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At least 55 records · Page 3

Unique safety features and licensing requirements of the NuScale small modular reactor

Small modular reactors (SMR) offer a novel approach to the construction and operation of nuclear power plants. The NuScale VOYGR™ plant uses a simplified SMR design that is based on proven light-water reactor technology with substantial improvements in nuclear safety. It consists of a 250 MWt reactor core housed with other primary system components in an integral reactor pressure vessel surrounded by a steel containment vessel, all of which is immersed in a large pool of water that also serves as the ultimate heat sink. At the core of the NuScale safety case are three primary safety systems: the decay heat removal system, the emergency core cooling system, and the containment. The ability of the NuScale Power Module (NPM) passive safety systems to remove core decay heat for an unlimited duration is demonstrated through analysis of a beyond-design-basis extended loss of AC power with no replenishment of water to the ultimate heat sink or operator actions. The NuScale methodology to evaluate an indefinite loss of AC power uses the proprietary NRELAP5 systems analysis computer code. Analysis results show that the reactor coolant system liquid level above the core is maintained and that containment pressure remains below the vessel design pressure. Once full passive air cooling is established, containment pressure and temperature will decrease over time with decreasing core decay heat. NuScale received standard design approval in September 2020 and design certification in January 2023 for its 50 MWe NPM configured as a 12 module plant. NuScale is currently seeking standard design approval to increase its core power to 250 MWt, nominally 77 MWe per module, in a 6-module plant (VOYGR™-6) configuration. The high-level safety of NuScale’s SMR technology is foundational to a new standard of nuclear power plant resilience.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Migration to a fully-integrated control room - 349

The nuclear industry is faced with a pressing need to reduce operating costs in order to remain competitive with other forms of electric generation. While current industry initiatives are focused on incremental gains by streamlining work processes and reducing worker burdens, very few, if any, involve significant reductions in the base workload of a nuclear plant. Migration to a fully-integrated control room affords just such an opportunity. This report describes an NPP digital instrumentation and control (I and C) system design, along with its corresponding human systems interface (HSI) design, which achieves high plant availability, while selectively applying digital equipment redundancy and integrating traditional I and C system partitions, to minimize the digital equipment needed, and thereby minimize initial installation costs and ongoing operations and maintenance (O and M) costs. An additional key component of digital equipment minimization is optimization of the digital interface to conventional plant sensors and controlled plant devices (e.g., pumps, valves), which requires no disturbance to plant cables and results in eliminating thousands of electro-mechanical relay control components. The design is rooted in the highly integrated digital technology applied to the most recent advanced light water reactors under United States (U.S.) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) design certification review and approval. While this design employs technology from new plants, that technology has been adapted to the modernization of current operating NPPs. Hence, the highly integrated digital I and C and HSI design is referred to as the compact control room digital modernization (CDM). Along with minimal digital equipment, the corresponding HSI design employs compact operator workstations with visual display units (VDU) and soft controls for both the main control room (MCR) and remote shutdown room (RSR), to immediately improve human performance and ultimately facilitate operating staff reduction. Some advanced light water reactors have demonstrated this staff reduction through full scope simulator testing of normal and abnormal plant conditions, with U.S. licensed operating crews from currently-operating U.S. plants. Digital equipment minimization, compact operator workstations, and optimized plant component interfaces that require no disturbance to field cables, also facilitate implementation of the CDM over multiple phases, most of which can be conducted during normal refueling shutdown windows. This phased implementation method includes a novel transition of the I and C, MCR and RSR with an operations centered focus. This paper presents the CDM design, along with qualitative cost/benefit comparisons to currently operating plants with conventional analog I and C and HSI technology; this generation of I and C/HSI is referred to as a conventional control room (CCR). A CCR also includes NPPs that have been upgraded with digital systems, but retain the current partitions between plant I and C systems (i.e., no I and C integration) and retain the current plant system to control board configuration of current NPP control rooms. Even though these comparisons are qualitative, a compelling case is presented for the CDM. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Certification Testing Approach for Propulsion System Design

The Certification of Propulsion Systems is costly and complex which involves development and qualification testing. The desire of the certification process is to assure all requirements can be demonstrated to be compliant. The purpose of this paper is to address the technical design concerns of certifying a system for flight. The authors of this paper have experience the lessons learned from supporting the Shuttle Program for Main Propulsion and On Orbit Propulsions Systems. They have collaborated design concerns for certifying propulsion systems. Presented are Pressurization, Tankage, Feed System and Combustion Instability concerns. Propulsion System Engineers are challenged with the dilemma for testing new systems to specific levels to reduce risk yet maintain budgetary targets. A methodical approach is presented to define the types of test suitable to address the technical issues for qualifying systems for retiring the risk levels.

