced Booster that meets the evolved capabilities of SLS. (2) Enable competition by mitigating targeted Advanced Booster risks to enhance SLS affordability. SLS Block 1 vehicle is being designed to carry 70 mT to LEO: (1) Uses two five-segment solid rocket boosters (SRBs) similar to the boosters that helped power the space shuttle to orbit. Evolved 130 mT payload class rocket requires an advanced booster with more thrust than any existing U.S. liquid-or solid-fueled boosters

Crocker, Andy↗
NASA NTRS2011

Space Launch System (SLS) Program Overview NASA Research Announcement (NRA) Advanced Booster (AB) Engineering Demonstration and Risk Reduction (EDRR) Industry Day

SLS is a national capability that empowers entirely new exploration for missions of national importance. Program key tenets are safety, affordability, and sustainability. SLS builds on a solid foundation of experience and current capacities to enable a timely initial capability and evolve to a flexible heavy-lift capability through competitive opportunities: (1) Reduce risks leading to an affordable Advanced Booster that meets the evolved capabilities of SLS (2) Enable competition by mitigating targeted Advanced Booster risks to enhance SLS affordability and performance The road ahead promises to be an exciting journey for present and future generations, and we look forward to working with you to continue America fs space exploration.

May, Todd A.↗