Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Operations Security”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 541 records · Page 30

The Meaning of Risk for Safety, Security, and Safeguards in the Design of Advanced Nuclear Reactors

What is the meaning of risk as it applies to the design of advanced reactors in the disciplines of safety, security, and safeguards? How can we find common terminology for the concept of risk and how can we find interfaces between these disciplines? These are important questions that should be explored in order that they may be applied in an integrated manner for the most effective and efficient design approaches. Eliminating or minimizing risks is a key design driver that motivates and informs the development of nuclear reactors. For safety, risk is well understood and applied in Probabilistic Risk Assessments. For security, the risk-based concepts of vulnerability assessments and vital areas are all considered in designing security systems. For safeguards, the concept of risk is not formally defined, as it relates to the design and operation of nuclear reactors. International nuclear safeguards seek to reduce the risk of proliferation in the nuclear fuel cycle and as such the concept of risk does exist. Therefore, the current understanding of the “3S’ approach, which seeks to find the interfaces and conflicts between safety, security, and safeguards requires a thorough understanding of the role that the reduction of risk plays in all three disciplines. The intersection of risk for safety and security is now being developed as there is a strong correlation between reactor design and operations and their vulnerability to sabotage. The intersection of risk for security and safeguards has to date chiefly been focused on the nuclear material control and accounting systems, which are relied on by both the operator (State) and the IAEA. This paper explores the concept of risk in each of the three disciplines, how they interact, potential conflicts and interfaces , how these might be addressed and leveraged, and a notional framework for how this could be achieved.

Kovacic, Donald N↗

Monitoring Operational States of a Nuclear Reactor Using Seismoacoustic Signatures and Machine Learning

Monitoring nuclear reactors is an important safety and security task with growing requirements. We explore the possibility of using seismic and acoustic data for inferring the power level of an operating reactor. Continuous data recorded at a single seismoacoustic station that is located about 50 m away from a research reactor was visualized and analyzed. The data show a clear correlation between seismoacoustic features and reactor main operational states. We designed a workflow that includes two machine learning (ML) models to classify the reactor operational states (OFF, transition, and ON) and estimate reactor power levels (10%, 30%, 50%, 70%, and 90%). We applied and compared five ML algorithms for the reactor OFF-transition-ON and four approaches for the power level classification. We also compared the performance of ML models trained with seismic-only, acoustic-only, and both types of data. Five-fold cross validations were implemented to assure a thorough evaluation of the model performances. Additionally, the results show the extreme boosting gradient algorithm worked best for the first model, whereas random forests performed best for the second model. Combining seismic and acoustic data leads to better performance than using a single type of data. Seismic data contributed more than acoustic data for both models. We reached an accuracy of 0.98 for reactor OFF and ON. The accuracies for the transition state and power levels are less optimal with a minimum accuracy of 0.66. However, our results suggest seismic and acoustic data contain useful information about the transition state as well as power levels. Seismic and acoustic data could be integrated with other observations to improve monitoring performance.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Contentious narratives and disinformation about nuclear weapons in strategic deterrence and competition: A SOCOM perspective. Part of Section: United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in Emerging Strategic & Geopolitical Challenges: Operational Implications for US Combatant Commands

Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine demonstrates the challenge for strategic deterrence and competition of countering contentious narratives and disinformation about weapons of mass destruction (WMD) during conventional regional wars against a nucleararmed adversary. Moscow uses both tailored, contentious narratives and targeted disinformation about WMD in Ukraine to influence and disrupt local and global perceptions in support of its deterrence and competition objectives vis-à-vis the United States and NATO. Since December 2021, Moscow has made a focal point of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons in its efforts to establish a permissive environment for its military buildup on the border with Ukraine and then its military intervention. These information tactics also demonstrate an opportunity for US Special Operations Forces (SOF). They are a case study for considering how SOF can contribute to strategic deterrence and competition objectives, specifically countering adversary gray-zone information efforts to alter regional security orders.1 Such a role is in line with the 2022 Special Operations Forces Vision and Strategy, which provides a framework for the evolution of SOF into “a force capable of creating strategic, asymmetric advantages for the nation as a key contributor of integrated deterrence” (United States Special Operations Command, 2022). This paper briefly examines this strategic challenge and SOF opportunity, focusing narrowly on the distinction between contentious narratives and disinformation about nuclear weapons and the role of SOF in countering these gray-zone information tactics. The nuclear dimension of Moscow’s contentious narratives and disinformation in the “special military operation” is of particular interest because it demonstrates the distinction between strategic efforts to influence and disrupt local and global perceptions in Moscow’s favor. This distinction between influence and disruption is less clear with Russia’s contentious narratives and disinformation about chemical and biological weapons in Ukraine, as disinformation about these two types of WMD appears to overwhelm contentious narratives. We believe this distinction is useful for policymakers and warfighters responsible for countering gray-zone information tactics because it provides a framework for crafting tailored responses to contentious narratives and disinformation about nuclear weapons and other WMD. The chapter concludes with a discussion of efforts that could be undertaken by SOF in cooperation with other relevant stakeholders to address this aspect of adversary gray-zone information tactics.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Considerations when Implementing Shift Work in Nuclear Operations

