Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “RADIOACTIVE WASTE STORAGE”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 505 records · Page 28

Sister Rod Destructive Examinations (FY23) Appendix B: Segmentation, Defueling, Metallographic Data and Total Cladding Hydrogen

As a part of the DOE-NE High Burnup Spent Fuel Data Project, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is performing destructive examinations (DEs) of high burnup (HBU) (>45 GWd/MTU) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) rods from the North Anna Nuclear Power Station operated by Dominion Energy. The SNF rods, called sister rods or sibling rods are all HBU and include four different kinds of fuel rod cladding: standard Zircaloy-4 (Zirc-4), low-tin (LT) Zirc-4, ZIRLO ® , and M5 ® . The DEs are being conducted to obtain a baseline of the HBU rod’s condition before dry storage and are focused on understanding overall SNF rod strength and durability. Both composite fuel and defueled cladding will be tested to derive material properties. Although the data generated can be used for multiple purposes, one primary goal for obtaining the post-irradiation examination data and associated measured mechanical properties is to support SNF dry storage licensing and relicensing activities by (1) addressing identified knowledge gaps and (2) enhancing the technical basis for post-storage transportation, handling, and subsequent disposition of the SNF. This report documents the status of the ORNL Phase 1 DE activities related to: Rough segmentation (RS), Defueling (DEF), DE.02 optical microscopy (MET), and DE.03, cladding total hydrogen measurements. It is a cumulative update to the FY22 status report.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Los Alamos National Laboratory SAVY-4000 Field Surveillance Plan (Update for 2021)

The Packaging Surveillance Program section of the Department of Energy (DOE) Manual 441.1- 1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual (DOE 2008), requires DOE contractors to “ensure that a surveillance program is established and implemented to ensure the nuclear material storage package continues to meet its design criteria.” The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) SAVY-4000 Field Surveillance Plan was first issued in fiscal year (FY) 2013. The surveillance plan is reviewed annually and updated as necessary based on SAVY-4000 surveillance findings, as well as results of the lifetime extension studies. Six surveillance plan updates have been issued, one in 2014, one in 2016, one in 2017, one in 2018 one in 2019 and one in 2020. This 2021 update documents what was actually done in 2020 and what is planned for 2021. Deviations from the 2020 surveillance plan were necessary because some of the planned surveillance containers were not available for examination.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Developing an Analytical Framework for Cumulative Effects

The extended dry storage scenario for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in the United States introduces the possibility of more than one transportation campaign to move the SNF from its point of origin to one or more interim storage facilities before it reaches its final destination. While the structural integrity of SNF and its storage and transportation systems are often evaluated under single event loading conditions, the reality is that a single SNF system will experience multiple structural loading events during its life cycle, the number and severity of which will depend on its individual circumstances. SNF systems will also be subjected to environmental exposure that will affect their temperature and the potential for cracks to develop in the SNF canister walls. Considered separately, many different events and scenarios might be strong enough to challenge the integrity of SNF cladding and the storage and transportations canisters that contain SNF. But considered together, over the full life cycle of an SNF system, there is the possibility that individual low-magnitude events could cause enough incremental damage to components of the SNF system to challenge its structural integrity if the time span is long enough or if the life cycle includes a sufficient number of loading events. The concern is that the cumulative effect of relatively small mechanical loads, thermal stresses, or cracking can add up to conditions that could compromise SNF or its containment structures. This report is a first step in establishing an analysis framework for evaluating these cumulative effects.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Effect of Evaporation on Vapor Space Flammability in DWPF Process Vessels - 20278

The Savannah River Site (SRS) Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) processes liquid high-level waste (HLW) and encapsulates it in glass within stainless-steel containers suitable for safe, long-term storage and disposal. Radiolytic and chemical decomposition of the liquid waste generates hydrogen and other flammable gases creating a hazard. The rate of flammable gas generation increases by an order of magnitude as temperature increases from sub-boiling to boiling. DWPF controls this hazard in process tanks by ensuring a minimum purge flow through each tank's head space. The minimum purge flow rate is established assuming dry air and neglecting evaporation. However, this study determined that steam from boiling in a representative process tank is sufficient to dilute flammable gases and, thereby, preclude flammability. For sub-boiling, water vapor is an insufficient diluent considering hydrogen's lower flammable limit (LFL) in air. However, the upper and lower flammable limits approach each other in a hydrogen-air-water-vapor environment as the water vapor concentration increases. This effect may preclude flammable conditions if water vapor concentration is about 60 volume percent or higher. A saturated, constant-pressure air-water system would achieve 60 volume percent water vapor at 86 deg. C. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Structural, Criticality, and Radiation Dose Calculations to Support SNF Loading into a DOE Standard Canister

