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USABILITY EXTENSION OF THE ŠKODA VPVR/M CASK FOR TRANSPORTING IRRADIATED FUEL ASSEMBLIES

New abstract from the final version being submitted now: This paper discusses the evolution and enhanced usability of the ŠKODA VPVR/M cask for the transport of irradiated fuel assemblies, particularly within the context of the demand for the delivery of newly appearing irradiated HEU fuel types for which the cask did not yet have a license to transport. Over time, the cask’s internal basket construction has demonstrated notable adaptability to accommodate various exotic HEU fuel types from research reactors of differing origins. The paper outlines sever-al custom internal baskets developed for specific fuel types, including those from Belarus and Serbia, as well as from Georgia, Uzbekistan, and MNSR cores, as well as a recently designed basket for MTR and TRIGA assemblies. The findings high-light the high flexibility and adaptability of the cask, supported by successful rede-signs and licensing efforts, underscoring its value for the safe and secure transport of nuclear material. Old abstract from the draft version that was already approved: The Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return (RRRFR) program, since its inception, has continuously used the ŠKODA VPVR/M Cask fleet designed for the repatriation of irradiated highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel. As the program progressed (from shut-down and a quasi-abandoned reactor, and/or as it began to include fuels of Chinese and US origin), new challenges emerged for the transport Cask. These were fuel types that had not yet been licensed for the Cask. Although these requirements did not arise during the design of the basic ŠKODA VPVR/M Cask, as revealed by the retrospective analyses, the Internal Basket of the ŠKODA VPVR/M Cask gives a high degree of flexibility to accommodate additional fuel types. This paper provides a brief overview of the ŠKODA VPVR/M Cask, which holds a B(U) type license, and introduces the different types of Internal Baskets that have already been licensed to transport so-called exotic irradiated HEU fuel types, in addition to the original license. The paper presents a new Internal Basket design for accommodating MTR-type and TRIGA-type irradiated HEU fuel assemblies. This includes a detailed presentation of the design basis and the new MTR-TRIGA Internal Basket, as well as the licensing matters of the package under the name ŠKODA MTR-TRIGA Cask, and the conformity test (dry- and wet-run) operations made to verify compliance with the new Internal Basket. Then, as a summary, the usage record for the Cask fleet is presented, and finally, the paper concludes with the consolidated experiences gained during the utilization of the ŠKODA VPVR/M Cask fleet, emphasizing the high degree of Cask flexibility ensured by the Internal Basket’s construction.

42 - ENGINEERING

A model to assess Zircaloy’s mechanical property changes following a transient beyond critical heat flux

Maintaining the integrity of nuclear fuel rods is essential for ensuring public health and safety in nuclear power generation. During reactor operation, this integrity is confirmed by demonstrating compliance with established regulatory acceptance criteria. For moderate-frequency events, such as limiting transients and anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs), the current fuel integrity criterion is based on preventing boiling transition. This criterion assumes that prevention of boiling transition will prevent excessive cladding heating and, thus, fuel failure during normal operations. While conservative, this approach places significant constraints on core design, fuel cycle economics, and a plant’s ability to perform major power uprates, leading to suboptimal fuel utilization and inefficient carbon-free energy production. A more efficient approach could be achieved by revising the failure criterion to a material-specific limit rather than strictly preventing the boiling transition, since boiling transition per se is not a cause of fuel cladding failure. Here, as a result, a new licensing framework based on material properties, termed time-at-temperature (t@T), is needed. This approach would allow for brief periods of post–critical heat flux operation during an AOO without compromising safety. Implementing the t@T licensing strategy requires a robust technical foundation in material properties, which must be established through comprehensive data collection on both unirradiated and irradiated fuel and cladding materials. This foundation would enable the development of a safety basis that ensures safe operation while providing greater flexibility and efficiency for reactor operation. This paper documents a thorough review of the available data to establish a baseline knowledge that can inform the development of cladding mechanical models, as well as identify experimental data gaps that need to be addressed in future research. Machine learning and data informatics were utilized to extract the importance of parameters on the t@T parameter. Industry tools were used to perform baseline analyses to define the relevant transient conditions for data analysis. The subsequent review successfully identified applicable experimental data, as well as sufficient data to evaluate changes in cladding mechanical properties following an AOO transient. Rather than developing new models, this work coupled existing irradiation annealing and recrystallization models to calculate changes in hardness, yield stress, and ultimate tensile stress following an AOO event. The findings from this review were summarized to highlight the experimental data needs required to fill remaining gaps and support the development of future t@T licensing methodologies.