Many domestic and international nuclear facilities have processes that require personnel to work on some type of shift. Shift work has many different schedules such as night, morning, swing, and rotating shift. Some common shifts are DuPont, Pitman, and Panama. There are many psychological and physiological impacts to a person working shifts. These impacts can affect work performance, safety, and security within an organization. A well-established nuclear organization relies on a strong security culture that implements a trustworthiness or reliability program. The IAEA defines this type of program as individuals meeting the highest standards of reliability, trustworthiness, and physical and mental suitability. Psychological and physiological impacts that apply to a Trustworthiness Program are reliability (an individual’s ability to adhere to security and safety rules and regulations) and physical and mental suitability. If shift work isn’t properly implemented in Facility Operations, then several issues or human factors can arise. An employee that suffers from a poorly designed shift, gets overworked, or doesn’t have the proper rest period implemented, may suffer from shift work disorder, acute fatigue, or cumulative fatigue. Introducing fatigue into Facility Operations can have severe consequences to security, safety, production, and cost. Another challenge of shiftwork within a facility is laziness and complacency. Creating an atmosphere where the employee is willing to admit fatigue to his or her supervisor is a challenge. It is up to the organization to do the needed research on shift work and to implement the best shift for their facility and personnel.

Stockwell, Brandon↗

Crystal growth, scintillation properties & fast neutron-gamma discrimination of cubic halide perovskite CsCaCl 3 :(Eu 2+ , Tl + )

The vast variety of nuclear security applications require radiation detection materials tailored to their operational needs. A scintillator’s properties are strongly influenced by the choice of luminescent dopant, which facilitates customization to different applications. In this work, transparent Ø12 mm single crystals of undoped CsCaCl 3 , CsCaCl 3 :1% Eu, CsCaCl 3 :1% Tl, and CsCaCl 3 :1% Eu, 1% Tl were grown via the Vertical Bridgman method. Their scintillation properties and fast neutron-gamma discrimination capabilities were investigated. Undoped CsCaCl 3 had a light yield of 2,500 ph/MeV, which is the highest reported to date for this CVL material. The incorporation of Eu 2+ or Tl + into CsCaCl 3 as luminescence centers resulted in significantly higher light yields of ∼16,000 ph/MeV and energy resolutions of ∼8% at 662 keV. Compared to the single dopant counterparts, CsCaCl 3 :Eu, Tl had significantly suppressed afterglow; however, this came at the cost of reduced light yield. Among the materials tested, only CsCaCl 3 :Tl showed effective fast neutron and gamma discrimination capabilities, achieving a Figure of Merit of 3.2 between gamma-rays and fast neutron captures that produce protons and 1.6 between gamma-rays and fast neutron captures that produce alpha particles.

crystal growth↗

Deploying Software-Defined Networking in Operational Technology Environments

Software Defined Networking for Operational Technologies, referred to as OT-SDN, is a leading technology to secure critical infrastructure and command and control (C2) systems. As the name implies, OT-SDN networks are programmable, which allows system owners to utilize the characteristics of their physical process to inform the security of their network. There are best practices for deploying OT-SDN into an environment, whether it is all at once or over time (hybrid) that the network is converted to SDN technologies. Through the development of data mining tools and standardized process control, OT-SDN can be deployed reliably. These tools will minimize or eliminate any communication failures during the transition and provide the network owner with complete documentation of their environment. This documentation could enable or facilitate the network owner to pass any audits or policy checks (Authority to Operate) before being allowed to utilize the OT-SDN infrastructure.

