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Annual Status Report (FY 2024): Performance Assessment for the Integrated Disposal Facility

The purpose of this Annual Summary Report (ASR) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 is to evaluate the continued adequacy of the Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF) Performance Assessment (PA) and Disposal Authorization Statement (DAS). This report consolidates relevant monitoring data, modeling analyses, and regulatory reviews to demonstrate a reasonable expectation that the PA objectives and performance measures will be met, as required under DOE O 435.1. The ASR follows the guidance in DOE-STD-5002-2017, which provides a framework for maintaining the validity of the DAS through periodic assessment of facility performance and compliance with waste disposal requirements. The IDF is a near-surface disposal facility designed to receive and permanently dispose of low-level waste (LLW) and mixed low-level waste (MLLW) generated from Hanford Site operations. The facility consists of two double-lined disposal cells equipped with leak detection and leachates recovery systems to ensure environmental protection. Waste planned for disposal includes vitrified low-activity waste (LAW) and solid secondary waste (SSW) from the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). At the end of FY 2024, the IDF had not yet received any waste, as it remains in a pre-operational state. Disposal activities will begin with the hot commissioning of the WTP LAW Vitrification Facility using the Direct-Feed Low-Activity Waste (DFLAW) approach in Calendar Year (CY) 2025. This ASR justifies the continued adequacy of the PA and DAS by reviewing key documents and data sources. these sources are listed in Table A-2 in Appendix A.4): The Operating Disposal Authorization Statement (ODAS) for the IDF (DOE-EM, 2021) remains in effect, with no outstanding conditions or key issues affecting its implementation. Based on the comprehensive review of PA analyses, monitoring data, and regulatory compliance activities, this ASR concludes that the IDF remains in compliance with DOE O 435.1, and there is reasonable assurance that the PA performance objectives will be met once disposal operations commence in CY 2025.

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Annual Summary Report (FY 2025) Performance Assessment for the Integrated Disposal Facility

The purpose of this Annual Summary Report (ASR) for fiscal year (FY) 2025 is to evaluate the continued adequacy of the Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF) Performance Assessment (PA) and Disposal Authorization Statement (DAS). This report consolidates relevant monitoring data, modeling analyses, and regulatory reviews to demonstrate a reasonable expectation that the PA objectives and performance measures will be met, as required under DOE O 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management. The ASR follows the guidance in DOE-STD-5002-2017, Disposal Authorization Statement and Tank Closure Documentation, which provides a framework for maintaining the validity of the DAS through periodic assessment of facility performance and compliance with waste disposal requirements.

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NASA aviation safety reporting system

The study deals with 165 inadvertent operations on or into inappropriate portions of the aircraft areas at controlled airports. Pilot-initiated and controller-initiated incursions are described and discussed. It was found that a majority of the pilot-initiated occurrences involved operation without a clearance; controller-initiated occurrences usually involved failure to maintain assured separation. The factors associated with these occurrences are analyzed. It appears that a major problem in these occurrences is inadequate coordination among the various system participants. Reasons for this, and some possible solutions to various aspects of the problem, are discussed. A sample of reports from pilots and controllers is presented. These relate to undesired occurrences in air transport, general aviation, and air traffic control operations; to ATC coordination problems; and to a recurrent problem in ASRS reports, parachuting operations. A sample of alert bulletins and responses to them is presented.

Source record↗

Identifying Emerging Safety Threats Through Topic Modeling in the Aviation Safety Reporting System: A Covid-19 Study

The NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) is a voluntary, confidential aviation safety reporting system. The ASRS receives reports from pilots, air traffic controllers, flight attendants, and others involved in aviation operations. The reports are de-identified and coded by ASRS expert safety analysts, and a short descriptive synopsis is written to describe the safety issue. The de-identified reports are then disseminated to the aviation community in many ways, including via an online database, Safety Alert Bulletins, For Your Information Notices, and the CALLBACK newsletter. In this work, we consider whether we can improve the grouping, linking, and understanding of safety concerns through topic modeling. Specifically, we use topic modeling as a building block to identify emerging safety threats over time. This unsupervised approach, we argue, offers the flexibility to identify new emerging themes in this large dataset by constructing different timelines based on the content similarity of ASRS report narratives. This method's unsupervised nature improves upon related research, which is limited to pre-defined labels and therefore can not fully capture emerging safety threats. We apply our method to all ASRS reports in 2020 to assess if the generated timelines can highlight COVID-19 as it is emerging as a safety threat in incoming ASRS reports. We perform both a quantitative and qualitative evaluation of the automatically constructed timelines. The qualitative evaluation is performed by describing the evolution of top terms in the timelines, generated by our method, which we found explicitly convey the themes of COVID-19. Separately, we use a set of 1,213 COVID-19 reports from 2020 that were manually identified by ASRS analysts to quantitatively evaluate the COVID-19 reports distribution across the timelines. Our results have shown that COVID-19 emergence can be identified using the top terms that were generated by topic modeling. The top terms in topic modeling therefore can serve as a summary alternative to manually inspecting reports. Moreover, leveraging the manually identified COVID-19 reports, we found the manually identified timelines accounted for over 70% of the COVID-19 reports curated by the ASRS analysts, which demonstrates the potential of this approach for facilitating the understanding of safety concerns as they emerge and evolve. This method shows great potential to understand aerospace safety threats and other narrative- driven incident report databases.

ASRS↗

Identifying Emerging Safety Threats Through Topic Modeling in the Aviation Safety Reporting System: A COVID-19 Study

The NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) is a voluntary, confidential aviation safety reporting system. The ASRS receives reports from pilots, air traffic controllers, flight attendants, and others involved in aviation operations. The reports are de-identified and coded by ASRS expert safety analysts, and a short descriptive synopsis is written to describe the safety issue. The de-identified reports are then disseminated to the aviation community in many ways, including via an online database, Safety Alert Bulletins, For Your Information Notices, and the CALLBACK newsletter. In this work, we consider whether we can improve the grouping, linking, and understanding of safety concerns through topic modeling. Specifically, we use topic modeling as a building block to identify emerging safety threats over time. This unsupervised approach, we argue, offers the flexibility to identify new emerging themes in this large dataset by constructing different timelines based on the content similarity of ASRS report narratives. This method's unsupervised nature improves upon related research, which is limited to pre-defined labels and therefore can not fully capture emerging safety threats. We apply our method to all ASRS reports in 2020 to assess if the generated timelines can highlight COVID-19 as it is emerging as a safety threat in incoming ASRS reports. We perform both a quantitative and qualitative evaluation of the automatically constructed timelines. The qualitative evaluation is performed by describing the evolution of top terms in the timelines, generated by our method, which we found explicitly convey the themes of COVID-19. Separately, we use a set of 1,213 COVID-19 reports from 2020 that were manually identified by ASRS analysts to quantitatively evaluate the COVID-19 reports distribution across the timelines. Our results have shown that COVID-19 emergence can be identified using the top terms that were generated by topic modeling. The top terms in topic modeling therefore can serve as a summary alternative to manually inspecting reports. Moreover, leveraging the manually identified COVID-19 reports, we found the manually identified timelines accounted for over 70% of the COVID-19 reports curated by the ASRS analysts, which demonstrates the potential of this approach for facilitating the understanding of safety concerns as they emerge and evolve. This method shows great potential to understand aerospace safety threats and other narrative- driven incident report databases.

