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DOE OSTI2025

Summary of Analytical Services for the Hanford Site Radionuclide NESHAP Program

This document is a summary of the point source analytical requirements used to demonstrate compliance for the Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site operations with 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 61, “National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants,” (NESHAP) Subpart H, “National Emission Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other Than Radon From Department of Energy Facilities,” and the Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 246-247, “Radiation Protection – Air Emissions.” This reference collects information from multiple source documents and is not intended to create, supersede, replace or over-ride any existing contractual, DOE, federal or state statutes, regulations, compliance agreements, orders, permits, licenses or other requirements. The requirement source document governs where any difference may exist. The Hanford Mission Integration Solutions (HMIS) Environmental organization has been contracted by DOE to manage and report data collected from the sampling and monitoring of radioactive air emissions point sources, colloquially called stacks. The Environmental organization coordinates the analyses and reporting of samples collected at various facilities across the Hanford Site. These facilities operate approximately 52 stacks that require sampling, monitoring or estimating radioactive air emissions. The stacks are operated by Bechtel National, Inc. (BNI), Central Plateau Cleanup Company (CPCCo), Hanford Tank Waste Operations & Closure (H2C), Hanford Laboratory Management and Integration (HLMI), and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). Stack samples from CPCCo, HLMI and H2C facilities are collected by the operating contractor staff, delivered to HMIS, and then shipped to an offsite contracted laboratory for analyses. The field and laboratory sample data uploaded into the Sample Management and Analytical Results Tracking (SMART) database are used to calculate sample volumes and concentrations. Sample concentrations are evaluated for compliance with federal and state regulations, permits, and license requirements. The SMART database also calculates total curies released for sampled point sources and stacks. Point source effluent concentrations and releases are published annually in publicly available reports. The BNI and PNNL operate several DOE-Hanford Field Office (HFO) stacks subject to the requirements of 40 CFR 61, Subpart H and WAC 246-247. The concentrations, curies released and dose modeling evaluation for these stacks are included in the DOE-HFO annual radionuclide NESHAP report. The sample collection, analyses and emissions estimates for these stacks are outside the scope of HMIS contracted responsibilities and not addressed further in this document.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2026

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 572: Test Cell C Ancillary Building and Structures, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

The purpose of this CR is to provide documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and data confirming that the closure objectives for CAU 572 were met. To achieve this, the following actions were performed: • Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from August 2020 through May 2023, as set forth in the SAFER Plan for CAU 572; and in accordance with the Soils Activity Quality Assurance Plan, which establishes requirements, technical planning, and general quality practices. • Corrective actions were completed during decontamination and demolition (D&D) and disposal activities, and were performed from August 2022 through September 2025.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2026

Annual Summary Report (FY 2025) Performance Assessment for the Integrated Disposal Facility

The purpose of this Annual Summary Report (ASR) for fiscal year (FY) 2025 is to evaluate the continued adequacy of the Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF) Performance Assessment (PA) and Disposal Authorization Statement (DAS). This report consolidates relevant monitoring data, modeling analyses, and regulatory reviews to demonstrate a reasonable expectation that the PA objectives and performance measures will be met, as required under DOE O 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management. The ASR follows the guidance in DOE-STD-5002-2017, Disposal Authorization Statement and Tank Closure Documentation, which provides a framework for maintaining the validity of the DAS through periodic assessment of facility performance and compliance with waste disposal requirements.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

2020 Postclosure Groundwater Monitoring and Inspection Report, Central Nevada Test Area, Subsurface Corrective Action Unit 443