Cladding performance

IM3 Open Source Data Center Atlas

IM3 Open Source Data Center Atlas Description This dataset contains locations of existing data center facilities in the United States. Data center locations were derived from OpenStreetMap (OSM), a crowd-sourced database. Data points from OSM are processed in various ways to determine additional variables provided in the data including: facility area (square feet), associated US county, and US state. This dataset can be used to identify areas of concentrated data center development and inform government and private sector planning strategies for future buildout of data centers and the infrastructure necessary to support it. Usage Notes Validation of OSM-derived data center locations is an ongoing development under the IM3 project, and the database will be updated as new information becomes available. In some instances, both the data center area (e.g., campus) and individual data center buildings are included as overlapping areas in the database. Both values are retained. Data center points, buildings, and campus areas are provided as separate layers in the downloadable data package. Note that data items are not necessarily complete across layers. That is, a specific data center may only be present as a single point geometry in the "point" layer while other data centers are represented in both the campus and building layers. In some cases, data center campuses and/or buildings straddle a county boundary line. Mappings to both counties are retained in the database as separate rows. These data rows will have the same data center id information, but each will have different county information. Crowd-sourced data, by nature, relies on individuals and communities to provide information. As a result, some data may be missing where it has not yet been reported. As we collect information on additional data center locations and as OSM receives additional contributions, the database will be updated to capture additional data points not yet shown. Technical Information Data is available for download under the following formats: GeoPackage (GPKG) CSV Geospatial data is provided in the WGS84 (EPSG:4326) coordinate reference system. The GeoPackage download contains the following layers. See usage notes for more information. "point" "building" "campus" The "point" layer includes all data from OSM that had POINT geometry type (i.e., individual coordinates). The "building" layer includes all OSM data that did not have POINT geometry and where the building tag in the OSM export was neither equal to "no" or null. Data that did not meet the "point" or "building" qualification was assumed to be a facility campus and included in the "campus" layer. The dataset contains the following parameters. Variables provided by OSM are labeled with (OSM-provided). id - unique identification number (OSM-provided with prefix of "node/", "relation/" and similar attributes removed) state - name of US state state_abb - two letter US state abbreviation state_id - state ID number county - name of US county county_id - county ID number ref - reference numbers or codes (OSM-provided) operator - the name of the company, corporation, or person in charge facility (OSM-provided) name - name of facility (OSM-provided) sqft - surface area of facility polygon, measured in square feet. Only available for "building" and "campus" layers lat - latitude of data centroid point lon - longitude of data centroid point type – represented spatial information. One of "point", "building", or "campus". geometry – POLYGON geometry of area footprint (in "campus" and "building" layers) or POINT geometry of locations (in "point" layer). This parameter is not included in the csv download. Attribution Data center locations were derived from OpenStreetMap, which is made available at openstreetmap.org under the Open Database License (ODbL). US state and county boundary information was collected from the US Census Bureau for the year 2024, which is made publicly available at https://www.census.gov/geographies/mapping-files.html Acknowledgment IM3 is a multi-institutional effort led by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and supported by the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Science as part of research in MultiSector Dynamics, Earth and Environmental Systems Modeling Program. License The IM3 Open Source Data Center Atlas is made available under the Open Database License: http://opendatacommons.org/licenses/odbl/1.0/. Disclaimer This material was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the United States Department of Energy, nor the Contractor, nor any or their employees, nor any jurisdiction or organization that has cooperated in the development of these materials, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness or any information, apparatus, product, software, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof, or Battelle Memorial Institute. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof. PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATIONAL LABORATORYoperated byBATTELLEfor theUNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGYunder Contract DE-AC05-76RL01830

