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At least 55 records · Page 3

Electric Vehicles at Scale (EVs@Scale) Laboratory Consortium

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Electric Vehicles at Scale Lab Consortium (EVs@Scale Lab Consortium) is accelerating research to support the establishment of a secure and scalable national network of charging infrastructure. This network will be critical to support tens of millions of light-, medium-, and heavy-duty EVs on American roads by 2030. The EVs@Scale Lab Consortium brings together national laboratories and key stakeholders to conduct infrastructure research and development (R&D) that advances innovations in, and sets unified standards for, high-power and wireless charging. The effort will also develop technologies to integrate vehicle charging with the power grid, and develop cybersecurity measures to protect drivers, vehicles, equipment, and the grid.

ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS,POWER TRANSMISSION AND↗

EVs@Scale Lab Consortium Semi-Annual Stakeholder Meeting

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Electric Vehicles at Scale Lab Consortium (EVs@Scale Lab Consortium) is accelerating research to support the establishment of a secure and scalable national network of charging infrastructure. This network will be critical to support tens of millions of light-, medium-, and heavy-duty EVs on American roads by 2030. The EVs@Scale Lab Consortium brings together national laboratories and key stakeholders to conduct infrastructure research and development (R&D) that advances innovations in, and sets unified standards for, high-power and wireless charging. The effort will also develop technologies to integrate vehicle charging with the power grid, and develop cybersecurity measures to protect drivers, vehicles, equipment, and the grid. The first hybrid EVs@Scale Lab Consortium Semiannual Stakeholder Meeting was held at ANL on September 27-28, 2023, to identify research, development, and deployment needs to accelerate technology development for electric vehicles at scale and explore opportunities for collaboration across government, academia, and industry.

advanced charging and grid interface technologies↗

2024 Electric Vehicles at Scale Semiannual Stakeholder Meeting

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Electric Vehicles at Scale Lab Consortium (EVs@Scale Lab Consortium) is accelerating research to support the establishment of a secure and scalable national network of charging infrastructure. This network will be critical to support tens of millions of light-, medium-, and heavy-duty EVs on American roads by 2030. The EVs@Scale Lab Consortium brings together national laboratories and key stakeholders to conduct infrastructure research and development (R&D) that advances innovations in, and sets unified standards for, high-power and wireless charging. The effort will also develop technologies to integrate vehicle charging with the power grid, and develop cybersecurity measures to protect drivers, vehicles, equipment, and the grid. The first hybrid EVs@Scale Lab Consortium Semiannual Stakeholder Meeting was held at ANL on September 27-28, 2023, to identify research, development, and deployment needs to accelerate technology development for electric vehicles at scale and explore opportunities for collaboration across government, academia, and industry.

advanced charging and grid interface technologies↗

Securing Vehicle Charging Infrastructure

As the US electrifies the transportation sector, cyber attacks targeting vehicle charging could bring consequences to electrical system infrastructure. This is a growing area of concern as charging stations increase power delivery and must communicate to a range of entities to authorize charging, sequence the charging process, and manage load (grid operators, vehicles, OEM vendors, charging network operators, etc.). The research challenges are numerous and are complicated because there are many end users, stakeholders, and software and equipment vendors interests involved. Poorly implemented electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE), electric vehicle (EV), or grid communication system cybersecurity could be a significant risk to EV adoption because the political, social, and financial impact of cyberattacks - or public perception of such - ripples across the industry and has lasting and devastating effects. Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive EVSE cybersecurity approach and limited best practices have been adopted by the EV/EVSE industry. There is an incomplete industry understanding of the attack surface, interconnected assets, and unsecured interfaces. Thus, comprehensive cybersecurity recommendations founded on sound research are necessary to secure EV charging infrastructure. This project is providing the power, security, and automotive industry with a strong technical basis for securing this infrastructure by developing threat models, determining technology gaps, and identifying or developing effective countermeasures. Specifically, the team is creating a cybersecurity threat model and performing a technical risk assessment of EVSE assets, so that automotive, charging, and utility stakeholders can better protect customers, vehicles, and power systems in the face of new cyber threats.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