Software Defined Networking, Operational Technolog↗

Enhancing Reliability of Classified Shipments Between the Nuclear Security Enterprise

The extent of this project, as related to by the Nuclear Security Enterprise (NSE), is related to the current shipping and logistical issues and optimization opportunities between several different NSE sites that are the basis of the enterprise. This current scope is part of every site’s, described as Design Agency (DA) and Production Agency (PA), normal operation to meet the needs and mission of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The NSE has a broad mission scope encompassing several differing DA and PA sites to meet the NNSA’s mission. These sites require frequent interaction and shipments of material and items between one another in order to meet the mission needs of the enterprise. Currently, there is no methodology that integrates schedules, standards, orders, processes, and best practices to optimize transfers between the differing sites. A centralized location and standard shipping process will optimize and improve the systems behavior, reducing lag time and increasing throughput at sites today. Ultimately this project proposes a central logistical platform, tiered escalation process, and standardized shipping forms to reduce taxpayer costs to meet the NSE’s mission more efficiently. This increase in processing logistics and process accuracy of shipments will save the NSE, not only from a monetary value, but it will reduce the frustrations of individuals working these outdated and over processed systems to improve their quality of life.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

MetaHeart: Metasurface enabled biometrics camouflage

Privacy-invading biometrics monitoring is becoming a prominent security threat as modern sensing systems move to higher operating frequencies (mmWave, sub-THz), increasing sensing resolution and accuracy. As such, developing systems that can protect or obfuscate biometrics from adversarial intrusion becomes pivotal to preserving user privacy. In this work, we develop and implement MetaHeart, a real-time biometrics misinformation system based on reflective, programmable metasurfaces and dynamic phase-front manipulation of radar inferences. MetaHeart’s key goal is to prevent the leakage of a legitimate user’s heartbeat biometrics by spoofing fake heartbeat signals at a malicious, radar-equipped, heart rate sensing intruder. Furthermore, we experimentally demonstrate MetaHeart’s ability to fake Alice’s presence when she is not there and to fool Trudy’s inferences even when Alice is present, achieving an overall accuracy above 98%. Finally, we conduct a robustness analysis to determine MetaHeart’s required spatial placement within the intruder’s monitoring area that would allow for effective spoofing.

77 NANOSCIENCE AND NANOTECHNOLOGY↗

Deep Learning enabled spectral energy conversion for in situ exposure measurements

A detector-specific deep learning (DL) approach is presented for spectra-to-exposure conversion using large-format sodium iodide (NaI(Tl)) detectors deployed for in situ environmental radiation measurements in emergency response scenarios. Accurate determination of exposure from NaI spectra is challenging due to poor energy resolution, partial energy absorption, and the strong sensitivity of traditionally deployed analytical conversion methods to calibrated source geometry and pre-deployment assumptions. Here, to address these limitations, a multi-layer perceptron model was trained on a hybrid in situ /Monte Carlo dataset constructed to span a broad range of photon energies, spatial extents, and realistic deployment variability, representative of general in situ emergency response conditions. The DL model was evaluated against commonly fielded analytical approaches under matched simulation conditions, including a single-factor method, a G-function method, and a modeled pressurized ion chamber (PIC) baseline. This study was intentionally computational in scope to enable controlled, like-for-like comparisons between conversion techniques while minimizing confounding real-world variability. Comparison to the modeled PIC provides contextual benchmarking and is not intended as a field inter-comparison with deployed instruments. Across the evaluated 20 keV to 3 MeV energy range, the DL approach consistently exhibited higher accuracy and reduced variance relative to the analytical methods against a deterministically calculated exposure. This may indicate improved robustness to spectral complexity without reliance on source-, geometric-, or spectral region-specific optimization. While results do not represent real-world validation, the presented work demonstrates that deep learning may effectively learn the nonlinear detector response-to-exposure relationship for asymmetric NaI(Tl) detectors and offers a promising pathway for improving in situ exposure estimation using spectroscopic systems already integrated into initial real-time emergency response operations.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Flow Reactor Study of the Soot Precursors of Novel Cycloalkanes as Synthetic Jet Fuel Compounds: Octahydroindene, p -Menthane, and 1,4-Dimethylcyclooctane