Mongird, Kendall [Pacific Northwest National Labor

IM3 Open Source Data Center Atlas

IM3 Open Source Data Center Atlas Description This dataset contains locations of existing data center facilities in the United States. Data center locations were derived from OpenStreetMap (OSM), a crowd-sourced database. Data points from OSM are processed in various ways to determine additional variables provided in the data including: facility area (square feet), associated US county, and US state. This dataset can be used to identify areas of concentrated data center development and inform government and private sector planning strategies for future buildout of data centers and the infrastructure necessary to support it. Usage Notes Validation of OSM-derived data center locations is an ongoing development under the IM3 project, and the database will be updated as new information becomes available. In some instances, both the data center area (e.g., campus) and individual data center buildings are included as overlapping areas in the database. Both values are retained. Data center points, buildings, and campus areas are provided as separate layers in the downloadable data package. Note that data items are not necessarily complete across layers. That is, a specific data center may only be present as a single point geometry in the "point" layer while other data centers are represented in both the campus and building layers. In some cases, data center campuses and/or buildings straddle a county boundary line. Mappings to both counties are retained in the database as separate rows. These data rows will have the same data center id information, but each will have different county information. Crowd-sourced data, by nature, relies on individuals and communities to provide information. As a result, some data may be missing where it has not yet been reported. As we collect information on additional data center locations and as OSM receives additional contributions, the database will be updated to capture additional data points not yet shown. Data items will occasionally be removed from OSM if they are misidentified, if they no longer exist, if they are duplicates of another item, or similar. For that reason, updated versions of this database may not contain all data center locations included in previous versions. Technical Information Data is available for download under the following formats: GeoPackage (GPKG) CSV Geospatial data is provided in the WGS84 (EPSG:4326) coordinate reference system. The GeoPackage download contains the following layers. See usage notes for more information. "point" "building" "campus" The "point" layer includes all data from OSM that had POINT geometry type (i.e., individual coordinates). The "building" layer includes all OSM data that did not have POINT geometry and where the building tag in the OSM export was neither equal to "no" or null. Data that did not meet the "point" or "building" qualification was assumed to be a facility campus and included in the "campus" layer. The dataset contains the following parameters. Variables provided by OSM are labeled with (OSM-provided). id - unique identification number (OSM-provided with prefix of "node/", "relation/" and similar attributes removed) state - name of US state state_abb - two letter US state abbreviation state_id - state ID number county - name of US county county_id - county ID number ref - reference numbers or codes (OSM-provided) operator - the name of the company, corporation, or person in charge facility (OSM-provided) name - name of facility (OSM-provided) sqft - surface area of facility polygon, measured in square feet. Only available for "building" and "campus" layers lat - latitude of data centroid point lon - longitude of data centroid point type – represented spatial information. One of "point", "building", or "campus". geometry – POLYGON geometry of area footprint (in "campus" and "building" layers) or POINT geometry of locations (in "point" layer). This parameter is not included in the csv download. Attribution Data center locations were derived from OpenStreetMap, which is made available at openstreetmap.org under the Open Database License (ODbL). US state and county boundary information was collected from the US Census Bureau for the year 2024, which is made publicly available at https://www.census.gov/geographies/mapping-files.html Acknowledgment IM3 is a multi-institutional effort led by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and supported by the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Science as part of research in MultiSector Dynamics, Earth and Environmental Systems Modeling Program. License The IM3 Open Source Data Center Atlas is made available under the Open Database License: http://opendatacommons.org/licenses/odbl/1.0/. Disclaimer This material was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the United States Department of Energy, nor the Contractor, nor any or their employees, nor any jurisdiction or organization that has cooperated in the development of these materials, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness or any information, apparatus, product, software, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof, or Battelle Memorial Institute. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof. PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATIONAL LABORATORYoperated byBATTELLEfor theUNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGYunder Contract DE-AC05-76RL01830

Mongird, Kendall [Pacific Northwest National Labor

Space Science and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Summary of a Workshop