Rodriguez, Henry↗

Certification Testing Approach for Propulsion System Design

The Certification of Propulsion Systems is costly and complex, involving development and qualification testing. The desire of the certification process is to assure all requirements can be demonstrated to be compliant. The purpose of this paper is to address the technical design concerns of certifying a propulsion system for flight. Presented are Pressurization, Tankage, Feed System and Combustion Instability concerns. Propulsion System Engineers are challenged with the dilemma for testing new systems to specific levels to reduce risk yet maintain budgetary targets. A methodical approach is presented to define the types of test suitable to address the technical issues for qualifying systems for retiring the risk levels. Experience of the lessons learned from supporting the Shuttle Program for Main Propulsion and On Orbit Propulsions Systems as well as previous collaborations on design concerns for certifying propulsion systems are utilized to address design concerns and verification approaches.

Rodriguez, Henry↗

Project Interface Requirements Process Including Shuttle Lessons Learned

Most failures occur at interfaces between organizations and hardware. Processing interface requirements at the start of a project life cycle will reduce the likelihood of costly interface changes/failures later. This can be done by adding Interface Control Documents (ICDs) to the Project top level drawing tree, providing technical direction to the Projects for interface requirements, and by funding the interface requirements function directly from the Project Manager's office. The interface requirements function within the Project Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I) Office would work in-line with the project element design engineers early in the life cycle to enhance communications and negotiate technical issues between the elements. This function would work as the technical arm of the Project Manager to help ensure that the Project cost, schedule, and risk objectives can be met during the Life Cycle. Some ICD Lessons Learned during the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) Life Cycle will include the use of hardware interface photos in the ICD, progressive life cycle design certification by analysis, test, & operations experience, assigning interface design engineers to Element Interface (EI) and Project technical panels, and linking interface design drawings with project build drawings

Bauch, Garland T.↗

Structural Analysis for the American Airlines Flight 587 Accident Investigation: Global Analysis

NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) supported the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) in the American Airlines Flight 587 accident investigation due to LaRC's expertise in high-fidelity structural analysis and testing of composite structures and materials. A Global Analysis Team from LaRC reviewed the manufacturer s design and certification procedures, developed finite element models and conducted structural analyses, and participated jointly with the NTSB and Airbus in subcomponent tests conducted at Airbus in Hamburg, Germany. The Global Analysis Team identified no significant or obvious deficiencies in the Airbus certification and design methods. Analysis results from the LaRC team indicated that the most-likely failure scenario was failure initiation at the right rear main attachment fitting (lug), followed by an unstable progression of failure of all fin-to-fuselage attachments and separation of the VTP from the aircraft. Additionally, analysis results indicated that failure initiates at the final observed maximum fin loading condition in the accident, when the VTP was subjected to loads that were at minimum 1.92 times the design limit load condition for certification. For certification, the VTP is only required to support loads of 1.5 times design limit load without catastrophic failure. The maximum loading during the accident was shown to significantly exceed the certification requirement. Thus, the structure appeared to perform in a manner consistent with its design and certification, and failure is attributed to VTP loads greater than expected.

Young, Richard D.↗

History and Benefits of Engine Level Testing Throughout the Space Shuttle Main Engine Program

Rocket engine testing is important throughout a program s life and is essential to the overall success of the program. Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) testing can be divided into three phases: development, certification, and operational. Development tests are conducted on the basic design and are used to develop safe start and shutdown transients and to demonstrate mainstage operation. This phase helps form the foundation of the program, demands navigation of a very steep learning curve, and yields results that shape the final engine design. Certification testing involves multiple engine samples and more aggressive test profiles that explore the boundaries of the engine to vehicle interface requirements. The hardware being tested may have evolved slightly from that in the development phase. Operational testing is conducted with mature hardware and includes acceptance testing of flight assets, resolving anomalies that occur in flight, continuing to expand the performance envelope, and implementing design upgrades. This paper will examine these phases of testing and their importance to the SSME program. Examples of tests conducted in each phase will also be presented.

