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At least 55 records · Page 3

A Summary of Taxonomies of Digital System Failure Modes Provided by the DigRel Task Group

Recently, the CSNI directed WGRisk to set up a task group called DIGREL to initiate a new task on developing a taxonomy of failure modes of digital components for the purposes of PSA. It is an important step towards standardized digital I&C reliability assessment techniques for PSA. The objective of this paper is to provide a comparison of the failure mode taxonomies provided by the participants. The failure modes are classified in terms of their levels of detail. Software and hardware failure modes are discussed separately.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Integrated Hardware and Software for No-Loss Computing

When an algorithm is distributed across multiple threads executing on many distinct processors, a loss of one of those threads or processors can potentially result in the total loss of all the incremental results up to that point. When implementation is massively hardware distributed, then the probability of a hardware failure during the course of a long execution is potentially high. Traditionally, this problem has been addressed by establishing checkpoints where the current state of some or part of the execution is saved. Then in the event of a failure, this state information can be used to recompute that point in the execution and resume the computation from that point. A serious problem arises when one distributes a problem across multiple threads and physical processors is that one increases the likelihood of the algorithm failing due to no fault of the scientist but as a result of hardware faults coupled with operating system problems. With good reason, scientists expect their computing tools to serve them and not the other way around. What is novel here is a unique combination of hardware and software that reformulates an application into monolithic structure that can be monitored in real-time and dynamically reconfigured in the event of a failure. This unique reformulation of hardware and software will provide advanced aeronautical technologies to meet the challenges of next-generation systems in aviation, for civilian and scientific purposes, in our atmosphere and in atmospheres of other worlds. In particular, with respect to NASA s manned flight to Mars, this technology addresses the critical requirements for improving safety and increasing reliability of manned spacecraft.

James, Mark↗

SSME Propellant Path Leak Detection

The complicated high-pressure cycle of the space shuttle main engine (SSME) propellant path provides many opportunities for external propellant path leaks while the engine is running. This mode of engine failure may be detected and analyzed with sufficient speed to save critical engine test hardware from destruction. The leaks indicate hardware failures which will damage or destroy an engine if undetected; therefore, detection of both cryogenic and hot gas leaks is the objective of this investigation. The primary objective of this phase of the investigation is the experimental validation of techniques for detecting and analyzing propellant path external leaks which have a high probability of occurring on the SSME. The selection of candidate detection methods requires a good analytic model for leak plumes which would develop from external leaks and an understanding of radiation transfer through the leak plume. One advanced propellant path leak detection technique is obtained by using state-of-the-art technology infrared (IR) thermal imaging systems combined with computer, digital image processing, and expert systems for the engine protection. The feasibility of IR leak plume detection is evaluated on subscale simulated laboratory plumes to determine sensitivity, signal to noise, and general suitability for the application.

Roger Crawford↗

First incremental buy for Increment 2 of the Space Transportation System (STS)

Thiokol manufactured and delivered 9 flight motors to KSC on schedule. All test flights were successful. All spent SRMs were recovered. Design, development, manufacture, and delivery of required transportation, handling, and checkout equipment to MSFC and to KSC were completed on schedule. All items of data required by DPD 400 were prepared and delivered as directed. In the system requirements and analysis area, the point of departure from Buy 1 to the operational phase was developed in significant detail with a complete set of transition documentation available. The documentation prepared during the Buy 1 program was maintained and updated where required. The following flight support activities should be continued through other production programs: as-built materials usage tracking on all flight hardware; mass properties reporting for all flight hardware until sample size is large enough to verify that the weight limit requirements were met; ballistic predictions and postflight performance assessments for all production flights; and recovered SRM hardware inspection and anomaly identification. In the safety, reliability, and quality assurance area, activities accomplished were assurance oriented in nature and specifically formulated to prevent problems and hardware failures. The flight program to date has adequately demonstrated the success of this assurance approach. The attention focused on details of design, analysis, manufacture, and inspection to assure the production of high-quality hardware has resulted in the absence of flight failures. The few anomalies which did occur were evaluated, design or manufacturing changes incorporated, and corrective actions taken to preclude recurrence.

