DOE OSTI2017
The 242-A Evaporator Facility is critical to the United States Department of Energy's (DOE) Hanford Site clean-up mission due to limited space within the existing Double-Shell Tanks (DSTs) used to store nuclear and chemical waste until future processing. The 242-A Evaporator Facility is currently the sole waste volume reduction process used at Hanford, and the E-A-1 Re-boiler is essential to the Evaporator process. Due to the potential for cross-contamination between the Re-boiler tubes through which waste passes and the tube sheets of uncontaminated steam, an assessment of the Re-boiler vessel's integrity is required for continuing operations of the facility. In order to meet these requirements, an independent integrity assessment was designed to use fluorescein liquid tracer (LT) to verify the leak-tightness of the Re-boiler vessel in accordance with Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS) tightness test standards, as well as, the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B and PV) Code, Section III, Division 1, NB-6300. LT test methodologies were evaluated and determined to be appropriate for a vessel with restricted access, such as the E-A-1 Re-boiler, as it provided the needed sensitivity, reliability, and cost; as well as, exceeded the leak-tightness specifications required by both WRPS and ASME B and PV Code standards. The integrity test requires water laced with fluorescein be circulated through the waste processing loop of the 242-A Evaporator and samples of steam condensate be collected and analyzed for traces of fluorescein to determine leak-tightness. Liquid condensate sampling was conducted prior to and during testing and the samples were analyzed for fluorescein tracer to determine the amount of fluorescein that flowed out of the tubes of the Re-boiler into the steam side of the vessel. Given the established criteria for 'leak-tight,' test results determined that the Re-boiler passed the integrity assessment. After further scrutiny of the 2014 test and data results, it was determined that although the Re-boiler was 'leak-tight,' as established by the test criteria, there was concern of future leakage. The DOE and the DOE Office of River Protection (ORP) requested that WRPS repeat the integrity assessment in two and a half years to determine if the potential leak was growing, which could threaten continuing operations of the 242-A Evaporator. The 2017 test has been redesigned using lessons learned from the 2014 test and was modified to account for ergonomic and safety considerations, ease of repeatability, and accuracy of results. The liquid tracer methodology and test plan developed for the Re-boiler will continue to be implemented in 5 year increments to monitor current and future integrity. The method may also prove useful for other aging components across the Hanford Site, where appropriate. (authors)
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