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Fast and low concentration detection of liquefied petroleum gas by Au-activated ZnO sensor

Highlights: • As-synthesized and Au-activated ZnO samples are studied as an LPG sensor. • The operating temperature of ZnO sensor decreases after activation by Au layer. • LPG sensitivity of ZnO sensor shows a significant enhancement after activation. • The Au-activated ZnO sensor is able to quick response to LPG. - Abstract: The development of a reliable and fast liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) sensor due to its highly inflammable and explosive nature is crucial to ensure a safe and healthy environment. In this research, as-synthesized and Au-activated nanostructured ZnO were prepared and investigated as an LPG sensor. The samples were structurally and morphologically characterized by X-ray diffraction (XRD) and field emission scanning electron microscopy (FESEM). LPG sensitivity of the sample shows a significant enhancement after activation with the Au layer. The results also show that the Au-activated sample is able to detect the LPG in the range of 100–1000 ppm (and more concentrations) with the response time of 33-18 S that can be remarkable compared to the previous reports attributed to different materials and technologies.

77 NANOSCIENCE AND NANOTECHNOLOGY↗

COVID-19 Lockdowns Drive Decline in Active Fires in Southeastern United States

Fire is a common ecosystem process in forests and grasslands worldwide. Increasingly, ignitions are controlled by human activities either through suppression of wildfires or intentional ignition of prescribed fires. The Southeastern United States leads the nation in prescribed fire, burning ca. 80% of the countries extent annually. The COVID-19 pandemic radically changed human behavior as workplaces implemented social-distancing guidelines and provided an opportunity to evaluate relationships between humans and fire as fire management plans were postponed or cancelled. Using active fire data from satellite-based observations, we found that in the Southeastern United States, COVID-19 led to a 21% reduction in fire activity compared to the 2003-2019 average. The reduction was more pronounced for federally managed lands, up to 41% below average compared to the past 20-years (38% below average compared to the past decade). Declines in fire activity were partly affected by an unusually wet February before the COVID-19 shutdown began in mid-March 2020. Despite the wet spring, the predicted number of active fire detections was still lower than expected, confirming a COVID-19 signal on ignitions. In addition, prescribed fire management statistics, reported by US federal agencies, confirmed the satellite observations, and showed that following the wet February and before the mid-March COVID-19 shutdown, cumulative burned area was approaching record highs across the region. With fire return intervals in the Southeastern United States as frequent as 1-2 years, COVID-19 fire impacts will contribute to an increasing backlog in necessary fire management activities, affecting biodiversity and future fire danger.

Biological Sciences↗

Precursor Analysis Report: Remote Access Attack on Oldsmar Water Treatment Facility 2021

The Remote Access Attack on Oldsmar Water Treatment Facility 2021 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the Oldsmar cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. On 5 February 2021, an adversary gained unauthorized remote access to Bruce T. Haddock Water Treatment Plant in Oldsmar, Florida, which provides treated water to 15,000 customers. The adversary accessed the facility’s Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) workstation and human machine interface (HMI) to change the chemical concentration of sodium hydroxide, commonly referred to as lye and used to regulate acidity levels, from 100 parts per million (PPM) to 11,100 PPM. The chemical was raised to lethal levels that if ingested could lead to serious soft tissue damage, burns, or even death. The facility, however, had redundancies and alarms in place to alert personnel of dangerous chemical levels, and facility officials stated it would have taken 24 to 36 hours for the chemical changes to affect the water supply. Researchers and analysts identified six unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 23 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Four of the identified techniques used during the Oldsmar cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 21 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 20 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the minutes preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Precursor Analysis Report: Cyber Attack on Thyssenkrupp Blast Furnace 2014

