Facilitation of Third-party Development of Advanced Algorithms for Explosive Detection Using Workshops and Grand Challenges
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The current invention provides a passive sampling device suitable for collecting and detecting the presence of target analytes. In particular, the passive sampling device is suitable for detecting nitro-aromatic compounds. The current invention further provides a passive sampling device reader suitable for determining the collection of target analytes. Additionally, the current invention provides methods for detecting target analytes using the passive sampling device and the passive sampling device reader.
The current invention provides a passive sampling device suitable for collecting and detecting the presence of target analytes. In particular, the passive sampling device is suitable for detecting nitro-aromatic compounds. The current invention further provides a passive sampling device reader suitable for determining the collection of target analytes. Additionally, the current invention provides methods for detecting target analytes using the passive sampling device and the passive sampling device reader.
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The term explosive detection system (EDS) is used by the TSA to describe equipment that is certified to detect explosives in checked bags. The EDS, as certified, by the TSL must consist of device for interrogating a bag and an automated detection algorithm (ATD) for evaluating the results of the interrogation. We only consider CT as the interrogation device in this report. A schematic drawing of a CT-based EDS is shown in Figure 2. The output of the ATD is the binary decision of alarm or non-alarm. Alarms may true- or false-positives. Non-alarms may be true- or false-negatives. False positives are also denoted false alarms. The true detection means that the ATD reports an alarm when a threat is present in the scanned bag. The probability of detecting a threat given that a threat is present is denoted the probability of detection (PD). The probability of false alarm (PFA) is the case when an alarm is reported when a threat is not present in a bag. Certification in this context means passing tests for PD and PFA at the TSL. The results of the EDS include CT cross-sectional images of the bag and specifics about the alarmed objects generated by ATD. These results are presented on a display so that a person may override the decision of ATD and declare the alarm to be a non-alarm. This process is denoted clearing. Bags that are not cleared by the person are sent to a secondary inspection process. Here the bags may be opened or assessed with explosive trace detection (ETD) in order to clear the bags. Bags that are not cleared at this point are evaluated by an ordinance disposal team. The CT scanner along with ATD is denoted Level 1 screening. The process of clearing on a display is denoted Level 2 screening. Secondary inspection is denoted Level 3 screening. Vendors of the deployed EDSs supply the TSA with equipment for all three levels. Therefore, the term EDS may include the equipment provided for Levels 1, 2 and 3. A schematic diagram of an EDS and the levels of screening are shown in Figure 7. The decision processes used as a bag is scanned and cleared is shown in Figure 8. Shield alarms and exceptions are discussed below. Since most alarms are false alarms, the probability of alarm is often times denoted the probability of a false alarm. The expenses associated with clearing false alarms occur in Levels 2 and 3.
The term explosive detection system (EDS) is used by the TSA to describe equipment that is certified to detect explosives in checked bags. The EDS, as certified, by the TSL must consist of device for interrogating a bag and an automated detection algorithm (ATD) for evaluating the results of the interrogation. We only consider CT as the interrogation device in this report. A schematic drawing of a CT-based EDS is shown in Figure 2. The output of the ATD is the binary decision of alarm or non-alarm. Alarms may true- or false-positives. Non-alarms may be true- or false-negatives. False positives are also denoted false alarms. The true detection means that the ATD reports an alarm when a threat is present in the scanned bag. The probability of detecting a threat given that a threat is present is denoted the probability of detection (PD). The probability of false alarm (PFA) is the case when an alarm is reported when a threat is not present in a bag. Certification in this context means passing tests for PD and PFA at the TSL. The results of the EDS include CT cross-sectional images of the bag and specifics about the alarmed objects generated by ATD. These results are presented on a display so that a person may override the decision of ATD and declare the alarm to be a non-alarm. This process is denoted clearing. Bags that are not cleared by the person are sent to a secondary inspection process. Here the bags may be opened or assessed with explosive trace detection (ETD) in order to clear the bags. Bags that are not cleared at this point are evaluated by an ordinance disposal team. The CT scanner along with ATD is denoted Level 1 screening. The process of clearing on a display is denoted Level 2 screening. Secondary inspection is denoted Level 3 screening. Vendors of the deployed EDSs supply the TSA with equipment for all three levels. Therefore, the term EDS may include the equipment provided for Levels 1, 2 and 3. A schematic diagram of an EDS and the levels of screening are shown in Figure 7. The decision processes used as a bag is scanned and cleared is shown in Figure 8. Shield alarms and exceptions are discussed below. Since most alarms are false alarms, the probability of alarm is oftentimes denoted the probability of a false alarm. The expenses associated with clearing false alarms occur in Levels 2 and 3.
