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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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DOE OSTI2025

ResDesign: Resilient by Design Platform for CPS Assessment and Validation

ResDesign project has developed integrated capabilities to help cyber physical system modelers and analysts to evaluate vulnerabilities and resilience of such systems using co-simulation-based attack testbed, graph-based visualization and monitoring tool, and Bayesian optimization-based co-design capability. The project demonstrates a collection of attack scenarios and use cases in an integrated software environment.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2025

BESS Digital Assurance, Supply Chain Risk Management, and Emerging Regulation Session One - Abridged

The TADA BESS Supply Chain Workshops are designed to equip participants with the knowledge and tools necessary to address the evolving challenges at the intersection of battery energy storage systems (BESS), cybersecurity, and supply chain vulnerabilities. The workshops emphasize the application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles using INL’s procurement guide and the CIE-BAT tool. Attendees will develop risk-based security strategies and actionable compliance roadmaps tailored to their BESS projects. Additionally, the program fosters a collaborative network of practitioners and provides guidance on navigating emerging regulatory requirements, including FEOC rules under the OBBB framework, to assess and enhance organizational readiness. This is Session 1 of 3.

25 - ENERGY STORAGE↗

DOE OSTI2025

BESS Digital Assurance, Supply Chain Risk Management, and Emerging Regulation Session Two

25 - ENERGY STORAGE↗

DOE OSTI2025

BESS Digital Assurance, Supply Chain Risk Management, and Emerging Regulation Session One

25 - ENERGY STORAGE↗

DOE OSTI2024

Addressing Consequence within Operational Risk (O.T. Gagnon III) 9-18-2024

Addressing Consequence within Operational Risk: Why threats and security are just not that important! When dealing with cyber or physical risk within any critical infrastructure (CI) environment, don’t concern yourself with vulnerabilities and threats, at least not at first! Also, don’t be overly fixated on “securing the systems” within the organization. The endeavor of tackling operational risk focused on consequences in any critical infrastructure environment to include the complex Aviation ecosystem is challenging even for the most resourced entity but can be advanced though a simplified approach: identifying, binning, and prioritizing the infrastructure environment. While no two entities within a single element of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors are exactly alike when it comes to risk, there is a basic process to move toward a greater understanding of operational risk through becoming more informed about the infrastructure environment in which the entity exists. The process starts with bringing internal and external stakeholders and subject matter experts together to analyze key areas such as Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) components and points of convergence, analyzing internal and external cyber and physical dependencies, accounting for explosive growth in devices and wireless technology, and leveraging the contributions of people inside and outside the operational environment. Attaining a common understanding of the infrastructure environment as part of addressing consequences within operational risk is not easy to do or resource light, but the process outlined provides the framework to further any entity’s efforts in this space. When it comes to cyber risks, before an organization can consider vulnerabilities within and threats to its operations, it must first have a solid understanding of the consequences existing inside its infrastructure environment. Idaho National Lab’s Consequence-Driven, Cyber-Informed Engineering is offered as an example of this approach to effective and efficient cyber risk mitigation.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Cybersecurity Considerations for Hydrogen Infrastructure in Airport Environments

This report explores key cybersecurity concerns and best practices within environments that serve as reference points for the development of hydrogen fueling infrastructure for aviation. This cybersecurity analysis leverages prior NREL studies: 1) hydrogen fueling station component validation to identify vulnerabilities and failure events documented in physical equipment, and 2) electric aircraft charging infrastructure analysis to explore primary cybersecurity vulnerabilities. It reviews the criticality of digitized technologies in sustaining hydrogen fuel production, storage, and fueling systems, noting cybersecurity concerns that are universal to power systems and industrial control systems in general. In considering cybersecurity vulnerabilities within a future landscape of hydrogen energy for aviation applications, a reference architecture was intended to reveal the points of connection between assets and the potential sensors that are vulnerable to manipulation in the event of compromised access or communication within a SCADA system. A generalized reference architecture can help stakeholders, engineers, or strategists understand connections, criticalities, and standard practices when it comes to designing and planning for new systems. There are several gaps to account for in assessing the future of hydrogen production, storage, and fueling for aviation. Engaging stakeholders, including aircraft manufacturers, electric utilities, site property owners, and local communities, will inform decision-making around site structure, operations, and resources for future hydrogen fueling infrastructure to understand operational needs and cybersecurity awareness. Cybersecurity mitigation strategy must consider physical attack vectors that emerge with the integration of hydrogen systems into existing airport security requirements. The cybersecurity risk assessment contained in this report is an entry point into potential future granular-level analyses to be conducted as part of hazard and risk assessments for safe aviation hydrogen infrastructure, determining how the scale of hydrogen fuel infrastructure for aviation impacts the volume of cyber attack vectors, and what, if any, are the vulnerabilities associated with different types of on-board hydrogen systems. In this nascent development phase, assessing how best to integrate cybersecurity practices into an evolving U.S. aviation landscape provides critical insights into building increased awareness and stakeholder engagement to support a cyber-resilient infrastructure.