The Cyber Attack on Thyssenkrupp Blast Furnace 2014 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the Thyssenkrupp Steel Mill cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. In December 2014, the German Government’s Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) released a report detailing a cyber attack on a German steel mill that occurred earlier that year, though exact dates and details of the attack were not revealed. While the report did not specify the name of the company, multiple sources identified the victim as one of Europe’s largest steel manufacturers, Thyssenkrupp AG. Further, Thyssenkrupp announced on 16 May of that year that Europe’s largest blast furnace, “Schwelgern 2,” located at its facility in Duisburg, Germany, would be offline for several weeks for repairs and upgrades, suggesting Schwelgern 2 was likely the target of the attack. The attack began in early 2014, when adversaries infiltrated the victim steel mill’s Information Technology (IT) network via a spearphishing campaign, then worked their way into the Operational Technology (OT) environment, where they executed software that caused denial of service, denial of control, and eventually a loss of control. This led to the blast furnace shutting down without proper safety procedures, resulting in catastrophic physical damage. No lives were lost in the incident, but ThyssenKrupp suffered $4 million in damage to the blast furnace and an additional $6 million in lost revenue. The adversaries required specialized knowledge and expertise in steel production, which enabled them to compromise a variety of internal systems and components across both IT and OT networks. The attack also demonstrated detailed knowledge of the industrial control systems (ICS) and production processes being used. This combination resulted in one of the earliest known publicly reported cybersecurity incidents resulting in physical damage to ICS equipment. Researchers and analysts identified 19 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 20 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 454 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Fifteen of the identified techniques used during the Thyssenkrupp cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 369 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 316 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 120 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Precursor Analysis Report: Doppelpaymer Ransomware Attack on Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) 2019

The DoppelPaymer Ransomware Attack on Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) 2019 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the PEMEX cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. The 2019 DoppelPaymer ransomware attack on PEMEX, Mexico’s nationalized petroleum corporation, highlights a unique threat that ransomware and cybercriminal extortion poses to Operational Technology (OT) environments in critical infrastructure. The incident began with an employee downloading commodity malware that allowed adversaries to gain initial access to PEMEX’s enterprise environment. After conducting privilege escalation, tool ingress, and data exfiltration, the adversaries deployed DoppelPaymer ransomware throughout the PEMEX enterprise environment, resulting in the company having to take dozens of systems offline for at least several days. Although PEMEX stated that their operations were not affected, the data exfiltrated from PEMEX was made available for download on DoppelPaymer’s leak site, as well as on other illicit criminal forums. This stolen data included not only company information, but also sensitive OT-specific configuration data. This incident showcases how cybercriminal exfiltration and posting of sensitive OT architecture documentation can pose security concerns for the targeted organization for years due to the long lifespan of OT assets and architectures. Researchers and analysts identified 18 unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 190 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Fifteen of the identified techniques used during the DoppelPaymer ransomware attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 163 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 34 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 60 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Precursor Analysis Report: JBS Foods Ransomware Attack 2021

The JBS Foods 2021 Ransomware Attack Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the JBS ransomware cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. In late May 2021, one of the world’s largest meat producers, JBS Foods, announced they had fallen victim to a worldwide ransomware attack, later found to be REvil ransomware. In the United States alone, JBS Foods accounts for nearly 25% of beef and roughly 20% of pork production. Adversaries initially launched a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack on the company’s Information Technology (IT) networks in Australia, but the attack impacted operations in Brazil, Canada, and the United States, as well. The attack caused plant operations in all four countries to shut down for at least one day. All nine of the U.S. meatpacking plants temporarily shut down because of the attack. The adversaries initially demanded a $\$$22 million ransom for the company’s data, but later negotiated the ransom down to $\$$11 million even after JBS Foods restored most of their systems. JBS Foods eventually paid the $\$$11 Million for reassurance from the adversaries that none of their customers’ data would be compromised in the future. Despite its short duration, the attack still caused large stocks of meat to spoil. The incident also underscored how adversaries can simultaneously compromise and move laterally through global subsidiaries of an organization. Researchers and analysts identified 22 unique techniques (in a sequence of 21 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 361 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Sixteen of the identified techniques used during the JBS Foods cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 308 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 163 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 75 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Precursor Analysis Report: SQL Slammer Worm Infection of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant 2003