The DOE Standard Canister Demonstration Project includes the development of an internal support structure (ISS) for the 4.6-m-long and 45.7-cm-diameter canister. This study presents structural evaluations, criticality safety assessments, and dose rate calculations conducted within the scope of the ISS design process to support smooth canister loading operations and to ensure safe storage, transportation, and disposal of Peach Bottom 1 Core II (PB2) and Fort St. Vrain (FSV) SNF, currently stored at INL’s CPP-603 facility. The ISS includes a 316L stainless-steel basket that holds 12 PB2 SNF rods. The PB2 basket rests on top of six individual, 78.7-cm-long, 316L stainless-steel columns that are equally spaced and welded to the inner canister wall at the lower end of the shell. These columns represent the FSV basket and can hold one FSV SNF element. An A92014 T6 aluminum spacer disc is bolted to the bottom plate of the PB2 basket to vertically restrain the FSV SNF element after the PB2 basket is placed inside the canister above the FSV basket. The structural evaluations of the ISS followed applicable ASME BPVC.III.3 guidelines and included finite element (FE) analyses of the PB2 basket structure; analyses of welds and bolds; buckling analyses of selected components, and acceptability assessments of the expected basket deformations under loading operations. The criticality safety assessments used the Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) software architecture Version 6.2, including ENDF/B-V continuous-energy cross-section libraries, considering intact SNF in a single storage overpack or two multistorage overpack configurations and intact or failed SNF configured for disposal. The dose rate computations are based on source terms taken from the DOE Spent Fuel Database. The isotopic composition was decay corrected for the year 2022 using the ORIGEN module in the SCALE suite. A 19-group photon spectrum and a 27-group neutron-source spectrum were generated and used in MCNP to calculate estimated dose-equivalent rates, both on DOE Standard Canister contact and at a radial distance of 1 m from the canister surface. The results of this study indicate a structurally sound system that can uphold its criticality safety functions throughout its intended operational phases. Furthermore, this study provides confidence that sufficient radiological protection is technically achievable.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Overview of Upcoming Process Improvement Efforts at the Saltstone Facilities at the Savannah River Site - 20474

The Saltstone Facilities at the Savannah River Site (SRS) process and dispose of low activity salt solution waste generated by other liquid waste facilities. Today in the Liquid Waste System (LWS), approximately 125 million liters of salt waste remain to be processed. The Saltstone Production Facility (SPF) receives the decontaminated salt waste, which is mixed with dry feeds consisting of cement, fly ash and slag to produce the saltstone. The mixed slurry is pumped to the Saltstone Disposal Units (SDUs) for safe disposal in the Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF). To support continuous Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) operations at annual processing volumes many times higher than present, significant modifications are required to ensure that the SPF has the capacity to support the throughput of salt waste. These changes include several infrastructure upgrades that are being worked through the Enhanced Low Activity Waste Disposal (ELAWD) project. In addition to infrastructure upgrades, Savannah River Remediation (SRR), the Savannah River Site's Liquid Waste Contractor for the U.S. Department of Energy, has identified a flowsheet improvement opportunity of implementing a cement-free saltstone formulation to eliminate cement from the current three component formulation. This two-component formulation would simplify the procurement, transport, off-loading, and storage of the premix materials, and increase the storage capacity for the individual components. This flowsheet, when implemented, will reduce operational risk and improve throughput necessary to achieve disposal rates necessary for SWPF operations. Research has been completed to confirm the feasibility of this formulation, with the new cement-free flowsheet expected to be implemented in the next few years. Improvements have also been identified downstream of the SPF to increase SDU utilization. Specifically, a concentrated effort has taken place to raise the fill height in SDU 6 to the full disposal height, 13 meters, to maximize the usage of each SDU in support of the liquid waste disposal mission. This improvement has been made through additional thermal modeling and improved process understanding to create a SDU flammability model and control strategy more representative of facility operations. This work will allow for the completion of construction and operational readiness for SDU 7 while filling SDU 6 to ensure there is no lapse in available space once SWPF starts up. A summary of these improvements as they relate to increased throughput will be provided along with associated status. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Reduced Neutralization Feasibility Study for H-Canyon Accelerated Basin De- Inventory (ABD) Program