VanHooser, Katherine↗

IMCS reflight certification requirements and design specifications

The requirements for reflight certification are established. Software requirements encompass the software programs that are resident in the PCC, DEP, PDSS, EC, or any related GSE. A design approach for the reflight software packages is recommended. These designs will be of sufficient detail to permit the implementation of reflight software. The PDSS/IMC Reflight Certification system provides the tools and mechanisms for the user to perform the reflight certification test procedures, test data capture, test data display, and test data analysis. The system as defined will be structured to permit maximum automation of reflight certification procedures and test data analysis.

Source record↗

Ensuring Safe Exploration: Ares Launch Vehicle Integrated Vehicle Ground Vibration Testing

Ground vibration testing has been an integral tool for developing new launch vehicles throughout the space age. Several launch vehicles have been lost due to problems that would have been detected by early vibration testing, including Ariane 5, Delta III, and Falcon 1. NASA will leverage experience and testing hardware developed during the Saturn and Shuttle programs to perform ground vibration testing (GVT) on the Ares I crew launch vehicle and Ares V cargo launch vehicle stacks. NASA performed dynamic vehicle testing (DVT) for Saturn and mated vehicle ground vibration testing (MVGVT) for Shuttle at the Dynamic Test Stand (Test Stand 4550) at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Huntsville, Alabama, and is now modifying that facility to support Ares I integrated vehicle ground vibration testing (IVGVT) beginning in 2012. The Ares IVGVT schedule shows most of its work being completed between 2010 and 2014. Integrated 2nd Stage Ares IVGVT will begin in 2012 and IVGVT of the entire Ares launch stack will begin in 2013. The IVGVT data is needed for the human-rated Orion launch vehicle's Design Certification Review (DCR) in early 2015. During the Apollo program, GVT detected several serious design concerns, which NASA was able to address before Saturn V flew, eliminating costly failures and potential losses of mission or crew. During the late 1970s, Test Stand 4550 was modified to support the four-body structure of the Space Shuttle. Vibration testing confirmed that the vehicle's mode shapes and frequencies were better than analytical models suggested, however, the testing also identified challenges with the rate gyro assemblies, which could have created flight instability and possibly resulted in loss of the vehicle. Today, NASA has begun modifying Test Stand 4550 to accommodate Ares I, including removing platforms needed for Shuttle testing and upgrading the dynamic test facilities to characterize the mode shapes and resonant frequencies of the vehicle. The IVGVT team expects to collect important information about the new launch vehicles, greatly increasing astronaut safety as NASA prepares to explore the Moon and beyond.

Tuma, M. L.↗

NASA's Space Launch System Marks Critical Design Review

With completion of its Critical Design Review (CDR) in 2015, NASA is deep into the manufacturing and testing phases of its new Space Launch System (SLS) for beyond-Earth exploration. This CDR was the first in almost 40 years for a NASA human launch vehicle and marked another successful milestone on the road to the launch of a new era of deep space exploration. The review marked the 90-percent design-complete, a final look at the design and development plan of the integrated vehicle before full-scale fabrications begins and the prelude to the next milestone, design certification. Specifically, the review looked at the first of three increasingly capable configurations planned for SLS. This "Block I" design will stand 98.2 meters (m) (322 feet) tall and provide 39.1 million Newtons (8.8 million pounds) of thrust at liftoff to lift a payload of approximately 70 metric tons (154,000 pounds). This payload is more than double that of the retired space shuttle program or other current launch vehicles. It dramatically increases the mass and volume of human and robotic exploration. Additionally, it will decrease overall mission risk, increase safety, and simplify ground and mission operations - all significant considerations for crewed missions and unique, high-value national payloads. The Block 1 SLS will launch NASA's Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) on an uncrewed flight beyond the moon and back and the first crewed flight around the moon. The current design has a direct evolutionary path to a vehicle with a 130t lift capability that offers even more flexibility to reduce planetary trip times, simplify payload design cycles, and provide new capabilities such as planetary sample returns. Every major element of SLS has hardware in production or testing, including flight hardware for the Exploration 1 (EM-1) test flight. In fact, the SLS MPCV-to-Stage-Adapter (MSA) flew successfully on the Exploration Flight Test (EFT) 1 launch of a Delta IV and Orion spacecraft in December 2014. This paper will discuss these and other technical and programmatic successes and challenges over the past year and provide a preview of work ahead before the first flight of this new capability.

