NASA's Human System Risk Management Needs Based Implementation of Space Health Innovation
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A quantitative risk assessment system (QRAS) builds a risk model of a system for which risk of failure is being assessed, then analyzes the risk of the system corresponding to the risk model. The QRAS performs sensitivity analysis of the risk model by altering fundamental components and quantifications built into the risk model, then re-analyzes the risk of the system using the modifications. More particularly, the risk model is built by building a hierarchy, creating a mission timeline, quantifying failure modes, and building/editing event sequence diagrams. Multiplicities, dependencies, and redundancies of the system are included in the risk model. For analysis runs, a fixed baseline is first constructed and stored. This baseline contains the lowest level scenarios, preserved in event tree structure. The analysis runs, at any level of the hierarchy and below, access this baseline for risk quantitative computation as well as ranking of particular risks. A standalone Tool Box capability exists, allowing the user to store application programs within QRAS.
NASA's risk classification system dates back to an era when every new NASA space mission was a one-of-a-kind build, and the only way to obtain reliability was as a by-product through a combination of reliability analyses, extensive and stringent quality requirements, and extensive testing. Originally, there were very limited commercial capabilities to develop systems to work reliably in space, so NASA considered its own homegrown approach the only recipe for success. This approach involved very detailed and prescriptive piece-part controls and no reliance on (and to some extent a rejection of) any type of commercial practices. Often risk was considered to be the lowest when NASA had the maximum amount of control and prescription, and the highest when commercial practices were largely employed, and these principles drove risk classification in the agency. Over time, however, commercial capabilities grew, and many products became standardized and commercialized, while the agency maintained its tried-and-true approach, paying little attention to the evolution of the commercial sector. In fact, the commercial sector was developing systems that have direct, proven reliability, established over time, while NASA still maintained the approach to ignore the reality of the commercialized aspects of standard products, label them as high risk, and attempt to change them to align with the agency's piece-part control practices. A table of mission classification vs lifetime for missions launched after 2000 indicates no correlation between lifetime and classification, with the few exceptions involving missions that have very limited objectives and no valid purpose to continue after they were met. This paper steps through some of the key historical elements in risk classification and NASA's overall approach to assurance, and presents some elements being brought forward to modernize the approach and take advantage of the growing capability in the commercial sector.
BACKGROUND NASA’s human exploration spaceflight missions to the Moon and Mars present unprecedented challenges for in-mission medical care. A greater distance from Earth will mean increased mission durations, communication delays, limited to no resupply opportunities, and constraints on the evacuation of ill or injured crew. Mass, volume, and power will be limited while higher demands will be placed on the crews to manage medical events. NASA’s Moon to Mars exploration strategy outlines increasingly complex Artemis missions both in terms of duration and operations. In these more challenging deep space missions, it is important to quantitatively estimate the human system risk attributable to medical conditions and use these estimates to advance medical system design. METHODS IMPACT (Informing Mission Planning via Analysis of Complex Tradespaces) is a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and tradespace analysis tool developed by NASA to advance exploration mission medical system design. IMPACT v1.0 includes a novel evidence library baselined to exploration environments; an expanded list of 119 medical conditions; a large increase in the number of medical resources and the flexibility of their use; and the ability for rapid and iterative analysis. Medical system risk estimates include loss of crew life, consideration of the need for return to definitive care (medical evacuation), and an estimate of crew time affected due to medical conditions. A notional long duration lunar orbit and lunar surface design reference mission (DRM) was chosen with a 4-astronaut crew to mimic a foundational exploration Artemis mission. The DRM profile includes outbound transit on Orion, Gateway space station rendezvous in lunar orbit, 6 months on the Lunar surface with extravehicular activity (EVA), return rendezvous with Gateway, and transit back to Earth. RESULTS/DISCUSSION: Overall, IMPACT successfully quantified medical risk and derived an optimal medical system to support crew on a long duration lunar mission. In this DRM, the calculated loss of crew life from a medical event was 0.008 events per mission, risk of potential need for evacuation was 0.30 events per mission, and cumulative crew time affected by medical conditions was 103 days. The medical conditions that most contributed to medical risk were decompression sickness, trauma, and respiratory failure. The conditions that had the largest effects on crew performance included musculoskeletal injuries and lunar dust exposure. The IMPACT-generated medical system included resources that target the most common and highest risk conditions and performed as expected. This demonstrates the value of the IMPACT tool in medical system design for human exploration spaceflight missions.