An alternative approach to Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) and Nuclear Material Processing was developed for future H-Canyon (HCAN) and L-Area operations that involves a paradigm shift from current HCAN, Concentrate, Storage, and Transfer Facility (CSTF), and Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) operations. The alternative, referred to as Accelerated Basin De-inventory (ABD), requires that all Domestic and Foreign Research Reactor SNF currently at the Savannah River Site (SRS) will be dissolved, stored, and then transferred to CSTF without recovery of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). Concentrated nitric acid is utilized to dissolve aluminum spent nuclear fuel (ASNF) in HCAN. The vessels and piping in HCAN are fabricated from 304L stainless steel and are ideally suited to handle the acidic waste stream. However, as the waste is transferred to the CSTF and DWPF, it will contact the carbon steel waste tanks in CSTF. In order to prevent corrosion of the carbon steel, the acidic waste is neutralized (i.e., pH adjusted over 11) by the addition of sodium hydroxide (NaOH). The NaOH is added until the final solution contains 1.2 M excess -OH. Additionally, if the waste is not neutralized to a pH greater than 11, then aluminum hydroxide (Al(OH) 3 ) would form, and solids may form in the piping as it is transferred to CSTF. This document presents an analysis of the influence of reducing the excess caustic that is added to the neutralization tanks on the corrosion protection scheme primarily for the CSTF waste tanks. The implications to HCAN and DWPF were also assessed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Evaluation of the 2018 Version of the Integrated Surveillance Program Database Pressure Equation

The Integrated Surveillance Program (ISP) Database Pressure Equation was developed to determine with reasonable certainty the total maximum pressure of hydrogen and other gases in packaged 3013 containers stored at Savannah River Site (SRS) in support of the destructive evaluation (DE) process. The pressure equation in the Department of Energy (DOE) 3013 Standard, “Standard for Stabilization, Packaging and Storage of Plutonium- Bearing Materials” (DOE-STD-3013-2004) used a bounding assumption that all the water is decomposed to form hydrogen. However, the results of Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) shelf-life experiments showed that hydrogen is consumed, and that the maximum pressures would not approach the design pressure of the 3013 container. Therefore, the ISP Database Pressure Equation was revised in 2008 to include terms for the generation of helium and hydrogen as a function of time, as well as the consumption of water and destruction of hydrogen based on shelf-life results. The 2008 ISP Database Pressure Equation provided a more reasonable estimate of the total maximum pressure in packaged 3013 containers than the pressure equation in versions of the 3013 Standard issued prior to 2018.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Evaluation of Hydrogen Generation in High Burnup Demonstration Dry Storage Cask

This report provides a best-estimate evaluation of residual water content (post-dry out) in the High Burnup (HBU) LWR Spent Fuel Demonstration project TN-32 cask, and evaluates the radiolysis of the residual free water, and the physisorbed and chemisorbed waters on the surfaces of the fuel and cask internal contents. The evaluation of radiolytic breakdown of those waters with gamma radiation causing the generation of hydrogen gas (H 2 ) is made using available literature data and models. This evaluation is part of the overall materials performance evaluation of the SNF-in-canister system, and is part of the technical bases for their continued safe dry storage. The TN-32 cask contents included 32 HBU LWR spent fuel assemblies each with 264 fuel rods clad in zirconium alloys, aluminum neutron absorber components, and aluminum and stainless steel structural components. The residual free and surface (physisorbed/chemisorbed) waters are ascribed to water vapor in the free volume and to components’ surfaces, respectively. The total potential radiolytic hydrogen inventory from the water vapor and from waters ascribed to surfaces has been calculated assuming all the water produced molecular H 2 . The residual water that is chemically incorporated into the bulk of a hydrated oxide, i.e., chemisorbed water, and its total potential hydrogen inventory has been calculated. These calculations are at the physical limit of material available and are used for a bounding assessment purpose only.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Investigation of Cold Spray as a Dry Storage Canister Repair and Mitigation Tool