The United States seeks to protect its security and foreign-policy interests, in part, by actively controlling the export of goods, technologies, and services that are or may be useful for military development in other nations. "Export" is defined not simply as the sending abroad of hardware but also as the communication of related technology and know-how to foreigners in the United States and overseas. The U.S. government mechanism for controlling dual-use items--items in commerce that have potential military use is the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) administered by the Department of Commerce; items defined in law as defense articles fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of State and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Because of the potential military implications of the export of defense articles, the ITAR regime imposes much greater burdens (on both the applicant and the government) than does the EAR regime during the process of applying for, and implementing the provisions of, licenses and technical-assistance agreements. Until the early 1990s export control activity related to all space satellites (commercial and scientific) was handled under ITAR. Between 1992 and 1996 the George H.W. Bush and the Clinton administrations transferred jurisdiction over the licensing of civilian communications satellites to the Commerce Department under EAR. In 1999, however, in response to broad concerns about Chinese attempts to acquire U.S. high technology, the U.S. House of Representatives convened the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People s Republic of China, also known as the Cox Committee. One of the many consequences of the Cox Committee's report was Congress's mandate that jurisdiction over export and licensing of satellites and related equipment and services, irrespective of military utility, be transferred from the Department of Commerce to the State Department and that such equipment and services be covered as defense articles under ITAR. Scientific satellites were explicitly included despite their use for decades in peaceful internationally conducted cooperative scientific research. It is widely recognized that the shift in regulatory regime from EAR to ITAR has had major deleterious effects on international scientific research activities that depend on satellites, spaceflight hardware, and other items that are now controlled by ITAR. Furthermore, contravening U.S. interests in attracting foreign students to U.S. universities, the capture of space technology by ITAR has caused serious problems in the teaching of university space science and engineering classes, virtually all of which include non-U.S. students. This report is a summary of a September 2007 workshop in which participants from the space research communities and the export-control administration and policy communities came together to discuss problems, effects, and potential solutions regarding the application of ITAR to space science. The principal themes and ideas that emerged from the discussions are summarized.

Finarelli, Margaret G.

Kennedy Space Center's Partnership with Graftel Incorporated

NASA Kennedy Space Center (KSC) has recently partnered with Graftel Incorporated under an exclusive license agreement for the manufacture and sale of the Smart Current Signature Sensor. The Smart Current Signature Sensor and software were designed and developed to be utilized on any application using solenoid valves. The system monitors the electrical and mechanical health of solenoids by comparing the electrical current profile of each solenoid actuation to a typical current profile and reporting deviation from its learned behavior. The objective of this partnership with Graftel is for them to develop the technology into a hand-held testing device for their customer base in the Nuclear Power Industry. The device will be used to perform diagnostic testing on electromechanical valves used in Nuclear Power plants. Initially, Graftel plans to have working units within the first year of license in order to show customers and allow them to put purchase requests into their next year's budget. The subject technology under discussion was commercialized by the Kennedy Space Center Technology Programs and Partnerships Office, which patented the technology and licensed it to Graftel, Inc., a company providing support, instrumentation, and calibration services to the nuclear community and private sector for over 10 years. For the nuclear power industry, Graftel designs, manufacturers, and calibrates a full line of testing instrumentation. Grafters smart sensors have been in use in the United States since 1993 and have proved to decrease set-up time and test durations. The project was funded by Non-Destructive Engineering, and it is felt that this technology will have more emphasis on future vehicles. Graftel plans to market the Current Signature Sensor to the Electric Utility industry. Graftel currently supplies product and services to the Nuclear Power Industry in the United States as well as internationally. Product and services sold are used in non-destructive testing for valves, penetrations and other applications. Graftel also supplies testing services to an industrial customer base. The customer base includes 90 percent of the U.S. Nuclear plants and plants in Brazil, Europe, and Asia. Graftel works internationally with two representative groups and employees and has ten people at the principle location and a group of contract engineers around the country.