Cybersecurity for Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure

As the U.S. electrifies the transportation sector, cyberattacks targeting vehicle charging could impact several critical infrastructure sectors including power systems, manufacturing, medical services, and agriculture. This is a growing area of concern as charging stations increase power delivery capabilities and must communicate to authorize charging, sequence the charging process, and manage load (grid operators, vehicles, OEM vendors, charging network operators, etc.). The research challenges are numerous and complicated because there are many end users, stakeholders, and software and equipment vendors interests involved. Poorly implemented electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE), electric vehicle (EV), or grid operator communication systems could be a significant risk to EV adoption because the political, social, and financial impact of cyberattacks — or public perception of such — would ripple across the industry and produce lasting effects. Unfortunately, there is currently no comprehensive EVSE cybersecurity approach and limited best practices have been adopted by the EV/EVSE industry. There is an incomplete industry understanding of the attack surface, interconnected assets, and unsecured inter faces. Comprehensive cybersecurity recommendations founded on sound research are necessary to secure EV charging infrastructure. This project provided the power, security, and automotive industry with a strong technical basis for securing this infrastructure by developing threat models, determining technology gaps, and identifying or developing effective countermeasures. Specifically, the team created a cybersecurity threat model and performed a technical risk assessment of EVSE assets across multiple manufacturers and vendors, so that automotive, charging, and utility stakeholders could better protect customers, vehicles, and power systems in the face of new cyber threats.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Zero Trust Framework: CWMD Zero Trust Principles Model

The research focuses on the critical need for enhanced cybersecurity within the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office, specifically targeting Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear devices. Traditional perimeter-based security models are insufficient against modern cyber threats, prompting a shift toward Zero Trust principles (ZTP) that emphasize continuous verification and stringent security for all devices. Federal directives mandate the adoption of Zero Trust (ZT) across agencies, supported by guidelines from National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and National Security Agency (NSA). The research involved mapping ZT guidance from these agencies to develop tailored CWMD ZTP. The study identified gaps and areas for improvement, including clear transitional guidance from traditional to ZT architectures and the focus on explicit cross cutting capabilities. Design improvements are recommended to ensure increased comprehensive protection and resilience against sophisticated cyber threats for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) devices. Collaborative efforts among federal agencies are essential for the successful deployment of an optimized ZT guidance.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Roadmap for Solar Photovoltaic (PV) Cybersecurity: A vision for improving cyber maturity of distributed and utility-scale solar energy installations

As the solar energy sector continues to expand, its integration into the broader energy infrastructure presents both unprecedented opportunities and new risks. The increasing reliance on digital technologies and interconnected systems in solar energy creates an expanded attack surface for motivated cyber adversaries. Cyberattacks have the potential to cause disruptions in energy production, damage to equipment, financial losses, and compromises in national security. Therefore, ensuring robust cybersecurity measures is paramount to protect the integrity, availability, confidentiality, and access control of solar energy systems. However, there are still key gaps and challenges to be addressed in industry and research, which stakeholders must race to address as they combat a growing number of real-world cyber incidents that affect solar energy systems and a growing number of vulnerabilities discovered and disclosed in key types of equipment. This roadmap explore the current state of solar PV cybersecurity and the gaps and challenges still to be addressed.

14 - SOLAR ENERGY↗

Water Security: Trends, Capabilities, and Research Directions to Secure Water Infrastructure

Water and wastewater sector is target rich and resource poor ~153k water utilities, serve 80% of US population ~16k publicly-owned wastewater systems in the US serve 75% of the population Need scalable solutions to fit small and medium to large systems Federal attention to critical infrastructure continues to grow – particularly in the water sector Increase in water sector incidents and threats for large scale disruption – particularly by nation-state actors and their proxies EPA is the SRMA DHS CISA focuses on critical infrastructure protection across sectors They must work together to secure WWW systems Research capabilities to enable secure water systems Current and future threats Resilience – natural disasters, accidents, cyber-physical attacks

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Securing the Clean Energy Transition with Cyber-Informed Engineering

The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law kick-started a surge in clean energy investments in the United States. Securing these systems and their supporting infrastructure from the outset is imperative, starting from the conceptual design and continuing through the entire engineering lifecycle. Cyber-Informed Engineering is an ideal approach to seamlessly integrate the necessary advanced control capabilities and adaptive protection systems, especially considering the trend towards cloud-based infrastructure and process controls. Learn more about CIE at https://www.energy.gov/ceser/articles/cyber-informed-engineering-bridge-between-cyber-and-critical-infrastructure-securing.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Resilient Energy Delivery and Control Systems (REDCS) (Final Technical Report)

US critical infrastructure is increasingly the target of cyberattacks, where disturbances could cause considerable damage and disruption. To help provide a new layer of cyber-physical protection for one key energy delivery system, natural gas pipelines, GE Vernova Advanced Research along with partners Florida State University and Intel Corporation created an innovative technology called "Resilient Energy Delivery and Control Systems" (REDCS). This cybersecurity package helps detect anomalies caused by cyberattacks, isolate the subsystem being impacted by the attack, and provide functions that can allow for resiliency – giving better situational awareness to the operators and cybersecurity specialists or in the future perform closed loop control for continued operation while compromised.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

CIE Curriculum Guide (V.2.0)

The Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Curriculum Guide offers a comprehensive framework, guidance, and resources for integrating CIE into university-level engineering programs and related educational activities. The primary goal is to help educators adopt CIE principles into their teaching to produce future engineers and technicians who understand digital risks in modern engineered systems, thereby addressing the nation’s infrastructure resilience needs. This guide outlines practical integration examples, links to resources to accelerate CIE adoption, and shares insights from partner academic institutions on various implementation strategies. CIE is a framework for embedding engineered controls that mitigate the impact of cyber-attacks in any cyber-physical system used in critical energy infrastructure and other sectors. Developed by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER), the National Cyber-Informed Engineering Strategy emphasizes embedding CIE into formal education, training, and credentialing. This guide supports this strategic objective by providing examples of integrating CIE concepts into engineering curricula, from class activities to new courses and certificate programs. The importance of educating cyber-informed engineers is underscored by the evolving cybersecurity threats facing engineered systems. As industrial control systems (ICS) increasingly incorporate digital technologies, the responsibility for security extends to both cyber professionals and engineers. CIE addresses critical gaps in designing and protecting physical systems with digital components against cyber risks, ensuring engineers consider digital risk throughout the engineering design lifecycle. Currently, engineering education does not routinely include cyber-informed principles, highlighting a gap in addressing modern engineering system risks. This guide advocates for updating engineering curricula to include digital risk management as a fundamental element. By doing so, future engineers will be equipped to design resilient systems that mitigate digital risks from the outset. Through this guide, engineering faculty can integrate CIE into their curricula, bridging the gap between digital risk and engineering. This approach prepares a cyber-informed workforce capable of safeguarding the cyber-physical systems crucial to national security and public welfare. By embedding CIE into education and training, institutions can produce engineers and technicians who can effectively mitigate cyber impacts throughout the engineering design lifecycle, resulting in more secure critical infrastructures.

42 - ENGINEERING↗

CCE and Resilience Strategies

Consequence-driven Cyber-informed Engineering (CCE) is a methodology focused on securing the nation’s critical infrastructure systems. Developed at Idaho National Laboratory, CCE starts with the assumption that if a critical infrastructure system is targeted by a skilled and determined adversary, the targeted network can and will be penetrated. This think like the adversary approach provides critical infrastructure owners, operators, vendors and manufacturers with a disciplined methodology to: evaluate complex systems; determine what must be fully safeguarded; and apply proven engineering strategies to isolate and protect an industry’s most critical assets.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Trends in Cybersecurity Threats to Clean Energy

As deployments of clean energy generation and storage assets continue to grow, the increased attack surface creates a greater risk for cyber threats, but is clean energy truly a target for cyber adversaries? This poster will present research on the trends in cyber incidents that have affected clean energy companies and assets as well as the trends in disclosed and exploited vulnerabilities. From a series of ransomware attacks on European wind manufacturers, to vulnerabilities exploited in solar assets to turn controllers into botnets, to attacks on communication infrastructure that have resulted in extended outages of remote control and monitoring, we explore the techniques used and the impacts to the clean energy sector. Key takeaways include understanding of how OT-focused malware is becoming more flexible and more destructive, how known vulnerabilities are being exploited, the growing number of IT and OT attacks that use built in tools and functionalities. Additionally, we highlight the presumed motivations and targeted sectors for various identified cyber adversaries. Viewers will leave with an understanding of how recent headlines fit into the development of cyberattack trends and what preventions they may need to take to protect against increasingly popular tactics.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Disrupting EV Charging Sessions and Gaining Remote Code Execution with DoS, MITM, and Code Injection Exploits using OCPP 1.6

Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP) 1.6 is widely used in the electric vehicle (EV) charging industry to communicate between Charging System Management Services (CSMSs) and Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE). Unlike OCPP 2.0.1, OCPP 1.6 uses unencrypted websocket communications to exchange information between EVSE devices and an onpremise or cloud-based CSMS. In this work, we demonstrate two machine-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks on OCPP sessions to terminate charging sessions and gain root access to the EVSE equipment via remote code execution (RCE). Second, we demonstrate a malicious firmware update with a code injection payload to compromise an EVSE. Lastly, we demonstrate two methods to prevent availability of the EVSE or CSMS. One of these, originally reported by SaiFlow, prevents traffic to legitimate EVSE equipment using a DoS-like attack on CSMSs by repeatedly connecting and authenticating several CPs with the same identities as the legitimate CP. These vulnerabilities were demonstrated with proof-of-concept exploits in a virtualized Cyber Range at Wright State University and/or with a 350 kW Direct Current Fast Charger (DCFC) at Idaho National Laboratory. The team found that OCPP 1.6 could be protected from these attacks by adding secure shell (SSH) tunnels to the protocol, if upgrading to OCPP 2.0.1 was not an option. Index Terms—Electric vehicle charging, cybersecurity, OCPP, cyberattack, cyber-resilience. INSPEC Accession Number: 23981565