Singer, Chris↗

Controls and guidance: Space

The Space Controls and Guidance Research and Technology Program is directed toward enabling the next generation of space transportation systems, large future spacecraft, and space systems such as the Space Station to have large communication antennas and high precision segmented reflector astrophysical telescopes. The new generation of transportation vehicles has demanding requirements to provide for an order of magnitude reduction in cost as well as an increase in capability. The future orbital facilities have demanding control requirements for pointing and stabilization, momentum management, build-up and growth accomodation, and disturbance management. To address these advanced requirements, the research and development program is designed to provide the generic technology base to support the implementation of advanced guidance, navigation, and control. The area of computational controls will be stressed in order to develop cost effective, high speed, high fidelity control system simulation and analysis and synthesis tools. The trust of this work will be to develop methods and software to enable analysis and real-time hardware-in-the-loop simulation of complex spacecraft for control design certification. To address future orbital facilities requirements, an advanced technology program is underway in system identification, distributed control, integrated controls/structures design methods, and advanced sensors and actuators. Because the behavior of large, light weight per unit area deployable/assembled spacecraft is greatly influenced by the ground environment, the testing and verification activity is both ground- and space-based.

Dibattista, John D.↗

2021-2026 Weapons Research Services Strategic Plan

The Weapons Research Services (WRS) Division provides Los Alamos National Laboratory with services, resources, and staff that are critical to fulfilling its national security mission. WRS serves the entire LANL Weapons Program and is housed within the Weapons Physics Directorate (ALDX), which is at the core of the design, certification, and assessment of the nation’s nuclear weapons. More specifically, WRS is a research and development organization that provides unique tools designed to meet the specific needs of the Lab’s weapons mission rather than administrative or Information & Technology (IT) tools used broadly by the Lab. WRS partners with other LANL organizations, including Global Security to conduct mission research and I&T organizations to meet basic IT infrastructure needs.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

ESBWR - Robust design for natural circulation and stability performance effectiveness

ESBWR is a 4500 MWt Generation III+ natural circulation reactor with an array of robust design features and passive safety systems to deliver highly effective plant performance during normal operation and to keep the reactor safe during postulated transients and accidents. With the submittal of the latest revision of the Design Control Document (DCD) to US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ESBWR is nearing the completion of the US design certification process. This paper focuses on the natural circulation-driven plant performance aspects during normal operation, and stability evaluation of the robust ESBWR design. The TRACG computer code is used for the analysis of ESBWR plant performance, safety analysis, and stability margins. The paper describes the evaluation of ESBWR stability performance during normal power operation including operation in the Core Power-Feed Water Temperature Operating Domain. For ESBWR the normal power operation condition has the highest power/flow ratio and is limiting from the perspective of stability. The paper includes results from detailed evaluation of the most limiting decay ratio for out-of-phase regional oscillations calculated by perturbing the core inlet flow rate in this out-of-phase mode about the line of symmetry for the azimuthal harmonic mode. The paper also summarizes the ESBWR regional mode stability evaluations during a limiting transient (Loss of Feedwater Heating), and during ATWS (Anticipated Transient without Scram). Nominal decay ratios of limiting Channel oscillation, Core wide oscillation and Regional oscillation are within the maximum acceptance criterion of 0.8, at 95% content and 95% confidence. These stability evaluation results indicate decay ratio is within design limits. The paper also describes the evaluation of ESBWR stability performance during plant startup, and summarizes the defense-in-depth stability solution for ESBWR. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

HFE Process Guidance and Standards for potential application to updating NRC guidance

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) reviews and evaluates the human factors engineering (HFE) programs of applicants for nuclear power plant construction permits, operating licenses, standard design certifications, and combined operating licenses. The purpose of these safety reviews is to help ensure that personnel performance and reliability are appropriately supported. Detailed design review procedures and guidance for the evaluations is provided in three key documents: the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800), the HFE Program Review Model (NUREG-0711), and the Human-System Interface Design Review Guidelines (NUREG-0700). These documents were last revised in 2007, 2004 and 2002, respectively. The NRC is committed to the periodic update and improvement of these guidance documents to ensure that they remain state-of-the-art design evaluation tools. Thus, the NRC has initiated a project with BNL to update the NRC guidance to remain current with recent research on human performance, advances in HFE methods and tools, and new technology. INL supported Brookhaven National Lab (BNL) to update the detailed HFE review criteria contained in NUREG-0711 and NUREG-0700 based on (1) feedback obtained from end users, (2) the results of NRC research and development efforts supporting the NRC staff’s HFE safety reviews, and (3) other material the project staff identify as applicable to the update effort. INL submitted comments on development plans and sections of NUREGs 0800, 0711, and 0700. The contractor prepared the report attached here as the deliverable for this work.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Updating Human Factors Engineering Guidelines for Conducting Safety Reviews of Nuclear Power Plants

