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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 55 records · Page 3
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

A Review on Protection Challenges of Transmission Lines Connected to Inverter-Based Resources

The increased penetration of inverter-based resources (IBRs) connected to transmission grids is challenging how traditional electric power systems operate. Such systems were originally designed based on the dominant presence of synchronous generators. Some main challenges include the increased concerns about system stability due to the reduced system inertia caused by IBRs and the reduced protection reliability caused by the non-deterministic fault current response of IBRs. The protection relays’ algorithms have been designed and validated based on well-known fault current characteristics of synchronous generations, while the short-circuit responses of IBRs heavily depend on their vendor-specific control schemes, which are mainly set to protect inverter semiconductor switches and DC components. The magnitude of short current that IBRs contribute is typically between 1.1–1.5 times the rated current that may behave unstably and incoherently with the voltages. The control scheme of the IBRs also controls the active (P) and reactive (Q) support during system voltage sag and swell conditions. These characteristics challenge not only protective relay schemes but also existing short-circuit software tools to correctly model IBRs for fault studies and protection coordination analyses

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
NASA NTRS1983

Photovoltaic system grounding and fault protection

The grounding and fault protection aspects of large photovoltaic power systems are studied. Broadly, the overlapping functions of these two plant subsystems include providing for the safety of personnel and equipment. Grounding subsystem design is generaly governed by considerations of personnel safety and the limiting of hazardous voltages to which they are exposed during the occurrence of a fault or other misoperation of equipment. A ground system is designed to provide a safe path for fault currents. Metal portions of the modules, array structures, and array foundations are used as a part of the ground system, provided that they and their interconnection are designed to be suitably reliable over the life of the plant. Several alternative types of fault protection and detection equipment are designed into the source circuits and dc buses feeding the input terminals of the subfield power conditioner. This design process requires evaluation of plausible faults, equipment, and remedial actions planned to correct faults. The evaluation should also consider life cycle cost impacts.

Stolte, W. J.↗
DOE OSTI2024

DOE 10658 Project Sensitivity-Driven Wide Area Protection (SWAP) Coordination Tools for IBRs

Utilities have seen a rapid increase in solar, wind, and battery energy storage systems that interconnect to their electric system through inverters. Inverter-Based Resources (IBRs) have fault current characteristics that are unlike the fault current response of traditional rotating-machine-based generators, which is well-known and repeatable. IBR’s non-traditional fault current behavior is due to the IBR control scheme, which is configured to provide a clean AC output but also protects the inverter’s sensitive power electronics devices from damage from conditions such as overcurrent. This results in a low fault current magnitude, low or no negative sequence current injection, the variability of sequence component currents, the variability of voltage with respect to current angles, and the lack of inertia. The control scheme also results in a fault current response that can vary between manufacturers and between models of the same manufacturer. High penetration of IBRs can adversely affect the protection schemes applied in areas with high penetration of IBRs. With the proliferation of IBRs, utilities are finding out that conventional protection schemes are not adequately equipped to protect the electric systems. This is mainly because the existing protection elements and practices have been designed based on the fault current response of conventional rotating machines. In several cases, the available literature does not provide any clear solution for the issues when the protection scheme does not operate properly near IBRs. This report identifies various protection challenges due to IBRs that industry is facing, from the utility perspective. Instead of focusing on one issue, this report looks broadly at all the challenges that system protection has experienced with high penetration of IBRs. Based on the IBR response from various utilities during real fault events and gathering perspectives from different utility SMEs via questionnaire, the report summarizes the gathered data and internal experiences.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Utilities Perspective on Protection Challenges with High IBR Penetration

Utilities have seen rapid increase in Solar, Wind, and Battery Energy Storage Resources that interconnect to their electric system through Inverters. Inverter-Based Resources (IBRs) have fault current characteristics that are unlike the fault current response of traditional rotating-machine-based generators, which is well known and repeatable. IBR’s non-traditional fault current behavior is due to the IBR control scheme, which is configured to provide a clean AC output but also protect the inverter’s sensitive power electronics devices from damage, one source of which is overcurrent. This results in low fault current magnitude, low or no negative sequence current injection, the variability of sequence component currents, the variability of voltage with respect to current angles, and the lack of inertia. The control scheme also results in a fault current response that can vary between manufactures and between models of the same manufacturer. High penetration of IBRs can adversely affect the protection schemes applied in areas with high penetration of IBRs. With the proliferation of IBRs, utilities are finding out that conventional protection schemes are not adequately equipped to protect the electric systems. This is mainly because the existing protection elements and practices have been designed based on the fault current response of conventional rotating machines. In several cases, the available literature does not provide any clear solution for the issues when the protection scheme does not operate properly near IBRs. This presentation identifies various protection challenges due to IBRs that industry is facing, from the utility perspective. Instead of facing on one issue, we are looking broadly on all the challenges that system protection has experienced with high penetration of IBRs. Based on the IBR response from various utilities during real fault events and gathering perspective from different utility SMEs via questionnaire, the presentation summarizes on gathered data and internal experiences.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Utility Perspective on Protection Challenges with High Penetration of IBRs