Rapid and sensitive detection of explosives is in high demand for homeland security and public safety. In this work, electron-rich of anthracene functionalized mesoporous aluminium organophosphonates (En-AlPs) were synthesized by a one-pot condensation process. The mesoporous structure and strong blue emission of En-AlPs were confirmed by the N{sub 2} adsorption-desorption isotherms, transmission electron microscopy images and fluorescence spectra. The materials En-AlPs can serve as sensitive chemosensors for various electron deficient nitroderivatives, with the quenching constant and the detection limit up to 1.5×10{sup 6} M{sup −1} and 0.3 ppm in water solution. More importantly, the materials can be recycled for many times by simply washed with ethanol, showing potential applications in explosives detection. - Graphical abstract: Electron-rich of anthracene functionalized mesoporous aluminium organophosphonates can serve as sensitive and recycled chemosensors for nitroderivatives with the quenching constant up to 1.5×10{sup 6} M{sup −1} in water solution. Display Omitted - Highlights: • Anthracene functionalized mesoporous aluminium organophosphonates were synthesized. • The materials serve as sensitive chemosensors for nitroderivatives. • The materials can be recycled for many times by simply washed with ethanol. • The materials show potential applications in explosives detection.
Explosives are often used in industry, geology, mining, and other applications, but it is not always clear what remains after a detonation or the fate and transport of any residual material. The goal of this study was to determine to what extent intact molecules of high explosive (HE) compounds are detectable and quantifiable from post-detonation dust and particulates in a field experiment with varied topography. We focused on HMX (1,3,5,7-Tetranitro-1,3,5,7-tetrazocane), which is less studied in field detonation literature, as the primary explosive material and RDX (1,3,5-Trinitroperhydro-1,3,5-triazine) as the secondary material. The experiment was conducted at Site 300, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s Experimental Test Site, in California, USA. Two 20.4 kg and one 40.8 kg above ground explosions (primarily comprised of LX-14, an HMX-based polymer-bonded high explosive) were detonated on an open-air firing area on separate days. The complex terrain of the firing area (e.g., buildings, berm, low-height obstacles) was advantageous to study HE deposition in relation to plume dynamics. Three types of samples were collected up to 100 m away from each shot: surface swipes of aluminum plates, surface swipes of fixed objects, and filters from air samples. We used atmospheric flow tube-mass spectrometry (AFT-MS) to quantify picogram levels of molecular residue of HE material in the post-detonation dust. An aliquot of sample extract in methanol (e.g., 1 µL of 0.5 mL) was placed onto a resistive material and then thermally desorbed into the AFT-MS. We successfully detected and quantified both HMX and RDX in many of the samples. Based on mass (pg) detected and solution dilution, we back-calculated the mass collected on the swipe or filter (ng per sample). The aerial distribution of molecular residue was consistent with the path of the plume, which was strongly determined by wind speed and direction at the time of each shot. The quantity of material detected appeared to correlate more with distance from the shot and the wind conditions than with shot size. This study demonstrates that the picogram detection levels of AFT-MS are well-suited for quantification of analytes (e.g., HMX and RDX) in environmental samples.
Laser methods of standoff detection of explosive traces on surfaces of objects are considered. These methods are based on active formation of multi- and hyperspectral images of an object examined. The possibilities of these methods and the prospects of their development are discussed. Emphasis is laid on the justification of the most preferred field of application of the technique under consideration.