Dunn, Carol Anne

The IOAG Recommendations on Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support

In 2014, the Inter-agency Operations Advisory Group (IOAG) chartered a multi-agency team effort to study how to best handle spacecraft emergency as part of cross support among network assets. The original intent is to put in place for the first time a process and guidelines to make emergency support as part of a permanent cross-support capability between space agencies. From the perspective of space communications service providers, a few key issues, common to all agencies, concerning the Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support (SECS) have been explored. They are: context of emergency support, provision of emergency support under a cross-support agreement, provision of emergency support with no cross-support agreement, legal and liability issues, response time, support priority, services provided, sustaining emergency support capabilities, and charge for the support. The positions of the various participating agencies with respect to these issues have been collected, analyzed, and finally harmonized to form the recommended IOAG positions. A central challenge most communications service providers are facing is that since the spacecraft emergency is an unplanned critical event, it typically requires fast response to the emergency call, hence lacking an international standard process for the operational interfaces seems to exacerbate the difficulty in providing SECS. For reducing the response time, i.e. from the time of accepting a request for SECS to the readiness for support, it is recommended that a “cross-support emergency system” be established by IOAG member agencies. Along with it, the IOAG core services, just-in-time ground communications line, cross support service management (CSSM), and standard operations procedures (SOP) for operational interfaces form the basic foundation of the “cross support emergency system”. Of the above, new to the cross support conducted thus far in the IOAG community is the concept of the SOP specifically for the interfaces between the service provider and service user during the SECS. Use cases, salient features, and definition of the key operational activities/tasks relevant to the interfaces are addressed by the effort. Underpinning such a system is the availability of the RF license granted by the local authority, at national and/or regional level, for a given ground station to communicate with and track the spacecraft in emergency mode at the uplink and downlink frequencies assigned to that spacecraft. That means it is critical for the IOAG member agencies to obtain a priori all-band licenses (for the entire X-band or S-band) for some, if not all, of their ground stations that are most capable of or likely to provide SECS. It is also recommended that certain prior arrangements be made with the relevant local licensing authorities for a process that will allow expedited authorization to transmit/receive signals to/from the declared spacecraft over the declared ground stations specifically and solely for the emergency case. Our analysis of the SECS has also uncovered a few fundamental programmatic issues. Recognizing any IOAG positions reached on these issues do not necessarily lead to any binding authority, it is recommended that they, along with those key attributes of the cross support emergency system, be explicitly stated as multi-agency guidelines to guide the implementation and provision of the SECS. The paper will present the results of the working group on Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support and, in particular, its findings, products and recommendations. It will also identify the next steps of this work that may include the production of some international standards as an extension of this work, or the process to make this emergency system usable by other spacecraft operators beyond the space agencies.

Tai, Wallace S.

The IOAG Recommendations on Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support

In 2014, the Inter-agency Operations Advisory Group (IOAG) chartered a multi-agency team effort to study how to best handle spacecraft emergency as part of cross support among network assets. The original intent is to put in place for the first time a process and guidelines to make emergency support as part of a permanent cross-support capability between space agencies. From the perspective of space communications service providers, a few key issues, common to all agencies, concerning the Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support (SECS) have been explored. They are: context of emergency support, provision of emergency support under a cross-support agreement, provision of emergency support with no cross-support agreement, legal and liability issues, response time, support priority, services provided, sustaining emergency support capabilities, and charge for the support. The positions of the various participating agencies with respect to these issues have been collected, analyzed, and finally harmonized to form the recommended IOAG positions. A central challenge most communications service providers are facing is that since the spacecraft emergency is an unplanned critical event, it typically requires fast response to the emergency call, hence lacking an international standard process for the operational interfaces seems to exacerbate the difficulty in providing SECS. For reducing the response time, i.e. from the time of accepting a request for SECS to the readiness for support, it is recommended that a “cross-support emergency system” be established by IOAG member agencies. Along with it, the IOAG core services, just-in-time ground communications line, cross support service management (CSSM), and standard operations procedures (SOP) for operational interfaces form the basic foundation of the “cross support emergency system”. Of the above, new to the cross support conducted thus far in the IOAG community is the concept of the SOP specifically for the interfaces between the service provider and service user during the SECS. Use cases, salient features, and definition of the key operational activities/tasks relevant to the interfaces are addressed by the effort. Underpinning such a system is the availability of the RF license granted by the local authority, at national and/or regional level, for a given ground station to communicate with and track the spacecraft in emergency mode at the uplink and downlink frequencies assigned to that spacecraft. That means it is critical for the IOAG member agencies to obtain a priori all-band licenses (for the entire X-band or S-band) for some, if not all, of their ground stations that are most capable of or likely to provide SECS. It is also recommended that certain prior arrangements be made with the relevant local licensing authorities for a process that will allow expedited authorization to transmit/receive signals to/from the declared spacecraft over the declared ground stations specifically and solely for the emergency case. Our analysis of the SECS has also uncovered a few fundamental programmatic issues. Recognizing any IOAG positions reached on these issues do not necessarily lead to any binding authority, it is recommended that they, along with those key attributes of the cross support emergency system, be explicitly stated as multi-agency guidelines to guide the implementation and provision of the SECS. The paper will present the results of the working group on Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support and, in particular, its findings, products and recommendations. It will also identify the next steps of this work that may include the production of some international standards as an extension of this work, or the process to make this emergency system usable by other spacecraft operators beyond the space agencies.