Redundancy verification of parallel systems related to element MTBF and decision maker perspective involving acceptance risk of system failure
Phased‐approach for implementation of risk management is necessary. Risk management system will be simple, accessible and promote communication of information to all relevant stakeholders for optimal resource allocation and risk mitigation. Risk management should be used by all team members to manage risks - not just risk office personnel. Each group/department is assigned Risk Integrators who are facilitators for effective risk management. Risks will be managed at the lowest‐level feasible, elevate only those risks that require coordination or management from above. Risk informed decision making should be introduced to all levels of management. Provide necessary checks and balances to insure that risks are caught/identified and dealt with in a timely manner. Many supporting tools, processes & training must be deployed for effective risk management implementation. Process improvement must be included in the risk processes.
NASA's exploration roadmap is focused on developing technologies and performing precursor missions to advance the state of the art for eventual human missions to Mars. One of the key components of this roadmap is various robotic missions to Near-Earth Objects, the Moon, and Mars to fill in some of the strategic knowledge gaps. The Resource Prospector (RP) project is one of these robotic precursor activities in the roadmap. RP is a multi-center and multi-institution project to investigate the polar regions of the Moon in search of volatiles. The mission is rated Class D and is approximately 10 days, assuming a five day direct Earth to Moon transfer. Because of the mission cost constraint, a trade study of the propulsion concepts was conducted with a focus on available low-cost hardware for reducing cost in development, while technical risk, system mass, and technology advancement requirements were also taken into consideration. The propulsion system for the lander is composed of a braking stage providing a high thrust to match the lander's velocity with the lunar surface and a lander stage performing the final lunar descent. For the braking stage, liquid oxygen (LOX) and liquid methane (LCH4) propulsion systems, derived from the Morpheus experimental lander, and storable bi-propellant systems, including the 4th stage Peacekeeper (PK) propulsion components and Space Shuttle orbital maneuvering engine (OME), and a solid motor were considered for the study. For the lander stage, the trade study included miniaturized Divert Attitude Control System (DACS) thrusters (Missile Defense Agency (MDA) heritage), their enhanced thruster versions, ISE-100 and ISE-5, and commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware. The lowest cost configuration of using the solid motor and the PK components while meeting the requirements was selected. The reference concept of the lander is shown in Figure 1. In the current reference configuration, the solid stage is the primary provider of delta-V. It will generate 15,000-lbf of thrust with a single burn of ~ 80's seconds. The lander stage is a bi-propellant, pressure-regulated, pulsing liquid propulsion system to perform all other functions.
The NASA Human System Risk Board (HSRB) is responsible for tracking the evolution of the top ~30 human system risks identified to be associated with human spaceflight. As part of this process, the Board is charged with maintaining a consistent, integrated process to evaluate those risks and developing evidence-based risk posture recommendations. Risks are ranked by likelihood and consequence. Intermediate causal relationships between risk contributing factors and countermeasures that link hazards to outcomes are described using Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs). The DAGs are also useful for identifying common factors and countermeasures across the top 30 risks as well as communicating how astronaut exposure to spaceflight hazards leads to meaningful mission-level health and performance outcomes. One of the top risks tracked by the HSRB is The Risk of Adverse Outcomes Due to Inadequate Human-Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA). This risk captures the possibility that due to decreasing real-time ground support during missions beyond LEO, crew will be unable to adequately respond to unanticipated critical malfunctions or detect safety-critical procedural errors. The HSIA risk is ranked red (high) for Lunar surface and Mars missions due to the probability of Loss of Crew and Loss of Mission consequences. This paper describes the evidence that supports the HSIA risk ranking and presents the central narrative of the HSIA risk DAG-- i.e., anomaly detection, diagnosis, intervention, and task performance. Characterizations of the current state of practice for each of the DAG’s central nodes and the future tools needed for successful anomaly response are provided.
FEAT, a software system for evaluating risks, was developed by Lockheed and later enhanced under NASA funding. FEAT uses directed graph - or digraph - models to provide information on cause and effect if a set of failure events occurs. James Miller, the program designer at Lockheed, formed DiGraphics, Inc. to market the software that has evolved from FEAT. The Diquest Analyzer, the company's flagship product, assists product designers in identifying the redundancies and weaknesses of a system. The software has applications in the chemical industry for risk assessment, design evaluation, and change management. Additional markets have been found in operations monitoring diagnostics and training of new personnel.