Ag/ZnO nanostructure for surface enhanced Raman scattering application in the detection of ANTA explosive molecule is demonstrated. A highly rough ZnO microstructure was achieved by rapid thermal annealing of metallic Zn film. Different thickness Ag nanostructures are decorated over these ZnO microstructures by ion beam sputtering technique. Surface enhanced Raman spectroscopic studies carried out over Ag/ZnO substrates have shown three orders higher enhancement compared to bare Ag nanostructure deposited on the same substrate. The reasons behind such huge enhancement are discussed based on the morphology of the sample.
Associated particle technique (APT) for detection of explosives is well established but has been implemented mostly for fixed portal systems. In certain situations, a portable system is required where the suspect object cannot be moved from site. This paper discusses the development of a portable APT system in single-sided geometry which can be transported to site and requires only one-sided access to the object. The system comprised D-T neutron source and bismuth germanate (BGO) detectors fixed on a portable module. Different aspects of the system have been discussed such as background contribution, time selection, and elemental signatures. The system was used to detect benign samples and explosive simulants under laboratory condition. The elemental ratios obtained by analyzing the gamma spectra show good match with the theoretical ratios.
A tester for testing for explosives associated with a test location comprising a first explosives detecting reagent; a first reagent holder, the first reagent holder containing the first explosives detecting reagent; a second explosives detecting reagent; a second reagent holder, the second reagent holder containing the second explosives detecting reagent; a sample collection unit for exposure to the test location, exposure to the first explosives detecting reagent, and exposure to the second explosives detecting reagent; and a body unit containing a heater for heating the sample collection unit for testing the test location for the explosives.
Vapor detection is a noncontact sampling method, which is a less invasive means of explosives screening than physical swiping. Explosive vapor detection is a challenge due to the low levels of vapors available for detection. This study demonstrates that the parts-per-quadrillion sensitivity of atmospheric flow tube-mass spectrometry (AFT-MS) combined with a high-volume air sampler enables standoff detection of trace explosives vapor at distances of centimeters to meters. Standoff detection of explosives vapor was possible both upstream and downstream of the vapor source relative to room air currents. RDX vapor from a saturated source was detected at up to 2.5 m. Vapors from RDX residue and nitroglycerin residue were detected at distances up to 0.5 m. The sampling can be optimized by accounting for air movement in the room or environment, which could further extend standoff detection distances. In conclusion, using AFT-MS with a high-volume sampler could also be effective for standoff vapor detection of drugs and additional chemical threats and could be useful for security screening applications such as at mail facilities, border crossings, and security checkpoints.
We employ quantum control methods towards detection and quantum controlled initiation (QCI) of energetic materials. Ultrafast pulse shaping of broadband Infrared ({approx}750 nm to 850 run) and ultraviolet (266 nm, 400 nm) light is utilized for control. The underlying principals behind optimal control can be utilized to both detect and initiate explosives. In each case, time dependent phase shaped electric fields drive the chemical systems towards a desired state. For optimal dynamic detection of explosives (ODD-Ex) a phase specific broadband infrared pulse is created which increases not only the sensitivity of detection but also the selectivity of an explosive's spectral signatures in a background of interferents. QCI on the other hand, seeks to initiate explosives by employing shaped ultraviolet light. QCI is ideal for use with explosive detonators as it removes the possibility of unintentional initiation from an electrical source while adding an additional safety feature, initiation only with the proper pulse shape. Quantum control experiments require: (1) the ability to phase and amplitude shape the laser pulse and (2) the ability to effectively search for the pulse shape which controls the reaction. In these adaptive experiments we utilize both global and local optimization search routines such as genetic algorithm, differential evolution, and downhill simplex. Pulse shaping the broadband IR light, produced by focusing 800 nm light through a pressurized tube of Argon, is straightforward as commercial pulse shapers are available at and around 800 nm. Pulse shaping in the UV requires a home built shaper. Our system is an acoustic optical modulator (AOM) pulse shaper in which consists of a fused silica AOM crystal placed in the Fourier plane of a 4-f zero dispersion compressor.