Utilities have seen rapid increase in Solar, Wind, and Battery Energy Storage Resources that interconnect to their electric system through Inverters. Inverter-Based Resources (IBRs) have fault current characteristics that are unlike the fault current response of traditional rotating-machine-based generators, which is well known and repeatable. IBR’s non-traditional fault current behavior is due to the IBR control scheme, which is configured to provide a clean AC output but also protect the inverter’s sensitive power electronics devices from damage, one source of which is overcurrent. This results in low fault current magnitude, low or no negative sequence current injection, the variability of sequence component currents, the variability of voltage with respect to current angles, and the lack of inertia. The control scheme also results in a fault current response that can vary between manufactures and between models of the same manufacturer. High penetration of IBRs can adversely affect the protection schemes applied in areas with high penetration of IBRs. With the proliferation of IBRs, utilities are finding out that conventional protection schemes are not adequately equipped to protect the electric systems. This is mainly because the existing protection elements and practices have been designed based on the fault current response of conventional rotating machines. In several cases, the available literature does not provide any clear solution for the issues when the protection scheme does not operate properly near IBRs. This report / presentation identifies various protection challenges due to IBRs that industry is facing, from the utility perspective. Instead of facing on one issue, this report looks broadly on all the challenges that system protection has experienced with high penetration of IBRs. Based on the IBR response from various utilities during real fault events and gathering perspective from different utility SMEs via questionnaire, the report summarizes on gathered data and internal experiences.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2024

Utility Perspective on Protection Challenges with High IBR Penetration [Slides]

Utilities have seen rapid increase in Solar, Wind, and Battery Energy Storage Resources that interconnect to their electric system through Inverters. Inverter-Based Resources (IBRs) have fault current characteristics that are unlike the fault current response of traditional rotating-machine-based generators, which is well known and repeatable. IBR’s non-traditional fault current behavior is due to the IBR control scheme, which is configured to provide a clean AC output but also protect the inverter’s sensitive power electronics devices from damage, one source of which is overcurrent. This results in low fault current magnitude, low or no negative sequence current injection, the variability of sequence component currents, the variability of voltage with respect to current angles, and the lack of inertia. The control scheme also results in a fault current response that can vary between manufactures and between models of the same manufacturer. High penetration of IBRs can adversely affect the protection schemes applied in areas with high penetration of IBRs. With the proliferation of IBRs, utilities are finding out that conventional protection schemes are not adequately equipped to protect the electric systems. This is mainly because the existing protection elements and practices have been designed based on the fault current response of conventional rotating machines. In several cases, the available literature does not provide any clear solution for the issues when the protection scheme does not operate properly near IBRs. This report identifies various protection challenges due to IBRs that industry is facing, from the utility perspective. Instead of facing on one issue, this report looks broadly on all the challenges that system protection has experienced with high penetration of IBRs. Based on the IBR response from various utilities during real fault events and gathering perspective from different utility SMEs via questionnaire, the report summarizes on gathered data and internal experiences.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
NASA NTRS1985

SSME digital control design characteristics

To protect against a latent programming error (software fault) existing in an untried branch combination that would render the space shuttle out of control in a critical flight phase, the Backup Flight System (BFS) was chartered to provide a safety alternative. The BFS is designed to operate in critical flight phases (ascent and descent) by monitoring the activities of the space shuttle flight subsystems that are under control of the primary flight software (PFS) (e.g., navigation, crew interface, propulsion), then, upon manual command by the flightcrew, to assume control of the space shuttle and deliver it to a noncritical flight condition (safe orbit or touchdown). The problems associated with the selection of the PFS/BFS system architecture, the internal BFS architecture, the fault tolerant software mechanisms, and the long term BFS utility are discussed.

