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DOE OSTI2022

Thermal-Hydraulics Modeling and Simulations of Hot Pool Using the SAS-CFD Coupled Code

The main goal of this activity is to test the dynamic coupling of the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 (SAS) and CFD models, using a recently patched version of the SAS code intended to address an undocumented limitation that hindered the Versatile Test Reactor (VTR) simulation efforts in FY21. As described in previous VTR calculation reports, the undocumented limitation in SAS v5.4 does not allow the user to activate the CFD coupling option during restart calculations. Since the analysts were unaware of this limitation, prior SAS-CFD simulation results for the protected station blackout (PSBO) transient were erroneous. Root-cause analysis was performed to determine the cause of this undocumented limitation in SAS v5.4, the SAS software was updated in a new patch, and the SAS-CFD simulations were repeated with this patched software. The results of the SAS-CFD simulations documented in this report show that the software patch does address the cited issue, and that the patched software indeed supports the activation of the CFD coupling model in restart calculations. The SAS development team will determine the schedule for implementing the patch in an official software release. This report documents updated SAS-CFD simulations of the PSBO transient response in the VTR. The hot pool is modeled with the CFD code STAR-CCM+, which is coupled at the flow boundaries to the SAS model of the primary heat transport system. SAS computes the mass flow rate and temperature at each core subassembly outlet, the thermal insulation cavity bypass, and the IHX inlet windows. CFD in turn computes the absolute pressure and temperature at each of these boundaries. The SAS code will ignore the temperature data at flow boundaries where flow is directed into the hot pool, i.e., at the core subassembly outlets unless flow reversal occurs. Similarly, CFD will ignore temperature data at boundaries where the flow is directed out of the hot pool, i.e., at the IHX inlets except under flow reversal. The focus of this work is to ensure that the SAS software patch addresses the undocumented limitation described in prior VTR calculation reports, rather than the accurate assessment of thermal stratification in the VTR during protected transients. This motivates the development of a new, simplified CFD model with a coarser mesh to accelerate the testing process. The updated model, and simplifying assumptions, are documented in this report. In future work, the thermal stratification assessment should be performed in more detail. The simplified CFD model can be improved by performing grid convergence studies sensitivity studies of turbulence parameters (e.g., Prandtl number, turbulence production and dissipation parameters) on temperature distributions and thermal stratification.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2022

R-Value Measurements Performed on Actinide Targets Irradiated using the GODIVA IV Critical Assembly in FY22

The separation and characterization of two irradiated uranium targets, a depleted uranium (DU) and a highly enriched uranium (HEU) target as well as a plutonium (Pu) target, was conducted in April of 2022. The three targets were assembled at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and irradiated using the GODIVA critical assembly at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC). Splits of the dissolved targets were received by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) after which the PNNL and LANL teams chemically separated the solutions using independent separation schemes and analyzed the separated fractions for short lived actinides and fission products. Chemical separations were traced with stable or radioactive tracers to allow for the determination of chemical yields, analyzing using either inductively coupled plasma optical emission spectroscopy (ICP-OES), inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) or gamma emission analysis (GEA) depending on the nature of the tracer. The Pu target solution was traced with stable elements at LANL to follow elemental fractionation during a Pu removal step. Many analytical techniques were used by PNNL including kinetic phosphorescence analysis (KPA), ICP-OES, ICP-MS, GEA, and thermal ionization mass spectrometry (TIMS) depending on the analyte’s need.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Savannah River Site H-Canyon Advancing Technologies for Remote Inspections - 20345

In 2017, the DOE Environmental Management Office of Technology Development (DOE-EM TD) sponsored the H-Canyon Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD) to demonstrate to DOE facilities the value of using new commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) and near-ready technologies to solve difficult problems and enhance worker safety. The DOE Savannah River Site (SRS) H-Canyon Air Exhaust Tunnel (HCAEX) inspection task was identified as representative of the hazardous, human denied environments which could benefit from advanced technologies. The HCAEX underground concrete tunnel is visually inspected biannually using a camera mounted on a remotely operated vehicle (ROV) designed and built by SRNL. While tunnel images have provided valuable visual information, it is desirable to have a higher order of understanding of the environment to support a more thorough structural integrity (SI) analysis and for long term planning purposes. As part of the ATD, the Concrete Integrated Product Team (CIPT) was formed to identify and evaluate available sensors and methods mature enough to remotely obtain tunnel concrete characterization data of high value and with a high probability of success. The team included SMEs and H-Canyon stakeholders in the field of concrete, nondestructive examination (NDE), structural integrity, sensors and remote systems from SRNL, SRNS, LANL, DOE-SR and the Army Corps of Engineering. The CIPT completed an in-depth identification of customer concrete inspection needs and potential technology solutions. Sensors and methods were evaluated on performance, data usefulness, cost and the feasibility of a successful deployment given the unique tunnel access challenges and environment. Two technologies were identified as promising by the CIPT for near term demonstration and evaluation: Lidar (Light Detection and Ranging) 3-dimensional (3D) mapping and remote robotic deployment of NDE instrumentation. Laser spectroscopy to characterize tunnel surface chemical changes was also of interest, but presently cost prohibitive. This paper will include a discussion of the two efforts underway to evaluate and implement the CIPT recommendations. First, the status of the November 2019 deployment of Lidar at a single location into the tunnel is presented. This initial deployment provided the team a learning curve and lessons learned on the challenges of tunnel deployment to include remote operation and data collection, stabilization of the sensor in high air flow (∼30 mph), ability to achieve a tolerance accuracy of 0.25-inches, and the probability to identify change in tunnel dimensions over time. Secondly, a discussion on the development of the Robotic Arm Concrete Inspection Test Bed capable of deploying NDE instruments to examine custom concrete forms will be presented. Concrete forms simulating the rough concrete surfaces, strength, composition and potential structural defects that can be found at our DOE EM facilities have been designed and built for the test bed. Two state-of-the art concrete NDE instruments have been identified as having potential to work on rough concrete walls, they are being tested and characterized as to their ability to provide desired structural integrity data to include wall thickness and defect identification on the developed test beams. Lastly, lessons learned, and the path forward will be presented. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