Source record↗

Orbiter wheel and tire certification

The orbiter wheel and tire development has required a unique series of certification tests to demonstrate the ability of the hardware to meet severe performance requirements. Early tests of the main landing gear wheel using conventional slow roll testing resulted in hardware failures. This resulted in a need to conduct high velocity tests with crosswind effects for assurance that the hardware was safe for a limited number of flights. Currently, this approach and the conventional slow roll and static tests are used to certify the wheel/tire assembly for operational use.

Campbell, C. C., Jr.↗

ISS Regenerative Life Support: Challenges and Success in the Quest for Long-Term Habitability in Space

This presentation will discuss the International Space Station s (ISS) Regenerative Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) operations with discussion of the on-orbit lessons learned, specifically regarding the challenges that have been faced as the system has expanded with a growing ISS crew. Over the 10 year history of the ISS, there have been numerous challenges, failures, and triumphs in the quest to keep the crew alive and comfortable. Successful operation of the ECLSS not only requires maintenance of the hardware, but also management of the station resources in case of hardware failure or missed re-supply. This involves effective communication between the primary International Partners (NASA and Roskosmos) and the secondary partners (JAXA and ESA) in order to keep a reserve of the contingency consumables and allow for re-supply of failed hardware. The ISS ECLSS utilizes consumables storage for contingency usage as well as longer-term regenerative systems, which allow for conservation of the expensive resources brought up by re-supply vehicles. This long-term hardware, and the interactions with software, was a challenge for Systems Engineers when they were designed and require multiple operational workarounds in order to function continuously. On a day-to-day basis, the ECLSS provides big challenges to the on console controllers. Main challenges involve the utilization of the resources that have been brought up by the visiting vehicles prior to undocking, balance of contributions between the International Partners for both systems and resources, and maintaining balance between the many interdependent systems, which includes providing the resources they need when they need it. The current biggest challenge for ECLSS is the Regenerative ECLSS system, which continuously recycles urine and condensate water into drinking water and oxygen. These systems were brought to full functionality on STS-126 (ULF-2) mission. Through system failures and recovery, the ECLSS console has learned how to balance the water within the systems, store and use water for contingencies, and continue to work with the International Partners for short-term failures. Through these challenges and the system failures, the most important lesson learned has been the importance of redundancy and operational workarounds. It is only because of the flexibility of the hardware and the software that flight controllers have the opportunity to continue operating the system as a whole for mission success.

Bazley, Jesse A.↗

INTEGRATED RISK ASSESSMENT OF DIGITAL I&C SAFETY SYSTEMS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

Upgrading the existing analog instrumentation and control (I&C) systems to state-of-the-art digital I&C (DI&C) systems provides the foremost means to improve performance and reduce costs for existing light-water reactors (LWRs). However, qualification of digital technologies remains a challenge?especially the issue of software common cause failure (CCF), which has been difficult to address. Existing analyses of CCFs in I&C systems mainly focus on hardware failures. With the application and upgrading of new DI&C systems, software CCFs due to design flaws might become a potential threat to plant safety, considering that most redundancy designs use similar digital platforms or software in their operating and application systems. With complex multi-layer redundancy designs to meet the single failure criterion, these I&C safety systems are of particular concern in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing procedures. In 2019, the Risk-Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway of the U.S. Department of Energy?s (DOE?s) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. An integrated risk assessment for the DI&C (RADIC) process was proposed for this strategy to identify potential key digital-induced failures, implement reliability analyses of related digital safety I&C systems, and evaluate the unanalyzed sequences introduced by these failures (particularly software CCFs) at the plant level. This paper summarizes these RISA efforts in the risk analysis of safety-related DI& systems at Idaho National Laboratory.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Space Station Freedom integrated fault model

A demonstration of an integrated fault propagation model for Space Station Freedom is described. The demonstration uses a HyperCard graphical interface to show how failures can propagate from one component to another, both within a system and between systems. It also shows how hardware failures can impact certain defined functions like reboost, atmosphere maintenance or collision avoidance. The demonstration enables the user to view block diagrams for the various space station systems using an overview screen, and interactively choose a component and see what single or dual failure combinations can cause it to fail. It also allows the user to directly view the fault model, which is a collection of drawing and text listings accessible from a guide screen. Fault modeling provides a useful technique for analyzing individual systems and also interactions between systems in the presence of multiple failures so that a complete picture of failure tolerance and component criticality can be achieved.