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) reviews the human factors engineering (HFE) programs of applicants for nuclear power plant construction permits, operating licenses, standard design certifications, and combined operating licenses. The purpose of these safety reviews is to help ensure that personnel performance and reliability are appropriately supported. Detailed design review procedures and guidance for the evaluations is provided in three key documents: the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800), the HFE Program Review Model (NUREG-0711), and the Human-System Interface Design Review Guidelines (NUREG-0700). These documents were last revised in 2007, 2004 and 2002, respectively. The NRC is committed to the periodic update and improvement of the guidance to ensure that it remains a state-of-the-art design evaluation tool. To this end, the NRC is updating its guidance to stay current with recent research on human performance, advances in HFE methods and tools, and new technology being employed in plant and control room design. This paper describes the role of HFE guidelines in the safety review process and the content of the key HFE guidelines used. Then we will present the methodology used to develop HFE guidance and update these documents, and describe the current status of the update program.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Human Factors Engineering Program Review Model (NUREG-0711)Revision 3: Update Methodology and Key Revisions

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) reviews the human factors engineering (HFE) programs of applicants for nuclear power plant construction permits, operating licenses, standard design certifications, and combined operating licenses. The purpose of these safety reviews is to help ensure that personnel performance and reliability are appropriately supported. Detailed design review procedures and guidance for the evaluations is provided in three key documents: the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800), the HFE Program Review Model (NUREG-0711), and the Human-System Interface Design Review Guidelines (NUREG-0700). These documents were last revised in 2007, 2004 and 2002, respectively. The NRC is committed to the periodic update and improvement of the guidance to ensure that it remains a state-of-the-art design evaluation tool. To this end, the NRC is updating its guidance to stay current with recent research on human performance, advances in HFE methods and tools, and new technology being employed in plant and control room design. NUREG-0711 is the first document to be addressed. We present the methodology used to update NUREG-0711 and summarize the main changes made. Finally, we discuss the current status of the update program and the future plans.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Progress of full-scale MCNP6{sup TM} model development of NuScale small modular reactor - 25394

This paper presents the recent progress of development of full-scale MCNP6{sup TM} small modular reactor within NuScale Power LLC (NuScale) using MCNP6{sup TM} version 1.0. This model currently is being used to determine of vessel neutron fluence, nuclear damage, and radiological consequence analysis. The results of the best estimate fluence analysis to support Design Certification Application (DCA) and technical details has been included within License Technical Report (LTR) which had been submitted to US NRC for review in 2017. Currently the detailed analysis of using this full-scale NuScale SMR model is focusing on operational radiological external dose exposure, nuclear damage, nuclear heating and neutron activation of SMR components to support optimized design and RAI (request additional information) response activities. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Trial by Fire

The NASa/ATK Thiokol space shuttle solid rocket motor program has doubled ground test firings and enhanced manufacturing quality and process control to increase safety for Discovery's return to flight. There are a number of places where we've strengthened our engineering and our processes, says Mike Kahn, ATK Thiokol vice president of space launch systems. Protecting the booster against corrosion in the humid Florida environment is one area that has been addressed. Since the loss of Columbia, ATK Thiokol and the Marshall Space Flight Center have completely reevaluated the shuttle solid rocket motor's design certification and found no major problems, Kahn said. The Thiokol solid motors did not play a role in the 2003 Columbia accident, but the motor's older field joint design (since replaced) was the primary cause of the 1986 Challenger accident that killed seven astronauts. The 129 X 12-ft. ATK Thiokol reusable solid rocket motor forms the core of the shuttle's two solid rocket boosters (SRBs). United Space Alliance (USA) has overall responsibility for the booster's nose-mounted systems such as recovery parachutes and aft-mounted thrust vector control systems that increase the length to 149 ft. USA and its subcontractors have also reaffirmed quality control on systems such as the booster's Hamilton Sundstrand hydraulic power units for critical thrust vector control. And to ensure greater safeguards against booster debris jeopardizing the orbiter, a bolt-catcher system to restrain the large bolts, severed at booster separation, was also redesigned.

Covault, Craig↗