ASRS↗

Human factors in aircraft incidents - Results of a 7-year study (Andre Allard Memorial Lecture)

It is pointed out that nearly all fatal aircraft accidents are preventable, and that most such accidents are due to human error. The present discussion is concerned with the results of a seven-year study of the data collected by the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). The Aviation Safety Reporting System was designed to stimulate as large a flow as possible of information regarding errors and operational problems in the conduct of air operations. It was implemented in April, 1976. In the following 7.5 years, 35,000 reports have been received from pilots, controllers, and the armed forces. Human errors are found in more than 80 percent of these reports. Attention is given to the types of events reported, possible causal factors in incidents, the relationship of incidents and accidents, and sources of error in the data. ASRS reports include sufficient detail to permit authorities to institute changes in the national aviation system designed to minimize the likelihood of human error, and to insulate the system against the effects of errors.

Billings, C. E.↗

On Time Performance Pressure

Within many operations, the pressures for on-time performance are high. Each month, on-time statistics are reported to the Department of Transportation and made public. There is a natural tendency for employees under pressure to do their best to meet these objectives. As a result, pressure to get the job done within the allotted time may cause personnel to deviate from procedures and policies. Additionally, inadequate or unavailable resources may drive employees to work around standard processes that are seen as barriers. However, bypassing practices to enable on-time performance may affect more than the statistics. ASRS reports often highlight on-time performance pressures which may result in impact across all workgroups in an attempt to achieve on-time performance. Reporters often provide in-depth insights into their experiences which can be used by industry to identify and focus on the implementation of systemic fixes.

aviation safety↗

Annual Summary Report for the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility—FY2021

This Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 annual summary report (ASR) documents the continued adequacy of the performance assessment (PA), the composite analysis (CA) and associated operating disposal-authorization statement (ODAS) technical basis documents for the Remote Handled (RH) Low-Level Waste (LLW) Disposal Facility at Idaho National Laboratory. Annual review of the adequacy of the PA and CA for the RHLLW Disposal Facility ensures that conclusions of the analyses remain valid in accordance with requirements of Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1, “Radioactive Waste Management.” In FY 2021, no significant operational changes or other activities occurred that would cause deviation from the assumptions in the PA and CA pertaining to disposal geometry, verification of waste characteristics, tracking disposal inventories against total limits, facility closure design, or institutional controls. Sixteen total waste-canister shipments were received at the RHLLW Disposal Facility, and 16 total waste canisters were emplaced.

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Annual Summary Report for the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility—FY 2022

This Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 annual summary report (ASR) documents the continued adequacy of the performance assessment (PA), the composite analysis (CA) and associated operating disposal-authorization statement (ODAS) technical-basis documents for the Remote-Handled (RH) Low-Level Waste (LLW) Disposal Facility at Idaho National Laboratory. Annual review of the adequacy of the PA and CA for the RHLLW Disposal Facility ensures that conclusions of the analyses remain valid in accordance with requirements of Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1, “Radioactive Waste Management.” In FY 2022, no significant operational changes or other activities occurred that would cause deviation from the assumptions in the PA and CA pertaining to disposal geometry, verification of waste characteristics, tracking disposal inventories against total limits, facility-closure design, or institutional controls. Fifteen waste canister shipments were received at the RHLLW Disposal Facility, and 15 waste canisters were emplaced in disposal vaults.

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Annual Summary Report for the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility—FY 2023

This Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 annual summary report (ASR) documents the continued adequacy of the performance assessment (PA), the composite analysis (CA) and associated operating disposal-authorization statement (ODAS) technical-basis documents for the Remote-Handled (RH) Low-Level Waste (LLW) Disposal Facility at Idaho National Laboratory. Annual review of the adequacy of the PA and CA for the RHLLW Disposal Facility ensures that conclusions of the analyses remain valid in accordance with requirements of Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1, “Radioactive Waste Management.” In FY 2023, no significant operational changes or other activities occurred that would cause deviation from the assumptions in the PA and CA pertaining to disposal geometry, verification of waste characteristics, tracking disposal inventories against total limits, facility-closure design, or institutional controls. Eleven waste canister shipments were received at the RHLLW Disposal Facility, and ten waste canisters were emplaced in disposal vaults.