This report presents the groundwater monitoring data collected by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) from the Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA), Nevada, Site, Subsurface Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 443 in Nye County, Nevada (Figure 1). The CNTA is the site of an underground nuclear test in 1968 that resulted in residual contamination near the detonation depth of 3200 feet (ft); the contamination requires long-term monitoring. Responsibility for the environmental restoration and long-term monitoring was transferred from DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Field Office, to LM on October 1, 2006. The environmental restoration and site closure process were completed in 2015 in accordance with the amended 1996 Nevada Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (State of Nevada et al. 1996, as amended) and all applicable Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) policies and regulations. The Closure Report, Central Nevada Test Area, Subsurface Corrective Action, Unit 443 (DOE 2018), also called the Closure Report, originally was completed in January 2016 and revised in October 2018; it describes LM’s plan for long-term postclosure monitoring. This includes monitoring of the radioisotopes of interest and water elevations, inspecting the site and maintaining the institutional controls (ICs), evaluating and reporting data, and documenting the site’s records and data management processes (DOE 2018).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Adaptive Site Management Strategies for the Hanford Central Plateau Groundwater

Adaptive site management (ASM) is a systematic and iterative management approach that can be used to expedite the remediation of large and/or complex sites. ASM is defined as a formal and systematic project or site management approach centered on rigorous site planning and a firm understanding of site conditions and uncertainties, using science and technology to routinely re-evaluate and prioritize site remedial actions and characterization activities. The goal of the approach is to create a framework of structured and continuous planning, implementation, and assessment processes that accommodates new information and changing site conditions to develop effective and efficient cleanup approaches that achieves the required outcome(s) while optimizing costs, cleanup timeframe, and performance. Central to ASM is an evolving conceptual site model (CSM). Over time, incremental reductions in uncertainty associated with the CSM will occur, while supporting continued progress toward site cleanup and closure through remedy optimization and evaluation. ASM has the potential to expedite cleanup for the Central Plateau area at Hanford through a planned and systematic approach for reducing uncertainty with targeted characterization activities, while continuing remediation activities that advance cleanup for key risk-driving contaminants. A core component of cleanup within the Central Plateau is the 200 West Pump-and-Treat (P&T) system. Even with an active P&T remedy, uncertainty exists with respect to plume distributions, total mass in the aquifer, and currently known continuing sources. Additional uncertainty is associated with multiple contaminant source locations in the vadose zone, which have the potential to create new groundwater plumes in the absence of any source control measures, although not all contaminant fluxes to groundwater will result in contaminant concentrations above cleanup levels. Collectively, these uncertainties need to be addressed in the CSM to support effective and efficient site progress toward cleanup goal(s). Other nontechnical factors that may warrant an ASM approach at the Hanford Central Plateau are associated with the formation of operable units (OUs) used to manage cleanup. With the exception of the 200-ZP-1 OU, the three remaining groundwater OUs only have interim action records of decision. Nine vadose zone source area OUs are also in the early stages of the remedial investigation and feasibility study process, with pending characterization and technology identification activities. A set of proposed site objectives for the Central Plateau are provided in this document as an initial consideration/example and basis for discussion for ASM implementation. These example site objectives were selected with the goal of maintaining protectiveness at the Columbia River through confinement of contaminant plumes within an administratively controlled area below existing surface waste sites and waste disposal facilities. Although site decision makers and regulators need to provide concurrence, these site objectives are used in this document to describe the elements of an ASM approach, including selection of interim objectives and a long-term adaptive management plan. Interim objectives are also defined to yield measurable incremental progress toward the overall site goals. This document identifies initial technical considerations for developing an ASM framework for the Central Plateau cleanup decisions. These considerations are intended to facilitate more specific decisions, such as objectives, near- and long-term actions, and performance metrics, to develop an overall approach that maintains protectiveness but recognizes the uncertainty, long timeframe, and technical challenges that need to be considered in selecting, implementing, and managing remediation at the Hanford Central Plateau.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

CLOSURE REPORT FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION UNIT 577 AREA 5 CHROMIUM CONTAINING WASTE DISPOSAL CELLS