08 HYDROGEN↗

DOE OSTI2025

Data Centers and Digital Assurance Introduction to Supply Chain and Cybersecurity for Data Centers, Session 1

The first session of the TADA (Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance) Data Centers Cohort Workshop, held on October 30, 2025, introduced foundational concepts of Digital Assurance in the context of data center and grid integration. Sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy, the workshop brought together utilities, data center operators, developers, and vendors to address cybersecurity and supply chain vulnerabilities. The session emphasized the growing criticality of data centers within the electric grid and the need for secure, real-time, bidirectional communication. Participants explored the principles of Digital Assurance, including cybersecurity, cyber-informed engineering (CIE), and lifecycle security, and applied a threat-vulnerability-consequence framework to identify and mitigate risks at the data center–grid interface. Discussions covered a range of threats such as spoofed dispatch signals and insider threats, architectural vulnerabilities like SCADA interfaces and insecure protocols, and potential consequences including cascading grid failures. The session also raised strategic questions about business value, vendor assurance, and defining cyber boundaries and responsibilities. This foundational workshop set the stage for deeper technical analysis and the development of actionable frameworks in subsequent sessions. Session 1 of 3.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2026

Smart Inverters, Dumb Risk: Taking Control of IBR Security in the Digital Age

This presentation addresses the security challenges posed by Inverter-Based Resources (IBRs) in the modern energy landscape. The presentation highlights the vulnerabilities and risks associated with IBRs, including the potential for cyber-attacks, the impact of insecure defaults, and the systemic risks posed by supply chain dependencies. Key topics covered include: 1) The increasing digital transformation in energy systems and the associated security risks. 2) Specific vulnerabilities in IBRs, including weak passwords, hardcoded credentials, and insecure web application interfaces. 3) The implications of persistent connectivity and the strategic risks posed by foreign-manufactured components. 4) The role of regulatory frameworks, such as NERC CIP, in addressing these challenges and the limitations of current oversight. 5) Practical solutions for mitigating risks, including secure design practices, vendor risk assessments, and the importance of strong passwords and role-based access control. The presentation underscores the necessity of a comprehensive, system-of-systems approach to securing IBRs, emphasizing the need for collaboration across various stakeholders, including operators, developers, and regulators, to ensure the resilience and security of the energy grid.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2025

Time Synchronization Techniques in the Modern Smart Grid: A Comprehensive Survey

In modern smart grids, accurate and synchronized time signals are essential for effective monitoring, protection, and control. Various time synchronization methods exist, each tailored to specific application needs. Widely adopted solutions, such as GPS, however, are vulnerable to challenges such as signal loss and cyber-attacks, underscoring the need for reliable backup or supplementary solutions. This paper examines the timing requirements across different power grid applications and provides a comprehensive review of available time synchronization mechanisms. Through a comparative analysis of timing methods based on accuracy, flexibility, reliability, and security, this study offers insights to guide the selection of optimal solutions for seamless grid integration.

comparison↗

DOE OSTI2025

Cybersecurity for Digital Energy Infrastructure : Trends, Threats, and Cyber-Informed Engineering