Mitchell, W. T.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Soil Moisture Active Passive Mission: Fault Management Design Analyses

As a general trend, the complexities of modern spacecraft are increasing to include more ambitious mission goals with tighter timing requirements and on-board autonomy. As a byproduct, the protective features that monitor the performance of these systems have also increased in scope and complexity. Given cost and schedule pressures, there is an increasing emphasis on understanding the behavior of the system at design time. Formal test-driven verification and validation (V&V) is rarely able to test the significant combinatorics of states, and often finds problems late in the development cycle forcing design changes that can be costly. This paper describes the approach the SMAP Fault Protection team has taken to address some of the above-mentioned issues.

Earth↗
DOE OSTI2025

Utility Experience with Inverter-Based Resource Impacts on Transmission Protection

High penetration of inverter-based resources (IBR) can adversely affect the transmission protection schemes in the area. With the proliferation of IBRs, utilities are finding out that conventional protection schemes are not adequately equipped to protect the electric systems because the existing system has been designed based on the fault current response of conventional rotating-machine-based generators. This report identifies various protection challenges due to IBRs that industry is facing.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Travelling wave‐based fault detection and location in a real low‐voltage DC microgrid

Abstract This paper discusses a device‐level implementation of a travelling wave (TW) protection device (PD) designed for a real low‐voltage DC microgrid. The TWPD fault detection and location algorithm is executed on a commercial digital signal processor (DSP) board, involving signal sampling at 1 MHz via the DSP board's analog‐to‐digital converter (ADC). The analogue input card measures positive pole, negative pole and pole‐to‐pole voltages at the TWPD location. Upon a successful fault detection using a second‐order high‐pass filter, the voltage data is normalised and multi‐resolution analysis (MRA) is performed on a 128‐sample buffer around the TW arrival time. MRA employs the discrete wavelet transform (DWT) to capture high‐frequency voltage patterns, and then the Parseval's energy theorem quantifies these TW characteristics by computing the energy of reconstructed wavelet coefficients. These energy values per decomposed frequency band are the basis for training a random forest classifier that predicts fault location and type. The TWPD is fully implemented and connected to a real DC microgrid in Albuquerque, NM, USA, for validation, and results are shown for field tests verifying the performance under faults.

Paruthiyil, Sajay Krishnan [Department of Electric↗
NASA NTRS1990

VIPER project

The VIPER project has so far produced a formal specification of a 32 bit RISC microprocessor, an implementation of that chip in radiation-hard SOS technology, a partial proof of correctness of the implementation which is still being extended, and a large body of supporting software. The time has now come to consider what has been achieved and what directions should be pursued in the future. The most obvious lesson from the VIPER project was the time and effort needed to use formal methods properly. Most of the problems arose in the interfaces between different formalisms, e.g., between the (informal) English description and the HOL spec, between the block-level spec in HOL and the equivalent in ELLA needed by the low-level CAD tools. These interfaces need to be made rigorous or (better) eliminated. VIPER 1A (the latest chip) is designed to operate in pairs, to give protection against breakdowns in service as well as design faults. We have come to regard redundancy and formal design methods as complementary, the one to guard against normal component failures and the other to provide insurance against the risk of the common-cause failures which bedevil reliability predictions. Any future VIPER chips will certainly need improved performance to keep up with increasingly demanding applications. We have a prototype design (not yet specified formally) which includes 32 and 64 bit multiply, instruction pre-fetch, more efficient interface timing, and a new instruction to allow a quick response to peripheral requests. Work is under way to specify this device in MIRANDA, and then to refine the spec into a block-level design by top-down transformations. When the refinement is complete, a relatively simple proof checker should be able to demonstrate its correctness. This paper is presented in viewgraph form.