Report will be submitted to the state of Nevada Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 577, “Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells,” includes five low-level waste cells at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) where buried waste received from Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS), was subsequently determined to contain chromium that exceeded the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure regulatory limit, which would require the waste to carry hazardous waste code D007. CAU 577 was created to satisfy the requirements of the Settlement Agreement (SA) executed between the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office on April 25, 2019. The SA required that the chromium-containing waste received from NFS would be addressed following the closure process laid out in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). The FFACO process ensures proper closure of the chromium-containing waste cells and documentation of that closure through FFACO-type documents (NDEP 2019). As stipulated in Paragraph 5C of the SA, a Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) was prepared that identified and evaluated risks and corrective action alternatives (CAAs) for CAU 577, provided the plan for implementing the recommended CAA, and presented the post-closure plan (U.S. Department of Energy [DOE] Environmental Management [EM] Nevada Program 2021).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2026

Southern Hemisphere Polar Infrared Radiation Experiment (SHIRE) Field Campaign Report

An extended-range atmospheric emitted radiance interferometer (AERI) instrument to be deployed to Scott Base (78 S, 166 E) in McMurdo Sound, Antarctica for the purpose of synergizing with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Polar Radiant Energy in the Far-InfraRed Experiment (PREFIRE) satellite mission (https://prefire.ssec.wisc.edu/), examining the closure of atmospheric thermal emission, and providing validation for PREFIRE. The PREFIRE mission is the first satellite mission to map Earth’s spectrally resolved thermal emission, from 5 to 50 microns, over seasonal to annual timescales. These new observations represent the beginning of an intensive examination of the nature of thermal emission from Earth (emission from both the surface and atmosphere). A primary requirement of the PREFIRE mission is to provide validation of the retrieved variables. Numerous field sites in the Arctic (such as the U.S. Department of Energy Atmospheric Radiation Measurement (ARM) North Slope of Alaska observatory and Summit Station, Greenland) have existing instrumentation to facilitate validation, leaving an observational gap in Antarctica. Through SHIRE, we propose to establish a temporary, intensive measurement site in Antarctica to ensure that both poles are suitably represented, and benefit from this state-of-the art science. This will also allow Arctic and Antarctic atmospheric radiative states to be compared and contrasted. For SHIRE specifically, we also propose further objectives to examine the spectrally resolved thermal radiative closure of the polar atmosphere and the historical changes in Antarctic radiative forcing, using previous Antarctic field campaigns, such as the ARM West Antarctic Radiation Experiment (AWARE).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

Computational Tools and Workflows for Quantitative Risk Assessment and Decision Support for Geologic Carbon Storage Sites: Progress and Insights from the U.S. DOE’s National Risk Assessment Partnership