Tai, Wallace S.

Relating Measured Component Damage to Assessed Component Reliability in Reliability Integrity Management (RIM)

There is currently no widely agreed detailed general method for licensing a novel plant incorporating novel materials (or materials being deployed in novel environments); in many such situations, there are no directly applicable engineering code cases for decision-makers (including regulators) to rely on. It may be possible to develop an approach to licensing such a plant that is based on the Reliability and Integrity Management (RIM) approach delineated in ASME BPVC Section XI Division 2. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.246, Rev.0, endorses, with conditions, the subject portion of the ASME Code. But that portion of the ASME code is written at a very high level, and there are fundamental technical challenges associated with applying it literally to licensing a real plant. In the RIM approach, applicants need to do the following (among other things): • Allocate target reliabilities to structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that collectively support the top-level plant safety and availability objectives; • Understand failure modes of those SSCs, and the degradation mechanisms that could lead to those failure modes; • Develop and propose a program of surveillances that will identify degradation prior to failure of SSCs; • Provide a means of reporting results, taking actions for anomalous or undesirable conditions, and give the regulator assurance of continued safe operations. Applying RIM in a specific case will call for advances in the state of practice of relating physical observables to functional reliability of certain component types. Except where a given level of damage corresponds to a failed (or nearly failed) state, it is not practical to establish a precise quantitative relationship between physical observables and reliability. This paper focuses on managing risk of passive component failures based on observable damage parameters. A simple approach to cumulative damage modeling will be illustrated with a view to possible use in RIM applications.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS

ACCELERATED DEPLOYMENT OF NOVEL MATERIALS BASED ON RELIABILITY INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT USING CUMULATIVE DAMAGE MODELING

There is currently no widely agreed, detailed general method for licensing a novel plant incorporating novel materials (or materials being deployed in novel environments); in many such situations, there are no directly applicable engineering code cases for decision-makers (including regulators) to rely on. This paper discusses a framework for solving this problem that is based on the Reliability and Integrity Management (RIM) approach delineated in ASME BPVC Section XI Division 2. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.246, Rev. 0, endorses, with conditions, the subject portion of the 2019 ASME Code. The proposed framework is meant to support development of a licensing case by addressing certain remaining technical challenges. The framework discussed here is compatible with the Licensing Modernization Project, but applying it in a specific case will call for advances in the state of practice, if not the state of the art. The RIM approach calls for applicants to (a) allocate reliability targets to plant structures, systems, and components (SSCs), (b) show that they are able to relate the currently observed physical condition of each SSC in the program to its failure probability well enough to determine whether the target reliability allocations are being satisfied, allowing for uncertainty related to the novelty of the materials/designs/operating environments, and (c) be able to demonstrate that the proposed program of surveillances will reliably detect unacceptable degradation of an SSC before SSC failure occurs. A modeling approach potentially applicable to item (b), based on cumulative damage modeling rather than failure rates, is briefly illustrated.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS

Digital Safety Analysis for Small Modular Nuclear Reactors (SMRs)

The licensing process for any nuclear installation generally requires the review and approval of numerous documents by a regulatory body. Alternate approaches are needed where similar nuclear installations are planned to be built and operated at multiple sites around the world. Such is the case for the deployment of small modular nuclear reactors (SMRs) under development by multiple enterprises in multiple countries. As a use case for this paper, the authors propose an alternative to the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) required by the United States Department of Energy (DOE) for the licensing of its nuclear installations. The DSA is a DOE construct that requires the review and approval of numerous documents. It includes an in-depth description of hazards, safe boundaries, and hazard controls.

Microreactors

Infrastructure and resource development needs to support a significant expansion of US nuclear capacity

In December 2023, the United States pledged at a United Nations conference to triple nuclear energy by 2050. In May of 2025 a new administration announced plans to quadruple nuclear energy by 2025, setting a new target that requires understanding the key infrastructure and resources needed to achieve large-scale deployment. This study attempts to quantify “what it takes” to deploy an additional 200 GWe of nuclear capacity. It projects demand levels for workforce, fuel, uranium mining and enrichment, waste management, supply chain, land, licensing, and water. Demand growth is also contextualized. For example, the peak number of construction workers required is approximately 215,000, a 37 % increase in the current US utility construction workforce. Up to 80,000 MT/year of mined uranium will be needed, necessitating a 60-fold increase in US mining production or a doubling of global mining if sourced externally. Advanced reactor fuels, uranium mining, and nuclear-grade equipment production would need substantial expansion. Operational workforce, enrichment needs, and licensing submissions also face significant increases. Although water consumption may see relatively lower increases, securing water rights poses unique challenges. This study consolidates various demand metrics in a broad context, highlighting the necessity of early preparations, such as workforce training, to support a tripling of nuclear energy. While it outlines the demand-side requirements, it does not assess the difficulties of ramping up or other supply-side issues. The findings also shed light on the impact of reactor size and reactor technology on various demand metrics.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY

A mechanistic, multiscale model for predicting Pd penetration in TRISO fuels using BISON

TRistructural ISOtropic (TRISO) particles use silicon carbide (SiC) as the primary structural member and barrier against metallic fission product (FP) release. palladiums (PDs), produced by fission in the fuel kernel, can diffuse to and chemically interact with the SiC layer, degrading its structural integrity and ability to contain radioactive FPs. Existing temperature-dependent correlations for predicting Pd penetration rely on experimental data with significant scatter due to varying conditions, potentially complicating ongoing fuel qualification and licensing efforts for advanced reactors that would subject TRISO fuels to operating conditions outside of those examined in the experiments. A mechanistic model of Pd production, transport, and reaction is developed in this work to better understand and predict PD attack of SiC in TRISO particles. molecular dynamicss (MDs) simulations are utilized to calculate the Pd diffusivity in SiC grain bulk and grain boundaries. A mesoscale phase-field diffusion model, informed by the MD diffusivities, is used to develop a reduced order model (ROM) for the effect of SiC microstructure on the Pd penetration rate. The engineering scale BISON model calculates Pd production and transport, utilizing the ROM to predict penetration rates consistent with experimental data. This novel mechanistic ROM captures the effect of temperature, microstructure, and irradiation history on Pd penetration. In conclusion, these new capabilities are expected to support ongoing qualification and licensing efforts associated with near-term TRISO-fueled reactor applications.

11 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS

Author Correction: A universal language for finding mass spectrometry data patterns

Correction to: Nature Methodshttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41592-025-02660-z, published online 12 May 2025. This article was originally published under standard Springer Nature license (© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature America, Inc.). It is now available as an open-access paper under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license, © The Author(s). The error has been corrected in the HTML and PDF versions of the article.