Lessons Learned from Hanford's Purex Tunnel 2 Structural Stabilization Project - 20509

In 2019, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) contractor CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) completed structurally stabilizing the Plutonium Uranium Extraction Plant (Purex) waste storage Tunnel 2 with engineered grout. This action significantly reduced risk to Hanford workers, the surrounding community and environment by preventing future collapse of the tunnel and possible release of radioactive materials. Decades of plutonium production at the Purex facility required construction of two large underground tunnels for storage of highly contaminated plutonium processing equipment that had failed during the operation of Purex and other facilities across the Hanford Site. Following the partial collapse of Purex Tunnel 1 on May 9, 2017, DOE and CHPRC took immediate action to safely stabilize the collapsed section of the tunnel. The hole in the tunnel was filled the next day as a temporary stabilization measure, and no contamination was detected as a result of the partial collapse of the tunnel. Workers then stabilized Tunnel 1 in its entirety by filling with engineered grout, which also encapsulated the radioactive equipment and railcars within the tunnel. Grouting eliminated the risk of further collapse and stabilized the tunnel contents, all while not precluding future remedial actions or final closure decisions. While conducting an integrity analysis of Tunnel 1 by using construction drawings, photos and other historical documents, project teams also analyzed the much larger Purex Tunnel 2. The analysis found Tunnel 2 did not meet current codes for structural integrity, and it may not be able to bear the weight of the soil above the tunnel. Therefore, it was determined that Tunnel 2 was also at risk of collapse. DoE's independent panel of experts determined grouting to be the best choice for stabilizing Tunnel 2 because it provides the highest level of stability and protection, and does not preclude future remedial actions. DOE authorized CHPRC to commence work and the Purex Tunnel 2 Structural Stabilization Project was launched in December of 2017. The paper will discuss the process of recognizing the following critical aspects and risks associated with stabilizing Tunnel 2, and the actions taken by the project team to mitigate these risks, including: - Tunnel investigation and data collection to assist with future remediation; - On-site batching and mock-ups to provide the large quantity of grout required for stabilizing the tunnel; - Workforce involvement and innovative actions that mitigated the project's most significant potential hazards, including traffic control; - Project team high level of execution translated into successful project execution. Sharing lessons learned from this critical risk-reduction effort can enhance the safety and efficiency of other complex and hazardous projects across the DOE complex. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2025

A Review of Tank 48H Treatment of Tetraphenylborate with Permanganate

Tank 48H contains roughly 270,000 gallons of radioactive waste material. The waste stored in this tank was to be processed in multiple stages utilizing facilities at the Savannah River Site (SRS) almost 30 years ago. The In-Tank Precipitation Process (ITP) was initiated in Tank 48H, which precipitated highly radioactive cesium-137 using sodium tetraphenylborate (NaTPB). While the process succeeded in precipitating the Cs, Sr, and other actinides, it also generated an unexpectedly large amount of benzene. The evolved benzene created a safety concern and made the waste incompatible with further downstream processing. This halted the ITP, and a new method of treatment was required to continue processing the legacy waste contained in Tank 48H. A myriad of treatment options have been proposed with multiple teams of researchers assembled to work on this highly complex issue over the last few decades. This review investigated one potentially viable treatment option, in-tank oxidation with sodium permanganate. Permanganate has been well known in literature as a strong oxidizing agent for organic compounds, as well as being utilized at the Savannah River Site (SRS) in other processes. A small number of studies have been conducted utilizing waste simulants to evaluate the use of permanganate as an oxidant for tetraphenylborate (TPB). A search of the literature and data from these studies indicates that permanganate could be a viable treatment for destruction of TPB in Tank 48H. While the scoping studies had a small number of individual experiments and nonideal conditions, the permanganate decomposed up to 90% of the TPB. A free hydroxide concentration above 1.0 M is required for tank corrosion control. Simulant studies indicate no decrease in TPB decomposition by permanganate until pH 14. The simulant studies show an increase in TPB decomposition as the temperature of the solution is increased to 40 °C. The post-reaction analysis of previous simulant tests did not look at all of the organic degradation products. Investigations into what these organic products are and in what quantity will help guide determinations as to whether the downstream processing facilities are able to handle the material that will be generated. Study on the time frame for the reaction between permanganate and TPB should be investigated as the literature reports only extend out to two weeks reaction time. The permanganate treatment conditions indicate no corrosion control concerns and a longer timescale reaction may be needed for in-tank treatment. In addition, further study would be useful to identify a lower boundary condition for the ratio of TPB and oxidant. The simulant tests applied large excesses of permanganate, and this may be unnecessary. The size constraint of the tank means that there will be practical limitations on the amount of sodium permanganate that can be added to the tank. The amount of permanganate should be minimized as much as possible while still ensuring decomposition of the TPB to minimize the amount of manganese dioxide solids generated.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