The SQL Slammer Worm Infection of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant 2003 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about Davis-Besse’s 2003 cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. On 25 January 2003, the SQL Slammer worm infected more than 90% of vulnerable hosts and crashed the internet in 10 to 15 minutes, making it one of the fastest spreading worms in history. SQL Slammer is a fileless, memory-resident worm that remotely exploits a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability on local hosts to intensively scan and rapidly self-propagate across the internet. The worm infected approximately 300,000 unpatched hosts running Microsoft Structured Query Language (SQL) Server 2000 or Microsoft Desktop Engine (MSDE) 2000 with SQL Server Resolution Service. The SQL Slammer worm indirectly infected FirstEnergy’s Davis-Besse nuclear power plant by first infecting a consultant’s company network server and then propagating through an external misconfigured connection into Davis-Besse’s site network. The infection caused major network congestion, slow performance, data overloads, and the inability of local hosts to communicate with each other, which eventually caused a loss of availability and a loss of view when the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Plant Process Computer (PPC) crashed. At the time of the infection, the plant was already offline, the digital monitoring systems had redundant analog backups, and the plant control and safety functions were not affected, so there were no concerns of a safety breach. However, this incident resulted in many lessons learned and spawned important discussions about cybersecurity’s role in nuclear safety and electric power reliability regulation, policy, and guidance. Researchers and analysts identified 10 unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 640 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Eight of the identified techniques used during Davis-Besse cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 596 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 428 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 331 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Precursor Analysis Report: Blackmatter Ransomware Attack on New Cooperative 2021

The BlackMatter Ransomware Attack on New Cooperative 2021 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the New Cooperative cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. The BlackMatter ransomware was first identified in July 2021 and is reported to have infected more than 50 corporations around the world. , The Iowa-based grain cooperative, New Cooperative, was impacted by the BlackMatter ransomware on or before 18 September 2021. The adversary likely resided on New Cooperative’s networks for 15 days prior to encrypting its network and demanding New Cooperative pay $5.9 million in ransom by 25 September to unlock systems and prevent 1 terabyte (TB) of sensitive data from being publicly released. It is not clear if New Cooperative paid the ransom. The full impact of the ransomware attack is not known; however, according to New Cooperative’s general manager, the attack caused the company’s automated processes to revert back to processes used in the 1970s. , As of 6 October, only 50 percent of New Cooperative’s operations were utilizing automated processes. The company took eight weeks to rebuild the entire network and information technology (IT) systems from the ground up, which puts the date of fully recovery around 13 November. Researchers and analysts identified 20 unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 404 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Seventeen of the identified techniques used during the New Cooperative cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 360 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 284 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 15 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

AAVPG: A vigilant vector where transgene expression is induced by p53

Using p53 to drive transgene expression from viral vectors may provide on demand expression in response to physiologic stress, such as hypoxia or DNA damage. Here we introduce AAVPG, an adeno-associated viral (AAV) vector where a p53-responsive promoter, termed PG, is used to control transgene expression. In vitro assays show that expression from the AAVPG-luc vector was induced specifically in the presence of functional p53 (1038±202 fold increase, p<0.001). The AAVPG-luc vector was an effective biosensor of p53 activation in response to hypoxia (4.48±0.6 fold increase in the presence of 250 µM CoCl{sub 2}, p<0.001) and biomechanical stress (2.53±0.4 fold increase with stretching, p<0.05). In vivo, the vigilant nature of the AAVPG-luc vector was revealed after treatment of tumor-bearing mice with doxorubicin (pre-treatment, 3.4×10{sup 5}±0.43×10{sup 5} photons/s; post-treatment, 6.6×10{sup 5}±2.1×10{sup 5} photons/s, p<0.05). These results indicate that the AAVPG vector is an interesting option for detecting p53 activity both in vitro and in vivo. - Highlights: • AAV vector where transgene expression is controlled by the tumor suppressor p53. • The new vector, AAVPG, shown to function as a biosensor of p53 activity, in vitro and in vivo. • The p53 activity monitored by the AAVPG vector is relevant to cancer and other diseases. • AAVPG reporter gene expression was activated upon DNA damage, hypoxia and mechanical stress.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