Sustainable aviation fuels (SAFs) or Synthetic aviation turbine fuels (SATFs) derived from nonpetroleum sources are essential for energy security and a strong rural and agricultural economy. Airplanes operating on SAF can have lower particle emissions compared to those of conventional jet fuel, reducing air quality impacts near airports. Processing biobased isoprene or wood and agricultural waste can produce cycloalkane-rich fuels with properties meeting ASTM International’s SATF requirements. The unique structures of these cycloalkanes yield lower soot emissions because of their lack of aromatic rings. We measured the soot formation tendency as yield sooting index (YSI) and used laminar flow reactor experiments to evaluate soot precursors formed for isoprene-derived compounds p-menthane and 1,4-dimethylcyclooctane (DMCO), and octahydroindene (OHI)─ produced from woody biomass via catalytic fast pyrolysis. The combustion chemistry of the OHI and DMCO has not been previously studied. Experiments were conducted at 10 bar from 800 to 1200 K, equivalence ratios of 1.0 and 3.0, and residence times of 1.0 and 0.6 s, respectively. Experimentally detected species were used to elucidate the mechanisms of soot precursor formation. OHI exhibited the highest YSI (94.5) and formed a high concentration of benzene primarily by direct dehydrogenation of the six-membered ring. p-Menthane (YSI 92.0) and DMCO (YSI 85.0) oxidation products included fewer aromatic components but higher benzene precursors, including 1,3-butadiene, propyne, and allene. This suggests that the ring-opening pathway is dominant over the dehydrogenation pathway in the benzene formation for these compounds. This experimental speciation provides insight into the influence of the cycloalkane structure on the sooting tendencies of potential SAF blend components, thereby aiding in fuel design processes.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗

GridSTIX

SF-25-112 Grid-STIX is a comprehensive extension of the STIX (Structured Threat Information Expression) 2.1 ontology specifically designed for electrical grid cybersecurity applications. This ontology provides a standardized, machine-readable framework for modeling grid assets, operational technology devices, threats, vulnerabilities, supply chain risks, and security relationships in electrical power systems. ## Key Features - **Comprehensive Grid Coverage**: Physical assets, OT devices, grid components, sensors, and energy storage systems - **Zero Trust Architecture**: Policy decision points, enforcement points, trust brokers, and continuous monitoring - **AMI Infrastructure**: Advanced metering networks, head-end systems, mesh gateways, and MDM systems - **Advanced Security Modeling**: Attack patterns, vulnerabilities, mitigations, and supply chain risks - **Critical Grid Relationships**: Power flow, protection, control, and synchronization relationships - **Supply Chain Security**: Supplier modeling, country of origin tracking, and risk assessment - **Protocol Support**: DNP3, Modbus, IEC 61850, IEC 60870-5-104, OPC-UA, and IEEE standards - **Python Code Generation**: Automated STIX-compliant Python class generation from ontologies - **Interactive Visualization**: Enhanced HTML network graphs with grid-specific categorization - **STIX 2.1 Compliance**: Full compatibility with STIX threat intelligence ecosystem

Blakely, Benjamin [Argonne National Laboratory (AN↗

Innovative Science, Technology, and Engineering Addressing the Nation's Most Challenging Problems

The Laboratory has four strategic objectives: nuclear security; mission-focused science, technology, and engineering; mission operations; and community relations. To accomplish our mission, excellence in all areas is our objective — we call that simultaneous excellence. To achieve simultaneous excellence, we apply the Safe Conduct of Research principles, an essential part of our strategy.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

MELCOR Accident Progression and Source Term Demonstration Calculations for a Heat Pipe Reactor

MELCOR is an integrated thermal hydraulics, accident progression, and source term code for reactor safety analysis that has been developed at Sandia National Laboratories for the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) since the early 1980s. Though MELCOR originated as a light water reactor (LWR) code, development and modernization efforts have expanded its application scope to includ e non-LWR reactor concepts. Current MELCOR development efforts include providing the NRC with the analytical capabilities to support regulatory readiness for licensing non-LWR techno logies under Strategy 2 of the NRC?s near- term Implementation Action Plans. Beginning with the Next Generation Nuclear Project (NGNP), MELCOR has undergone a range of enha ncements to provide analytical capabilities for modeling the spectrum of advanced non-LWR concepts. This report describes the generic plant model developed to demonstrate MELCOR capabilities to perform heat pipe reactor (HPR) safety evaluations. The generic plant mode l is based on a publicly-available Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Megapower design as modified in the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Design A description. For plant aspects (e.g., reactor building size and leak rate) that are not described in the LANL and INL references , the analysts made assumptions needed to construct a MELCOR full-plant model. The HP R uses high assay, low-enrichment uranium (HALEU) fuel with steel cladding that uses heat pipes to transfer heat to a secondary Brayton air cycle. The core region is surrounded by a stainless-steel shroud, alumina reflector, core barrel and boron carbide neutron shield. The reactor is secured inside a below-grade cavity, with the operating floor located above the cavity. Example calculations are performed to show the plant response and MELCOR capabilities to characterize a range of accident conditions. The accidents selected for evaluation consider a range of degraded and failed modes of operation for key safety functions providing re activity control, the primary and secondary system heat removal, and the effectiveness of th e confinement natural circulation flow into the reactor cavity (i.e., a flow blockage).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Security Evaluation of Smart Cards and Secure Tokens: Benefits and Drawbacks for Reducing Supply Chain Risks of Nuclear Power Plants