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Annual Summary Report for the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility—FY 2024

This Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 annual summary report (ASR) documents the continued adequacy of the performance assessment (PA), the composite analysis (CA), and associated operating disposal- authorization statement (ODAS) technical-basis documents for the Remote-Handled (RH) Low-Level Waste (LLW) Disposal Facility at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Annual review of the adequacy of the PA and CA for the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste (RHLLW) Disposal Facility ensures that conclusions of the analyses remain valid in accordance with requirements of Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1, “Radioactive Waste Management.” In FY 2024, no significant operational changes or other activities occurred that would cause deviation from the assumptions in the PA and CA pertaining to disposal geometry, verification of waste characteristics, tracking disposal inventories against total limits, facility-closure design, or institutional controls. Nineteen waste canister shipments were received at the RHLLW Disposal Facility, and all nineteen waste canisters were emplaced in disposal vaults.

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Annual Summary Report for the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility—FY 2025

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) requires the performance assessment (PA) (Department of Energy Idaho Operations Office [DOE-ID] 2018a), composite analysis (CA) (DOE-ID 2012), and CA addendum (DOE-ID 2018b) for the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste (RHLLW) Disposal Facility at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Site shall be maintained to evaluate changes that could affect the performance, design, and operating basis for the facility (DOE Manual 435.1-1 Change 3, “Radioactive Waste Management Manual,” Section IV.P. [4]). The RHLLW Disposal Facility became operational in September 2018 after the completion of operational readiness activities required by DOE Order 425.1D, “Verification of Readiness to Start Up or Restart Nuclear Facilities,” and the issuance of the startup authorization by the Startup Approval Authority (Boston 2018). The first waste disposals at the RHLLW Disposal Facility began in Fiscal Year (FY) 2019. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2025, no significant operational changes or other activities occurred that would cause deviation from the assumptions in the PA and CA pertaining to disposal geometry, verification of waste characteristics, tracking disposal inventories against total limits, facility closure design, or institutional controls. This FY 2025 annual summary report (ASR) documents the continued adequacy of the PA, CA, operating disposal authorization statement (ODAS) (ODAS 2018), ODAS technical-basis documents, and the radioactive waste management basis (RWMB) (INL 2024a) to meet DOE Order 435.1, “Radioactive Waste Management,” performance objectives for the RHLLW Disposal Facility. Annual review of the adequacy of the PA and CA at the RHLLW Disposal Facility ensures that conclusions of the analyses remain valid in accordance with requirements of DOE Order 435.1.

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A summary and integration of research concerning single pilot IFR operational problems

A review of seven research studies pertaining to Single Pilot IFR (SPIFR) operations was performed. Two studies were based on questionnaire surveys; two based on National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reports; two were based on Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) incident reports, and one report used event analysis and statistics to forecast problems. The results obtained in each study were extracted and integrated. Results were synthesized and key issues pertaining to SPIFR operations problems were identified. The research that was recommended by the studies and that addressed the key issues is catalogued for each key issue.

Chapman, G. C.↗

A summary and integration of research concerning single pilot IFR operational problems

A review of seven research studies pertaining to Single Pilot IFR (SPIFR) operations was performed. Two studies were based on questionnaire surveys, two were based on National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reports, two were based on Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) incident reports, and one report used event analysis and statistics to forecast problems. The results obtained in each study were extracted and integrated. Results were synthesized and key issues pertaining to SPIFR operations problems were identified. The research that was recommended by the studies and that addressed the key issues is cataloged for each key issue.

Chapman, G. C.↗

Cleared for the visual approach: Human factor problems in air carrier operations

The study described herein, a set of 353 ASRS reports of unique aviation occurrences significantly involving visual approaches was examined to identify hazards and pitfalls embedded in the visual approach procedure and to consider operational practices that might help avoid future mishaps. Analysis of the report set identified nine aspects of the visual approach procedure that appeared to be predisposing conditions for inducing or exacerbating the effects of operational errors by flight crew members or controllers. Predisposing conditions, errors, and operational consequences of the errors are discussed. In a summary, operational policies that might mitigate the problems are examined.