THE EXTENDED CHANDRA DEEP FIELD-SOUTH SURVEY: OPTICAL SPECTROSCOPY OF FAINT X-RAY SOURCES WITH THE VLT AND KECK

We present the results of a program to acquire high-quality optical spectra of X-ray sources detected in the Extended-Chandra Deep Field-South (E-CDF-S) and its central 2 Ms area. New spectroscopic redshifts, up to z = 4, are measured for 283 counterparts to Chandra sources with deep exposures (t {approx} 2-9 hr per pointing) using multi-slit facilities on both VLT (VIMOS) and Keck (DEIMOS), thus bringing the total number of spectroscopically identified X-ray sources to over 500 in this survey field. Since our new spectroscopic identifications are mainly associated with X-ray sources in the shallower 250 ks coverage, we provide a comprehensive catalog of X-ray sources detected in the E-CDF-S including the optical and near-infrared counterparts, determined by a likelihood routine, and redshifts (both spectroscopic and photometric), that incorporate published spectroscopic catalogs, thus resulting in a final sample with a high fraction (80%) of X-ray sources having secure identifications. We demonstrate the remarkable coverage of the luminosity-redshift plane now accessible from our data while emphasizing the detection of active galactic nuclei (AGNs) that contribute to the faint end of the luminosity function (L {sub 0.5-8keV} {approx} 10{sup 43}-10{sup 44} erg s{sup -1}) at 1.5 {approx}< z {approx}< 3 including those with and without broad emission lines. Our redshift catalog includes 17 type-2 QSOs at 1 {approx}< z {approx}< 3.5 that significantly increases such samples (2x). Based on our deepest (9 hr) VLT/VIMOS observation, we identify 'elusive' optically faint galaxies (R {sub mag} {approx} 25) at z {approx} 2-3 based upon the detection of interstellar absorption lines (e.g., O II+Si IV, C II], C IV); we highlight one such case, an absorption-line galaxy at z = 3.208 having no obvious signs of an AGN in its optical spectrum. In addition, we determine accurate distances to eight galaxy groups with extended X-ray emission detected both by Chandra and XMM-Newton. Finally, we measure the physical extent of known large-scale structures (z {approx} 0.7) evident in the CDF-S. While a thick sheet (a radial size of 67.7 Mpc) at z {approx} 0.67 extends over the full field, the z {approx} 0.73 structure is thin (18.8 Mpc) and filamentary as traced by both AGNs and galaxy groups. In the Appendix, we provide spectroscopic redshifts for 49 counterparts to fainter X-ray sources detected only in the 1 and 2 Ms catalogs, and 48 Very Large Array radio sources not detected in X-rays.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗

Precursor Analysis Report: Industroyer2 and Wiper Malware Targeting Ukrainian Energy Provider 2022