The lack of a permanent spent nuclear fuel repository means utilities are faced with extending licenses for dry cask storage systems (DCSS) canisters far beyond their original 20-year license period. DCSS canisters are made from austenitic stainless steels (SSs) and fabricated using fusion welds. High heat input and melting associated with fabrication welds causes material around the weld to be susceptible to chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking (CISCC). The purpose of the work reported here is to investigate the use of cold spray for repair and mitigation of CISCC in DCSS canisters to ensure integrity far beyond their original license period. This report presents an analysis of cold spray for canister life extension, a summary of related efforts, relevant technology down selections, work accomplished, and future efforts relative to use of cold spray for repair and mitigation of CISCC in DCSS canisters.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Disposal Concepts for a High-Temperature Repository in Shale.

Disposal of large, heat-generating waste packages containing the equivalent of 21 pressurized water reactor (PWR) assemblies or more is among the disposal concepts under investigation for a future repository for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in the United States. Without a long (>200 years) surface storage period, disposal of 21-PWR or larger waste packages (especially if they contain high-burnup fuel) would result in in-drift and near-field temperatures considerably higher than considered in previous generic reference cases that assume either 4-PWR or 12-PWR waste packages (Jové Colón et al. 2014; Mariner et al. 2015; 2017). Sevougian et al. (2019c) identified high-temperature process understanding as a key research and development (R&D) area for the Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) Campaign. A two-day workshop in February 2020 brought together campaign scientists with expertise in geology, geochemistry, geomechanics, engineered barriers, waste forms, and corrosion processes to begin integrated development of a high-temperature reference case for disposal of SNF in a mined repository in a shale host rock. Building on the progress made in the workshop, the study team further explored the concepts and processes needed to form the basis for a high-temperature shale repository reference case. The results are described in this report and summarized..

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Real Time, In-line Monitoring of Hanford Tank Wastes - Year 1 Report

The team comprised of students, postdocs, early, mid and senior career scientists from Los Alamos National Laboratory, Savanah River National Laboratory, Georgia Tech and Florida International University, with the guidance of H2C, is developing a suite of in-line instruments for the Hanford high level waste (HLW) and low active waste (LAW) processes to provide near-real-time analysis of waste form physical properties and composition. The work builds on results from the recent DOE-ORP, EM Technology Development and other projects that demonstrated promise for the use of real-time in-line monitoring (RTIM) to measure chemical compositions of slurries of up to 20 weight % solids. The goal is for this instrument suite is to substantially reduce the need for sampling for process control. Sample waste, exposure associated with sample analysis, and the demand for an external laboratory facility would be greatly reduced. The throughput of waste treatment systems would be improved by elimination of the downtime caused by waiting for sample results. This translates into reduced process storage as process knowledge will be continuously updated in near-real-time. These breakthrough technologies would significantly reduce the life cycle cost and accelerate the schedule for the Hanford tank waste mission.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Gap Analysis to Guide DOE R&D in Supporting Extended Storage and Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel: An FY2019 Assessment (Final Report)

This report is a condensed version of previous reports identifying technical gaps that, if addressed, could be used to ensure the continued safe storage of SNF for extended periods and support licensing activities. This report includes updated gap priority assessments because the previous gap priorities were based on R&D performed through 2017. Much important work has been done since 2017 that requires a change in a few of the priority rankings to better focus the near-term R&D program. Background material, regulatory positions, operational and inventory status, and prioritization schemes are discussed in detail in Hanson et al. (2012) and Hanson and Alsaed (2019) and are not repeated in this report. One exception is an overview of the prioritization criteria for reference. This is meant to give the reader an appreciation of the framework for prioritization of the identified gaps. A complete discussion of the prioritization scheme is provided in Hanson and Alsaed (2019).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