This presentation discusses the rise in digital energy infrastructure and associated threats. It covers an in-depth risk assessment of digital energy equipment and provides real world examples of threats, vulnerabilities, and known incidents. Research conducted by INL assessing and addressing these risks follows, concluding with a dive into Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) and it's application to digital energy infrastructure, using battery energy storage systems (BESS) as an example.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2024

Trends in Cybersecurity Threats to Clean Energy

As deployments of clean energy generation and storage assets continue to grow, the increased attack surface creates a greater risk for cyber threats, but is clean energy truly a target for cyber adversaries? This poster will present research on the trends in cyber incidents that have affected clean energy companies and assets as well as the trends in disclosed and exploited vulnerabilities. From a series of ransomware attacks on European wind manufacturers, to vulnerabilities exploited in solar assets to turn controllers into botnets, to attacks on communication infrastructure that have resulted in extended outages of remote control and monitoring, we explore the techniques used and the impacts to the clean energy sector. Key takeaways include understanding of how OT-focused malware is becoming more flexible and more destructive, how known vulnerabilities are being exploited, the growing number of IT and OT attacks that use built in tools and functionalities. Additionally, we highlight the presumed motivations and targeted sectors for various identified cyber adversaries. Viewers will leave with an understanding of how recent headlines fit into the development of cyberattack trends and what preventions they may need to take to protect against increasingly popular tactics.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2026

Roadmap for Solar Photovoltaic (PV) Cybersecurity: A vision for improving cyber maturity of distributed and utility-scale solar energy installations

As the solar energy sector continues to expand, its integration into the broader energy infrastructure presents both unprecedented opportunities and new risks. The increasing reliance on digital technologies and interconnected systems in solar energy creates an expanded attack surface for motivated cyber adversaries. Cyberattacks have the potential to cause disruptions in energy production, damage to equipment, financial losses, and compromises in national security. Therefore, ensuring robust cybersecurity measures is paramount to protect the integrity, availability, confidentiality, and access control of solar energy systems. However, there are still key gaps and challenges to be addressed in industry and research, which stakeholders must race to address as they combat a growing number of real-world cyber incidents that affect solar energy systems and a growing number of vulnerabilities discovered and disclosed in key types of equipment. This roadmap explore the current state of solar PV cybersecurity and the gaps and challenges still to be addressed.

14 - SOLAR ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2024

SCA Tools - SCRM Value Add or Lossy Noise Machines

Software supply chain risk management (SCRM) depends upon accurate information regarding the software components that comprise any given software system. The collection of components included in a software package can be organized within a software bill of materials, or SBOM. SBOMs are ideally generated when the software components are put together, such as at compile time, but for many reasons that has not and is not always possible. For example, legacy or proprietary software packages often do not have SBOMs available to downstream consumers of that software. It’s not just end users that are affected, manufacturers themselves also must deal with this problem. To answer these questions, the market has seen the rise of several commercial software composition analysis (SCA) tools. These tools aim to peer into completed software systems, automatically identifying hidden software dependencies and looking up known vulnerabilities associated with those dependencies to enable end-users to enhance their cyber supply chain risk management processes. These tools are potentially a huge boon to end users of legacy and proprietary software – and a potential bane, depending on how accurate they are. This research asks that question – how accurate are currently available binary SCA tools – and provides answers to several other questions: What does it mean to be “accurate”? What limitations do the tools have in identifying common edge cases that take place in modern software development? Can they help you avoid a devastating supply chain attack, or is it all just noise? After researching SCA tools on the market, we identified three vendors that fit our use case and would provide analysis on compiled binaries. Using these tools, we submitted firmware for critical infrastructure devices for analysis and SBOM generation. The SBOM outputs were then cross referenced with SBOMs generated through manual analysis for comparison. In addition to the firmware samples, we also submitted edge case samples based off a popular open-source library that were specifically crafted to evaluate each tools’ ability to accurately identify components. These samples were customized to be consistent with modifications we have seen in modern software development as well as a couple that are representative of supply chain attacks.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2025

Emerging Threats in Transportation Security Related to Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS)