The Industroyer2 and Wiper Malware Targeting Ukrainian Energy Provider 2022 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the Industroyer2 cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. An adversary attempted to cause a blackout in Ukraine in April 2022 by using the Industroyer2 malware against a regional Ukrainian energy provider. The adversary targeted eight high-voltage electrical substations and utilized the malware in tandem with disk wipers for Windows, Linux, and Solaris operating systems in an attempt to make response and recovery efforts more difficult. The adversary reused a piece of the original Industroyer malware designed to open circuit breakers and de-energize target substations. The adversary gained initial access to the victim’s enterprise network through unknown means in February 2022 and was able to perform reconnaissance, pivot to the operations network, and reside in the system for at least 51 days. This gave the adversary a detailed understanding of the environment and allowed them to customize the Industroyer2 malware to the victim’s operations network. However, defenders detected and stopped the attack before the adversary could achieve their intended impact. Had the Industroyer2 attack been successful, it could have caused a blackout for more than two million people during the early stages of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Researchers and analysts identified 22 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 31 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 297 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-three of the identified techniques used during the Industroyer2 cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 224 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 122 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 51 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Precursor Analysis Report: Industroyer Targeting Ukraine Electric Power Transport Utility (Ukrenergo) 2016

The Industroyer Targeting Ukraine Electric Power Transport Utility (Ukrenergo) 2016 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the December 2016 cyber attack against the Ukrainian Ukrenergo electric transmission utility and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. Industroyer is a modular malware framework designed to deploy several Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol-specific attack payloads to disrupt electricity distribution. Adversaries deployed Industroyer within the target network on a Microsoft Windows endpoint capable of directly manipulating or communicating with ICS. Industroyer abuses the functionality of a targeted ICS’s legitimate control system to achieve its intended impact. Adversaries likely first gained access to Ukrenergo enterprise networks in early 2016 after a successful spearphishing campaign against organizations in the electric power sector. Adversaries then began capturing credentials beginning on 1 December 2016. This allowed access to the ICS environment at the Pivnichna electric transmission substation outside Kyiv through a device dual-homed on the Information Technology (IT) and ICS networks. Adversaries conducted discovery, targeting, and access to this device using information and previously captured credentials from compromised enterprise IT machines. Finally, the adversaries deployed and launched the Industroyer malware just before midnight on 17 December. By midnight, Ukrenergo had lost control of a targeted substation, resulting in electric power outages for over an hour in the city of Kyiv and the Kyiv region. Researchers and analysts identified 31 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 33 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 846 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-nine of the identified techniques used during the Industroyer cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 548 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 353 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 300 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Precursor Analysis Report: Ryuk Ransomware Attack on Universal Health Services 2020

The Ryuk Ransomware Attack on Universal Health Services (UHS) 2020 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the 2020 UHS cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. UHS manages over 400 hospitals and is one of the largest healthcare providers in the United States with 3.5 million patients each year. On 27 September 2020, UHS suffered a widespread ransomware attack that resulted in a denial of service to critical internet-dependent healthcare systems including workstations, phones, and data centers. Employees resorted to filing patient details with pen and paper, while other facilities had to redirect ambulances and urgent patients to other facilities for adequate care. Adversaries carried out the attack with Ryuk, a ransomware that encrypts data and generates a RyukReadMe.txt ransom note with the ransom fee to decrypt the data, varying from 15 Bitcoin (BTC) to 50 BTC, equivalent to roughly $\$$353,892 to $\$$964,617. UHS did not pay the ransom and was able to recover data through backups, but still reported an impact of $\$$67 million dollars in recovery costs. On 29 October, one month after the attack, UHS made an official statement that their systems had been restored and they were resuming normal operations. Researchers and analysts identified 18 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 19 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 185 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Fourteen of the identified techniques used during the UHS cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 106 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 82 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 30 days to two hours preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Precursor Analysis Report: Conti Ransomware Attack on the Health Service Executive of Ireland 2021