He Leak Testing of 3013 Inner Container Lids

The 3013-container package is used for the long-term storage of plutonium bearing materials at Department of Energy (DOE) sites. The package consists of three nested stainless-steel containers: outer, inner and convenience, which are made of stainless steel. The requirements of the DOE 3013 Standarda, also entail the development of a surveillance program, tasked to ensure structural integrity of the outer container for at least 50 years. The Materials Identification and Surveillance Working Group (MIS-WG) is specified to be responsible for selecting the containers for the surveillance as well as analyzing results. The MIS-WG determined that corrosion is a potential mechanism for container degradation with the most credible type of failure to be stress corrosion cracking (SCC) through wall breach of the inner container closure weld region (ICCWR). A breach of the inner container has the potential of allowing corrosive gases to be released into the safety class outer container.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Predeployment progress of the Canister Deposition Field Demonstration

This report updates the high-level test plan for evaluating surface deposition on three commercial 32PTH2 spent nuclear fuel (SNF) canisters inside NUTECH Horizontal Modular Storage (NUHOMS) Advanced Horizontal Storage Modules (AHSMs) from Orano (formerly Transnuclear Inc.) and provides a summary of the surface sampling activities that have been conducted to date. The details contained in this report represent the best designs and approaches explored for testing as of this publication. Given the rapidly developing nature of this test program, some of these plans may change to accommodate new objectives or requirements. One goal of this testing is to collect defensible and detailed dust deposition measurements from the surface of dry storage canisters in a marine coastal environment to guide chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking (CISCC) research. Another goal is to provide data for the validation of computational fluid dynamics (CFD) based deposition modeling. To facilitate surface sampling, the otherwise highly prototypic dry storage systems will not contain SNF but rather will be electrically heated to mimic the decay heat and thermal hydraulic environment. Test and heater design is supported by detailed CFD modeling. Instrumentation throughout the canister, storage module, and environment will provide extensive information about the thermal-hydraulic behavior of horizontal dry cask storage systems. Manual sampling over a comprehensive portion of the canister surface at regular time intervals will offer detailed quantification and composition of the deposited particulates from a realistic storage environment. Discussions of a potential host site for the Canister Deposition Field Demonstration (CDFD) are ongoing. Until a host site is chosen, testing of key CDFD hardware components including the heater assemblies, power skid, and remote data acquisition system will continue. Functional testing of the finalized heater assemblies and test apparatus started this fiscal year. These initial heater tests have shown the assemblies are performing within design specifications. Staged surface sampling of a mockup of a canister outside the AHSM on a transfer skid was also performed. Refinements to the sampling procedures and techniques were captured from observation of these activities and lessons-learned debriefs. These updated sampling procedures and techniques are planned to be tested again in the field using the mockup in order to assure personnel are using the most accurate and repeatable methods possible prior to deployment for actual CDFD testing.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Large Plate Experiment of Chloride-induced Stress Corrosion Cracking in Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Canisters

This report provides a description of the testing (in progress at the Savannah River National Laboratory) to evaluate the corrosion behavior of a large section of welded plate material harvested from the Sandia National Laboratories’ full-size mockup of a spent nuclear fuel (SNF) dry storage canister. The details of the establishment of this plate test, the interim corrosion results (from visual examination), and the general plan for examination of the plate in CY21 to evaluate crack growth behavior (if any) are provided. This work is intended to inform aging management programs for SNF canisters under conditions of extended dry storage. A “large plate” (approximately 51 x 46 cm with thickness 16 mm and weight about 30 kg) and containing a circumferential weldment from the mockup is the test specimen. The knowledge of the salt, temperature, humidity conditions for chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking (CISCC) including the threshold stress intensity factor, K iscc , were used to setup the large plate test in which a set of part-through-wall and through-wall electrical discharge machined (EDM) defects were positioned in the weld residual stress field of the welded plate material from the mockup canister. A marine salt solution was applied to this plate specimen with an air-brush spray, then dried, and then exposed to a sustained 71-73% RH condition at an ambient room temperature of 22 °C. The salt loading and environmental condition is expected to be aggressive to cause CISCC

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Evaluation of Hanford Supernatant Waste Evaporation