Becker, Fred J.↗

An Integrated Risk Assessment Process of Safety-Related Digital I&C Systems in Nuclear Power Plants

Upgrading the existing analog instrumentation and control (I&C) systems to state-of-the-art digital I&C (DI&C) systems will greatly benefit existing light water reactors. However, the issue of software common cause failure (CCF) remains an obstacle in terms of qualification for digital technologies. Existing analyses of CCFs in I&C systems mainly focus on hardware failures. With the application and upgrading of new DI&C systems, design flaws could cause software CCFs to become a potential threat to plant safety, considering that most redundancy designs use similar digital platforms or software in their operating and application systems. With complex multilayer redundancy designs to meet the single failure criterion, these I&C safety systems are of particular concern in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing procedures. In Fiscal Year 2019, the Risk-Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades and designs. An integrated risk assessment for the DI&C process was proposed for this strategy to identify potential key digital-induced failures, implement reliability analyses of related digital safety I&C systems, and evaluate the unanalyzed sequences introduced by these failures (particularly software CCFs) at the plant level. Here this paper summarizes these RISA efforts in the risk analysis of safety-related DI&C systems at Idaho National Laboratory.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): FMEA/CIL assessment

The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL). Direction was given by the Orbiter and GFE Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis and assessment using the instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206. The IOA analysis featured a top-down approach to determine hardware failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, the analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL documentation. The assessment process compared the independently derived failure modes and criticality assignments to the proposed NASA post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation. When possible, assessment issues were discussed and resolved with the NASA subsystem managers. Unresolved issues were elevated to the Orbiter and GFE Projects Office manager, Configuration Control Board (CCB), or Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB) for further resolution. The most important Orbiter assessment finding was the previously unknown stuck autopilot push-button criticality 1/1 failure mode. The worst case effect could cause loss of crew/vehicle when the microwave landing system is not active. It is concluded that NASA and Prime Contractor Post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation assessed by IOA is believed to be technically accurate and complete. All CIL issues were resolved. No FMEA issues remain that have safety implications. Consideration should be given, however, to upgrading NSTS 22206 with definitive ground rules which more clearly spell out the limits of redundancy.

Hinsdale, L. W.↗

Method of Testing and Predicting Failures of Electronic Mechanical Systems

A method employing a knowledge base of human expertise comprising a reliability model analysis implemented for diagnostic routines is disclosed. The reliability analysis comprises digraph models that determine target events created by hardware failures human actions, and other factors affecting the system operation. The reliability analysis contains a wealth of human expertise information that is used to build automatic diagnostic routines and which provides a knowledge base that can be used to solve other artificial intelligence problems.

Iverson, David L.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): FMEA/CIL assessment

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. Direction was given by the Orbiter and GFE Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis and assessment using the instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206. The IOA analysis features a top-down approach to determine hardware failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, the anlaysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA and prime contractor FMEA/CIL documentation. The assessment process compares the independently derived failure modes and criticality assignments to the proposed NASA Post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation. When possible, assessment issues are discussed and resolved with the NASA subsystem managers. The assessment results for each subsystem are summarized. The most important Orbiter assessment finding was the previously unknown stuck autopilot push-button criticality 1/1 failure mode, having a worst case effect of loss of crew/vehicle when a microwave landing system is not active.