Damiani, Tito

RASPA3

RASPA3, a molecular simulation code for computing adsorption and diffusion in nanoporous materials and thermodynamic and transport properties of fluids. It implements force field based classical Monte Carlo/molecular dynamics in various ensembles. RASPA3 is rewritten from the ground up in C++23 with speed and code readability in mind. Transition-matrix Monte Carlo is added to compute the density of states and free energies. The Monte Carlo code for rigid molecules is based on quaternions, and the atomic positions needed in the energy evaluation are recreated from the center of mass position and quaternion orientation. The expanded ensemble methodology for fractional molecules, with a scaling parameter λ between 0 and 1, now also keeps track of analytic expressions of dU/dλ, allowing independent verification of the chemical potential using thermodynamic integration. The source code is freely available under the MIT license on GitHub.

Dubbeldam, David

An Evaluation and Qualification of U.S.-Based Research Reactors for Irradiation Capabilities Supporting Advanced Nuclear Systems

Irradiation experiments are a prerequisite for evaluating nuclear reactor system designs, analyzing the performance of these systems, and obtaining licenses. Likewise, irradiation facilities are necessary for producing the radioisotopes used in industrial and medical applications. Recent developments in modeling and simulation capabilities and advancements in computational resources have further enabled the design of irradiation experiments for evaluating radiation-induced phenomena and determining nuclear fuel, material, and system design and safety criteria pertaining to both normal and accident scenarios. These computational tools and models require comprehensive experimental datasets acquired under prototypic radiation conditions—for exploring material and system performance under the uniquely harsh environments found in nuclear reactors—to enable verification and validation for qualification and licensing purposes. However, qualification of irradiation experimental facilities, primarily research and test reactors (RTRs), necessitates that their performance be evaluated based on the irradiation environment (e.g. flux, power, testing capabilities) using an appropriate scoring matrix. Although many university campus RTRs are available for research and development (R&D) activities and initiatives, this study focuses on evaluating and qualifying the irradiation facilities (mostly RTRs) within the United States that are suitable for advanced nuclear fuel, material, and system irradiation experiments aimed at establishing operational-performance limits and informing component and fuel designs so as to improve operational efficiencies and mitigate proliferation vulnerabilities, as well as for radioisotope production aimed at multipurpose applications. As a result, the findings of the present study support the acceleration of nuclear fuel and material qualifications, thus hastening new and advanced nuclear energy system demonstrations and radioisotope production efforts by using extended R&D.

irradiation experiment

SetGo: Metadata Readiness for Scientific AI Datasets

Scientific datasets intended for AI use require both computational readiness for model training and metadata readiness for discovery, sharing, and reuse. The Readiness Engine for Data Integration (REDI) addresses computational readiness, but no corresponding tool evaluates whether a dataset’s metadata are sufficiently complete, governed, and standards-compliant for publication and agent-based consumption. Existing FAIR assessors operate only on published repository records, and no single system covers FAIR compliance, licensing, provenance, governance, reproducibility, and catalog readiness together. We present SetGo, an open-source Python toolkit that assesses and repairs metadata readiness across these six dimensions before a dataset is published or archived. Applied to four scientific corpora, SetGo surfaces deficiencies that general-purpose tools do not detect: ERA5 climate metadata scores 4% on ACDD 1.3 compliance; materials datasets fail OPTIMADE species-definition requirements; and PDB-derived proteomics data carries licensing terms incompatible with standard SPDX identifiers. Guided enrichment raises overall FAIR scores from 52–57% to 81–91%, and a single setgo publish command pushes to Hugging Face Hub, CKAN, or OpenMetadata with ML Commons Croissant 1.0 metadata sidecars. To support interactive and automated workflows, SetGo integrates with coding agents powered by large language models (LLMs) through a /setgo skill that enables natural-language execution of the full assess–enrich–publish loop, with user involvement limited to supplying missing metadata values.

Wilkinson, Sean [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000214437479)

pnnl-predictive-phenomics/csc052cyc

Using the genome annotation as input, Pathway-tools generates a database containing all the information that can be inferred from the genome. The Pathway/Genome database (PGDB) can subsequently be curated manually Licensed under the CC-BY-4.0 license

Zucker, Jeremy [Pacific Northwest National Laborat