The 2005 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special Report on CCS raised the profile of CO2 capture and storage (CCS) as an important technology for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. CCS is now recognized as a key component of most climate change mitigation scenarios. Since publication of that report the international research, development, and deployment (RD&D) community has advanced key technical aspects, clarified regulatory requirements, explored value chain and infrastructure solutions, and developed incentive paradigms to enable and promote large-scale deployment of CCS. These efforts have included research to better characterize geologic storage resources, to improve injection performance and storage efficiency, to assess and manage subsurface environmental risks, and to advance monitoring technologies to assure system conformance. These efforts have helped to build confidence in the viability of geologic carbon storage (GCS), but stakeholder concerns about long-term risks and liability associated with GCS remain a hurdle to broad acceptance and large-scale deployment of CCS. Since 2010, the U.S. DOE’s National Risk Assessment Partnership (NRAP) – a research collaboration between five contributing national laboratories – has worked to establish and demonstrate methods and tools to quantify and manage the subsurface environmental risks associated with GCS, amidst uncertainty. This work supports the Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management Carbon Transport and Storage Program’s goal of advancing safe and secure commercial-scale GCS deployment. To address the technical challenge of simulating the physical response of the GCS site to large-scale CO2 injection, NRAP has adopted an approach that relies on coupling computationally efficient reduced-order and/or data-driven proxy models of important system components (i.e., storage reservoir, sealing caprock, leakage pathways, intermediate formations, overlying groundwater aquifers, and the atmosphere) in integrated assessment framework. That integrated model of the physical system is complemented with fit-for purpose functionality to support site characterization and risk-related decisions. The recently released NRAP Phase II toolset includes the Open-Source Integrated Assessment Model (NRAP-Open-IAM) for evaluation of trends in leakage risk and potential impact, tools to support monitoring design optimization (Designs for Risk Evaluation and Management – DREAM v3.0 and Passive Seismic Monitoring Tool - PSMT), and tools for state of stress evaluation (State-of-Stress Analysis Tool - SOSAT) and forecasting induced seismicity risk. The NRAP team has also released a pair of reports describing conceptual workflows to incorporate physics-based, quantitative risk assessment into many of the design, planning, operation, and closure decisions for GCS projects. An online catalogue highlights published studies where these tools and methods are demonstrated. In this presentation, the utility of these products to assess risks and address key stakeholder questions will be highlighted through examples, and related insights about the safety and security of geologic carbon storage in qualified storage sites will be discussed. The prospect of rapid, large-scale deployment of GCS technology to aggressively reduce anthropogenic CO2 emissions requires careful consideration of interference between multiple commercial-scale storage projects within a basin. Going forward, NRAP is expanding and adapting site-scale risk quantification tools and methods to enable assessment of risks and inform management decisions for basin-scale deployment. Increasingly, this work will leverage next-generation approaches for surrogate modelling, fast prediction, and advanced visualization enabled by machine learning and artificial intelligence to promote virtual learning, scenario evaluation, and augment risk-based decision making.

quantitative risk assessment, geologic carbon stor↗
DOE OSTI2025

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Facility Radionuclide Emission Points and Sampling Systems

Battelle–Pacific Northwest Division operates numerous research and development laboratories in Washington State. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) contracts to Battelle at Richland facilities on both the DOE Hanford Site and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) Richland campus. These facilities have the potential for radionuclide air emissions. The PNNL contract with DOE also includes operations at the PNNL-Sequim campus in Sequim, where there is also the potential for radionuclide air emissions. This document is a periodic update that describes current PNNL facility emission units and sampling systems. The National Emission Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP [40 Code of Federal Regulations 61, Subpart H]) requires an assessment of all emission units that have the potential for radionuclide air emissions. Emission units are registered with the State of Washington. Potential emissions from emission units are assessed annually by PNNL staff. Sampling, monitoring, and other regulatory compliance requirements are designated based on the potential to-emit dose criteria, a graded approach to facility-identified potential impact categories, and regulatory requirements. The purpose of this document is to describe the facility radionuclide air emission sampling program and provide current and historical facility emission unit system performance, operation, and design information. For sampled emission units, the building, exhaust unit, control technologies, and sample extraction details are provided. Additionally, applicable configuration drawings, figures, and photographs are included. For non-sampled emission units, emission estimation and radionuclide source details are provided. Site-wide permits for the lowest potential impact category are described. Deregistered/transitioned emission unit details are also provided as necessary for at least 5 years post-closure/transition. Currently, five emission units are sampled continuously for particulate radionuclides at PNNL managed facilities on the PNNL-Richland campus (3 of the 5) and on the Hanford Site (2 of the 5). Four of these units have sampling systems that comply with the American National Standards Institute/Health Physics Society (ANSI/HPS) N13.1–2011 standard for sampling from stacks and ducts of nuclear facilities, and the fifth is grandfathered and compliant with the older ANSI N13.1–1969 standard. In addition, the PNNL-managed Hanford Site 325 Building EP 325-01-S stack is sampled continuously for emissions of tritium. No emissions sampling is required for the single licensed emission unit on the PNNL-Sequim campus.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2026

Tank 11H Low Temperature Aluminum Dissolution and Inhalation Dose Potential Analyses at Savannah River Site – 26018