The supply chain attack pathway is being increasingly used by adversaries to bypass security controls and gain unauthorized access to sensitive networks and equipment (e.g., Critical Digital Assets). Cyber-attacks targeting supply chain generally aim to compromise the environments, products, or services of vendors and suppliers to inject, add, or substitute authentic software and hardware with malicious elements. These malicious elements are deemed to be authentic as they arise from the vendor or supplier (i.e., the supply chain). This research aims to leverage findings and assumptions made from the previous report to determine the security benefits and drawbacks of a smart card- based hardware root of trust. Smart cards can provide devices inside Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) with a secure environment to store keys in and perform sensitive operations such as digital signature generation. These abilities can be leveraged to increase supply chain cybersecurity by autonomously providing NPP Licensees with reports on device integrity, authenticity and measurements of executable and non-executable data.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator: Cohort 2 - runZero Public Report

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) sponsors the Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator™ (CECA) to expedite the deployment of emerging security technologies that address the most urgent security concerns facing modern and future electric grids. CECA Cohort 2 assessed solutions focused on hidden risks due to incomplete system visibility and device security and configuration. Improving visibility can be achieved through operational technology (OT) asset identification solutions, including capabilities like automatic discovery, vulnerability reporting, and configuration monitoring. Solutions that monitor and identify assets in information technology (IT) networks in other domains are widely used; however, there is far less adoption of monitoring solutions for operational technology environments. Wider adoption may increase with increased confidence in the ability for these solutions to understand and respond to the specific requirements of OT environments. CECA Cohort 2 evaluated the active and passive asset discovery capabilities of market-ready solutions, documented and analyzed results, and identified gaps in functionality or capabilities. This report and describes how these results can help advance the adoption of these and similar solutions in the electric sector.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Design of Defensive Cybersecurity Architectures for High Temperature, Gas-Cooled Reactors

This report presents the design of defensive cybersecurity architectures (DCSAs) for High Temperature, Gas-Cooled Reactors (HTGRs). A DCSA is a cybersecurity design feature that places systems into security zones in a graded approach according to the importance of the functions performed by the systems. DCSA design efforts for advanced reactors may commence as early as the system-level design phase. This design approach is consistent with the draft regulatory guide for advanced reactor cybersecurity programs (DG-5075) and enables advanced reactor designers to consider the effects of security-by-design (SeBD) features on their DCSAs. Integration of DCSA design and other cybersecurity activities with the traditional design process as part of a SeBD framework may enable advanced reactor designers to improve the security posture of their plants while reducing implementation and operating costs. This report provides a DCSA template for an exemplar HTGR and describes a DCSA design process using event tree analysis so that the template may be optimized for a given HTGR design.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator: Cohort 2 - Asimily Public Report

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) sponsors the Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator (TM) (CECA) to expedite the deployment of emerging security technologies that address the most urgent security concerns facing modern and future electric grids. CECA Cohort 2 assessed solutions focused on hidden risks due to incomplete system visibility and device security and configuration. Improving visibility can be achieved through operational technology (OT) asset identification solutions, including capabilities like automatic discovery, vulnerability reporting, and configuration monitoring. Solutions that monitor and identify assets in information technology (IT) networks in other domains are widely used; however, there is far less adoption of monitoring solutions for operational technology environments. Wider adoption may increase with increased confidence in the ability for these solutions to understand and respond to the specific requirements of OT environments. CECA Cohort 2 evaluated the active and passive asset discovery capabilities of market-ready solutions, documented and analyzed results, and identified gaps in functionality or capabilities. This report and describes how these results can help advance the adoption of these and similar solutions in the electric sector.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Design of Defensive Cybersecurity Architectures for Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactors

This report presents the design of defensive cybersecurity architectures (DCSAs) for Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactors (SFRs). A DCSA is a cybersecurity design feature that places systems into security zones in a graded approach according to the importance of the functions performed by the systems. DCSA design efforts for advanced reactors may commence as early as the system-level design phase. This design approach is consistent with the draft regulatory guide for advanced reactor cybersecurity programs (DG-5075) and enables advanced reactor designers to consider the effects of security-by design (SeBD) features on their DCSAs. Integration of DCSA design and other cybersecurity activities with the traditional design process as part of a SeBD framework may enable advanced reactor designers to improve the security posture of their plants while reducing implementation and operating costs. This report provides a DCSA template for an exemplar SFR and how the template may be optimized for a given SFR design.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