Saiidi, Mo J.↗

Test and evaluation of the generalized gate logic system simulator

The results of the initial testing of the Generalized Gate Level Logic Simulator (GGLOSS) are discussed. The simulator is a special purpose fault simulator designed to assist in the analysis of the effects of random hardware failures on fault tolerant digital computer systems. The testing of the simulator covers two main areas. First, the simulation results are compared with data obtained by monitoring the behavior of hardware. The circuit used for these comparisons is an incomplete microprocessor design based upon the MIL-STD-1750A Instruction Set Architecture. In the second area of testing, current simulation results are compared with experimental data obtained using precursors of the current tool. In each case, a portion of the earlier experiment is confirmed. The new results are then viewed from a different perspective in order to evaluate the usefulness of this simulation strategy.

Miner, Paul S.↗

Earth to Moon Transfer: Direct vs Via Libration Points (L1, L2)

For some three decades, the Apollo-style mission has served as a proven baseline technique for transporting flight crews to the Moon and back with expendable hardware. This approach provides an optimal design for expeditionary missions, emphasizing operational flexibility in terms of safely returning the crew in the event of a hardware failure. However, its application is limited essentially to low-latitude lunar sites, and it leaves much to be desired as a model for exploratory and evolutionary programs that employ reusable space-based hardware. This study compares the performance requirements for a lunar orbit rendezvous mission type with one using the cislunar libration point (L1) as a stopover and staging point for access to arbitrary sites on the lunar surface. For selected constraints and mission objectives, it contrasts the relative uniformity of performance cost when the L1 staging point is used with the wide variation of cost for the Apollo-style lunar orbit rendezvous.

Condon, Gerald L.↗

An Integrated Risk Assessment Process for Digital Instrumentation and Control Upgrades of Nuclear Power Plants

Most of the existing nuclear power plants (NPPs) in the world rely on traditional analog instrumentation and control (I&C) systems for monitoring, control, and protection functions. With the industrial base largely moving to digital systems, the operation and maintenance of plants involves managing issues including lack of needed analog spare parts, increasing maintenance costs, and the loss of vendor support. Compared with existing analog I&C systems, digital I&C systems have significant functional advantages, such as reliable system performance in terms of accuracy and computational capability, high data handling and storage capabilities to fully measure and display operating conditions, and improved capabilities (e.g., fault tolerance, self-testing, signal validation, process system diagnostics). Therefore, the U.S. nuclear power industry has initiated the replacement of existing, aging analog systems with digital I&C technology, and is developing new designs for advanced plants using digital systems in integrated control rooms to provide modern control and protection systems. However, the qualification of digital I&C systems remains a challenge, especially the issue of software common cause failure (CCF), which has been difficult to address. A CCF is the malfunction of two or more plant components or functions due to a single failure source. CCFs have the potential to generate unanalyzed events or sequences that may not be bounded by previous plant accident analyses, therefore, to challenge the plant safety. Existing analyses on CCF in I&C systems are mainly focusing on hardware failures. With the application and upgrades of new digital I&C systems, software CCFs due to design flaws have become a potential threat to plant safety considering most redundancy designs are using the similar digital platforms or software in the operating and application systems. With complex multi-layer redundancy designs to meet the single failure criterion, these I&C safety systems are of a particular concern in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing procedures. Therefore, there is a need to develop an integrated risk assessment strategy with digital CCF and plant transient responses considered to assure the long-term safety and reliability of vital digital systems and reduce uncertainties in costs, time, and support integration of digital systems in the plant. The overall goal of this project is to deliver a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, and secure digital I&C technologies for the digital upgrades to existing NPPs. To deal with the expensive licensing justifications from regulatory insights, this technical basis is instructive for nuclear vendors and utilities to effectively lower the costs associated with digital compliance and speed-up industry advances by: (1) defining an integrated risk-informed analysis process for digital I&C upgrades including hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis; (2) applying systematic and risk-informed tools to address CCFs and quantify responding failure probabilities for digital I&C technologies; (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the individual level, system level, and plant level; and (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks, thus to support the development, licensing, and deployment of advanced digital I&C technologies on NPPs. Upgrading digital I&C (safety and non-safety related) systems in existing NPPs within a cost-effective and regulatory acceptable way offers the foremost means of performance improvements and cost-reductions for existing NPPs. One key outcome of this project is to perform plant-specific risk assessment to provide a sustainable scientific support for enabling industry to balance the digital-related risks, costs, reliability, and safety.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