Currently, there is approximately 34 million gallons of high-level radioactive tank waste in the Tank Farm at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The ultimate goal of operations at the Tank Farm is to remove the high level waste (HLW) from the tanks followed by stabilization of the waste through vitrification of the HLW into glass or grouting the decontaminated waste into saltstone. After bulk removal of the HLW consisting of sludge, saltcake, and supernatant, further efforts are made to reduce the residual waste present in the tank in order to declare preliminary cease waste removal (PCWR) signifying completion of HLW removal. These reduction efforts can include tank washing to remove soluble salts and radioisotopes and dissolution of solids including aluminum. Aluminum in the form of gibbsite and boehmite is relatively insoluble in water. Through addition of aqueous sodium hydroxide, the aluminum can be dissolved at mild temperatures. In order for the waste tank to meet closure mode requirements of the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facilities (CSTF), which includes the Tank Farm, Documented Safety Analysis (DSA), a component of the safety basis, the inhalation dose potential (IDP) and the radiolytic hydrogen generation rate of the stored waste must be demonstrated to be lower than their respective designated limits. These parameters are calculated from measured radiochemical analyses of isotopes that emit a high amount of radioactivity including Cs-137, Sr-90, Pu-238, Pu-239, Pu-240, Pu-241, Am-241, and Cm-244. Following the low temperature aluminum dissolution (LTAD) process, Tank 11H slurry samples were pulled from the tank and sent to Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) to measure the extent of aluminum dissolution, hydroxide concentration, densities of slurry and supernatant, weight percent solids analyses, and radionuclide activities. The analyses of the composite sample found that approximately 90% of the total aluminum in the slurry was dissolved, indicating successful reduction of the insoluble aluminum in the waste tank. Additionally, the weight percent insoluble solids (slurry basis) measurement of the composite sample was found to be approximately 1%, demonstrating that minimal solids still remain in the tank. Finally, the radiochemical analyses of the composite sample determined that the waste contents of the tank met the IDP and radiolytic hydrogen generation rate requirements of the CSTF DSA. These measurements have shown that the LTAD process in Tank 11H was successful in waste reduction efforts and a positive step towards declaring PCWR and tank closure at SRS.

Dekarske, John [Savannah River National Laboratory↗
DOE OSTI2025

International Nuclear Security Nuclear Material Accounting and Control Kit Participant Guides

You work at a facility that stores large amounts of nuclear material in varying containerizations. Management has just approved the establishment of a tamper indicating device program in order to cut down on the effort required to conduct inventories, and to enhance overall control of nuclear materials within the site boundary. You have been assigned, along with your colleagues, to conduct an initial assessment to determine the ideal TID types to be used at your facility. You will apply TIDs to a variety of apparatuses that are representative of the closure mechanisms on different containers and entry points to rooms and vaults onsite.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Testing of Crystalline Silicotitanate to Support Tank-Side Cesium Removal System Operations - 20458

The direct feed of waste from the Hanford tank farms to the Low-Activity Waste Facility at the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant requires an intermediate treatment step that prepares the waste for vitrification. Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS) selected a near-tank treatment system known as the Tank-Side Cesium Removal (TSCR) system to perform the required intermediate treatment functions. The approach in the TSCR system is to filter waste supernatant with a sintered metal dead-end filter and then use a series of ion exchange columns to remove cesium; this system has several similarities to the Tank Closure Cesium Removal system that has been deployed on the Savannah River Site. The ion exchange media proposed for use is crystalline silicotitanate (CST), which is a non-elutable media with a high affinity for cesium. Because the media is non-elutable, loaded columns will be blown down with compressed air, moved into interim storage, and replaced with new columns when cesium capacity is reached. The assumed extent and rate of drying that could be achieved in the TSCR column geometry lacked confirmation by experimental data. In addition, once the columns are loaded with cesium, they generate flammable gases (primarily hydrogen) via radiolysis acting on any resident liquids, i.e., moisture, remaining in the media bed. An assessment of available information on CST concluded that gas generation data that bounds expected operational conditions were needed to support the TSCR system safety basis and planned operations. Working with WRPS, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) designed and conducted testing with CST media to address the need for (a) representative in-column drying data, and (b) bounding flammable gas generation data. Drying testing was performed using a full-height column with a diameter of approximately 2 inches with injected air at temperatures of 18 deg. C and 30 deg. C. Gas generation testing was conducted in an engineered bunker that allowed simultaneous irradiation of up to eight samples at a time. These two experimental approaches used at PNNL for the CST testing are summarized and the major outcomes are presented. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Sludge Removal: Success and Partnership with T Plant - 20510