Transport of high-consequence shipments requires a resilient and robust systems of systems to guarantee cargo arrival. Furthermore, rising adoption of technologies such as connected and automated vehicles (CAVs), intelligent infrastructure, and vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication presents unique challenges for securing transportation systems. Within these Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS), several additional vulnerabilities exist that create pathways for adversarial attacks and cargo interception. For example, connectivity provides cyber pathways directly into vehicle systems and infrastructure for malicious actors. Furthermore, advanced vehicle automation exposes additional vehicle control necessary for shipment interception otherwise unavailable to adversaries. Within this paper, we will discuss the specific threats introduced by ITS-enabled technologies currently deployed and in development. These include those mentioned related to connectivity and automation, but will be expanded into grid, infrastructure, and vehicle specific threats. In addition, we will discuss how to potentially mitigate these emerging challenges as well as how to safeguard transportation systems from next generation attacks.

Cook, Adian [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000160825395)↗

DOE OSTI2025

Cyber Informed Engineering Cie Analysis Tool

Main Benefits: • Collaborate on assessment via the web and access and share assessments on your mobile device. • Helps you maximize your cybersecurity investment and resources • Saves you significant time and money by eliminating the requirement to research each government and industry standard in order to understand your cybersecurity posture • Contains easy to follow, step by step instructions to guide you through the process of identifying the cybersecurity posture of your organization • Provides a place to begin with cybersecurity improvement and a way to prioritize your tasks and budgets. • Covers all major cyber relevant topic areas for a comprehensive assessment of your organization’s cybersecurity posture. • Dives deep into the details of each topic area. • Contributes to the organization's risk management and decision-making process • Highlights vulnerabilities and gaps in your organization's IT and control systems. • Raises awareness and facilitates discussion on cybersecurity within your organization • Educates the controls system community on cyber security.

Hansen, Barry [Idaho National Laboratory (INL), Id↗

DOE OSTI2026

Equipment Assessment Guide: A Technical Inspection and Hardening Guide for Devices in Power Grid Operations

This Equipment Assessment Guide, developed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL), provides a comprehensive framework designed to enhance the security of operational technology (OT) devices within power grid operations. The guide outlines essential steps for asset owners to conduct technical inspections and harden vulnerable hardware and firmware components commonly found in embedded systems. It focuses on components frequently targeted by cyber threats, offering valuable identification techniques for locating and recognizing critical components on devices. Additionally, the guide presents recommended secure configurations aimed at minimizing exposure and reinforcing defenses, along with impact analysis that highlights the potential consequences for grid operations if components are compromised. By implementing the recommendations outlined in this guide, asset owners can significantly enhance their cybersecurity posture, reduce the attack surface of field-deployed devices, and improve the resilience of grid services against emerging cyber threats.

42 - ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2024

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Guidance to Defeat Systematic OT Weaknesses

This research summary outlines the University of Illinois Information Trust Institute (ITI) team's evaluation of whether applying the 12 Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Principles could reduce or eliminate weaknesses identified by the SEI-ETF in engineered systems. ITI's findings suggest that applying CIE principles to weaknesses in MITRE CWE View 1358 can potentially mitigate or eliminate those vulnerabilities.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2026

Assessing Energy Infrastructure Devices for Vulnerabilities

Industrial control systems prove to be vital to the health and security of the nation in our critical infrastructure. Critical infrastructure includes the most foundational systems to support modern civilization which includes water and wastewater systems, communications, and the electricity we use to name a few sectors. However, these devices' overall composition remains largely unknown and are untested from a cyber security perspective. As part of the Cyber Testing for Resilient Industrial Control Systems (CyTRICS) program, I analyzed one such energy infrastructure device to better understand how it functions, what hardware and software components are present within it, and assess it for security vulnerabilities. To achieve this, I reverse engineered binary files using Ghidra to understand system functionality and learned more about how to collaborate with other researchers on a shared Ghidra project. I learned more about how web sockets function and how to interact with them through Python to test if they are secure or not. This work led me to assess possible vulnerabilities in this device and provide a better understanding of its composition and function, which are essential to INL's mission of securing our nation's energy infrastructure.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