ISS Internal Active Thermal Control System (IATCS) Coolant Remediation Project

The IATCS coolant has experienced a number of anomalies in the time since the US Lab was first activated on Flight 5A in February 2001. These have included: 1) a decrease in coolant pH, 2) increases in inorganic carbon, 3) a reduction in phosphate buffer concentration, 4) an increase in dissolved nickel and precipitation of nickel salts, and 5) increases in microbial concentration. These anomalies represent some risk to the system, have been implicated in some hardware failures and are suspect in others. The ISS program has conducted extensive investigations of the causes and effects of these anomalies and has developed a comprehensive program to remediate the coolant chemistry of the on-orbit system as well as provide a robust and compatible coolant solution for the hardware yet to be delivered. The remediation steps include changes in the coolant chemistry specification, development of a suite of new antimicrobial additives, and development of devices for the removal of nickel and phosphate ions from the coolant. This paper presents an overview of the anomalies, their known and suspected system effects, their causes, and the actions being taken to remediate the coolant.

Morrison, Russell H.↗

ISS Internal Active Thermal Control System (IATCS) Coolant Remediation Project -2006 Update

The IATCS coolant has experienced a number of anomalies in the time since the US Lab was first activated on Flight 5A in February 2001. These have included: 1) a decrease in coolant pH, 2) increases in inorganic carbon, 3) a reduction in phosphate concentration, 4) an increase in dissolved nickel and precipitation of nickel salts, and 5) increases in microbial concentration. These anomalies represent some risk to the system, have been implicated in some hardware failures and are suspect in others. The ISS program has conducted extensive investigations of the causes and effects of these anomalies and has developed a comprehensive program to remediate the coolant chemistry of the on-orbit system as well as provide a robust and compatible coolant solution for the hardware yet to be delivered. This paper presents a status of the coolant stability over the past year as well as results from destructive analyses of hardware removed from the on-orbit system and the current approach to coolant remediation.

Morrison, Russell H.↗

Localization of Ad-Hoc Lunar Constellations in Communication Failure Modes for Distributed Spacecraft Autonomy

As Lunar missions increase in complexity, inspired by NASA’s Artemis Program, they will require reliable and sufficient Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) capability to support the upcoming Lunar users. The navigation service should also be compatible with the smaller platforms, like CubeSats, being sent by the public and private sectors. A non-dedicated, ad-hoc Lunar navigation constellation can provide PNT services on-demand using the non-dedicated swarm assets. Swarm members cooperatively and autonomously localize themselves with minimal interaction from Earth, freeing up valuable bandwidth and ground segment resources. The autonomous localization of Lunar constellations utilizes neighbor two-way intersatellite link (ISL) measurements in a distributed extended Kalman filter (DEKF) system to minimize operating costs. Because the decentralized Lunar PNT system relies on relay communication amongst the agents, network failures or loss of assets among ad-hoc Lunar constellations may impact localization performance. This study presents an evaluation of localization performance under increasing levels of network degradation. A simulation of an ad-hoc Lunar PNT swarm is augmented to include system faults and the impacts of intermittent and permanent failures on localization performance are evaluated. We investigate three potential causes of network degradation: single spacecraft loss, multiple spacecraft loss, and antenna failure. The numerical assessments from the simulation show that the LPNT system under study, based on an autonomous decentralized concept of operation, is highly robust and resilient to communication failures. Minor faults, such as single spacecraft loss, solar interference, technical malfunctions, message delays, and antenna outages, have minimal impact on state estimation, with only a 4.47% and 3.75% degradation in median position error for assets and a representative ground user, respectively, compared to an ideal communication scenario. However, major faults, such as hardware failures or meteor strikes leading to the loss of multiple spacecrafts, are more concerning. The permanent loss of three spacecraft results in a more severe performance degradation, with median position error increasing by 23.3% for assets and 11.7% for a representative ground user, despite the Lunar PNT system remaining functional.

Yeji Kim↗