U.S. DOE contractor CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) has safely and efficiently managed the removal of highly radioactive sludge from the 105-K West Reactor fuel storage basin (105- KW Basin) near the Columbia River. In mid-September 2019, sludge retrieval was completed after 21 storage containers were safely loaded with highly radioactive sludge and transported approximately 13 miles from the 105-KW Basin to T Plant, located in the 200 West Area on the Central Plateau of the Hanford Site. Sludge removal represents the last major source term reduction necessary before the K West Reactor and fuel storage basin can transition to closure activities in preparation for final deactivation and demolition. The technical complexity of the sludge retrieval process, coupled with the challenging physical and radiological characteristics of the waste, necessitated a methodical and deliberate approach using unique design and operational solutions to safely conduct the work. This challenge was further complicated by the need to plan and conduct the work in two separate facilities, each subject to the controls and requirements of its own nuclear facility safety basis. The project overcame these challenges through creating an integrated team that actively engaged, communicated and coordinated each phase of the project to ensure successful completion. This paper will cover how these key elements of the Sludge Removal Project led to its success: - Integrating project planning and management; - Lessons learned from design and construction; - Preparing for a successful campaign (lessons learned from testing and start-up); - Lessons learned from operating in two separate facilities, transporting sludge containers on the Hanford Site and ensuring compliance with a range of regulatory and safety basis requirements. The establishment of an integrated group spanning two facilities and multiple organizations created a team capable of overcoming the challenges necessary to successfully plan and execute the sludge retrieval mission. Sharing lessons learned from this successful project can enhance the ability of teams across the DOE complex to successfully plan and execute complex projects. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Update to the Performance Assessment for the Savannah River Site Saltstone Disposal Facility - 20124

In 2019, Savannah River Remediation developed a revision to the performance assessment (PA) on behalf of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Savannah River Operations Office (SR) for the near-surface disposal of low-level waste at the Savannah River Site (SRS) Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF). Soluble waste from SRS Tank Farms undergoes salt processing to remove cesium and other high activity constituents. The low-activity decontaminated salt solution (DSS) is then immobilized by mixing it into a cementitious waste form known as saltstone. After mixing, the saltstone is poured into leak-tight concrete vaults, known as saltstone disposal units (SDUs), where the waste form cures. By the time of facility closure, the SDF is expected to consist of 15 SDUs with a combined capacity of 1.06 E+09 L (280 Mgal) of cured saltstone. The facility operates under a Disposal Authorization Statement (DAS) from DOE and a permit from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC). Since the start of operations in 1990, the SDF has received almost 6.7 E+07 L (18 Mgal) of DSS, resulting in the safe disposal of 2.7 E+16 Bq (7.3 E+05 Ci) of activity. Due to the radioactive decay of short-lived contaminants, the total remaining activity in the disposed waste is estimated to be approximately 1.4 E+16 Bq (3.9 E+05 Ci), as of September 2018. The Disposal Authorization Statement requires a demonstration that the system of engineered and natural features of the disposal facility will limit releases from the facility and be protective of human health and the environment for at least the next 1,000 years. The long-term performance of the facility was evaluated under the requirements of the DoE's Radioactive Waste Management Manual (US DOE Manual 435.1-1). Simulations were performed to demonstrate that the disposal facility would meet performance objectives specified in the manual. The evaluation was based on numerical models that simulate the releases of contaminants from the saltstone waste form. Contaminants were transported through groundwater and air pathways to points of assessment to evaluate compliance. In addition, the potential consequences of an inadvertent human intrusion (IHI) were also evaluated. In accordance with the guidance and recommendations in US DoE's technical standard for DAS, deterministic and probabilistic analyses were performed to demonstrate the SDF system, which includes the engineered cover system, the SDUs, the waste form, and the natural features of the site, provides a reasonable expectation that saltstone disposal will meet performance objectives. Post-closure doses to future members of the public (MOP) were evaluated; dose estimates from the air pathway were well below the 1.0 E-04 Sv/yr (10 mrem/yr) performance objective within 1,000 years, and the calculated doses to the MOP from all exposure pathways, including the groundwater and air pathways, were well below the 2.5 E-04 Sv/yr (25 mrem/yr) performance objective within 1,000 years. Doses following an assumed intrusion event within the facility boundaries were well below the IHI performance objectives, where the acute IHI dose was below the acute IHI dose performance objective of 5.0 E-03 Sv (500 mrem) and the chronic IHI dose was below the chronic IHI dose performance objective of 1.0 E-03 Sv/yr (100 mrem/yr) within 1,000 years. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Waste Management Project Success - Regulatory Assurance Systems - 20118