Kershaw, John↗
NASA NTRS2014

Fault Management Design Strategies

Development of dependable systems relies on the ability of the system to determine and respond to off-nominal system behavior. Specification and development of these fault management capabilities must be done in a structured and principled manner to improve our understanding of these systems, and to make significant gains in dependability (safety, reliability and availability). Prior work has described a fundamental taxonomy and theory of System Health Management (SHM), and of its operational subset, Fault Management (FM). This conceptual foundation provides a basis to develop framework to design and implement FM design strategies that protect mission objectives and account for system design limitations. Selection of an SHM strategy has implications for the functions required to perform the strategy, and it places constraints on the set of possible design solutions. The framework developed in this paper provides a rigorous and principled approach to classifying SHM strategies, as well as methods for determination and implementation of SHM strategies. An illustrative example is used to describe the application of the framework and the resulting benefits to system and FM design and dependability.

systems engineering↗
NASA NTRS1983

Grounding and fault protection of the SMUD PVI array

If large terrestrial photovoltaic (PV) power plants are to provide an economic source of generation, low-cost, reliable and easily maintainable systems must be developed. In addition, if the system is to be a central station powerplant owned and operated by an electric utility, the design must also be consistent with utility specifications and design standards. The particular solutions developed to address these issues, with regard to grounding and fault protection, for the first phase of the Sacramento Municipal Utility District's (SMUD) 100 mw(ac) PV powerplant are presented. This plant, known as PV1, is nominally rated at 1 mw(ac) and is scheduled to be in operation by the spring of 1984.

Rosen, D.↗
NASA NTRS1973

Self-healing fuse development

The mercury-filled self-healing fuses developed for this program afford very good protection from circuit faults with rapid reclosure. Fuse performance and design parameters have been characterized. Life tests indicate a capability of 500 fuse operations. Fuse ratings are 150 v at 5, 15, 25 and 50 circuit A. A series of sample fuses using alumina and beryllia insulation have been furnished to NASA for circuit evaluation.

Jones, N. D.↗
DOE OSTI2025

Utility Experience with Inverter Based Resource Impacts on Transmission Protection

High penetration of inverter-based resources (IBR) can adversely affect the transmission protection schemes in the area. With the proliferation of IBRs, utilities are finding out that conventional protection schemes are not adequately equipped to protect the electric systems because the existing system has been designed based on the fault current response of conventional rotating-machine-based generators. In several cases, the available literature does not provide any clear solution for the issues when the protection scheme does not operate properly near IBRs. This report identifies various protection challenges due to IBRs that industry is facing, from the utility perspective. It includes a broad review of all challenges that system protection has experienced so far with high penetration of IBRs. Key issues have been identified based on a survey of different utility protection engineers. Finally, fault event recordings are shown to demonstrate some actual cases of mis-operations of relays near IBRs.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
NASA NTRS2014

The Curiosity Mars Rover's Fault Protection Engine

The Curiosity Rover, currently operating on Mars, contains flight software onboard to autonomously handle aspects of system fault protection. Over 1000 monitors and 39 responses are present in the flight software. Orchestrating these behaviors is the flight software's fault protection engine. In this paper, we discuss the engine's design, responsibilities, and present some lessons learned for future missions.

flight software↗
DOE OSTI2026

Study of the Protection Improvements for a Weak Grid Area With High Inverter-Based Resources (IBRs)

This project designs enhanced protection scheme for the real-world weak grid area with a high penetration of IBRs. As the existing protection schemes are originally designed for traditional synchronous machines, we first evaluate if the protection scheme will continue to operate reliably in systems with high levels of IBRs. Hardware relays are tested using a controller-hardware-in-the-loop setup. PSCAD electromagnetic transient simulation with IBR original equipment manufacturer black-box models is used to perform fault studies and generate COMTRADE data, which are replayed by a real-time digital simulator (RTDS) to feed input to the hardware relays. Three scenarios are analyzed: normal operation, an N-1 contingency, and an IBR-only scenario. The evaluation results reveal the following: 1) the protection scheme remains reliable under normal conditions and N-1 contingencies and 2) in IBR-only scenarios, differential protection (87L) continues to operate reliably, whereas local protection elements, such as distance and directional elements, fail because of the lack of regulated negative sequence current contributed by IBRs. Enhanced protection is designed to address the challenge of lack of negative sequence current from IBRs, including increased restraining factors a2 and k2 to block 32Q or using V instead QV ORDER for ground faults, enhanced mho distance element with voltage and phase angle supervision for L-L faults. The efficacy of enhanced protection logic is validated and proven to work reliably. Additionally, IEEE Std. 2800-2022 negative sequence current compliant GFL and GFM IBRs from another vendor are tested and proven to work reliably without need for enhanced logic. Therefore, this work provides valuable decision-making for utilities facing protection system challenges due to IBRs, either designing enhanced protection scheme or requesting their IBRs being IEEE Std. 2800-2022 compliant to produce regulated negative sequence current for protection relay to make correct decision.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