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

GridSTIX

SF-25-112 Grid-STIX is a comprehensive extension of the STIX (Structured Threat Information Expression) 2.1 ontology specifically designed for electrical grid cybersecurity applications. This ontology provides a standardized, machine-readable framework for modeling grid assets, operational technology devices, threats, vulnerabilities, supply chain risks, and security relationships in electrical power systems. ## Key Features - **Comprehensive Grid Coverage**: Physical assets, OT devices, grid components, sensors, and energy storage systems - **Zero Trust Architecture**: Policy decision points, enforcement points, trust brokers, and continuous monitoring - **AMI Infrastructure**: Advanced metering networks, head-end systems, mesh gateways, and MDM systems - **Advanced Security Modeling**: Attack patterns, vulnerabilities, mitigations, and supply chain risks - **Critical Grid Relationships**: Power flow, protection, control, and synchronization relationships - **Supply Chain Security**: Supplier modeling, country of origin tracking, and risk assessment - **Protocol Support**: DNP3, Modbus, IEC 61850, IEC 60870-5-104, OPC-UA, and IEEE standards - **Python Code Generation**: Automated STIX-compliant Python class generation from ontologies - **Interactive Visualization**: Enhanced HTML network graphs with grid-specific categorization - **STIX 2.1 Compliance**: Full compatibility with STIX threat intelligence ecosystem

Blakely, Benjamin [Argonne National Laboratory (AN↗

Cybersecurity Standards for Photovoltaic Operations

Solar energy plays an important role in securing a more resilient, cyber-secure electrical grid in Pennsylvania. Solar's ability to be widely "distributed" on residential and large roofs, marginal lands, and many other locations across Pennsylvania - as opposed to being centralized - offers a strong option for addressing the myriad of potential disruptions that can occur to the grid's infrastructure. And when combined with energy storage, local energy needs can be met immediately without having to wait on the delivery of an off-site fuel source. As more and more distributed solar electricity generation is brought online, researchers, technology developers, solar developers and grid operators are paying close attention to the potential for solar to enhance grid cybersecurity. Although nobody may know when, where, or how the next cyberattack will take place, there are security measures, technical solutions, and management practices that are being implemented across the industry to protect against network control issues and grid operations. Everyone participating in the solar value chain stands to gain from a coordinated, iterative approach to protect against cyber vulnerabilities and build deeper resilience into the architecture of our grid.

cybersecurity↗

Facility Cybersecurity Framework Best Practices

Federal facilities are increasingly adopting automation and connecting to the Internet creating an energy-internet-of-things environment that converges operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT). Today's buildings increasingly weave together networked sensors and cyber and physical systems that enable data to be collected, aggregated, exchanged, stored and monetized in new ways. Building technological advances have created new energy technology, services, markets and value creation opportunities (e.g. transactive energy, two-way grid communications, machine learning, and increased use of renewable and distributed energy resources). But as larger data sets are being exchanged at faster speeds between an increasing number of OT systems, it becomes more difficult to protect the security of the data lifecycle and the physical equipment it interacts with. These challenges are especially difficult to overcome because the economic and environmental gain (interoperability, big data, social networks and ubiquitous information sharing) are driving these prominent trends in the digital age. Often cybersecurity is an afterthought. The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) funded the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to develop various cybersecurity tools, trainings, and reports to aid federal facility managers – and other building owners and operators – in better applying frameworks and lessons learned from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF), risk management framework (RMF), DOE’s cybersecurity capability maturity model (C2M2), and a wide variety of industry best practices and guidance documents (i.e., NIST 800 series, Department of Defense United Facilities Criteria). This set of tools, collectively known as the FEMP Facility-Related Control System Cyber Toolkit (FRCS Cyber Toolkit)2, is focused on cybersecurity concerns from facility-related control systems and other operational technology (OT), such as industrial control systems (ICS). The FRCS Cyber Toolkit can be applied across six of the sixteen critical infrastructure sectors designated by the Department of Homeland Security, including government facilities, healthcare and public health, commercial facilities (e.g., public assembly, offices, lodging), financial services (e.g., banking and insurance), emergency services (e.g., fire and police stations), and information technology. With increasingly converged IT and OT systems, it is crucial to address OT cybersecurity considerations and assess how the seam of these two systems could impact the overall cybersecurity posture of a facility. The objective of this report is to provide an overview of the best possible method to use FRCS Cyber Toolkit (section 2.0) and distilled cybersecurity best practices for the federal facilities to address growing non-linear cyber threats (section 3.0). Recommendations in this document are aggregated from several NIST and other documents (see Appendix A for additional details).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