Storage space within Hanford’s double shell tanks is running low, with only an approximate 4.1 Mgal of space remaining. Construction of additional storage space is not a pursuable option, but treatment of the waste via vacuum evaporation may be used to reduce the waste volume and increase the available amount of free space. However, without proper care and consideration, concentrating the waste may lead to harmful effects such as excessive solids generation, growth in liquid density and ionic concentration, and development of aggressive properties in the solution. OLI Studio was used to simulate a subset of DSTs using BBI ionic concentrations to generate recipes of every tank’s supernatant layer. Vacuum evaporation was performed by taking each simulated solution and bringing it to 50°C under a pressure of 60 Torr, after which the vapor phase was removed from the simulation, and the solution was brought back to ambient temperature and pressure. Several million gallons of space were created, and only about 100-200 kgal of solids were precipitated during evaporation. Minimal changes to the solution’s pitting factor occurred, and no solution is expected to develop aggressive characteristics due to evaporation. Although a theoretical result is provided, it is unique to the specific temperature and pressure value chosen for the simulation, and future transfers of waste are expected to cause changes in waste properties, which would cause the OLI recipes to lose accuracy. Though the results are not anticipated to be used as a target value or a guide, as an exercise, they show that the extent of volume gains could be equivalent to the construction of new DSTs.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Whose Gas is it anyway? Differentiating the Source of a Large Soil Vapor Plume beneath Two Adjacent Waste Sites - 20487

DOE contractor CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company is currently responsible for conducting groundwater contamination monitoring at several RCRA treatment, storage, and disposal units located on the Hanford Site in Richland, Washington State. The Nonradioactive Dangerous Waste Landfill treatment, storage, and disposal unit presents a distinct groundwater monitoring problem because of a large multi-contaminant soil vapor plume beneath it that is a likely source of low-level volatile organic compound groundwater contamination. Adjacent to Nonradioactive Dangerous Waste Landfill is the Solid Waste Landfill. Volatile organic compounds are inventory components of both the Nonradioactive Dangerous Waste Landfill and the Solid Waste Landfill. Therefore, it is possible that both sites could be contributing to the soil vapor plume. For regulatory purposes, it is important to differentiate which site is the primary contributor of volatile organic compounds to the plume. An approach was developed to identify the primary volatile organic compound source of the soil vapor plume beneath Nonradioactive Dangerous Waste Landfill and Solid Waste Landfill. The site conceptual model hypothesis of vapor-phase volatile organic compound transport to the dissolved phase in groundwater was tested by a simple mathematical model of vapor/liquid equilibrium concentrations at the groundwater/air interface. Once it was shown that vapor-phase volatile organic compound transport to groundwater was a valid conceptual model for Nonradioactive Dangerous Waste Landfill and Solid Waste Landfill, spatial and statistical methods were used to determine the primary site contributing to the majority of volatile organic compounds to the soil vapor plume. Average groundwater chloroform, tetrachloroethene, and trichloroethene concentrations from Nonradioactive Dangerous Waste Landfill and Solid Waste Landfill monitoring network wells were plotted on maps of the facilities and immediate vicinities and compared to soil vapor sampling probe locations. Principal component analysis and mixing ratios were used to identify source contributions of each treatment, storage, and disposal unit to the plume. Results of the vapor/liquid equilibrium concentrations mathematical model showed that transport phenomena outweigh steady-state equilibria. Estimated vapor/liquid equilibrium concentrations were considerably lower than soil vapor measurements. The results indicate that dynamic vadose zone and groundwater factors such as decreased vapor concentrations with depth, vapor dilution from dispersion in the vadose zone, and advective and diffusional volatile organic compound dilution in groundwater result in groundwater volatile organic compound concentrations much less than would be measured under steady-state equilibrium conditions. Site source contribution differentiation by principal component analysis and mixing ratios was inconclusive using actual soil gas data because of the similarity in concentration values in both datasets for Nonradioactive Dangerous Waste Landfill and Solid Waste Landfill. Similar data populations suggest mixing of the vapor contributions from both sites by dispersion through the soil matrix pore spaces. However, when groundwater volatile organic compound data were compared between the Nonradioactive Dangerous Waste Landfill and Solid Waste Landfill monitoring networks, Solid Waste Landfill mean concentrations were higher, suggesting more vapor-phase volatile organic compound transport to groundwater at those locations. Simulated volatile organic compound soil vapor and groundwater datasets created to test the methods developed for this study show that the method can be successful in source differentiation when significantly different datasets are compared. This paper will describe a method of testing a conceptual model for vapor-phase contaminant transport to groundwater and for differentiating site sources of contaminants comprising a mixed-constituent soil vapor plume. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