Waste management (WM) and remediation projects are essential within a restorative environmental culture. Despite years of experience, challenges and obstacles associated with efficient and effective WM project execution remain. Although some obstacles are project specific, a common challenge is navigating the regulatory landscape from planning through execution, particularly with first of a kind (FOAK) and first in a while (FIAW) projects. The absence of a comprehensive regulatory assurance strategy places significant hurdles in the path of project success. To clear a path for the successful execution of increasingly complex WM projects, this paper focuses on development of a comprehensive regulatory assurance strategy and implementation plan that effectively engages stakeholders, agencies, and performers to produce project plans that fully and cost effectively integrate applicable regulatory requirements. The most reliable way to align regulatory processes and decisions needed for mission success is through a regulatory assurance system. This system establishes a healthy interface with regulatory decision makers, to work in a collaborative manner, to create a common vision for regulatory decisions on an agreed upon schedule. A regulatory assurance system consists of several elements. Although the mission may vary from cleanup to site closure to nuclear component production, the elements of a regulatory assurance system remain essentially constant and must include: 1) identifying a common vision or end state, 2) developing a long-term, integrated strategy and schedule, 3) establishing a regulatory partnering team consisting of key decision-makers, 4) regular and frequent communication with decision-makers, 5) ensuring consistent surveillance for early identification of issues and changes that may impact the project, 6) quick resolution of emerging issues to prevent schedule impact, 7) identifying core compliance functions, 8) periodically assessing progress of the project as it relates to regulatory assurance and, 9) providing constructive feedback to improve the process. A regulatory assurance system provides a living, multi-faceted approach to planning, visioning, communicating and tracking to avoid surprises and ensure smooth and timely progress to the project. The overall success measures will be whether the system produces common sense regulatory decisions supporting the vision on time without appeal. Effective regulatory frameworks rarely happen on their own. Balanced, common-sense regulatory decisions stem from teams that are trained to work together to achieve shared goals. In this paper, particular attention is placed on the importance of starting with a shared vision for a regulatory assurance and execution strategy that leverages experience to establish optimal approaches. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Reinforced Ammo Can Validation Test Report for Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