Monan, W. P.↗

Safety Analysis of FMS/CTAS Interactions During Aircraft Arrivals

This grant funded research on human-computer interaction design and analysis techniques, using future ATC environments as a testbed. The basic approach was to model the nominal behavior of both the automated and human procedures and then to apply safety analysis techniques to these models. Our previous modeling language, RSML, had been used to specify the system requirements for TCAS II for the FAA. Using the lessons learned from this experience, we designed a new modeling language that (among other things) incorporates features to assist in designing less error-prone human-computer interactions and interfaces and in detecting potential HCI problems, such as mode confusion. The new language, SpecTRM-RL, uses "intent" abstractions, based on Rasmussen's abstraction hierarchy, and includes both informal (English and graphical) specifications and formal, executable models for specifying various aspects of the system. One of the goals for our language was to highlight the system modes and mode changes to assist in identifying the potential for mode confusion. Three published papers resulted from this research. The first builds on the work of Degani on mode confusion to identify aspects of the system design that could lead to potential hazards. We defined and modeled modes differently than Degani and also defined design criteria for SpecTRM-RL models. Our design criteria include the Degani criteria but extend them to include more potential problems. In a second paper, Leveson and Palmer showed how the criteria for indirect mode transitions could be applied to a mode confusion problem found in several ASRS reports for the MD-88. In addition, we defined a visual task modeling language that can be used by system designers to model human-computer interaction. The visual models can be translated into SpecTRM-RL models, and then the SpecTRM-RL suite of analysis tools can be used to perform formal and informal safety analyses on the task model in isolation or integrated with the rest of the modeled system. We had hoped to be able to apply these modeling languages and analysis tools to a TAP air/ground trajectory negotiation scenario, but the development of the tools took more time than we anticipated.

Nancy G. Leveson↗

Alternative Perspectives on Risk: Individual Differences in Problem Structuring

Team decision making involves contributions of multiple players toward a common goal. While much has been written about the importance of developing shared mental models in order for teams to work together effectively, little has been done to determine the value of alternative perspectives on problem solving and decision making. Early studies of expertise contrasted experts with novices and noted that the two groups differ in the way they structure problems and in their selection of information as salient. Little attention has been given to differences among experts who differ in their specializations. A series of experiments was conducted to determine: (1) what dimensions of flight-related problem situations pilots judge to be most important when making flight-relevant decisions; and (2) whether pilots in different crew positions differ in the way they interpret problems relating to flight decisions. A sorting task was used to identify underlying dimensions judged as salient to individual pilots. Captains, first officers, and flight engineers from two major carriers participated in the study. Twenty-two flight scenarios were developed based on ASRS reports. Pilots were required to make judgments about how they would respond in each case and to sort the scenarios on the basis of similarity of decision factors. They were also asked to provide a verbal label that described each of their sorted categories. A second study required a different group of pilots (also captains, first officers and flight engineers) to sort on predetermined bases.

Orasanu, Judith↗

Presentation on the INL Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility FY-2024 Annual Summary Report

The abstract below is from the report INL/RPT-24-82600. The powerpoint presentation contains information taken from the report. This Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 annual summary report (ASR) documents the continued adequacy of the performance assessment (PA), the composite analysis (CA), and associated operating disposal authorization statement (ODAS) technical basis documents for the Remote Handled Low Level Waste (RHLLW) Disposal Facility at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Annual review of the adequacy of the PA and CA for RHLLW Disposal Facility ensures that conclusions of the analyses remain valid in accordance with requirements of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1, “Radioactive Waste Management.” In FY 2024, no significant operational changes or other activities occurred that would cause deviation from the assumptions in the PA and CA pertaining to disposal geometry, verification of waste characteristics, tracking disposal inventories against total limits, facility closure design, or institutional controls. Nineteen waste canister shipments were received at the RHLLW Disposal Facility, and all nineteen waste canisters were emplaced in disposal vaults.

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