The Conti Ransomware Attack on the Health Service Executive (HSE) of Ireland 2021 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed by the adversary. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. The HSE provides public healthcare corporate services and operational services throughout Ireland, with critical functions including the acute national ambulance service, acute hospital service, and community healthcare service. On 14 May 2021, Conti ransomware encrypted 80 percent of the HSE’s Information Technology (IT) infrastructure across corporate, hospital, community, and electronic health record services. Conti is a ransomware-as-a-service operation that encrypts local files, uses double extortion against victims, and is facilitated by many intrusion tools. The attack forced the HSE to shut down its entire IT infrastructure to contain the ransomware, forcing employees to revert to pen and paper recordkeeping and leading to the cancellation of many appointments and procedures. The adversary also exfiltrated 700 GB of data, compromising the confidentiality of patients’ protected health information. Had the adversary targeted the COVID-19 cloud systems or operational technology assets, such as Internet of Medical Things medical devices or smart building management systems, the impact of the attack would almost certainly have been far more severe. Researchers and analysts identified 21 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 23 steps) likely utilized during the attack with a total of 1,185 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-one of the identified techniques used during the attack on the HSE were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 1,086 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 850 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 57 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Simultaneous probing of bulk liquid phase and catalytic gas-liquid-solid interface under working conditions using attenuated total reflection infrared spectroscopy

Design and performance of a reactor set-up for attenuated total reflection infrared (ATR-IR) spectroscopy suitable for simultaneous reaction monitoring of bulk liquid and catalytic solid-liquid-gas interfaces under working conditions are presented. As advancement of in situ spectroscopy an operando methodology for gas-liquid-solid reaction monitoring was developed that simultaneously combines catalytic activity and molecular level detection at the catalytically active site of the same sample. Semi-batch reactor conditions are achieved with the analytical set-up by implementing the ATR-IR flow-through cell in a recycle reactor system and integrating a specifically designed gas feeding system coupled with a bubble trap. By the use of only one spectrometer the design of the new ATR-IR reactor cell allows for simultaneous detection of the bulk liquid and the catalytic interface during the working reaction. Holding two internal reflection elements (IRE) the sample compartments of the horizontally movable cell are consecutively flushed with reaction solution and pneumatically actuated, rapid switching of the cell (<1 s) enables to quasi simultaneously follow the heterogeneously catalysed reaction at the catalytic interface on a catalyst-coated IRE and in the bulk liquid on a blank IRE. For a complex heterogeneous reaction, the asymmetric hydrogenation of 2,2,2-trifluoroacetophenone on chirally modified Pt catalyst the elucidation of catalytic activity/enantioselectivity coupled with simultaneous monitoring of the catalytic solid-liquid-gas interface is shown. Both catalytic activity and enantioselectivity are strongly dependent on the experimental conditions. The opportunity to gain improved understanding by coupling measurements of catalytic performance and spectroscopic detection is presented. In addition, the applicability of modulation excitation spectroscopy and phase-sensitive detection are demonstrated.

75 CONDENSED MATTER PHYSICS, SUPERCONDUCTIVITY AND↗

Detecting cavitation in mercury exposed to a high-energy pulsed proton beam

The Oak Ridge National Laboratory Spallation Neutron Source employs a high-energy pulsed proton beam incident on a mercury target to generate short bursts of neutrons. Absorption of the proton beam produces rapid heating of the mercury, resulting in the formation of acoustic shock waves and the nucleation of cavitation bubbles. The subsequent collapse of these cavitation bubbles promote erosion of the steel target walls. Preliminary measurements using two passive cavitation detectors (megahertz-frequency focused and unfocused piezoelectric transducers) installed in a mercury test target to monitor cavitation generated by proton beams with charges ranging from 0.041 to 4.1 C will be reported on. Cavitation was initially detected for a beam charge of 0.082 C by the presence of an acoustic emission approximately 250 s after arrival of the incident proton beam. This emission was consistent with an inertial cavitation collapse of a bubble with an estimated maximum bubble radius of 0.19 mm, based on collapse time. The peak pressure in the mercury for the initiation of cavitation was predicted to be 0.6 MPa. For a beam charge of 0.41 C and higher, the lifetimes of the bubbles exceeded the reverberation time of the chamber (~300 s), and distinct windows of cavitation activity were detected, a phenomenon that likely resulted from the interaction of the reverberation in the chamber and the cavitation bubbles.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Imaging gene expression in real-time using aptamers