A research effort was conducted to investigate the effects of an unintentional internal detonation of energetic materials on a small transportation container called the “Reinforced Ammo Can” (RAC), which is currently approved for the transport of energetic materials up to 2 grams net explosive weight (NEW) onsite at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The project used experimental testing of the containers based on simulated results conducted by a Missouri S & T explosives engineering graduate student while on an internship working in explosives safety at LLNL. The proposed experimental testing consisted of 20 central detonation tests in separate Reinforced Ammo Can containers to verify their high explosive (HE) containment capability. RAC containers are required for transporting secondary explosives on site at LLNL Site 200 in quantities between 300 mg and 2 grams of Trinitrotoluene (TNT) equivalent NEW. Currently, the LLNL Environmental Safety and Health (ES&H) Manual states that the RAC containers are permissible for on-site transportation of secondary explosives up to 2 grams NEW by approved HE handlers with the approval of an Explosives Safety Expert (ESE). Simulated results indicated that tensile failure of the closure mechanism on the container is the most likely failure mode, and showed potential occurrence at the 2 gram NEW threshold. Experimental validation tests were conducted indicating failure/rupture of the containers lid with venting of the detonation products at the 2 gram NEW test threshold with an explosive mass safety factor of 1.3. Failure consisted of impact opening the container latch mechanism resulting in potential ejection of the lid depending on the orientation of the charge within the confinement. This analysis solely is an evaluation of the response of the containment if a detonation were to occur, it does NOT consider the probability of such an event.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Use of Unmanned Aerial Systems for Post-closure Waste Site Maintenance and Surveillance - 20143

The P- and R-Area Reactor buildings, located at SRS near Aiken, SC, were in-situ decommissioned by grouting below-grade portions of the buildings and demolishing some above-grade structures to grade level. Other reactor building structures were left above-grade and sealed to prevent human or animal access. Because the above grade-structures are expected to continue in their present state for hundreds of years, the condition of the building roofs is critical to mitigate rainwater intrusion. For this reason, building roof areas were strengthened with high strength concrete to ensure the long-term integrity of the roof structure. Periodic inspections of the roof structures are required to ensure that the roofs are functioning properly and to identify damage areas. The traditional method of inspecting closed reactor buildings requires the use of a helicopter and photographer to generate photographs and videos for review. This method proved sufficient but lacked the resolution and clarity that is required for a thorough inspection of the building structure. Fortunately, the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) has established a Small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS) program using commercially available and custom-built remote-controlled aircraft. EC and ACP contacted the SRNL program to evaluate whether the sUAS technology could be employed for periodic reactor building inspections. The sUAS can fly within a few meters of the reactor buildings and hover, allowing for a more thorough aerial inspection. The initial sUAS inspection of the P-Area Reactor building was completed in February 2018 and at the R-Area Reactor building in August 2018 and were successful in providing higher resolution photos and videos. The sUAS inspections also revealed that vegetation had begun to grow on the roofs that could potentially damage the structure integrity. SRNL partnered with Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University to build a custom heavy lift sUAS that could be equipped with herbicides to remotely treat the vegetative growth. Herbicides were successfully applied to the R-Area Reactor building roof using the custom sUAS in September 2018. The use of unmanned aircraft systems at SRS to perform aerial inspections and herbicide treatment in otherwise inaccessible areas has proven to be an efficient and cost-effective technology that provides high value, increases knowledge of facility conditions, and provides for early detection of damage. Periodic inspections of the reactor building roofs using sUAS technology are performed safely, efficiently, and at a significant cost and schedule savings while reducing emissions, noise, and fossil fuel use. The use of sUAS equipment for building inspections and herbicide application at SRS is unique within the DOE complex. The goal of SRS is to apply this remote technology to other waste unit operations and maintenance activities in the future. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2026

Annual Summary Report (FY 2025) Composite Analysis for Low-Level Waste Disposal in the Central Plateau of the Hanford Site

In accordance with DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, requirements, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Field Office (HFO) prepared this Annual Summary Report (ASR) for fiscal year (FY) 2025 for the Hanford Site Composite Analysis (CA) reported in DOE/RL-2019-52, Composite Analysis for Low-Level Waste Disposal in the Hanford Site Central Plateau (FY 2020) (hereinafter referred to as the Hanford Site Composite Analysis). The preparation of this ASR follows the technical specifications provided in DOE-STD-5002-2017, Disposal Authorization Statement and Tank Closure Documentation.

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