Signal transduction pathways are usually activated by external stimuli and are transient. The downstream changes such as transcription of the activated genes are also transient. Real-time detection of promoter activity is useful for understanding changes in gene expression, especially during cell differentiation and in development. A simple and reliable method for viewing gene expression in real time is not yet available. Reporter proteins such as fluorescent proteins and luciferase allow for non-invasive detection of the products of gene expression in living cells. However, current reporter systems do not provide for real-time imaging of promoter activity in living cells. This is because of the long time period after transcription required for fluorescent protein synthesis and maturation. We have developed an RNA reporter system for imaging in real-time to detect changes in promoter activity as they occur. The RNA reporter uses strings of RNA aptamers that constitute IMAGEtags (Intracellular MultiAptamer GEnetic tags), which can be expressed from a promoter of choice. The tobramycin, neomycin and PDC RNA aptamers have been utilized for this system and expressed in yeast from the GAL1 promoter. The IMAGEtag RNA kinetics were quantified by RT-qPCR. In yeast precultured in raffinose containing media the GAL1 promoter responded faster than in yeast precultured in glucose containing media. IMAGEtag RNA has relatively short half-life (5.5 min) in yeast. For imaging, the yeast cells are incubated with their ligands that are labeled with fluorescent dyes. To increase signal to noise, ligands have been separately conjugated with the FRET (Förster resonance energy transfer) pairs, Cy3 and Cy5. With these constructs, the transcribed aptamers can be imaged after activation of the promoter by galactose. FRET was confirmed with three different approaches, which were sensitized emission, acceptor photobleaching and donor lifetime by FLIM (fluorescence lifetime imaging microscopy). Real-time transcription was measured by FLIM-FRET, which was detected by the decrease in donor lifetime resulting from ligand binding to IMAGEtags that were newly synthesized from the activated GAL1 promoter. The FRET signal was specific for transcribed IMAGEtags.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Imaging gene expression in real-time using aptamers

Signal transduction pathways are usually activated by external stimuli and are transient. The downstream changes such as transcription of the activated genes are also transient. Real-time detection of promoter activity is useful for understanding changes in gene expression, especially during cell differentiation and in development. A simple and reliable method for viewing gene expression in real time is not yet available. Reporter proteins such as fluorescent proteins and luciferase allow for non-invasive detection of the products of gene expression in living cells. However, current reporter systems do not provide for real-time imaging of promoter activity in living cells. This is because of the long time period after transcription required for fluorescent protein synthesis and maturation. We have developed an RNA reporter system for imaging in real-time to detect changes in promoter activity as they occur. The RNA reporter uses strings of RNA aptamers that constitute IMAGEtags (Intracellular MultiAptamer GEnetic tags), which can be expressed from a promoter of choice. The tobramycin, neomycin and PDC RNA aptamers have been utilized for this system and expressed in yeast from the GAL1 promoter. The IMAGEtag RNA kinetics were quantified by RT-qPCR. In yeast precultured in raffinose containing media the GAL1 promoter responded faster than in yeast precultured in glucose containing media. IMAGEtag RNA has relatively short half-life (5.5 min) in yeast. For imaging, the yeast cells are incubated with their ligands that are labeled with fluorescent dyes. To increase signal to noise, ligands have been separately conjugated with the FRET (Förster resonance energy transfer) pairs, Cy3 and Cy5. With these constructs, the transcribed aptamers can be imaged after activation of the promoter by galactose. FRET was confirmed with three different approaches, which were sensitized emission, acceptor photobleaching and donor lifetime by FLIM (fluorescence lifetime imaging microscopy). Real-time transcription was measured by FLIM-FRET, which was detected by the decrease in donor lifetime resulting from ligand binding to IMAGEtags that were newly synthesized from the activated GAL1 promoter. The FRET signal was specific for transcribed IMAGEtags.

Transcription↗